


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THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

EDITED BY

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

*Member of the Institute of International Law
Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari Libri III

BY BALTHAZAR AYALA

Jurisconsult and Judge Advocate General of the Royal Army in the Low Countries

EDITED BY JOHN WESTLAKE, LL. D., D. C. L., K. C.

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VOL. I. Reproduction of the First Edition, with Introduction
 by John Westlake.

VOL. II. Translation of the Text, by John Pawley Bate, with
 Translator's Note and Index of Citations.

TO VIND
ANDREW LEO

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PREFACE.

The Carnegie Institution of Washington has undertaken the republication of the leading classics of International Law and the present volume, edited by the distinguished publicist Professor John Westlake, is the second of a comprehensive series.

The grounds for including Ayala's treatise *De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari* are sufficiently set forth by Professor Westlake in his introduction. The original text is exceedingly difficult to procure and has not hitherto been translated into English. The photographic reproduction places the work within the hands of scholars of any and all countries, and the faithful and literary translation by Mr. John Pawley Bate makes its mastery an easy matter to the English-speaking world.

One reason for republishing the classics of International Law is the difficulty of procuring the texts in convenient form for scientific study; the libraries in the United States have been searched with the result that few of the earlier works were to be found. Another reason is that some of the works selected for republication have never been translated into English. The American publicist is therefore at a disadvantage in consulting works of admitted authority, and when found they are, as it were, sealed books to all but trained Latinists. The specialist is thus forced to rely upon summary statements and references to them to be found in treatises on International Law, or is driven to examine them in European Libraries, often a difficult task, while the general reader is practically barred from the stores of knowledge locked up in the earlier works on the Law of Nations. The same difficulty exists in Latin America, Japan, and in a lesser degree in many European countries.

Eminent publicists, European and American, who have been consulted as to the usefulness of the plan to republish the Classics, have indorsed the project and have pledged their personal co-operation. The works to be included in the series have not only

been approved but suggested by them, so that the undertaking is international in scope, in selection, and in execution.

The underlying principle of selection has been to reissue those works which can be said to have contributed either to the origin or to the growth of International Law and the term classic has been used in the broad rather than in the narrow sense, so that no work will be omitted which can be said to have contributed to the origin or growth of the Law of Nations. The masterpieces of Grotius will naturally be the central point in the series, but the works of his leading predecessors and successors will likewise be included. The text of each author will be reproduced photographically, so as to lay the source before the reader without the mistakes which might creep into a newly printed text. In the case of the early authors the photographed text will be accompanied by a revised text whenever that course shall seem desirable. An Introduction will be prefixed to each work, giving the necessary biographical details and stating the importance of the text and its place in International Law; tables of errata will be added, and notes deemed necessary to clear up doubts and ambiguities or to correct mistakes in the text will be supplied. Variations in successive editions of the text published in the author's lifetime will be noted, but little or nothing in the nature of historical commentary will be furnished.

Each work will be accompanied by an English version made expressly for the series by a competent translator.

It is hoped that the series will enable general readers as well as specialists to trace International Law from its faint and unconscious beginnings to its present ample proportions and to forecast with some degree of certainty its future development into that law which Mirabeau tells us will one day rule the world.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,
General Editor.

Washington, D. C., September 1, 1912.

Univ. of
California



BALTHASAR AYALA I.C. ET SENATOR
REGIVS MACHLINIENSIS.

*FeLIX IngenIo, rethor graVIs, arte dIsertVs
LIIngVIsqVe, et CLarVs IVre perlVs erat:
RegIVs In beLLo IVdeX, desCrIpIt, et iLLa
BeLLICa, qVe arqVaLI, IVra hILanCe dabat:
prInCIpIbVsqVe VIrIs gratVs, deCoratVs honoro
offICIo, seros oCCIdIt ante dIes.*

BALTHAZARUS DE ALAE

I. C. et Exercitiorum Rerumque Militarium Supplementum

De Jure et Officiis Rerumque Militarium

LIBER III

AVTHOR

JOHN WESTWICK, Esq. of the Middle Temple

*Late Secretary of the Admiralty, and
Member of the Council of the Admiralty*

Esq. of the Middle Temple

Late Member of the Privy Council, and of the Admiralty

and President of the Admiralty

Honorary Secretary of the Admiralty

VOL. III





BALTHAZARIS AYALAE
I. C. et Exercitus Regii apud Belgas Supremi Juridici
De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari
Libri III

UNIV. OF
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VOLUME ONE



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The text here reproduced was photographed from a copy of the original edition of 1582, belonging to the library at All Souls College, Oxford, and loaned to the University Press for the purpose of photographing.

The portrait of Ayala given in this volume has been reproduced by photography from one found in a volume of portraits of Belgian authors, published at Antwerp in 1608, with the title *Illustrium Galliae Belgicae Scriptorum Icones et Elogia: ex Musaeo Auberti Mirae Canonici Antwerp.*

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INTRODUCTION.

I.

AYALA; AND BOOK I, CHAPTER 1.

In a celebrated passage of the *prolegomena* or preface to his great work, § 37, Grotius mentions a number of books which he had seen, some by theologians and some by doctors of law, treating specially on the *jus belli*, an expression not adequately translatable in any short English form. Besides the laws of war, that is, the rules according to which it ought to be carried on, it includes all that relates to the place of war in a philosophical system of human life and conduct. And these predecessors he condemns, all of them because they had said so little on a very wide subject, most of them also because they had mixed up in disorderly confusion things belonging to natural, divine, state or canon law, or to the received law of nations (*jus gentium*). He goes on in § 38 to name three others who had attempted to supply what was most lacking in the first mentioned, the light thrown by history; but of these he at once dismisses Faber as not having enunciated propositions to which his citations might apply, while the other two, Balthazar Ayala and Albericus Gentilis, had referred the examples cited by them to certain propositions laid down by them. Grotius then admits his indebtedness to the industry of Gentilis, though he leaves readers to form their own judgment on the doctrinal use to which Gentilis put his collections. Of Ayala he only says—and, as we shall see, incorrectly—that he did not touch the causes for which a war is called just or unjust. If these notices do not amount to praise, at least they show that Grotius agreed with general opinion in marking Ayala and Gentilis as his two chief predecessors in what is now called international law. And in any comparison of their merits Ayala claims our sympathy and

our excuse for his shortcomings, as being the first in time. He died in 1584, the year before the publication of Gentilis's first book, *de Legationibus libri tres*. How early they both were in relation to the development of thought on their subject will be seen from the fact that it was not till 1612, after the deaths of both, that Suarez, the greatest of Grotius's predecessors in the philosophy of law, published his *Tractatus de Legibus et de Deo Legislatore*.

Balthazar de Ayala was born a subject of the Emperor Charles the Fifth, at Antwerp in 1548. His father, Don Diego de Ayala, was a native of Burgos in Spain, and had obtained the rights of citizenship at Antwerp in 1531-1532. His mother was the daughter of Charles de Renialme, a licentiate in law and an Alderman (*échevin*) of the same city in 1531, 1532 and 1534. Thus Balthazar had ties with each of the principal parts of the vast dominions of Charles and his son Philip, but he was essentially a Netherlander (*Belge*). He had arrived at years of discretion when in the disturbances of 1566 the Netherlands began to be convulsed by the struggle for civil and religious liberty, and at years of manhood when in 1572 the insurrection was placed on a firm footing through the seizure of the port of Brill by the Sea-Beggars (*gueux de la mer*). But neither Balthazar nor any of his family appears at all to have doubted which side they should take. His brother Gregory was a member of the Council of Brabant. His brother Philip was Spanish ambassador at the court of Henry the Fourth of France, and afterwards held an important place in the financial administration of the Netherlands under the Archduke Albert. His first cousin, Gabriel de Ayala, doctor of medicine of the University of Louvain, became the public medical officer (*médecin pensionnaire*) of the city of Brussels, and published a volume of epigrams in Latin verse. A relation, the Canon de Ayala, was a correspondent of Cardinal Granvelle and was employed by the Netherland bishops as their agent at Rome. Balthazar himself became a licentiate of law in the University of Louvain, and we may conjecture that he spent some time there in the acquisition of the learning of which his book is full.

The Netherlands military service was distinct from the Spanish, as might be expected from the fact that Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second held the Netherlands—that is, the Burgundian inheritance completed by the acquisitions made by Charles on the defeat of the Schmalkaldic League—in a merely personal union with the crown of Spain. In 1553 Charles created for the military forces of the Netherlands two great officers, the auditor and the captain of justice. The character of the former office may be learnt from the commission of its first holder, Doctor Stratus, in which it is said that “in order that we may be the better able to keep our said army in good discipline and justice, we have found it necessary to commission some scholarly person (*personnage de lettres*), learned and experienced in the matter of justice, to be with our captain-general of our said army, and under him to execute the office of auditor of the camp and give him good advice and counsel in what shall concern justice”. The term captain-general was combined with that of lieutenant-governor to form the title of the king’s representative in the Netherlands, as in Ayala’s dedication of this book we find it applied to the Prince of Parma in its Latin form of *imperator*. Thus the auditor, as military judge and judicial adviser of the chief of the army, held a position similar to that of the English judge-advocate-general, and in one respect with more extensive attributes. For while the rule in the Netherlands was that soldiers were tried for common crimes, not depending on the quality of a soldier, by the jurisdictions to which they were subject in their civil capacity, an exception was made for foreign soldiers and their servants who, if they did not fall under the special jurisdiction existing for persons attached to the court, were tried for all crimes by the military judge. Under this system the employment of Spanish troops in the Netherlands must have made a considerable addition to the duties of the auditor.*

To this military auditorship Ayala was appointed at the age of thirty-two, doubtless in consequence at once of family interest and of the reputation earned by his studies. The following

* Defaçoz, *Ancien Droit Belgique*, t. 1, pp. 80, 81; citing an ordinance of the Duke of Alba, dated 5th July 1570.

minute of his commission, preserved in the state archives of the kingdom of Belgium, is dated at Mons, 27th May 1580:

PHILIP etc. to all who shall see these presents sends greeting. Since in order to guard, preserve and defend our countries on this side [*the Netherlands, as distinguished from Spain, Naples etc.*] from the enterprises and invasions of the Prince of Orange and other heretics his adherents, and to recover the countries, towns and places which they occupy unjustly and against all right, divine and human, we are now preparing a camp, and an army of men of war both horse and foot, under our very dear and well beloved good nephew the Prince of Parma and Piacenza, lieutenant-governor and captain-general of these countries;

And since in order that we may be so much the better able to keep that army in good discipline and justice, we have found it very requisite and necessary to commission some scholarly person, learned and experienced in the matter of justice, to execute in it the office of judge-advocate-general of the camp [*It will be noticed that this paragraph has become common form*];

We make it known that, considering this and desiring to provide for the advancement of the said justice and the maintenance of good military discipline, and fully confiding in the sense, scholarship (*literature*), loyalty, diligence and experience of our well beloved Master Baltasar d'Ayala, licentiate in the laws, we have, by the determination of our said good nephew the Prince of Parma etc. retained, commissioned and ordered, and do by these presents retain, commission and order him to the said situation and office of judge-advocate-general of our said camp and army, giving him full power and authority and special commandment to execute and perform that office, to give advice and counsel to our aforesaid good nephew the Prince of Parma and others whom it may concern in matters concerning justice, as he shall find to be according to right and reason and conformable to our proclamations and ordinances issued and to be issued thereanent, and for the rest to do well and duly all that a good and loyal judge-advocate-general of the said camp can and ought to do, and that is competent and belongs to the matter;

At such wages and emoluments as by our further letters patent shall be taxed and ordered on that behalf.

The minute then goes on to direct Ayala to take the appropriate oath, which is to include a denial of all bribery for obtaining the said office, always excepting the accustomed fees of the Sieur de Hauteville, state and privy councillor, who on receiving the said oath is to induct Ayala into his office.

By a further order, dated at Mons, 1st August 1580, there are appointed for Ayala, by the month of thirty days, a hundred florins for himself and sixteen each for a clerk, two serjeants and an executioner, for the whole of which hundred and sixty-four florins Ayala is to give a receipt together with an attestation of his having had the said officers in his service.

Three years later Ayala received an accession of power and dignity. By an order dated at Tournai, 20th January 1583, the Prince of Parma appointed him, on the death of Jehan aux Truyes, a member of the great council and master of requests in ordinary, his oath of office to be sworn before the president of that council. But by another order, dated at Tournai, 4th April 1583, reciting that the service of His Majesty, on which in his character of auditor-general Ayala was then employed near the person of the prince, did not permit his going to take the oath at Namur—to which place the great council had been transferred from its usual seat at Mechlin, in consequence of the occupation of the latter city by the forces of the prince of Orange—he is permitted to swear it before the president of the privy council, and is confirmed in the receipt of the salary of his new offices notwithstanding his not being resident at Namur to perform the duties of a member of the great council.

It would indeed seem that the auditor-general had his place so fixed at the side of the captain-general that he required a special command to absent himself, in order to perform elsewhere even duties appertaining to that office. Thus we find an order of the prince directing all officials to assist Ayala in the execution of a command which he had received to accompany the Count of Reulx to Louvain, Aerschot, Liège, Maestricht and other places, in order to enquire into the disorders committed by the troops there in garrison, particularly the outrages which they had done to the commissioners of musters, and to correct and chastise those whom he should find guilty. Thus Ayala's public avocations must not only have been engrossing, but also, as he followed the headquarters of the army from place to place, must have kept him at a distance from libraries. In the time which intervened between his appointment and the dedication of his book, which is dated from the camp before Tournai, 31st October 1581, he can

scarcely have done more than put in order the notes which he had collected before his appointment, and the three years which remained of his life did not allow him to render any further service to legal literature. He died, Nys tells us, "at Alost, 1st September 1584, according to the authorities, but in August, if we follow the text of his successor's commission, which is dated the 20th of that month. He left a natural daughter, Barbe, who married Henry Zoes, professor of law at Louvain, one of the good Belgian jurists of the period, who died in 1627." *

The impression at once derived from reading the work of Ayala is that it is not a treatise of which the system and the parts have been logically thought out, and of which the conclusions are supported by the authorities cited, but a mass of authorities and examples collected from all ages and sources, arranged under the heads supplied by their tenour, and accompanied by the author's determinations on those heads. The learning is first and the thought second. This however does not seem to be attributable to any deficiency of the author, except in the sense that Ayala certainly had not an original mind. His thought ran on the lines which had been handed down for many ages, and demanded no rearrangement of the traditional sign-posts by which its course was marked out. It must be believed that his authorities had been collected during the years which preceded his appointment as judge-advocate-general, in view of a work to be carefully prepared, and that when the press of official business interfered with careful preparation he deemed it better to throw his materials together into such form as he could speedily give them, than to delay, and perhaps risk altogether, the publication of much that was especially appropriate to the time. The want of final polish in arrangement is thus easily accounted for and condoned, but the nature of the author's mind stands out not the less clearly.

The question of Ayala's character is no less interesting than that of his mind. Can we trace what it was in the times in which he lived that most excited his grief or displeasure, and to which

* We must acknowledge our great indebtedness to the work of M. Ernest Nys, now a professor at the university of Brussels and a member both of the Belgian court of appeal in that city and of the permanent international court of arbitration at the Hague, *Le droit de la Guerre et les Précurseurs de Grotius*, 1882, pp. 173-182. Besides other information we owe to this source the official documents which we have translated or summarized.

he most earnestly desired to bring some remedy? The answer to this question may be learnt from the dedication and the preface, which, though no doubt the last parts of the book to be written, disclose for that reason the thoughts of which the abiding force dwelt with the writer when the details of his subject had been dismissed. Of Ayala's dedication to the Prince of Parma the key-note is the necessity of maintaining ancient institutions, and of his preface the key-note is the necessity of maintaining justice. These, and not reason or humanity, were his dominant considerations. His spirit was conservative and stern. Against innovation he would make a stand. In accordance with this bent we find that the first of the three books into which his work is divided begins with the statement that, as the Romans were in all things careful to study law, they followed that habit in declaring war no less than in the things of peace, and that their constant success in war was the result of it. He then devotes the opening chapter to the existence of the Roman *fecials* as a body to which the form of commencing war was entrusted, the fixed law which they observed with regard to that and to the other ceremonies relating to war, and the Roman respect for such law.

II.

BOOK I, CHAPTER 2.

We will now notice the most remarkable among the further contents of the work here offered to the reader, in the order of the text.

It will be well to premise that the three books into which it is divided were evidently intended to bear titles corresponding to the divisions implied in the general title—*De Jure Belli*, *De Officiis Bellicis*, and *De Disciplina Militari*. In each book each chapter except the first has a title of its own, while to the first there is prefixed, in the case of the second and third books, the special title of the book, *De Officiis Bellicis* or *De Disciplina Militari*. In the case of the first book the title which occupies the corresponding position is not, as it should have been by analogy, *De Jure Belli*, but that which logically belongs to it as expressing the substance of the chapter—*De Ratione Belli Indicendi aliisque Caerimoniis Bellicis quae antiquo jure feciali proditae fuerunt*. There is thus some confusion, which may have been made either by Ayala in putting his papers together, or by the printer, who may have been led to omit *De Jure Belli* as the title of the first book because that form does not appear separately in the general title of the work.

It must also be premised that the division of each chapter into sections, quoted here as § §, is made by figures in the margin which are not placed accurately opposite breaks in the context, or even opposite the ends of sentences. Their length is variable, and their origin is difficult to account for.

In the second chapter of the first book we are told at the outset that in general peace is preferable even to a just war with the devastation which accompanies it, but that a righteous war is better than a dishonourable peace. That a war may be called just, it must be declared and waged by the authority and command of the sovereign prince. A private person can not wage

it because he must resort to the courts of law for the defence of his rights; but immediately, as if perceiving the inappropriateness of that reason to a case where the opponent is not amenable to a court of law, Ayala adds that a private person taking any steps of the nature of war without the command of the prince is guilty of *laesa majestas* by the *lex Julia*, the ground of which is the *lex regia*, by which the people has transferred to the prince all sovereignty over itself and all power. If, however, the cause is great and necessary, the prince absent, and delay dangerous, war may be waged even without his order, especially for defence, the right of which is allowed to every one by the law of nature, which includes in that permission not only vengeance but even expelling the enemy from his own land if with less we can not be safe from him. In such cases there will be a just war and the laws of war will have place, because effects follow their causes, and booty will become the property of the captors.

But even the prince ought not to wage war without a just and necessary cause, and ought not to be influenced by any lust for doing harm, for cruel revenge, or for domination: § 10. The principal objects of just war are the defence of one's self and of one's friends and allies, the recovery of what has been unjustly taken away by violence, the vindication of injuries received, and, if the injury has been done by private persons without public authority, their surrender for punishment. The refusal of passage through another's territory will justify war, for passage without doing harm (*transitus innoxius*) is free by the law of human society. That the passage meant is that of a military expedition against an enemy is shown by the example cited, that of the war of the Israelites against the Amorites who had refused them a passage to the promised land: § 11. Nothing more clearly marks the rudimentary conception of neutrality entertained in the time of the renaissance than the assertion of this right, which indeed was still axiomatic to Grotius. But the most just of all causes of war is given by rebels or seceders (*rebelles et imperio deficientes*), for they commit an injury against God, from whom all power is derived: §§ 12, 13. Yet since a rebel can not properly be called an enemy, an armed contention with such is less properly called a war than an execution, and does not require the

authority of the prince, but the order of a judge having jurisdiction will be sufficient: § 14. This, however, is only true so far as regards the measures taken for defence or for the enforcement of jurisdiction. The further rights of war can only be exercised against rebels when the authority of the prince has made the contest a true war, but even then the acts of the rebels, like those of pirates and robbers, will not be covered by the laws of war, and therefore they will not acquire the property of the things which they capture and persons captured by them will not become slaves: § 15.

It will be seen at once that here we are concerned with the question which in consequence of the Netherlands insurrection must have bulked largest in Ayala's thoughts. Accordingly he is not content till he has submitted it to a further examination. Ulpian had said that the parties in civil dissensions were not enemies to one another, so that the laws of war relating to capture and to postliminy should be in force between them, and that therefore enslavement was not the consequence of capture on either side. And the "ordinances of the kingdom of Spain," an authority which must have touched Ayala more nearly, ordered the sevenfold restitution of things captured in the course of civil dissensions. These rules, he explains, as is shown by Ulpian's use of the word "parties," hold when citizens are at variance only with citizens, but those who contend against the majesty of the state and aim at its destruction are deemed to be enemies.

So Cicero considered that the Sempronian law, which made a vote of the people necessary for the capital punishment of a Roman citizen, did not prohibit him from putting Cethegus and Lentulus, the fellow conspirators of Catiline, to death. And so also the Romans habitually visited their subject allies, when insurgent, with the extreme penalties of war: § 16. Indeed the law of Solon, condemning to banishment Athenians who took neither part on the occasion of a popular outbreak, had much to recommend it, and in Ayala's own time the modest patience of so many of the Netherlands people greatly aided the rebels: § 17.

But although the exercise of private judgment between contending parties is admissible in a democracy or an aristocracy

when there are rival governments (*scisso imperio*), in a monarchy every good and wise subject will rank himself on the side of the prince who lawfully enjoys the supreme power: § 19. For as soon as it has been determined that the commonwealth shall be administered by one person, to whom by the *lex regia* the people have granted all rule and power over themselves, and who is the common parent of all, there is the same duty to defend him that there is to defend the country: § 20. Armed resistance to him is parricidal and can never be justified: § 21. The prince and the commonwealth are so connected that no one can be the enemy of one without being the enemy of the other: § 22. Rebellion against the prince is comparable to heresy, and a person disobedient to him is called *infidelis*, the double meaning of which term—faithless and infidel—is justified by the question of St. Jerome, “how can a man be faithful in the matter of God (*in substantia Dei*) who could not keep his faith to his lord in the flesh?” To obey kings is ever the general pact of human society, and while good kings are sent by God, bad ones must be endured and their misdeeds referred to his judgment: § 23. It follows that although a usurper (*tyrannus*) who has seized the throne by illegal violence may be lawfully killed by any one if the usurpation can not otherwise be ended, it is not lawful for a private person to kill, or for the people to reject or to revolt against, one who is the prince by right of succession or election, however cruelly or unjustly he may act: § 24.

It must be noticed with reference to this passage that on 15th June 1580 the prince of Parma had issued the edict which set a price on the head of the prince of Orange, and that on 26th July 1581 the Dutch states-general had declared Philip to have forfeited the sovereignty. Ayala must have written with these recent facts expressly in view. He proceeds to declare that all rule and power over the people are concentrated in the person of the prince not only by the *lex regia* but by the ordinance of God: § 26. But the pope, to whom both the spiritual and the temporal swords have been committed on earth, may depose kings, while popular power is worse than that of any single tyrant: § 27.

From the amplifications on state government into which the mention of war against rebels has led him Ayala returns to the

just causes of war. It can not be waged against infidels merely because they are such, for God, who makes his sun to rise on the just and on the unjust, has not given the lordship over things to the faithful alone but to all creatures endowed with reason: § 28. Nor can the justice of war against infidels as such be deduced from their refusal to obey the emperor, for although it is a common opinion that the emperor is the lord of all the world, yet the most learned men, whose teaching is summed up by Covarruvias and Ferdinand Vasquez, have proved the contrary: § 29.

Here it will be noted that Ayala's Spanish origin and sympathies keep him on the side of the protest which Spain, France and England, the homes of independent nationality, maintained throughout the middle ages against the German and Italian doctrine of a world-emperor. The boundary of the authority which the prelates of the Church, even the pope himself, have received, is to be drawn between those who have never accepted Christianity, with regard to whom St. Paul asked, "what have I to do with them that are without?" and those who have once submitted to the Christian faith but have fallen from it, against whom as heretics war can be justly made: § 29. Against infidels, however, war can be made for the same causes as against any one else, also when they hinder the Christian faith by blasphemy or false argument (*pravæ persuasionibus*); or when they hinder the preaching of that faith, and so do an injustice to Christians, who have the right of preaching the gospel throughout the world: § 30.

The causes of war which have been reviewed, Ayala next says, are to be very carefully weighed by princes and kings, but if it happens that these are led into war by greed the soldiers will not be guilty, for they must obey their prince: §§ 30, 31. But in § 32 this is qualified by the reservation, "unless it is clearly established that the war is unjust." The question thus raised was an old one, and our author cites in his support Saint Augustine, who begins with a pronouncement in the sense of the wide one first made by Ayala, and proceeds to base it on grounds which are scarcely satisfactory. He points out that in peace the soldier is the subject even of a sacrilegious king, and that in war the commands given him are either certainly not contrary to the law of

God or at least not certainly contrary to it, so that there is a chance (*fortasse*) that the king may be guilty by reason of the commands and the soldier innocent by reason of his servient position. It is remarkable that Ayala does not go further into the authorities, for they are interesting. In feudal times the duty of allegiance to a lord had reinforced that drawn from simple civil subjection. In the treatise entitled *Feudorum Consuetudines*, which is commonly printed as an appendix to the *Corpus Juris*, we read (lib. 2, tit. 28) that according to some the vassal must always aid his lord, without any distinction of case, but that according to Obertus de Orto and Gerardus Campagistus, whose opinion the author of the treatise adopts, this in an unreasonable war is only true for the lord's defence, and the vassal will not lose his fief for refusing to aid the lord in an attack. Having regard to the disputable reasonableness of most wars, and to the possibility of representing an attack as a really defensive measure, we can hardly doubt that the feudal liability, even as interpreted by Obertus and Gerardus, would have a practical tendency in favour of the claim of a pugnacious lord. We find therefore without surprise that Thomas Aquinas does not so much as notice the existence of a question, but says unreservedly that "a private person who uses the sword under the authority of the prince or judge does not take the sword, but uses a sword placed in his hands by another": *Summa Totius Theologia; secunda pars, quaestio XL, art. 1; utrum bellare sit semper peccatum*.

But the received opinion of the sixteenth century did not go quite so far, for Nys quotes Franciscus de Victoria as laying down that subjects must not take arms in a manifestly unjust war, but that if the notables of the nation, consulted by the king, pronounce in favour of the justice of the war, the classes below them may in good conscience conform themselves to their decision.* Indeed the increasing employment of hired soldiers, whose voluntary engagement would deprive them of the excuse either of feudal allegiance or of the duty of a simple subject, could scarcely fail to inspire moralists with a hesitation which is perhaps reflected by Ayala. Certainly, a little later, Suarez holds mercenaries to

* *Les Origines du Droit International*, p. 174.

be strictly bound to enquire into the justice of the cause for which they fight.†

At this point Ayala tells us that all he has so far said about just causes of war relates rather to right and equity, and to the duty of a good man, than to the legal effects of war; and he makes a sudden transit to the other sense of *justus*, namely lawful by reason of fulfilling certain legal requirements, as in the case of lawful marriage, lawful age, and so forth. In that sense it is possible for a war to be *justum* on both sides, and for a war declared between persons capable of being enemies and not brigands to entitle each side, however plainly unjust, to the rights of war, such as postliminy and the enslavement of prisoners. This was rightly maintained by Alciatus and Fulgosius, in opposition to the received opinion based on the justice of the cause, which can not exist on both sides: §§ 33–35. Here then at last Ayala is alive to the difference between the provinces of the legist and the moralist in what concerns war. Had he recognised it earlier in his work, he might have discussed more clearly the duty of a soldier in an unjust war. But the time was not yet come, either for him or for so much greater a man as was Aquinas, to think adequately on a question involving the rights and duties of conscience.

The short remainder of the second chapter is devoted to the question of the expenses of war. The prince ought primarily to bear them out of any revenues assigned to him by the people, but if these are insufficient the whole kingdom must bear the burden, and it can not be limited: § 37. The soldier ought to be paid: § 38. And, serving for pay, he has no claim for his losses in the war to be made good, as he would have were he not paid. But if he has been summoned to fight in an unjust war, he will have no right of action either for his pay or for his losses, because *ex causa turpi nulla datur actio*: § 40. Surely Ayala did not mean that a prince or a commonwealth might plead in court the injustice of his or its own war, as an answer to an action arising out of it? It would rather seem that the veil obscuring the confines of morality and law, which had been raised for a moment, had

† Nys, u. s., p. 175.

fallen again, and that Ayala had no clear view of the question which he had raised.

Thus closes Ayala's second chapter, in which without much arrangement he has disburdened his mind of the general matter which he most desired to impress on his contemporaries, and has left himself free to enter on the topics of detail which follow. It should have shielded him from the imputation of neglecting the just causes of war, by making which Grotius showed that even his prodigious memory was not infallible.

III.

BOOK I, CHAPTERS 3-5.

The third chapter of the first book is devoted to Single Combat. The admission of that subject into a book on war is a scholastic feature, belonging rather to the time when war, as a public national contest, had not been so far differentiated from fighting in general as even Ayala had differentiated it in what we have already passed under review. He condemns single combat on the usual grounds, except as between soldiers on the opposite sides of a regular war, by the order or with the consent of the general (§ § 7, 8, 9), or when the princes on both sides agree to refer their differences to the combat of two or more selected champions (§ § 10, 11), even in which case, however, Ayala deems it an imprudent mode of seeking a decision, because, as Livy says, a settlement which promises to be lasting is reached only when the defeated party has contended with all his might (§ § 12, 13). Either the notion, if Ayala really entertained it, that these exceptional cases could occur in the days of Philip the Second and the Dutch Republic, or the apparently serious mention of them without such a notion being entertained, further shows the merely scholastic character of the chapter.

In the fourth chapter Ayala discusses reprisals. He condemns them so far as affecting the person of any but the guilty party, basing himself on the Deuteronomic precept, "the fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin": § 3. And on the principle quoted from Ulpian in the Digest—lib. 9, t. 2, l. 13—that no one is lord over his own limbs—*dominus membrorum suorum nemo videtur*: § 6. From that principle Ayala concludes that not even under a law or statute, to which every one is presumed to have consented, can any but the guilty party be affected by corporal penalties, though he may be so by pecuniary ones. Of course the penance imposed

by Saint Ambrose on the Emperor Theodosius is cited: § 7; and the biblical examples to the contrary are pronounced to be beyond human imitation: § 4.

The right of reprisals on property exists because human law, for the good of the commonwealth and the better repression of offences, may punish by fine, confiscation, diminution of honour and the like, even those who have committed no offence; and so it has often been enacted both in civil and in canon law, especially for the sons and descendants of those who have sinned against divine or human majesty: § 5. Hence a prince may authorise reprisals on property against a people who will neither redress the injuries done by those whom they harbour, nor give up the guilty to punishment. The practice rests on the same foundations, divine, natural and civil, as war, and the authority of a sovereign who has the right of declaring war is necessary for such reprisals: §§ 2, 10. The authority of a judge is not sufficient, and they no longer take place between fellow subjects, whatever may once have been the case at Athens or elsewhere: § 10. When reprisals on property have been duly authorised, although the innocent can not be personally attacked but only their goods taken, they may be accidentally killed, because otherwise the reprisals could not be executed. It is just as in war, neither the innocent nor women and children can be killed of set purpose, yet they may be so by accident, as when a city is besieged or bombarded, because war could not otherwise be carried on: § 9.

The fifth chapter of the first book is devoted by Ayala to capture in war and to postliminy. It is characteristic of the looseness of his style that, although the principles on which he considers the lawfulness of capture to depend are glanced at in §§ 1 and 2, they are fully explained only when he comes in § 16 to the enslavement of prisoners. His view is that in the primitive age, the golden age as the heathen called it, all men were born free and were deemed to be peers and equals, and all things were enjoyed in common. This state of things he refers to *jus naturale*, which he says did not enact that men should be free, but slavery and property were unknown, and its resulting silence about them left a loophole for the later creation of those institutions. Evidently then the ambiguous term *jus* in Ayala's *jus naturale* does not

mean law, but what might be called a right, in the sense of an enjoyment which no one questioned. He goes on to say that in later times, when, because of increasing wickedness, such a state of things was found inconvenient, natural right reason, than which nothing is more divine, dictated the institution of property, and of war with capture and enslavement as the rights of war, which thus by universal consent became the *jus gentium*. That term, in which *jus* appears as law, Ayala uses in its classical sense of the law in which the people of all nations are agreed and which they apply in their respective communities—a fact, or supposed fact, which carries with it as a consequence the application of the same law to the mutual relations of those communities, in other words its operation as what we call the law of nations.

The law of nations is thus accounted for as positive law, but to what extent is it a righteous law? So far as concerns the laws of war Ayala teaches that they are not wanting in an equity based on the repression of injustice—§ § 1, 16—and that they do not exist in favour of brigands, pirates, or any one who is not a lawful enemy: § 18. If the remark had been made that even within those limits the laws of war may operate in favour of the unjust party, we do not know what Ayala's answer would have been, but probably he would have said that the just must at least be armed with the means of repression, although the decrees of Providence may sometimes deny them that effect. And one limitation of the rights given by the general laws of war is furnished by the ancient and laudable custom—for Ayala does not put it higher than this—that in a war between Christians those who are captured on either side do not become slaves but are kept as freemen for ransom. Even that limitation does not enure to the benefit of Christians who fight for Saracens or infidels, or render them any kind of aid, only although enslaved by capture they must not be sold to any but Christians: § 19.

The law that the property in captured things passes to the captor applies only to movables, for captured immovables, such as land, become the public property of the victor commonwealth: § 3. And even with regard to the enemy's movables, it is only those that are acquired without a battle that belong to whosoever has first gained possession of them: § 8. The losing owners of

the booty acquired in battle are indeed deprived of their property in it, but its disposition is subject to the prince's pleasure, unless the proportional shares to be retained by him and to be assigned to the others concerned are fixed by law, as the Spanish ordinances fix them for land war, leaving to the prince's liberality what he will allow to the others out of captures made in naval war of which he bears the cost: § 9. It is apparently because of this difference that Ayala mentions those ordinances as assimilating captured ships of war to land rather than to movables in general: § 3. Certain examples relating to booty and founded on reason are cited with an evident intention of acting on them in the performance of the author's duties. Such are that those who guard the baggage are to share equally with those who fight: § 6; that the troops are not to throw themselves on the booty till the victory has been secured: § 11; that those who have not done their duty shall lose their shares: § 13; that fraud in the division of the spoil may be punished by fines in addition to the loss of the shares: § 12; and that the troops may be ordered to sell the spoil which they are allowed to acquire lest the army should be hampered and seduced from duty by it: § 14. It is also laid down that things entrusted to the care of a sacred institution but not belonging to it, *res sacro commendatae*, are not immune from capture if enemy's property: § 15.

In § § 20 to 24, Ayala deals with various questions about the recovery of personal conditions by postliminy, and then introduces some observations of which the leading purport appears to be the treatment of prisoners. In § 25 we learn that women and children are subject to capture and enslavement but must not be put to death, and that enemies found in our country at the outbreak of war may be made prisoners but can no longer be enslaved as formerly they were. Also that canon law forbids touching priests, monks, lay brothers, travellers, merchants and country people, but that the prohibition has been repealed by desuetude, except, in Ayala's opinion, for ecclesiastics so far as they do not meddle with affairs of war. No legal relief can be given against a bargain which a captive has made for his ransom, because the fear of death or servitude which was its motive was not inspired as a means of extortion, but was a lawful fear arising out of his

situation: § 26. In § 27 we learn that prisoners and the fixing and enjoyment of their ransom are now generally left to their captors, except in the case of *grandees* whose ransom exceeds ten thousand crowns. These by the ancient custom of Spain, France, and England, belong to the prince. They must be admitted to ransom unless there is reason to fear from them a renewal of the war, for to spare them in that case would be an unjust mercy, as Saint Ambrose says. Thus the Roman generals at the end of a triumph put to death the leading captives, who had sown the seeds of discord and were the authors of the war. But no killing or harsh treatment of captives by private authority is allowed, any more than by civil law it is allowed in the case of slaves; and a Spanish ordinance is to that effect in the case of captives made in a war between Christians, though not in a war between peoples of different religions: § 28.

We now come to various points about ransoms: §§ 29 to 32; and then return to *postliminy*. The ancient rule that on its being recovered from the enemy land returns by *postliminy* to its former owners is followed by the Spanish ordinances, subject to a proviso for the case of governments, kingdoms, countries, and other major proprietary rights, that *usucapion* does not run for them even from the date of their recovery; but minor proprietary rights will be acquired by prescription against the former owner, not being under age, in four years from the date of their recovery. And if a subject loses his own castle by his own fault, and retakes it by his own exertions, still the king will be entitled to claim it on its recovery: § 33. It is easily seen what a field for the application of these provisions must have been afforded by the constant border warfare with the Moors, of which a frequent incident would be the taking of Christian property by the latter and its retaking by the former owner or by an adventurer.

In § 35 Ayala mentions and rejects a number of general statements and distinctions made on *postliminy* by various writers. His own position, as may be collected from §§ 34 to 38, is that the first question to be asked is whether a corporeal thing captured by a lawful enemy, not by a pirate or robber, is one of those which are capable of *postliminy*, such as land, ships, riding or baggage animals, and men, whether free or slave. If it is not such, of

which arms are an example, because they can not be lost by a living man except through his fault, it is at once the captor's booty. If it is such, the next question is whether the enemy has secured at least a temporary possession of it, that is, in the common phrase, whether it has been brought *intra praesidia*. If this has not happened before the thing is recovered, the property in it has not been displaced, and the recoverer must restore it to its owner, whether he recovered it by force of arms, by purchase, or in any other way, except that if he recovered it by purchase the owner must repay him its price. If, however, the thing has been brought *intra praesidia*, its property has passed to the captor by the laws of war, but on the recovery of the thing the property will return to the former owner by postliminy. And if the recoverer was a fraudulent party to the capture, he will be liable to the former owner not only for the restitution of the thing recovered but also for what he might have saved from capture. In § 39 Ayala notes the Spanish ordinance which applied the question whether booty had been brought *intra praesidia* to captures made by pirates as well as to those made by an enemy, and can only account for it by supposing that "its object may have been to stimulate the troops in the pursuit of pirates and robbers, especially since it is legitimate to make provision for the public good even at the cost of private persons, as Tacitus says that every great example has some injustice to individuals which is compensated by the public utility." In § 40 Ayala expresses a rather hesitating opinion that a thing first stolen, then captured by an enemy and lastly recovered, need not be restored to its former owner, the law of war which changes the property prevailing over the civil rule that the vice of theft, which clings to the thing stolen, is not purged until the thing has returned to the owner's power; but he is clear that equity prohibits suit against the possessor in such a case unless the value can not be recovered from the thief or his heir.

The closing §§ of the chapter, 41 to 43, deal with the questions whether incorporeal rights can be captured in war and transferred to the conqueror, and, if so, whether they are subject to postliminy. On the first question Ayala decides in the affirmative as to the incorporeal rights of a conquered community,

because such rights are the creditor's property, and the property of a conquered community passes to the conqueror together with the persons forming the community. He can give laws to them, and one who is in another's power can have nothing in his own power. Therefore when Alexander had conquered Thebes he was competent to receive from the Thessalians the hundred talents which they had borrowed from the Thebans, and if he had done so, the Thebans, when their city was restored by Cassander, would have had no claim against the Thessalians.

On the second question Ayala admits that there may be postliminy of an incorporeal right, and that, since Alexander had merely assumed to remit the debt to the Thessalians, the restored Thebans were entitled by postliminy to exact it from them, and would have been so in whatever legal form the remission might have been made. In that case there would have been law against law, and the nature of the law of postliminy is to prevail over the law of capture. If there had been payment to Alexander there would have been law against fact, and "the law of postliminy does not restore those things which have been removed by lawful fact, for law has no supremacy over fact." But the incorporeal rights of a private person pass to his captor only when he is made a slave, who can have nothing of his own, and now that between Christians a prisoner does not become a slave his incorporeal rights adhere inseparably to him.

The question is quite differently regarded by Grotius. There is, says that jurist, no postliminy of a debt, and the absolute right which Alexander acquired by the conquest of Thebes made his remission of their debt to the Thessalians as effectual in law as their payment of it to him would have been. Moreover there was no restoration of the Thebans, for their city had been dissolved by the conquest, and the Thebes which Cassander set up again was a new entity. *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*; l. 3, c. 9, § 9.

IV.

BOOK I, CHAPTERS 6-9.

The sixth chapter is devoted to the subject of keeping faith with an enemy, and is a tolerably full and, with one important exception, a good discussion of that subject, with the connected one of the law and ethics as to keeping promises made in civil life, whether with or without the sanction of an oath. The exception is that Ayala repudiates any duty of keeping faith with those whom he regards as rebels. He has pointed out that pirates and robbers, as being the common enemies of mankind, can not claim the performance of the engagements which they may have it in their power to extort: § 6. This he extends to rebels, as also not being lawful enemies: § 7. And, "as a consequence," conventions which have been extorted by a usurping force (*per tyrannidem*) are not binding. In their case there has been no consent, which is required in all contracts, for consent is vitiated by unlawful force. It is doubted by most whether a prince is ever bound by a contract with his subjects, but certainly if they have wrung the contract from him by insurrection, which is in itself a breach of their faith to him, they can not claim faith from him. Nor can it be expected that those who have violated both divine and human law, by taking arms against their common parent who has received his power from God, will themselves keep their word.

Again, subjects can not give the law to their prince; therefore any promise by him to them is a voluntary one, which can never be binding. The common doctrine of the canonists, that the pope's hands are never bound, is based on these principles. And if a prince is injured by a contract he has the same right as one under age to be relieved from it: § 8. The rights of the crown are inseparable from the crown, and as the prince can not lose his sovereign power by a voluntary abdication, or alienate any part of his kingdom, so he can not alienate any of those rights. nor

can they be lost by the longest term of prescription. The prince is only a usufructuary, or at most holds his crown as a husband holds his wife's dowry: § 9. Bodin, seeing the insecurity of any convention made by insurgents with their prince, advised them not to be parties to such a convention, but to get some foreign prince to contract for them; but Ayala advises them rather to return to their duty and seek the clemency of their prince: § 11.

It is an interesting problem how historical characters such as Charles I. of England, and many of their supporters no less, who were not on the whole bad men, can have been morally blind on that side of conscience which relates to political compacts with subjects. The arguments which have been quoted in some detail are interesting as showing the question as they saw it. The base of their position was the belief in a divine external order which, where it is entertained, makes impossible secure political compromises affecting that order. The common humanity on which the duty of keeping faith must be founded is not felt, by those who identify themselves with a divine will to which they attribute institutions, to exist between them and their opponents.

Except on the point which has been examined Ayala's standard of faith was high. Faith must be kept towards a lawful enemy by a private person as well as by the state or its representatives, and Regulus did no more than his duty: § 2. Engagements must be interpreted without quibbling on their letter: § 4. Giving hostages does not permit a treaty to be broken, as if they were a substitute for faith, the erroneous doctrine by which Bodin defended the conduct of Francis I. If the French authorities whose consent was necessary refused it to the treaty of Madrid, Francis ought to have saved his personal faith by returning to captivity: § 5. But even towards a lawful enemy faith is not to be kept if that which was promised would offend God or be contrary to good morals: § § 13, 14. All our actions ought to be referred to the ground principles of justice; first, that no one be injured; secondly, that the common utility be served: § 15. Breach of a treaty by one party exempts the other, at his discretion, from the duty of observing the same treaty, unless the broken clause is such that it is not likely the contracting parties attached much importance to it; but it does not authorise the breach of another

treaty: §§ 17, 20, 22. The rules of faith are the same for truces as for treaties of peace or alliance: § 18. But it is usual and right, though not a matter of law, that a slight breach of a truce which will shortly expire should not be treated as ending it: § 19. The perfidious character of an enemy, though often shown, does not warrant a breach of faith towards him: § 21.

The seventh chapter begins with a distinction of treaties into three kinds—those which end a war by the complete surrender of the enemy, who thenceforward enjoys only such existence as the conqueror allows him—those which end a war on terms, possibly including the enemy's recognition of the conqueror's superiority (*ut is populus alterius populi majestatem conservet*)—and those which are concluded in time of peace, possibly including a similar recognition by one party. But no use is made of the classification. A general's commission, even when conferring plenipotentiary power on him, does not enable him to conclude a peace, unless that power is expressly given: § 5. Truces for long terms, equivalent to peace, fall under this rule, but not short truces: § 6. It will be remembered that in Ayala's time the Ottoman empire concluded peace with non-Moslem powers only for terms of years. In extreme necessity the prince may conclude a treaty not only abandoning private property of his subjects which is in the enemy's hands, but even taking other property from his subjects and giving it to the enemy, for the common utility is to be preferred to that of individuals: § 7. It would rather seem, though it is not clear, that Ayala did not consider that subjects were entitled to compensation from the prince or the public treasury for property so taken. When a prince dies who has concluded treaties in the name of the commonwealth, they subsist both against and in favour of his successor, whether taking as heir, by a statute or by election; unless where things annexed to the crown have been alienated without the necessary consent of the people or of the estates (*citra populi vel ordinum consensum, qui ad hoc requiritur*), or where the dignity and authority of the prince (*majestas principis*) have been impaired, which could not have been validly done to the prejudice even of the deceased: § 10. The last reservation can not have been intended to apply to treaties with foreign powers, since Ayala, as we have seen, ad-

mitted that a treaty either of his second or of his third kind might include an admission of the superiority of one party. The purport clearly is that no perpetually binding close can be given to a civil war by an agreement limiting the prince's prerogatives, in accordance with what Ayala has taught in the preceding chapter about its not being a duty to keep faith with rebels.

The eighth is a commonplace chapter on lawful stratagem and fraud in war, in which no principles are laid down by which cases may be distinguished.

The ninth chapter is on the rights of ambassadors, and contains nothing remarkable except Ayala's refusal of such rights to rebels and to subjects who serve an enemy with treasonable intent. On that ground he considers that the imperialists were within their right in putting to death the subjects of Charles V. who were commissioned by the king of France as ambassadors to the Grand Turk, but he does not notice that, whatever their personal condition, they could have no rights against the emperor as ambassadors from an enemy to a third power: § 5. The man of God who was eaten by a lion for disobeying the divine order not to accept meat or drink from Jeroboam, whose sin he had been sent to denounce, is brought in as a warning to princes not to treat with rebels and schismatics: § 6.

V.

BOOKS II AND III.

The second and third books contain little or nothing that belongs to international law. Ayala's object in them seems to have been to bring together all the maxims of policy or prudence which he could find relating to war, whether apprehended, being waged, or leaving questions behind it—whether again such maxims were generally accepted or were debated. This must not be understood only of maxims belonging to philosophy, statecraft, or administrative science; even strategy and tactics are not wholly outside Ayala's purview, although he says comparatively little about them, probably because in the then condition of military art little of a general character had been said about them. The merest technicalities of the military or naval profession are all that he avoids. The authorities and examples are mostly taken from classical or biblical antiquity, and next in frequency come those of Spain, as where the extreme severity of the Spanish ordinances for the case of the surrender of a castle is commented on: book III, chapter 18, § § 2, 5. Of course the difference of circumstances and institutions would render a large part of what Ayala has thus collected inapplicable to the Low Countries in the sixteenth century, but we shall probably not be wrong in thinking that he, as a special devotee of learning, was haunted by a notion, due to the adoption of Roman law in the German or Holy Roman empire, that more practical use might be made of his vast collection than it would now occur to any one to think possible. An instance may be seen in book III, chapter 7, § 27, where he argues that the privileges of Roman soldiers still belong to them, against what he admits to be the general opinion, but claiming to have the most learned on his side. A notable instance of an opinion ventured by Ayala on his own authority, not supported by any citation of a writer but only by examples, is that a man of some position (*nobilis*) may act as a spy not only without discredit but even with glory, when his motive is zeal for the public good; though he admits that to do so for pay would be discreditable to him: book III, c. 13, § 6.

J. WESTLAKE.

BALTHAZA-

RIS AYALÆ, I. C. ET
EXERCITVS REGII APVD
BELGAS SVPREMI IVRIDICI,

DE IVRE ET OFFICIIS BEL-
LICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI,
LIBRI III.

*Non in multitudine exercitus victoria belli;
sed de calo fortitudo est. 1. Mach. 3.*



D V A C I,
Ex officina Ioannis Bogardi Typogr.
iurati, sub Bibliis aureis, anno
M. DC. LXXXII,



SERENISSI-

MO PARMÆ ET PLA-
CENTIÆ PRINCIPI,
ALEXANDRO FARNESIO,
Regis apud Belgas Præfecto, & Im-
peratori felicissimo, BALTHAZAR
AYALA I. C. S.



I qui de republ scri-
psere, Princeps se-
renissime, ad reipub.
salutem & conser-
uationem præcipue
spectare censent, ut
actiones nostras, iu-
ra, & leges, ad vete-
rum mores, & instituta maiorum sapius re-
uocemus. rempub. enim, ut picturam egregiam,
sed euanescentem vetustate, si eam coloribus
iisdem, quibus fuerat, renouare neglexerimus,
nec formam, nec extremalineaamenta seruare:
& ut in corporibus humanis, sic quoque in
a 2 repub.

EPISTOLA

repub. quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod curatione indiget: & senescentibus legibus rescunt vitia, quae rempub. haud diu stare permittunt. unde Ennii versum, quo dixit, Moribus antiquis res stat Romana, virisque, vel breuitate, vel veritate, tanquam ex oraculo effatum censet Cicero. Nam neque viri, inquit, nisi ita morata ciuitas fuisset, neque mores, nisi i viri praefuissent, aut fundare, aut tam diu tenere potuissent tantam, & tam iuste lateque imperantem rempub. Itaque & mos ipse patrius praestantes viros adhibebat, & veterum morem, ac morum instituta retinebant excellentes viri: quae ratione Romana respubl. & creuit, & stetit. Imperium enim, ut inquit Sallustius, his artibus facile retinetur, quibus initio partum est. verum, ubi pro labore, desidia, pro continentia, & aequitate, libido, atque superbia inuasere, fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur. quod & Apollo oraculo suo significasse videtur, quo, consultus quando tandem malorum, & seditionum, quibus Gracia miserè affligebatur, finis esset, respondit, tam demum calamitatem Gracia cessaturam, cum ipsius aram, quae apud Delios erat cubica, duplicassent. quod Graeci facile arbitrati, cum alteram tantam molem, quanta prior erat, adiecissent, neque tamen malum leniri sentirent; & non

in suis de rep.
libris.

DEDICATORIA.

Et non satis rite oraculo satisfactum ex eodem deo intelligerent, tandem edocti a Platone, & alius philosophis, cognouerunt non molem moli, ex oraculo Apollinis aquandam esse; sed Analogiam cum Analogia, & rationem cum ratione componendam. atque ita sapientium virorum prudentia, & consilio, ad veterum normam, institutaque maiorum rebus constitutis, omnibusq; suo loco repositis, malum mitescere, & pristina felicitas redire cepit. Hinc quoq; Horatius percipiens, quantum calamitatis inuexisset contempta religio, ad Romanos scribit, his versibus:

Carmin. l. 3.
ode 6.

Delicta maiorum, immeritus lues,
Romane, donec templa refeceris,
Ædeisque labentis deorum, &
Foeda nigro simulacra fumo.

Et qua sequuntur. quibus ostendit, quantum degenerauerint Romani a suis maioribus, ob violatam religionem, & neglectum veterum morem. Et huius rei præclarum exemplum nobis exhibet Romana historia, ut dilucidè proponit Liuius, qui corruptis Romanorum moribus, neglecta deorum religione, & iure gentium violato, urbem captam & partem deletam a Gallis refert: quæ rursus Camilli virtute liberata, cultu diuino restituto, legibus institutisq; maiorum reuocatis, de violatoribus iurisdictionum

EPISTOLA

supplicio sumpto, mirum in modum creuit, & tandem totius orbis imperium adepta est: ut merito dici possit, urbem Romanam multo ante perituram fuisse, nisi perisset: aut saltem nunquam ad tantum fastigium peruenturam. Cuius exemplo Sereniss. Princeps, speramus fore, ut tua praeclara virtute, & mira in rebus gerendis dexteritate & providentia, veri Dei cultu restaurato, & Maestate Regis, quae diuino & humano iure illi debetur, reparata, diuinarum humanarumque rerum perturbatio in Belgium inuecta, diuini numinis auxilio, sedari & tolli aliquando possit, & totum Belgium pristinae felicitati reddi. de quo dici potest, id quod sacra
Iudith cap. 5 *litera de Israëlitis habent: Vbicunque ingressi sunt, sine arcu & sagitta, & absque scuto & gladio, Deus eorum pugnavit pro eis, & vicis: & non fuit, qui insultaret populo isti: nisi quando recessit a cultu Domini Dei sui. Quotiescunque autem prater ipsum Deum suum, aliterum coluerunt, dati sunt in pradam, & in gladium, & in opprobrium. Porro cum in civili & togata societate, leges constitutionesque, sapius renouari, & ad veterum instituta rescari expediat, (qua de causa etiam veteres illi Romani censores creauere, qui censendis civium moribus, qui facile negligentia corrumpuntur, antiquum decus, & morum integritatem re-*

DEDICATORIA.

tem retinebant:) tum profectò omnium maxi-
mè in bello id fieri conuenit, eò quòd aspero &
abscisso castigationis genere, disciplina milita-
ris indiget. Quia, ut inquit Val. Max. vires
armis constant, quæ ubi semel a recto itinere
desciuerunt, oppressura sunt, nisi opprimantur.
Et certè tantum in disciplina militari possum
est, ut ea sola retenta vel neglecta, maxima cla-
des illata vel accepta plurimi exercitus casi vel
seruati, amplissima denique imperia parta vel
collapsa sint: ut in huius operis progressu latius
ostendemus. Ceterum cum belli gloria longè
maxima apud Romanos fuerit, qui suum con-
ditorisq; sui parentem Martem ferebant, ad
eamq; sola disciplina militari (quod præcipuum
decus & stabilimentum Romani imperij vocat
Valer. Max.) peruenerint, eademq; labente pau-
latim magis ac magis præcipientes iuerint, donec
tandem una cum virtute maiorum, & impe-
rium & gloriam amitterent: operæ precium me
facturum existimaui, si per quos viros, quibus
artibus, quo genere disciplina, tantam in rebus
bellicis gloriam meruerint (quatenus studio
iuris & historiarum lectione consequi potui)
proponerem. Ex quibus certè liquebit, eadem
ingenta hominum, quæ nunc sunt, & olim
fuisse: eosdem quoque casus & euentus rerum,
qui imiles contingunt, & olim euenisse. unde

EPISTOLA

non difficile erit ei, qui antiqua diligenter expenderit, & perpenſo iudicio examinauerit, & retroactis (quod propriè ſapientis viri officium eſt) præſentia iudicare futura proſpicere, & ex veterum exemplis, propter caſuum ſimilitudinem, conuenientia remedia malis adhibere: quibus neglectis, in eundem lapidem ſapius impingimus. Neque enim, ut Ariſtides dicebat, in bello tam armis res magna geruntur, quàm prudentia & conſilio. Itaque Xerxes, cuius exercitū & terra, & mare vix capere poterat, vnius Themiftoclis induſtria ſuperatus fuit. & Romanis, neque multitudo, neque vires maiores, quàm ampliſſimis regnis, & ferociſſimis Barbaris fuerunt: ſed principes eos fecit ſeueritas inſtitutorum, & ordo militiæ. Vnde Agamemnon non optabat, ut Aiæcis ſimiles haberet decem, ſed ut Neſtoris & Uliſſis: quorum conſilio & prudentia non dubitabat quin breui Troia peritura eſſet. & Salluſtius diu quidem magnum inter mortales certamen fuiſſe ſcribit, vine corporis, an virtute animi, res magis militaris procederet: ſed poſtea periculo atque negotiis compertum eſſe, in bello plurimum ingenium poſſe. Lucullum verò ſcribit Cicero, cū eſſet Roma ad Mitridaticum bellum proſectus, rei militaris planè rudis, legendis rebus geſtus, induſtria & ingenio, tantum

DEDICATORIA.

tantum imperatorem in omni genere belli ex-
stitisse, ut confessione & iudicio Mithridatis,
regis post Alexandrum maximi omnibus, quos
ipse legisset, ducibus præferretur. Quare pru-
denter Alphonsus Aragonum rex, rogatus plus
ne armis, an libris debcret, respondit. Ex libris
arma, & armorum iura se dedicasse: aperte pro-
fessus, se doctrina omnia debere. Quo spectat
quod Iustinian. imperator ait, militarem rem in l. 1. C. de
Iustin. cod.
confr.
tam legibus in tuto collocatam esse quam leges
armorum præsidio servatas, & horum alterum
alterius auxilio semper eguisse. Nam si rectè
iudicare volumus, non magis leges sine armis,
quam arma sine legibus & disciplina rempub.
victumque florentissimam ullo modo tueri pos-
sunt. Quæ cum ita sint, Sereniss. Princeps,
hunc qualemcumque laborem meum T. Cels.
non ingratum fore confido; munus certè exi-
guum, & splendori tuo indignum: sed ad præ-
sentem rerum statum, nisi fallor opportunum.
in quo recensendo, graues fortasse nimium, &
severos censores monitos velim, eius quod Q.
Fabius Max. Q. Fabio Max. filio consuli di-
cebat, aliter in medio ardore belli, aliter in pace
tranquilla arbitrandum esse. multa enim quæ
in pacis otio vindex disciplina persequitur, in-
ter turbas & gladios veniam merentur. T.
verò Cel. Sereniss. Princeps, hoc quicquid est
a s vel flu.

PRÆFATIO

*vel studij vel laboris, dedicaui: tum quòd mea
interesse putarem, eam non ignorare quid age-
rem, & quæ studia tractarem, dum a publicis
functionibus vacarem: tum quòd militaria
hac nemini magis conuenire arbitrarer, quàm
tibi tanto Imperatori, & disciplina militaris
amantissimo. Cuius actiones Deus optimus
maximus dirigat, eundemque nobis quàm
diutissimè seruet incolumem. E castris
ante Tornacum, pridie Kal. No-
uemb. 1581.*



PRÆFATIO DE IVRE BELLII.



Plurimè a Pyndaro pleriq;
dictum existimât, bellum
tyrannum esse, & legem
omnium reginam. nihil
enim legibus, quæ diuini-
tus nobis datæ sunt, tam contrarium,
quàm vi agere; quod proprium est bel-
luarum. & quemadmodum aquilæ vn-
guis acumen, & leoni dentium asperi-
tas: sic homini rationem (quam rectè I.
C. animam legis esse voluerunt) datam
esse: qua sola contédere & se tueri debet.
Vnde quamuis rempub. sine iusticia geri
non

DE IVRE BELLI.

non posse, nihilq; tam inimicum quàm iniusticiam ciuitati, a Lælio (quem Cicerò de repub. disputantem contra Philum inducit) abudè satis disceptatum sit: tamen bellum sine iniuria geri nō posse, adhuc hodie multorū mentibus insedit. tot enim mala, tam magna, tam horrēda, tam sœua, ex bellis, etiam quæ iusta dicuntur, & quidem necessariò oriri: vt qui illa omnia ad iusticiæ normam redigere conetur, nihil aliud agat, quàm si cum ratione insaniat. Etenim prorsus inutilem esse iusticiam: & id ius esse in bello, quod ei, qui plus potest, vtile est: & pro iure vires esse: hoc potissimum argumento probare nitebātur veteres, iniustum scilicet esse, & contra naturam, vt homines hominibus dominantibus seruiant: quod belli iure inductum fuit: quam tamen iniusticiam nisi sequatur imperiosa ciuitas, cuius magna est resp. non eam posse prouinciis imperare. Sed certè tollenda est hæc opinio, sunt enim & belli, sicut & pacis iura: & in eos, qui equum pati non possunt, nec ratione cohiberi, vis haud iniusta est. Iniquitas enim partis aduersæ, vt inquit D. Augustinus, iusta bella ingerit gerenda sapiēti, imo

*de ciuit. Del
lib. 19. cap. 7.*

PRÆFATIO

imo necessaria. Itaque Dauid vir Deo acceptissimus, aliiq; viri sanctissimi, bella
c. noli. 23. q. 1 gesserunt². & Deus ipse præcepit Israëlitis, vt Amorrhæis, aliisque populis bella inferrent. Dolebit ergo sapiens, iusti
Deut. 2. belli sibi extitisse necessitatem: suscipiet tamen, communi reipub. vtilitati consulens potius quàm priuatorum: ne cōtra præceptum illud Platonis, dum partem aliquam reipub. tueri vult, totum corpus deferat. Nec protinus iniustum censendum est, quòd iusto bello victi, in seruitutem olim redigerentur: imo id iustissimum esse, ex eo defendi potest, quòd reipub. conueniat, vt puniantur ij, qui iniustum bellum gerunt. sed & quod talibus hominibus sit vtilis seruitus, dici potest: quia scilicet improbis auferitur iniuriarū licētia, & domiti se melius habituri sunt, quàm indomiti se habuerūt. quales Asia incolas esse, Agesilaus dicere solet, bonos
Plut. in apop. scilicet, si seruiret, malos, si libertate fruerentur. Quæ ratio vt firmaretur, Lælius apud Ciceronem de republ. disputans, subdidit veluti a natura sumptū nobile exemplum, & dixit: Cur igitur deus homini, animus corpori imperat, ratio libidini, ceterisque vitiosis animi partibus.
 quod

DE IVRE BELLI.

quod D. Augustino mirè probatur. Sed ^{de civit. Dei}
 & ex præcepto Dei Moyſes, Madianitis ^{lib. 19. cap. 7.}
 prælio victis, prædam omnem tam ho- ^{num. 31.}
 minum, quàm pecorū inter ſuos diuifit.
 & Apoſtolus monet ſeruos, vt obediant ^{ad Eph. 6.}
 dominis ſuis, & ex animo ſeruiant. Recta
 itaq; ratio natura ſapiētibus inſita, coër-
 cendam humanam improbitatem, bello,
 captiuitate, & ſeruitute ſuaſit. de quo a-
 lio loco plura dicemus. Porro eadem
 ratio iuſticiæ, quæ bellis gerendis nor-
 mam præſcribit, dat etiam ſuas leges mi-
 litibus & exercitui, quibus diſciplina mi-
 litaris ſtabilitur: qua ſemel polluta, vt
 „ Papyrij dictatoris verba apud Liuiū re- ^{lib. 8.}
 „ feram, & non miles cēturionis, non cen-
 „ turio tribuni, non tribunus legati, non
 „ legatus conſulis, non magiſter equitum
 „ dictatoris pareat imperio: nō edicta im-
 „ peratoris obſeruentur; ſine comœatu
 „ vagi milites, in pacato, in hoſtico errent,
 „ immemores ſacramenti, licentia ſola ſe
 „ vbi velint exauctorent: infrequentia de-
 „ ferantur ſigna: neque conueniatur ad e-
 „ dictum, nec diſcernatur interdium, nocte;
 „ æquo, iniquo loco; iniuſſu imperatoris
 „ pugnent, & non ſigna, non ordines ſer-
 „ uent, latrocinij modo cæca & fortuita,
 pro

PRÆFATIO DE IVRE BELLI.
pro solenni & sacra militia erit. Vt enim ,
in fidibus & cantu, ex distinctis sonis, &
dissimillarum vocum moderatione, cō-
cors tamen concentus efficitur & con-
gruens : sic ex summis, & mediis, & infi-
mis interiectis ordinibus , moderatum
ratione & disciplina exercitū (quod de
ciuitate dicebat Scipio, quem Cicero de
republ. disputantem inducit) consensu
dissimillimorum concinere dicendū est.
& quæ harmonia a Musicis dicitur in cā-
tu, ea est in exercitu concordia, arctissi-
mum & optimū disciplinæ militaris vin-
culum : quæ certè sine iusticia esse non
potest: quæ ad quamcunque rem geren-
dam est necessaria: & cuius, vt ait Cicero,
tanta vis est, vt nec illi quidem, qui male-
ficio & scelere pascuntur, possint sine vlla
particula iusticiæ viuere. Et hæc quidem
dixisse sufficiat, vt huius operis rationem
redderemus, & iis satisfaceremus, qui iu-
ra belli (quibus reip. salus continetur)
tanquam naturæ & paci euangelicæ
contraria, damnare sunt
ausi.

LIBRI

LIBRI PRIMI CAPITA.

D E ratione belli indicendi, aliisque caerimonijs bellicis, quæ antiquo iure feciali proditaæ fuere.	Cap. 1.
De bello iusto, & iustis belli causis.	Cap. 2.
De duello seu singulari certamine.	Cap. 3.
De pignerationibus, quas vulgò reprecasias vocat.	Cap. 4.
De bello captis, & iure postliminii.	Cap. 5.
De fide hosti seruanda.	Cap. 6.
De foederibus & inducijs.	Cap. 7.
De insidijs & fraude hostili.	Cap. 8.
De iure legatorum.	Cap. 9.

Libri secundi capitula.

D E officijs bellicis.	Cap. 1.
De imperatore vel duce exercitus.	Cap. 2.
Vnum non plures exercitui præfici debere, & cum potestate libera: eundemque continuum: nec eum quem prius offenderis ignominiaue affeceris.	Cap. 3.
Vtrum lenitate & beneuolentia, an verò seueritate & sæuitia plus proficiet imperator.	Cap. 4.
Temporum rationem præcipuè in bello habendâ.	Cap. 5.
Contentiosas & lentas de rebus bellicis deliberationes admodum noxias esse, præsertim vbi facto magis quàm consulto opus est.	Cap. 6.
Dum res adhuc sunt integræ, ne minimum quidem regi vel reip. de maiestate sua concedendum esse: & errare eos qui arrogantiam hostium; modestia & patientia vinci posse existimant.	Cap. 7.
An præster bellum domi excipere, an verò in hostilem agrum inferre.	Cap. 8.
An præstet initio prælij magno clamore & cōcitato cursu in hostes pergere, an verò loco manere & hostium impetum excipere.	Cap. 9.
Non esse consilij inuicem insensos civilibus dissentionibus hostes sola discordia fretum inuadere.	Cap. 10.
Necessitatem pugnandi magno studio imponendam esse militibus & hostibus remittendam.	Cap. 11.
In victoria potissimum de pace cogirandum.	Cap. 12.
Deiunctis hostibus, qua potissimum ratione perpetua pace quieti obtineri possint.	Cap. 13.

Libri

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De eo qui arcem, vel oppidum, cuius præsidio impositus est, amittit, vel hostibus dedit.	Cap. 18.
De furtis & aliis quibusdam delictis militaribus.	Cap. 19.
De præmiis militum.	Cap. 20.

*Tres hi libri utiles sunt ad conseruandam hoc tempore ca-
lamitosa disciplinam militarem, nec habent aliquid quod
fidei Catholice contrarietur. Sic censio 16. Nouemb. 1581.*

Mathias Lambrecht sacre Theol.
Licent. & Regius in alma vniuers.
Duacen. Catechismi professor.

DE IV-

I

DE IVRE ET OFFICIIS BELLICIS, ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI, LIBER PRIMVS.

DE RATIONE BELLII INDICENDI,
ALIISQVE CÆRIMONIIS BELLICIS,
quæ antiquo iure feciali proditæ fuerunt.

- 1 *Ius feciale.*
- 2 *Collegium fecialium.*
- 3 *Officium fecialium.*
- 4 *Clarigatio.*
- 5 *Paterpatratus.*
- 6 *Tybarenorum fides.*
- 7 *Verba iuris fecialis.*
- 8 *Iniussu populi fœdus iniri non poterat.*
- 9 *Sp Postumus hostibus deditus.*
- 10 *Deditionis formula.*
- 11 *Mancinus Numantinis deditus.*

CAPVT PRIMVM.



ROMANOS belli, sicut & pacis iura perpenso iudicio semper æstimasse, ex eorū historiis licet cognoscere: ita vt mirum videri non debeat, tam felices eis semper contigisse bellorū exitus: quippe qui arma
A nunquam

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

nunquam nisi iustis de causis sumpse-
rint, vt refert Dionysius Halicarnass.^a
a Antiquitat. Roma. lib. 2. vsque adeò vt cùm legati Campanorũ
(quos Samnites aduerso prælio frege-
rant, & ad petendum Romæ auxilium
coëgerant) in senatum introducti, mul-
tis verbis docuissent, quam utilis foret
Rom. rebus Cāpanæ societatis accessio,
petentes amicitiam in perpetuũ, in præ-
sens auxilium: nihil tamen aliud impe-
trarunt à senatu, qui non temerè se bel-
lis alienis immiscere volebat, quàm vt
legati mitterentur ad Samnites, precatũ
ne qua vis Campanis fieret. ad quẽ prin-
ceps legationis à Cāpanis missus, quẽ-
admodum in mādatis acceperat; Quan-
doquidem, inquit, nostra tueri aduersus
vim atque iniuriam iusta vi non vultis,
vestra certè defendetis. itaq; populum
Campanum, vrbẽque Capuam, agros,
diuina, humanaque omnia in vestram
P. C. populi que Rom. ditionem dedi-
mus. quicquid deinde patiemur dediti-
tij vestri passuri. Tum in senatu iam fi-
desagi visa, vt refert Liuius,^b dediros nō
prodi, bellumque aduersus Samnites
susceptũ est, quod sine iusto titulo, Ro-
mani à Campanis in se nunquam ver-
tissent.

b lib. 7.

tissent. Similiter priusquam tertium & ultimum bellum Punicū susciperetur, diu multumque tāta res agitata est; atque inter M. Porcium Catonem, & Scipionem Nasicam senatus principes (quorū alter sapientissimus vir in ciuitate habebatur, alter optimus vir etiam à senatu iudicatus erat) variis sententiis certatū. Cato suadebat vt bellum indiceretur Carthaginensibus, qui exercitum specie contra Massanissā regem; reipsā, cōtra Romanos cōparatum in finibus habebant, Nasica cōtradicante, ex cuius sententia legatos mitti Carthaginem placuit, qui specularentur quid agerent, castigato eorum senatu, quòd contra fœdus exercitum, & nauales materias haberent. Sed Gisgo Amilcaris filius, homo seditiosus, ita senatum bellum aduersus Romanos suadendo concitauit, vt legati fuga sibi consulere coacti sint. cumque tunc Cato non diutius bellum differendum censeret, Nasica nondum iustam sibi beilandi causam videri, & nihil temerè faciendum dicebat. sed Catonis sententia peruicit, & cum Carthaginensibus, quòd contra fœdus naues haberent, & extra finēs exercitum

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

eduxissent, quodque Massanissæ socio
a Flor. lib. 49 arma intulissent, bellum gestum^a. Ac
belli quidem æquitas, ut inquit Cice-
b offc lib. 1. ro^b, sanctissimè * feciali populi Roma- 1
ni iure perscripta erat. ex quo intel-
ligi potest, nullum bellum fuisse iu-
stum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis ge-
reretur, aut denūciatum antè esset, aut
indictum. quod ius Ancus Martius rex,
ab antiqua gēte Æquicolis descripsit. a
quo bellicæ cærimoniæ, ut non gererē-
tur solum, sed etiam indicerentur bella
aliquo ritu, primùm Romanis, uti Li-
c lib. 1. uius^c testatur, sunt proditæ: licet alij hoc
Numæ Pompilio tribuant, a quo septi-
ma sacrarum legum parte, collegium
d Dionysius fecialium * institutum fuisse asserunt^d. 2
Haliscar. an- Officiū * verò fecialiū (cuius summa 3
tiquit. Rom. semper apud Romanos fuit auctoritas)
lib. 2. in summa erat: dare operam ne Romani
vlli foederatæ ciuitati, iniustum bellum
inferret; & de bellis, foederibus, pactio-
nibus, & iniuriis, sociis, aliisque confœ-
deratis gētibus illatis cognoscere. quòd
si qua prior, contra foederis cōditiones,
aliquid commisisset, legatos mittere, &
verbis primùm ius suum repetere, & res
sibi dari clara voce poscere (quæ clari-
gatio

4 gatio * dicta) his verbis : Iouem ego te-
 „ stem facio, si ego impiè iniusteque, illas
 „ res dedier populo Romano, mihi que
 „ exposco, tunc patriæ compotem nun-
 „ quam sinas esse. Quòd si dedignaretur
 facere postulata, renūciata prius socie-
 tate & amicitia (si qua fortè erat) post
 triginta demum dies, qui solènes fuère,
 bellum indicere, captaq; & hostili mo-
 do deuastata, belli iure repetere. Fecia-
 libus certè prohibentibus, aut non pro-
 bantibus, neque consuli, neque senatui,
 neq; populo, arma in hostes sumere li-
 5 cebat. Maximus * verò erat inter fecia-
 les, quem Patrempatratum appellabāt.
 is autem erat, qui liberos haberet, uiuo
 adhuc patre suo ^a, què fecialis, verbena ^{a Plut. in}
 caput & frontem cingens, indicēdi bel- ^{quæst. Romæ.}
 li, aut percutiendi foederis, principem
 faciebat. Cæterum sciendum est non
 fuisse necesse, ipsi regi, cum quo fortè
 belligerandum erat, bellum indici, sed
 satis erat, ad præsidium aliquod nun-
 ciare. vt feciales consulti, primùm cū
 Philippo, & iterum cū Antiocho bel-
 lum indicendum esset, decreuere. Bel-
 lo autem legitimè indicto, sublatis cō-
 meritiis, militi arma capere, & copias
 A 3 cogere

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cogere licebat, ad hostes ducere, excursions facere, prædas agere, fines populari, eosque ferro, ignique deuastare, frumenta succidere, ædificia incendere, atque omnia hostiliter agere. Tybarenos
 * tamē adeo iustos fuisse memoriæ proditum est, ut non prius cum hoste congregerentur, quàm diem, locum, & decretandi horam, ex fide per feciales hosti denunciarent. quod & à veteribus illis Romanis, nōnunquam factum fuisse legimus. Formulam verò, & ritum belli indicēdi, antiquissimum refert Livi².
 Feciales itaque, si qui illatam cōtra fœdus iniuriā querebantur, causam eorum cognoscebant, & cōperto crimine, fontes comprehensos læsis dedebant. iudicabant item de legatorum iniuriis, qui iure gentium sancti fuere: atque ita, si à quouis populo, aut natione violati forent, ut hi qui iura gentium temerè violassent, dederentur, per feciales cauebatur. idque etiam iure nostro cautum est^b.
 Dabant quoque operam feciales, ut servarentur cōditiones fœderis, pacem faciebant, & si parum legitimè facta videbatur, irritam reddebant. Non aliter tamen fœdera cum sociis, aut hostibus sancire,

^a Lib. I. Et
 Cell. lib. 16.
 cap. 4. Et
 Dion. Halic.
 car. Ant. Ro-
 ma, lib. 2.

^b In l. ult. D.
 de legationib.

fancire, aut pactiones concipere poterant, quàm si cōsulis, aut prætoris auctoritate, intercedente S. C. iussuq; populi, permissum foret, denique si quid imperatores, vel duces contra iurisiurâdi religionem peccassent, feciales cognoscebant, atque expiabant. Verba^a autem
 „ iuris fecialis hæc erant : Belli, pacis, fœderum, indutiarum, oratorum, feciales iudices sunt^a. Et quidem auctores fœderis, minus rite initi, per ipsos feciales hostibus dedebâtur, vt hac ratione, populus religione solueretur. In iussu^a verò populi & citra Senatus auctoritatē, nihil sanciri poterat, quod populum teneret, & sine fecialibus, cærimoniaque alia solemni, fœdus fieri non poterat. Vnde T. Veturius, & Sp. Postumius
 9 confs.^a quia, cū malè pugnatum apud Caudiū esset, legionibus Romanis subiugum missis, pacem cum Samnitibus iniussu populi, senatusque fecerant, vnâ cum T. Numicio & Q. Æmilio Trib. pleb. quod eorū quoq; auctoritate pax Caudina facta erat, dediti sunt hostibus, vt pax Samnitum repudiaretur. atque huius deditionis ipse Postumius, quid dedebatur, suasor & auctor fuit^b.

^a Cicer. lib. 2
de legib.

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Cuius verba, vt refert Liuius, hæc fuerunt : Dedamur per feciales, nudi vinctique, exoluamus religione populum, si qua obligauimus : ne quid diuini, humanive obftet, quo minus iustū piumque de integro ineatur bellum. Deditionis vero per feciales factæ formula hæc fuit * : Quandoquidem hice homines iniussu populi Romani, quiritum foedus ictum iri spopoderunt, atque ob eam rem noxam nocuerunt : ob eam rē, quò populus Romanus scelere impio sit solutus, hosce homines vobis dedo. Similiter multis annis post * C. Mancinus Numantinis, quibuscum iniussu populi & citra senatus auctoritatem foedus fecerat, deditus est ^b.

^a Cicero of-
fic. lib. 3.
Flor. lib. 2.
cap. 18.

DE BELLO IUSTO ET IUSTIS
BELLICAVSIS.

- 1 *Conseruanda iura belli.*
- 2 *Duo genera decertandi.*
- 3 *Bella suscipienda, vt in pace vinatur.*
- 4 *Ex bellis etiam iustis multa mala oriri.*
- 5 *Bellum honestum turpi paci præferendum.*
- 6 *Iusta bella iure Gentium, Canonum, & diuino permissa.*

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- 7 *In iusto bello requiritur auctoritas Principis.*
- 8 *Apud Romanos belli pacisque arbitrium penes populum fuit.*
- 9 *Quandoque iniussu principis bellum geri posse.*
- 10 *In pacem rebellionis ipso iure inciditur.*
- 11 *Iusta belli causa.*
- 12 *Rebellio.*
- 13 *Iniuria facta principi, cesset facta Deo.*
- 14 *Aliud rebellus; aliud hostis.*
- 15 *Iura belli an conueniant rebellibus.*
- 16 *Ciuilis dissentio.*
- 17 *Lex Solonis.*
- 18 *In bello non semper tutum non alteri parti se adiungere.*
- 19 *Media via periculosa.*
- 20 *Principis auctoritas semper sequenda contra rebelles.*
- 21 *Nulla iusta causa rebellandi.*
- 22 *Quid respub. vel patria.*
- 23 *Rebellio grauissimum crimen.*
- 24 *Tyrannus occidi potest.*
- 25 *Legitimus princeps tyrannus dici non potest.*
- 26 *Lex Regia.*
- 27 *Pontifex ex causa potest regem regno priuare.*

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- 28 *Bellum aduersus infideles an, & quatenus iustum.*
 29 *Imperator non est totius mūdi dominus.*
 30 *Hæreticis iustum bellum infertur.*
 31 *Militi non nocet iniusta belli causa.*
 32 *Militi Christiano sub imperatore pagano permissum militare.*
 33 *Quatenus regi infideli parendum.*
 34 *Iustum bellum etiam sine iusta causa.*
 35 *An utrimque bellum dici possit iustum.*
 36 *Pecunia neruus belli.*
 37 *Cuius impensis bellum geri debeat.*
 38 *Traianus fiscum leni comparabat.*
 39 *Mos Gallorum.*
 40 *Damnain bello accepta an resarciri debeant.*

CAPVT SECVNDVM.

IN repub. bene constituta maximè cō-
a offic. lib. 1. seruanda* esse iura belli docet Cicer.^a 1
 in quo & suscipiendo, & gerendo, & de-
 ponendo ius vt plurimum valet & fi-
b Cicer. lib. 2 de legibus. des^b. quò spectāt illa, quæ de iure feciali
 diximus. Nam cū sint duo* genera de- 2
 certandi, vt idem ait : vnum per discep-
 tationem, alterum per vim : cumq; illud
 proprium sit hominis, hoc belluarum;
 confugiendum est ad posterius, si vti nō
 licet

licet superiore. Quod etiā indicasse videntur poëtæ, cū Chironem centaurum (cuius superiorem partē hominis, inferiorem verò equi formā referre fingunt) Achillis pædagogum cōstitutum tradunt: vt ostenderent, bonum principem non solum prudentia & consilio, aliisque animi dotibus præditum, sed etiam viribus, & armis instructum esse debere. in eos enim qui æquum pati nō possunt, neq; ratione cohiberi, vis haud iniusta est. Sed vt Scipio dicere solet, imperator itidē vt medicus, ad malum curandum vltimo demum loco ferrum

3 adhibere debet ^a. Quare suscipienda ^a a Plaz. in A-
poph. quidem bella sunt, ob eam causam vt sine iniuria in pace viuatur, & ita vt nihil aliud nisi pax quæsitā videatur ^b. Quò ^b b c. vol. 23
quest. 1. spectat memorabilis illa Martiani Cæsaris sententia: Donec liceret in pace viuere, nō debere principē arma sumere:

4 cū tot tantaque mala ex bellis ^{*}, etiam quæ iusta dicuntur, oriantur. quorum

„ malorum, vt exclamat D. Augustinus ^c, c de ciuit. Dei
lib. 19. cap. 7

„ multas & multiplices clades, diras &

„ duras necessitates, si, vt dignū est, eloqui

„ velim, quanquam nequaquam sicut res

„ postulat, possim; quis erit prolixę disputationis

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tationis modus? Sed sapiens, inquiunt, iusta bella gesturus est: quasi nō, si se hominem meminit, multo magis dolebit iustorum necessitates sibi extitisse bellorum. quia nisi iusta essent, gerenda nō essent, ac per hoc sapienti nulla bella essent. iniquitas enim partis aduersæ iusta bella ingerit gerenda sapiēti, imo & necessaria, quæ iniquitas homini utique dolēda, quia hominum est, etsi nulla ex ea bellandi necessitas nasceretur. Hæc itaque mala tam magna, tam horrenda, tam sæua quisquis cum dolore considerat, miseriam necesse est fateatur. quisquis autem vel patitur ea sine animi dolore, vel cogitat, multo ubique miserius ideo se putat beatum, quia & humanū perdit sensum: hæc ille. Sunt enim, ut inquit Liuius, quædā belli iura, quæ ut facere, ita pati fas est: ut fata exuri, dirui tecta, prædas hominum pecorumq; agi: quæ certè misera, licet non semper indigna, patienti sunt. Paci itaque, quæ nihil sit habitura insidiarū, aut turpitudinis, ut ait Cicero^a, semper erit cōsulendum. Ceterum, quāuis, ut idem ait^b, dulce sit nomen pacis, & ipsa res tum iucunda, tum salutaris. nam neq; priuatos fōcos, neque

^a officio. lib. 1

^b Philopp. 13

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7

neque publicas leges, neque libertatis
iura chara habere potest, quæ discordiæ,
quem cædes ciuium, quem bellum pu-
blicum delectat: bellum tamen * hone-
stū, ex Demosthenis sententia, turpi pa-
ci semper est præferendum. Et quidem
6 iusta * bella sunt iure gentium indicta a:
& tum iure canonum^b: tum etiam iure
diuino permissa^c. nā & Deus ipse præ-
cepit Israelitis, vt Amorræis, aliisq; po-
pulis bellum inferrent^d. vnde D. Au-
gust.^e Noli, inquit, existimare neminem
Deo placere, qui armis bellicis mini-
strat. nam Dauid Deo acceptissimus, &
Centurio ille, cuius fides diuino testi-
monio extollitur, & alij sancti viri ope-
ram militiæ dederunt. Vt autem bellum
7 dicatur iustum, debet imprimis * aucto-
ritate, & mandato summi principis, pe-
nes quem est belli pacisq; arbitrium, in-
dici, & suscipi^f. Nam ad priuatum non
spectat bellum mouere, cū ius suū in
iudicio persequi possit & debeat. violat
enim ius principis, qui sine iuris aucto-
ritate, manu regia ius sibi dicit^g. Sed
nec vlli, in scio, & inconsulto principe,
quorumlibet armorum mouendorum
copia tribuitur^h. Et lege Iulia maiesta-
tis te-

a L. ex hoc
iure. ff. de
iust & iur.
b c. in si. c.
Dominus. 23
quasi. 2. In-
no. in c. olim.
de iestit. spol.
c c. nise bella.
c. noli. c. mili-
tare. 23. q. 1.
c. notandum.
23. q. 2.
d Deuter. 2.
e epist. 1. ad
Bonifac.

f c. quid cul-
patur. 23. q. 1.
D. Augustin.
lib. 22. contra
Faust. ca. 74.
g L. ex si. at.
D. de eo quod
met. caus.
h L. vnc. C.
vt armo. v.
sus iusc. prin-
cip si inter-
dict. lib. 11.

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tis tenetur, qui iniussu principis bellum
 gesserit, delectumve habuerit, aut exer-
 citum comparauerit^a. Itaque Cato cen-
 sebat reuocandum exercitum, & Cæsa-
 rem hostibus dedendum, quod iniussu
 populi bellū in Gallia gereret^b. Apud
 Romanos^{*} enim penes populum, cuius 8
 erat summum imperium, belli pacisque
 arbitriū fuit, vt ex multis Liuij locis sa-
 tis constat. Itaque patres decreuere, in-
 quit Liuius^c, vt tribuni militum de bel-
 lo indicendo Veiētibus, primo quoque
 die ad populum ferrent. item Prænesti-
 nis ex S. C. populi iussu, bellum indictū
 est^d: & ex auctoritate patrum populus
 Palæpolitanis bellum fieri iussit: item
 Vestinis^e, & Æquis^f. Vnde cum popu-
 lus omne imperium in se, potestatem-
 que, principi lege Regia cōtulerit^g, hoc
 belli, pacisq; arbitrium est apud solum
 principem: quod ita penes ipsum resi-
 det, & maiestati principis cohæret, vt ab
 eo diuelli non possit^h. & hoc ius reges
 semper habuisse, indicat quoque histo-
 ria sacraⁱ. Nonnunquam tamen^{*}, vt puta 9
 ex magna & necessaria causa, & si prin-
 ceptis sit absens, sitque periculū in mora,
 etiam iniussu principis bellum geri po-
 terit:

^a L. 3. D. ad
 legem Iul.
 maiest.

^b Plutar. in
 Cat. Vticen.
 & Iul. Cæsar

^c Liuius l. 4.

^d Liuius lib.
 16.

^e Liuius lib.
 18.

^f Liuius lib.
 19.

^g l. 1. D. de
 constit. princ.

^h Latè Bo-
 din. de repub.
 lib. 1. ca. vlt.

ⁱ Reg. 1. c. 8.

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8 ^a Argumenta

terit^a: præsertim ex causa defensionis,
quæ iure naturæ cuilibet conceditur^b.

Quo casu non solum licebit propellere
iniuriam, sed etiam vlcisci^c, & hostes se-
dibus suis pellere, si aliter ab iis tuti esse
non possumus. neque enim dicendus est
quis moderamen inculpatæ tutelæ ex-

cedere, qui id facit, sine quo periculum
evitare non potest: vt multis ostendit
Marian. Socin.^d Nepos, qui existimat
istud bellum dici iustum, etiā quoad ef-
fectum, & iuri belli locum esse (effectus
enim ex causis colligitur^e.) ideoq; capta

in hoc bello, fieri capientium: & hæc
multò magis obtinere, si cū rebellibus
res sit: quorum conatus non solum qui-
libet potest, sed etiam tenetur cohibere,
nō expectato iussu principis, si sit peri-
culum in mora. Si enim is, qui non pro-
pellit à socio iniuriam, cū potest, tam
est in vitio, quàm is qui facit^f: quid de
iniuria, quæ principi fit, dicendum est?

10 præsertim* cū ij, qui quid contra prin-
cipis maiestatem, & reipub. quietem ma-
chinantur, ipso iure in poenam rebellio-
nis incidāt^g, & quasi hostes occidi pos-
sint^h, vel captiui haberiⁱ: vnde multò
magis bona eorum capientium fient^k.

estque

l. si alius. §.
bellissime. in
fine. D. quod
vi aut clam.
L. generalis.
C. de decurio.
lib. 10. L. a
prator. §. si
debitorem. D.
quæ in fraud.
credit.

b L. vt vim.
D. de iust. &
iur. l. 1. quæd.
lic. vn. fin.
iud. se ven.
Clem. Pasto-
ralis. in fine,
de re iud.

c c. Dominus
23. q. 2.

d Conf. 68.
tomo 3.

e l. 2. §. ult.
& l. sequ. D.
de donatio.
se. nō in infe-
rēda 23. q. 3.

g ex. qui sint
rebell.

h L. 3. §. ult.
D. ad l. Cor-
nel. de sica. L.
proditores. D.
de re militar.

i L. transfu-
gam. D. de
acq. rer. dom.
k Gloss. ex.

qui sunt re-
bell. & ibi
Bart. & Cur.

lno. conf. 137

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estque inter cetera, quæ in Romana historia inuenire licet, præclarum in hanc sententiam exemplum de L. Pinario, Ænnæ in Sicilia præfecto præsidij : qui cum ciuium rebellionem, & defectionē ad Carthaginienses præsentiret, & liberum nō esset legatos ad Cōsulem Marcellum, quāuis haud procul esset, mittere, ex improviso magna cæde facta, ciues omnes oppressit. quo facinore Ænna retenta est, eiusque factum Marcellus non improbavit, & prædam Ænnesium militibus concessit^a. Itaque Cicero laudat factum Octauij Cæsaris, qui non expectato senatus decreto, bellum contra Antonium sua sponte susceperat. decernendi enim tempus, vt ille ait, nondum venerat ; belli autem gerendi tempus si prætermisisset, videbat repub. oppressa, nihil decerni posse^b. & senatus quoque bellum priuato consilio à Cæsare susceptum, auctoritate publica comprobauit^c. Sic quoq, Scipio Nasica maximam laudem meruit, qui priuata auctoritate, se omnibus bonis ducem præbens, Tib. Gracchū cum scelerata factione oppressit^d. Neceesse est enim, vt inquit Cicero, in tanta perturbatione rerum, temporibus

^a *Liuius lib.*
34.

^b *Cic. Phil. 8*

^c *Cic. Phil. 5*

^d *Val. Max.*
lib. 3. cap. 2.
Appian. de
bell. ciuil. lib.
1.

bus potius parere, quàm moribus. & , vt idem ait, semper in pace, consuetudini; in bello, vtilitati parendum est. in quam sententiã alio loco plura à nobis dicentur*. Præterea bellū non nisi ex iusta & necessaria causa gerēdum est a: & abesse debet omnis nocendi cupiditas, vlciscendi crudelitas, & dominandi libido^b. quò spectant illa quæ iure feciali apud Romanos fuere prodita. Neque solū peccat, qui ex iniusta causa bellum gerit: sed etiam opinione humana passim receptum est, eum fere semper succumbere. Nam, vt inquit Propertius,

Frangit, & attollit vires in milite causa.

Quæ nisi iusta subest, excutit arma pudor.

Iustæ verò belli* causæ præcipuæ sunt

- 11 hæ: Defensio proprii imperij, personarum, amicorum, sociorum, & rerum^c. ad defensionem enim ipsa lex naturalis etiam priuatæ auctoritatē præstat^d. Iustum ergo bellum, vt C. Pontius Sannitium dux dicebat, quibus necessariū, & pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis spes relinquitur. Subest quoque iusta belli causa, cū geritur ad recuperandas res, quæ per vim & iniustè ab hostibus detinentur^e: vel vt iniuriæ, vel dāni

B illati

* l. 2. cap. 5.

a c. noli. 23.

q^u 1.

b c. quid cul-
pat. 23. q. 1.

c c. iustum.

23. quest. 2.

c. fortitudo.

cum duob. se-

quent. 23. c. o-

lim. et ibi In-

no. de restit.

spol.

d l. vt vim.

D. de iust. &

iur. l. furem.

D. ad l. Cor-

nel de fidei. l.

itaque. D. ad

l. Aquil.

e c. iustum.

23. quest. 2.

D. Augustin.

quest. 10. su-

per iofue li. 2

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illati auctores dedantur ad supplicium, si fortè non publico, sed priuato cōsilio iniuria illata fuerit^a. quod etiā iure fe-
ciali cautum fuisse superius ostēdimus. Ita-
que Daud, mortuo Saule, bellum
gessit cum Isboſeth, filio Saulis, qui oc-
cupare nitebatur regnum Israhēl, quod
Dominus per Samuelem prophetā tra-
diderat Dauidi^b. & Romulus Albanis
bellū intulit, quòd dictator eorū Clui-
lius, nollet res raptas restituere, neque
raptores tradere^c. Est præterea iusta bel-
lica causa, vindicta iniuriæ iniquissimè il-
lata^d. Sic legimus Dauidem regem in-
tulisse bellum regi Ammonitarum, pro-
pter derisos legatos suos^e. Et quidem
ratione iniurię illatæ, dicetur etiam bel-
lum iustum, si quis prohibeatur transire
per alicuius prouinciam. modò trāsitus
innoxius futurus sit : qui iure humanæ
societatis patere debet^f. Itaque Israhēlitę
bellū intulerunt regibus Amorrhęorum,
propter non concessum transitū inno-
xium, in terrā ipsis a Deo permissam^g.
Iustissimam^{*} deniq; belli causam habet^h
princeps, qui armis persequitur rebel-
les, & ab imperio deficientes^h. grauis e-
nim iniuria infertur Deo, & principi,
cū

a c. 1. de in-
im. 16. cap.
Dominus, 23
quest. 2.

b Reg. 2. c. 2

c Dionys
Halic. lib. 3.

d c. Dominus
23. quest. 2.
cap. dispar.

23. quest. 8.

e Reg. 2. cap.
20. cu duob.
sequ.

f c. ult. 23.
quest. 2.

g Num. 2.

h c. auctori-

tatē. 15. q. 6.

cap. scire vos.

23. qu. 8. fac.

l. amissione.

§. qui defi-

cunt. D. de

capit. munit.

12

- cùm eius imperio subditi resistunt, non est enim potestas, nisi a Deo : & qui resistit potestati, vt inquit Paulus^a, Dei ordinationi resistit : & iniuria * facta principi, cēsetur facta Deo: qui Samueli, a quo populus alium regem petebat, dixit : Non te abiecerunt, sed me, ne regnem super eos^b. Dauid autem bellum gessit cum Seba filio Bochri, qui populum sollicitauit, vt a Dauide ad ipsum deficeret^c. Sed cùm rebellis * propriè hostis dici non possit, (nam aliud est hostis, aliud rebellis^d) verius est, vt si cū subditis rebellibus armis certetur, non tam dicamus esse bellum, quàm executionem iurisdictionis, & persecutionem rebellium^e. Vnde etiam non erit opus auctoritate summi principis, sed sufficiet eius qui iurisdictionē habet^f. Hinc iura belli *, captiuitatis, & postliminij, quæ hostibus tantùm cōueniunt^g, non posse rebellibus cōuenire, consequēs videntur : sicut nec piratis & latronibus (qui hostium numero non cōtinentur) conueniūt^h. quod ita intelligi debet, vt ipsi iure belli agere non possint : ideoq; dominium rerū captarum non acquirūtⁱ, quod hostibus tantùm tributum est^k. in

^a ad Roman.
^{cap.} 13.

^b Reg. 1. c. 3.

^c Reg. 2. c.

20.

^d ex. qui sunt

rebellis. l. ho-

stes D. de ca-

ptiuit. hostes.

D. de verbor.

significat.

^e inno. in c.

olim. 1. de re-

stitu. spoliat.

fuc. l. qui re-

stituere. D. de

res vendic.

^f d. . . qui re-

stituere.

^g l. post imi-

nij. et l. de ho-

stib. D. de capti-

uit. h. D. l. ho-

stes.

ⁱ l. post imi-

nij. §. à pi-

ratis. D. de

captiui. l. a

latronib. D.

de testam. l.

hostes.

^k D. l. postli-

minij.

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a Argumēto
l. 3. §. 1. D.
de donat. in-
ter vir. et vir.
b Philipp. 5.

c epist. 6. lib.
10.

ipſos verò iure belli ſæuire, multoquæ
magis quàm in hoſtes, licet: ſunt enim
odio digni maiore, & nō debet eſſe me-
lioris cōditionis rebellis & latro, quàm
legitimus & iuſtus hoſtis^a. Quò ſpecta-
re videtur quod bCicero ſentit, non eſſe
mittendos legatos ad Antonium, nec
verbis rogandum, ſed cogendum armis
eſſe recedere ab obſidione Mutinæ, co-
loniæ populi Rom. & oppugnatione
Bruti imperatoris, conſulis deſignati, &
ciuis optimi. non enim cum Annibale
rem eſſe hoſte reipub. ad quem ſenatus
olim legatos miſerat, vt à Sagunto rece-
deret; ſed cum ciue. Neque intereſſe di-
cebat, vtrùm urbem Romanā Antonius
oppugnaret, an coloniā populi Rom.
præſidij cauſa collocatam. & alibi idem
Cicero ad Plancum ſcribens c̄dicit, cum
Antonianiſ, à quibus Brutus Mutinæ
obſidebatur, pacem fieri nō debere: vo-
cans eos ſœdiſſimos latrones, qui aut
armis poſitis pacē petere deberent: aut,
ſi pugnantes eam poſtulerent, victoria
pacem, non pactione pariendam eſſe.
Præterea cū à parte principis ſint om-
nia illa, quæ ad iuſtum bellum ſunt ne-
ceſſaria: nempe belli gerēdi ius, & iuſta
belli

LIBER PRIMVS.

II

belli causa; à parte verò rebellium, neq;
belli gerēdi ius, quod soli principi com-
petit, vt superius ostēdimus, neque iusta
belli causa: cū nulla sit causa rebellan-
di, vt mox dicemus: sequitur bellum,
quod cum rebellibus princeps gerit, iu-
stissimum esse: ideoq̃ue iuri belli locum
esse contra rebelles, qui tanquam hostes
occidi possunt^a, vel capti serui haberi^b,
vnde etiam multò magis bona eorum
prædæ cedent^c. effectus enim ex causis
colligitur^d. Quod ita verum puto, si
auspiciis summi principis bellum gera-
tur, alioqui verò, quamuis defensio cui-
libet permissa sit, & quisque iurisdictio-
nem suam exercere possit, tamen iura
belli non aliter locum habebunt, quàm
si auctoritatē, & nomine summi princi-
pis bellum geratur^e. alias enim bellum
dici non potest. Bellum verò quod re-
belles gerunt, iniustissimum esse cōstat:
ideoq̃ue iure belli agere non possunt, &
capti ab ipsis non fiunt serui^f. nam ces-
sante causa cessat effectus^g; & nemo ex
dolo suo lucrari, aut aliis nocere de-
bet^h. Non obstat quod Vlpianus respō-
ditⁱ, in ciuilibus dissentionibus*, qui in
alterutram partē discessissent, vice ho-

^a l. 3. §. ult.
D. adl. Cor.
de fisc. l. pro-
ditores. D. de
re militar.
^b l. transfu-
gam. D. de
acq. rer. dom.
^c Gloss. &
Bart. ex. qui
sunt rebe. l.
Curt. l. in.
conf. 137.
^d l. 2. §. ult.
c. ml. seq. D.
de don.
^e Bart. in l.
hostes. D. de
captiu. l. inso.
in c. olim. 1.
de restit. spcl.
in c. scut. &
infra de iure-
iura.
^f d. l. possi-
mum §. a
piratis. D. de
captiu. d. l. a
latronibus.
D. de testam.
^g c. cum ces-
sante. de ap-
pellat. l. adi-
gere. D. de
iur. patro.
^h l. dotū. C.
de per. et com.
rei vend.
ⁱ in l. si quis
ingennam §.
in ciuilibus.
D. de captiu.

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stium non esse : eorū scilicet, inter quos iura captiuitatis & postliminij vigent: ideoque captos hinc inde non fieri seruos, & quod cōstitutionibus regni Hispaniæ, in ciuilibus dissentionibus capta iubetur cum septuplo restitui^a. Nam hæc locum habent, cū ciues inter sese dissentiunt, & tumultuantur : non autē cū quid contra maiestatem imperij machinatur, & in exitium reipub. contendunt^b. tunc enim hostium numero haberi incipiunt^c. Itaque Vlpianus vsus est vocabulo partis. partes autem dici ait Cicero^d, cū scissa in duas partes reipub. ciues inter se contendunt, quæ etiam factiones dicuntur à Cæsare^e. bellum verò, quod Antonius inferret reipub. non partiū certamen, sed defectionem à populo Romano vocari debere. Hinc quoque Cicero^f dissentit à Cæsare, qui propter legem Semproniam, quæ iniussu populi de capite ciuis Rom. iudicari vetebat, non cēsebat mortis pœnam irrogandam Cethego & Lentulo, catilinariæ coniurationis sociis, ad quæ docet Cicero legem Semproniam. quæ de ciuibus Romanis cōstitutæ est, ad eos, qui essent reipub. hostes, qui certē ciues esse

^a Reg. lib. 16
lit. 26. par. 2.

^b D. §. in ciuilibus.

^c L. amissio ne. §. qui deficiunt. D. de cap. manu. L. nihil interest.

L. postliminiū §. transfuge.

D. de captiu.

L. ult. D. ad

l. Iul. Maiest.

d Philop. 13.

^e De bello

Gallie lib. 6.

^f In Catil. 4.

esse nullo modo possent, nō pertinere. Sic certè bello cum Latinis, Campanis, Fidenatibus, Hernicis, Æquis, Hetruscis, aliisque populi Romani sociis, quos subditos, non participes imperij, fuisse satis cōstat ex Liuiio ^a, Appian. ^b & Dionys. Hal. ^c deficiētibus, & rebellātibus, legimus victos oīa hostilia passos fuisse, & capta prædæ cessisse, atq; captos in seruiturē redactos: imo multo durius cum iis actū fuisse, quàm cum aliis hostibus. censebant enim maximè ita rebellantes in officio posse contineri, si id actum esset, ne possent rebellare. quamdiu enim malis relinqueretur malefaciēdi facultas, ad fore & voluntatem. Atque ita Capua, quæ per deditionem populi Rom. facta fuerat ^d, cū ad Pœnos defecisset, ^d *Liuius li. 7* expugnata à Romanis, lxx. pondo auri, & argenti tria millia ex præda ad quæstores delata sunt; lxx. principes senatus interfecti: recenti ferme nobiles Campani in carcerem conditi, variis casibus interierunt: multitudo alia Campanorum venundata: ager omnis & tecta publica populi Romani facta sunt ^e. Simi- ^e *Liuius l. 36* liter cum Fidenatibus, quæ erat colonia populi Romani, rebellantibus actum ^f. ^f *Liuius li. 4*

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Ænna quoque, in Sicilia, vt superius diximus, quæ præsidio Romanorum tenebatur, cum ad defectionem spectaret, cum magna cæde ciuium direpta fuit ^a. eodem modo postquam Gallia in provinciam esset redacta, cum Gallis rebellibus actum fuisse passim inuenias apud Cæsarem. Porro in dissentionibus ^{*} ciuilibus non inutilis futura videtur lex Solonis: quæ, inter alias antiquissimas, Athenis axibus ligneis incisa erat: quæ cavit, vt qui exorta seditione populari, & scissa in duas partes ciuitate, neutri se adiunxisset, hic domo, patria, fortunisq; careret, exul, extorrisq; esset. Quod & Phauorinus philosophus inter fratres quoq; & amicos dissidentes fieri oportere censuit: vt vtriusque partis amici, si ad concordiam componendam parum auctoritatis habuerint, tum alter in alteram partem discedat, & hac ratione viam sibi ad vtriusque concordiam muniant ^b. Equidem hanc legem hisce nostris temporibus vtilissimam fore censeo, ad hoc, vt exorta aliqua factione malorum, protinus omnes boni communibus viribus eos opprimant, neque se vnà cum repub. opprimi patiatur: vt, proh dolor! cum

a *Liuius lib.*
34.

b *Gell. lib. 2.*
cap. 2.

cum magno reipubl. Christianæ detri-
 mento, & huius Belgij euerfione passim
 fieri videmus. dum enim boni nimia sua
 modestia, & patientia, malis conatibus
 feditioforum ciuium concedēdo, se pa-
 cem habituros confidunt, durissimum
 sibi feruitutis iugum iniiciūt: quod po-
 stea frustra excutere conantur. & fit, vt
 cū bonorum iacturam aut vitæ peri-
 culum pro repub. adire recusant, neces-
 sariò cum republ. pereant. omne enim
 malum nascens, vt inquit Cic. facile op-
 primitur, inueteratum fit plerumque
 18 robustius. Neque etiam *semper tutis-
 simum erit, quod plerique arbitrantur,
 non interponere se bello, sed spectatōrē
 belli, fortunarumque alienarum, euen-
 tum sine vllō discrimine rerum suarum
 operiri, quod legati Antiochi & Æto-
 lorum, qui Romanos Græcia expellere
 conabantur, Achæis amicis Romanorū
 persuadere nitebantur, petentes vt sal-
 tem neutri parti se adiungerent. nam ad
 ea T. Quintius Proconsul, nihil tam a-
 lienum à rebus Achæorum esse ostēdit:
 quippe, siue gratia, siue dignitate, præ-
 mium victoris futuros^a. Aristenus quo-
 que prætor Achæorum, cū Romani³⁵.

a *Liuius lib.*

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primùm eorum amicitiam expeterent,
& Philippus saltè ne armis interessent,
postularet, oratione ad suos habita o-
stendit, Romanos aut socios habendos,
^a *Uiniol. 32* aut hostes; mediam^a viam nullam esse^a: 19
quæ, vt Pontius Samius dicebat, neque
amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit. Ita-
que Portius Cato, summus vir, Põpeto
& Cæsare inter se contendentibus, quã-
uis a factionum auctõribus multis in re-
bus causa reipub. dissentiret, & neutrius
mentem planè probaret; tamen bello
exorto: non sibi quiescendum existima-
uit, sed eas partes secutus est, quæ plus
æquitatis habere viderentur, Bruto etiã
dehortante, cui prudenter respondet:

Summum Brute nefas ciuilia bella fatemur,

Sed quo fata vocant, virtus secura sequetur.

^b *lib. 2.*

Et cetera, quæ carmine prosequitur Lu-
canus^b. Sed hæc deliberatio, vtrius par-
tes æquiores sint, in democratia vel ari-
stocratia, scisso imperio, quod pluribus
commune est, admitti potest; in monar-
chia verò, optimus & prudentissimus
quisque, principis*, apud quem summa 20
imperij est, auctoritatem sequetur, cõtra
seditiosos & turbulentos ciues, & iudici-
tos. postquam enim visum est reipub.
per

pervnum consuli^a: cui lege regia popu-
lus omne imperium in se, potestatemq;
concessit^b, quique est communis om-
nium parens^c: & cui diuina lege obe-
dire iubemur^d: eum, non secus ac pa-
triam, defendere & tueri quilibet debet.

Et quidem, vt inquit Cicero, nulla iusta

- 21 * causa videri potest aduersus patriam
arma capiendi. & Plato nefas esse duxit,
vi vti contra patrem vel matrem, omniū
verò maximè contra patriam. Nulla au-
tem tanta impietas, nullum tantum sce-
lus, quod sit parricidio vindicandum^e.
Parricidā verò patriæ vocat Cicero An-
tonium; quòd reipub. bellum inferret;
cuius certè salus præferri debet saluti

- 22 patris^f. Rempub. voco*: in quo sanctis-
simū nomen patriæ cōtineri dixit Cor-
nificius^g; non solum ipsum, quod ab-
surdum esset. nam omne solū viro forti
patria est: sed vt Cicero interpretatur,
coetum ciuium iuris consensu, & utili-
tatis communione sociatum. Quò spe-
ctat quod Cēforinus apud Appianum^h
legaris Carthaginensium respōdit: ci-
uitatem Carthaginensium, quam Ro-
mani promiserant liberam fore, non in
muris & ædificiis consistere: quæ delere
vellent.

a l. 2. §. no-
uissime. D. de
orig. iur.

b L. 1. D. de
constit. princ.

c Authen.
neq; v. quod
ex donat. in
fine.

d Paul. ad
Roma. 13.

e Quintil. de
cla. 286.

f I. minimè
D. de religio,
& sumptib.
funer. L. ve-
luti. D. de
iust. & iur.
g ad Heren.
lib. 4.

h In bello
p. 11.

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vellent. Factionem verò optimatum, & seditionem, & conspirationem populi remp. dici non posse, idem Cicero asserit. iniustus enim populus, quem tyrannum vocat, non potest rempub. constituere. Nam vt modò diximus, qui hostiliani aduersus rempub. vel principem est animatus, cùm natura sit ciuis, voluntate sit hostis, diciturq; perduel-

a in l. ult. D.

ad leg. lul. maiest.

b l. quos nos. D. de verbo.

fig.

c d. l. ultim.

lis ^a: quo nomine hostes appellari solent ^b. Et quidem hæc duo, princeps & respub. ita connexa sunt & copulata, vt illius hostis nemo esse possit, quin etiã sit huius, & e conuerso ^c. Pro patria verò mori, & ei nos totos dedere, & in ea nostra omnia ponere, & quasi nos consecrare debemus, vt inquit Cicer. ¹ & vt idem ait, laudandus est, qui mortem optet pro repub. quiq; docet chariorẽ esse patriam nobis, quàm nosmet ipsos. Omnia itaque quæ agimus, non ad nostram vtilitatem & commodum, sed ad patriæ & principis salutem conferre debemus. quo nomine Demarathus Lacedæmonius, Aristides, Phorion & Themistocles Athenienses; Tarquinius Collatinus, Camillus & Rutilius Romani, maximam laudẽ meruerunt: qui omnes iniurias

d de legibus lib. 2.

iniurias à patria illatas, æquissimo animo tulerūt, & nullam vindictam, quamvis nō deesset facultas, moliti sunt. quin Themistocles, sumpto veneno, mori maluit, quàm Persurum regi, a quo magnis honoribus & præmiis erat affectus, operam suam ad bellum patriæ, licet ingrata, inferendum præstare. & Camillus, vir optimus, & de patria optimè meritus, in exilium actus, patriæ in extremo periculo, immemor iniuriæ, opem tulit, eamque hostibus expulsis, restaurauit.

- 23 Inobedientia* autem subditorum, & rebellio in principem, grauissimum crimē habetur, & hæresi comparatur ^a: & inobediens dicitur infidelis ^b. Quomodo enim, inquit D. Hieronymus, fidelis esse poterit, in substantia Dei, qui carnali Domino fidem adhibere non potuit ^c. ideoque ob quantumuis graua onera a rege subditis imposita, non licet rebellare. nam melius est omnia mala pati, quàm malo consentire ^d. & quamuis onus a superiore impositum sit difficile, nihilominus tamen ferendum est, & pia deuotione tolerandum ^e, propter bonum obedientię. generale enim pactum est societatis humanæ, obtemperare regibus

^a c. sciendum.
8. qu. 1. c. si
papa. 40. dist.
1. c.

^b c. nullus.
38. dist.

^c c. si apud.
23. quest. 5.

^d c. ita nec.
32. quest. 5.
cap. Lothar.
rus. 31. qu. 2.

^e c. in memoriam.
19. dist.

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a c. que contra, dist. 8.

gibus suis^a. Quare quamvis Roboam, filius & successor Salomonis, nollet vel minimum Israëlitis, de iugo durissimo ipsis imposito per Salomonē, minuere: sed diceret, quod gravi iugo, a patre imposito, grauius superadderet: ideoque decem tribus Israël scissæ a tribu Iudæ
b 3. Reg. 12. & Benjamin, relicto rege suo, Hieroboā fecissent regem^b, non tamen ex eo extra culpam fuerūt. nam indignatus est Dominus omni semini Israël, & demoliuit eos, & dedit eos in direptionem, donec abijceret eos a facie sua. quia scilicet ab unitate dissipati, alterum sibi regem cōstituisent^c. Similiter quamvis Nabuchodonosor rex esset infidelis, & plurima mala faceret^d, & statuam suam aureā adorari præciperet, & eos, qui non adorassent, mitti in fornacē ignis ardentis: tamen dixit ei Daniel: Tu rex regū es, & Dñs cæli regnum, & fortitudinē & imperiū dedit tibi. & Dominus per prophetam Hieremiā ait: Dedi omnes terras istas in manu Nabuchodonosor regis Babilonis, serui mei: in super & bestias agri dedi illi, & seruiant illi omnes gentes, & filio eius, & filio filij eius: donec veniat tempus terræ eius, & ipsius, & seruiant

*e Cypri. lib. 1
 ejusd. 6. c. de
 miqua. 7. qu. 1
 d Hier. 39.*

e Daniel. 3.

f Daniel. 2.

„ seruiant ei gētes multę, & reges magni^a. ^{a Hīre. 27.}
 „ Et propheta Baruch: Orate, inquit, pro
 „ vita Nabuchodonosor regis, & pro vita
 „ Balthazaris filij eius, vt sint dies eorum
 „ sicut dies cæli super terrā^b. & Ezechiel ^{b Baruch. 1}
 propheta grauitur inuehitur in Sede-
 chiam regem Iudæ, accusans eius perfidiam,
 & rebellionem cōtra regem suum Nabuchodonosor^c. Sed & Dauid rex ^{c 2. Para. 26}
 Hebræorū diuina auctoritate designatus,
 tamen Saulem (qui per legem diuinam regno erat priuatus) regnantem & illi
 infensum, semper est honore regio persecutus,
 & cū posset eundē, in speluncam, in qua latebat,
 ingressum, solū paruo negotio obtruncare, noluit,
 negans se extēsurum manum in christum Domini^d.
 iussit quoque Dauid occidi illum, qui nūtiabat
 se occidisse Saulem, ^{d Reg. 1. ca. 24. & 26.}
 inquit: Quare non timuisti mittere manum
 tuam in christū Domini^e? ^{e Reg. 2. c. 1}
 Reges ergo & principes, si boni sunt, tanquam
 à Deo missi ad vindictam malorum, laudem
 verò bonorum, vt inquit Petrus^f, summa pietate
 coli debent; ^{f Epist. 1. c. 2}
 sin mali, patiēter tolerari. principum enim
 & regum peccata ferenda sunt, & ad Dei
 iudicium reiicienda, cui placet interdū
 popu-

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populos, ob ipsorum peccata, iniquitate principum affligi. nam, ut est in sacris literis^a, Deus regnare facit hominem hypocritam, propter peccata populi^b. nulla autem potestas nisi a Deo, ut Paulus testatur^c, qui nos principibus obedire iubet^d. & Petrus, etiam dyscolis dominis, nos parere vult^e. & idem docet honorandos esse reges : cum tamen tunc nullus adhuc rex Christi fidem accepisset, sed omnes essent infideles, & in Christianis persequendis crudelissimi (neque enim Neronis & Domitiani, & aliorum crudelitatem tot scriptorum literis celebratam, quisquam ignorat) iisdem tamen Christiani ex præcepto Dei obediebant, quatenus nihil præciperetur, quod Deum offenderet: cui sciebant magis obediendum, quam hominibus^f. Ex his certè^{*} 24 liquet, quod quamvis tyrannum, qui per vim & illegitimè principatum occupavit, si tyrannis aliter tolli non possit, occidere cuilibet licitum sit : & per legem Valeriam, sacrum esset cum bonis caput eius, qui consilia regni occupandi iniisset^g : illum tamen, qui iure successionis, electionisve princeps est, quamvis iniquè & crudeliter agat, privato non licere

^a Job cap. 14

^b Alphon. de Cast. contra here. in verb. Potestas.

^c ad Rom. 13

^d ad Tit. 3.

^e epist. 1. c. 2

^f Act. 1.

^g Plut. in vita P. Valerij.

P. Dion.

Ha. lib. 5.

licere occidere, neque populo eum reij-
 cere, vel ab eo deficere ^a. idque concilio
 Constantiensi ^b decisum est: quo etiam
 hæretici declarantur contrariæ sententiæ
 25 assertores ^c. legitimus * enim princeps,
 quamuis crudelis & iniquus, tyrannus
 26 dici non potest. cumque lege * regia, imo
 ex ordinatione Dei, omne imperium &
 potestas principi in populū sit collata;
 illum iudicare populus non poterit. nō
 enim potest inferior iudicio superiorē
 ligare ^d. Quò spectat quod propheta
 ait ^e: Nunquid gloriabitur securis cōtra
 eum, qui secat in ea? aut exaltabitur ser-
 ra cōtra eum, qui trahit eam? ex quibus
 luce clarius esse Nicolaus Papa rescrip-
 sit, non posse quemquam, qui minoris
 auctoritatis est, eum qui maioris pote-
 statis est, iudiciis suis addicere, aut pro-
 priis definitionibus subiugare ^f. Itaque
 rectè M. Aurelius Imperator populo
 magistratum, magistratui regem, regi
 verò Deum iudicem constitutum dixit.
 Et quidem si princeps, qui potestatem a
 Deo habet, indicta causā, neminem pu-
 nire aut condēnare potest ^g: qua aucto-
 ritate subditi, qui nullā potestatem ac-
 ceperunt, principem, cuius in potestate

^a Felin. in co-
 cū nobis.

^b ex. de pra-
 script. Bruc.

^c in reper. in
 verbo Tyrā-

^d nus. Domin.
^e a Soto de iust.

^f & iur. lib. 5.
^g qu. 1. art. 8.

^h b sess. 15.
ⁱ c Alphon de

^j Cast contra
 here. in ver-

^k bo Tyrannus;
^l d c. inferior.

^m 21. dist. 1. nō
ⁿ magistratus;

^o d. de recep.
^p arb.

^q c Esai. 10.

^r f in d. c. in-
^s ferior.

^t g Clemēt.
^u pastoris de

^v censib. & re
^w iudic.

C

& im-

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& imperio sunt, & cui obedire iubetur, suo arbitrio expellere, aut reijcere poterunt? cū ne tyrannus quidē, lege Solonis, indicta causā occidi posset; & cū iuri naturali repugnet, vt inferior habeat imperium in superiorem, & vt idē sit accusator & iudex. Grauib. ergo pœnis coërcetur, ex primo capite legis Iuliæ, non solū qui principē occidit, sed etiam cuius operâ, dolo malo, consilium occidendi initum fuerit, vel quid

a l. 1. c. ad
l. iul. maiest.
L. quisquis
eod. tit.

contra maiestatem imperij machinatū^a. Sed & si quamcunque infamiam, quamcunque pericula, mortem denique, si res ita postulat, pro salute principis, & patriæ subire, iura diuina, & humana cogunt, quæ iusta rebellandi causa esse potest? Quemadmodum enim videmus in corpore humano, omnia mēbra capiti, tanquā parti nobiliori, obedire, qualiacunque tādē præcipiat, & pro eius salute nullū recusare periculū: sic quoque subditi, qui sunt mēbra reipub. salutem principis, qui reipubl. caput est, proprio commodo præferre debent. & huius quoque sententiæ assertores fuere, qui inter Hebræos præcipui habiti sunt, Essēi vocati, id est executores legis diuinæ: qui

næ: qui reges & principes, qualescunq;
 tandē sint, subditis inuiolabiles esse de-
 bere, dixerunt, tanquam a Deo missos.
 Neque quemquam mouerit exemplum
 Tarquinij Superbi, qui regno pulsus
 est, propter sua scelera: tum quia nō rex,
 sed verē tyrannus fuit: (non enim legi-
 timē, sed per vim, netario scelere, occiso
 Tullio socero suo, regnū adeptus est^a.)
 tum etiam quia, vt I. C. ait, nō quid Ro-
 mæ fiat, sed quid legitimē fieri debeat,
 spectandum est^b. errant enim, vt inquit
 Cicero, qui quod exemplo fit, id etiam
 iure fieri putāt. Et hæc quidem ita pro-
 cedunt, si summum imperium sit apud
 vnum principem; sin verò sit apud po-
 pulum, vel optimates, certē hoc casu si-
 ne dubio licebit cum tyrāno iure agere,
 si tempora permittāt; sin minus, licebit
 eum vi opprimere, & quauis ratione ty-
 rannum ē medio tollere. Itaque senatus
 priorē viam secutus est in Nerone tol-
 lendo: posteriorem in Maximino. Sciē-
 dum est enim Imperatores Romanos
 non habuisse summum imperium, quā-
 uis plerique id sibi tyrannicē vsurpaue-
 rint. idque indicant hæc Suetonij ver-
 ba in Caligula; Parū absuit, inquit, quin
 C 2 speciem

^a Dion. Hal.

lib. 4.

^b L. sed licet.

D. de off.

pres.

^c Appianus
in procemio l.
1.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

speciem principatus in regnum cōuerteret. non enim erant imperatores aliud quàm principes, imperium verò erat apud populum ^a. Reges verò imperio abutentes* poterit summus Pontifex, variis modis coërcere, & cōpellere vt administrent iusticiam ^b. gerit enim vices Dei in terris, a quo vtrumque gladium accepit, spiritualem & temporalem, ad reipub. Christianæ quietem, & conseruationem ^c. Itaque Nicolaus Papa Lotharium reprehendit propter sua peccata ^d. & Gelazius Anastasio minabatur ^e. Innocentius eius nominis primus, Arcadium Imperatorem, eò quòd sanctum Ioannem Chrysostomū e sede sua pelli permiserat, excommunicauit ^f. Sed & si Reip. Christianæ omnino conueniat, non solùm coërcere poterit, sed etiam destituere. quemadmodum Deus (cuius vicarius est Pontifex) Saulem regno priuauit, & Dauidem in locū eius surrogauit ^g. sicque Zacharias Pontifex, Childericum eius nominis tertiū Francorum regem destituit, & Francos iuris iurandi religione exsoluit ^h. Innocētius quartus, Fredericum II. Imperatorem, propter sua scelera primū excommunicauit,

^a Bodin. de rep. lib. 1. c. 8.

^b c. administratores. 23. q. 5.

^c c. nonit. de iudic. c. vna sanctam. ex. de maio. et obed.

^d in c. sceler. 2. quest. 1.

^e in c. alius. 15. quest. 6.

^f c. duo sunt. dist. 26.

^g 1. Reg. 2. 6

^h c. alius. 15 quest. 6.

nicauit, & cū nihil proficeret, indignū
 imperio iudicauit, & subditos a vinculo
 sacramenti liberauit^a. & idem Innocē-
 tius, Lusitanæ regi, propter suam negli-
 gentiam, fratrem ipsius Comitē Beno-
 nientem, collegam dedit^b. Hanc verò
 potestatem populo tribuere, vt nōnulli
 voluerunt^c, non solū absurdum est, &
 iniquum, sed etiam ad reipub. euerfio-
 nem spectat, non enim rex, si aliquantu-
 lum contra volūtatem populi imperat,
 protinus iniquus, & tyrannus dicendus
 est. nam ista ratione nulli sint reges. Ac
 Moyse ipse iustissimus, & sapiētissimus
 princeps, idem tyrannus iudicaretur:
 quòd omnia fere iuberet, ac prohiberet
 contra populi volūtatem. Sed nec mo-
 narchia, vel regia potestas dicenda est,
 cū arbitrio populi respub. gubernatur
 a rege: quoniam status reipub. pendet a
 populo. quo nihil stultius, nihil intem-
 perantius, & cū in bonos exarserit, ni-
 hil furiosius. Multitudinis namque, vt
 rectè Liuius, ea est natura, vt humiliter
 seruiat, aut superbè dominetur. & Xe-
 nophon, idem imperator bonus ac Phi-
 losophus, popularem potentiam virtu-
 ribus inimicam esse testatur: nec aliter

^a cap. ad A-
 postolica. de
 sent. et re iud.
 in 6.

^b c. grādi. de
 supplend. ne-
 gligent. pre-
 lat. lib. 6.

^c Fer. Vazq.
 illust. quest.
 lib. 1. c. 5. un.

10. Hicoms.
 in Fræcogal-
 lia. Girard. de

Bernard. in
 hist. Franc. l.
 3.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

stabiliri posse, quam bonis omnibus e-
iectis. quod Seneca paucis verbis com-
plexus est: Quis enim, inquit, placere
potest populo, cui placet virtus? Sic cer-
tè legimus, apud Athenienses & Roma-
nos, longè præstantissimos ciues, & de
republ. optimè meritos ostracismo, exi-
lio, morte, per inuidiam, iniuste a stulta
& ingrata plebecula multatos fuisse.
Præclare autem Anacharsis Scythæ, A-
theniensium rempub. breui perituram
prædixit: quòd sapientes in ea consul-
tarent, stulti verò iudicaret. videbat e-
nim senatum, reipub. cōsilia, quibus ni-
hil sanctius esse debet, à populo petere;
id est a stulto & infano, prudentiam. Ne-
que verò tam absurdum erat, quamvis
absurdissimum, omnes omnium opes,
quàm summum imperium inter ciues
equare: quòd, vt rectè Bodinus^a, opibus
quisque frui potest; imperadi verò pru-
dentia paucissimis est a natura tributa.
Et quidem si metuendus est tyrannus,
multò magis metuenda est tyrannorum
multitudo. Qui autem populare impe-
rium Ro. laudant, non satis illorum hi-
storias legisse videntur, neq; perpendisse
calamitates tot seditionum, secessionū,
conten-

^a in method.
hist. cap. 6.

contentionum, & bellorum ciuiliū,
 quæ repub. toties afflixerunt. quorū
 omnium certè, cōmunio imperij, quod
 ex æquo partiri difficile est, causa fuit.
 sed de his pluribus agere instituti nostri
 28 ratio non permittit. Vt ergo iustas* belli
 causas prosequamur, bellū aduersus in-
 fideles, ex eo solum quòd infideles sunt,
 ne quidem auctoritate imperatoris, vel
 summi Pontificis, indici potest^a, infide-
 litas enim nō priuat infideles dominio
 quod habent iure gentium. nam non fi-
 delibus tantum rerū dominia, sed omni
 rationabili creaturæ data sunt. Domini
 enim est terra, & plenitudo eius, orbis
 terrarum, & vniuersi qui habitāt in eo^b.
 & Dominus solem suū oriri fecit super
 bonos & malos^c. Itaque quamuis Na-
 buchodonosor esset infidelis, tamen do-
 minus dedit illi regnum & imperiū, vt
 modo diximus. & hæc sententia plerisq;
 probatur, vt ostēdit Couarruias^d. Sed
 nec ex eo capite bellum dicitur iustum
 cum infidelibus, quòd puta. imperatori
 29 *tanquam totius mundi domino parere
 recusent, ex receptissima interpretū sen-
 tentia^e. nam communem hanc opinio-
 nem falsam esse, & imperatorem nō esse

a l. Christiani-
 ni, C. de pa-
 ga. & fact. et
 temp. eor. c.
 dispar. 33.
 quasit. 8.

b Genes. c. 1.
 c Matt. 5. in
 fin. & c. 6. in
 prin.

d in c. pecca-
 tū. de reg. iur.
 in 6. 2. par.
 relect. 6. 9.

e in l. be e a
 Lenone, C. de
 quadr. præ-
 script. in l. de-
 precatio. D.

ad leg. Rhod.
 de iact. in l.

curiosos popu-
 los, C. de sum-
 ma Trinit. &

fide Cath. in
 l. hostes Di. de
 captiui.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

totius mundi dominum, a viris doctissi-
 mis apertè ostensum est^a: quos refert &
 sequitur Couar.^b & Ferd. Vazq.^c Vnde
 ex hac causa non poterit imperator iu-
 stum bellū inferre infidelibus, qui eius
 imperio subditi non sunt, siquidem ne-
 mo punire potest eum, quem nō habet
 in sua potestate^d. Nec itē ex auctoritate
 summi Pont. poterit dici, istud bellum
 iustum. nam is in infideles iurisdictionē
 non habet, nec temporalem, nec spiri-
 tualē: nisi quatenus ea necessaria est ad
 Christianæ reipub. quietem & utilitatē.
 & ad ecclesiam non pertinet, punire in-
 fideles, qui nunquā Christi fidem susce-
 perunt, secundū illud Pauli ad Corinth.,
 Quid mihi de his qui foris sunt, iudica-
 re? Vbi Thomas dicit, prælatos ecclesiæ
 accepisse potestatem tantum in eos, qui
 se fidei Christianæ semel subiecerunt.
 vnde hæreticis*, qui a fide Christiana
 defecerūt, iustum bellum insertur. Qua
 de re pulchrè Alphons. a Cast.^f Conten-
 ditur verò iusto bello cum infidelibus,
 ex causis, ex quibus cum aliis quibuscū-
 que bellum gerere licet &. tum etiam ex
 eo quod forte fidem Christianam blas-
 phemiis, pravisque persuasionibus im-
 pediant,

^a Card. Alb.
 Fulg. Alc.
 Chas. Dormin.
^b Soto et alius
^c in d. l. pec-
 catum d. 9.
^d quest. 1.
 l. 1. c. 20
 & si q.
 d. l. ult. d.
 de iuris. omni.
 iud. c. ult. de
 consensu. in 6
 l. 1. et toto tit.
 C. ubi de cri-
 min. agi o-
 por.

e cap. 5.

^f l. 2. de iust.
 her. pum.
 g. c. dispar. 23
 q. 1. luno. &
 DD. in cap.
 quod super
 his de voto.
 Thom. 22. q.
 10, art. 8.

pediant, atque item legis euangelicæ liberam prædicationem : quia fit iniuria Christianis, qui habent ius prædicandi euangelij, per vniuersum orbem. Et hæc quidem iustæ belli gerendi causæ, per pèso iudicio principibus ac regibus (penes quos est belli auctoritas atque consilium ^a) sunt æstimandę: qui si forte humana cupiditate bellum gerant *, non nocebit militibus, qui obedire debent principi. Itaq; inquit D. Augustinus ^b; <sup>a c. quid cul-
petur. 23. q. 2.</sup>

31 „ Vir iustus, si forte sub rege homine etiã <sup>b lib. 22. cõ-
tra Faust.</sup>

„ sacrilego militet, rectè potest illo iubete <sup>Man. c. 75. de
c. quid culpe-
tur.</sup>

„ bellare, ciuicæ pacis ordinem seruãs. cui

„ quod iubetur, vel non esse contra Dei

„ præceptum certum est, vel vtrum sit, cer-

„ tum non est: vt fortasse reum regem fa-

„ ciat iniquitas imperandi; innocentem

„ autem militem ostendat ordo seruiēdi.

32 Vnde & Christiano * militi etiam sub imperatore pagano militare permissum est. nam & Iulianum Cæsarem apostatã milites Christianos habuisse legimus: quibus cum diceret, Producite aciẽ pro reipub. defensione, obediebãt: cum autem diceret, producite aciẽ in Christianos, agnoscebant imperatorem cæli <sup>c. c. Iulianus
11. quest. 3.</sup> quos cum idẽ imperator donatiuo dato

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

ad sacrificia deorum gētilium pellicere
tentasset, donatio imperatori reddito,
christiani mū liberrimē professos, cum
martyrij desiderio, exauctoratos fuisse

a *Sozom. l. 5
c. 17. Cassio.
lib. 6. tripart.
hist. c. 30. Nis-
siph. lib. 10.
cap. 23.*

tradunt^a. Legimus quoque Marcū Au-
relium Antoninum, Christianorū, qui
sub ipso merebant, precibus (quibus sibi
pluviam, hostibus fulmina a Deo impe-
trarunt) bellum Marcomanicū, Sar-
matis, Vandalis, Quadis deuictis, con-

b *Paul. Oro-
f. lib. 7. c. 15.
Euseb. lib. 5.
eccl. histor. c.
5. Nicoph. l. 4
c. 12.
c. Aet. 1. cap.
15. q. 6.
et d. c. Indu-
mus,
d. Pet. 1. c. 2.*

fecisse^b. Ex quibus docemur sub impe-
ratore pagano, vel etiam hæretico, sub-
ditis licere militare, nisi liquidò constet
bellum iniustum esse. nam Deo magis
seruiendum, quā hominibus^c. Quā-
uis enim etiam infideli regi^{*}, & iniquo
parendū esse doceamur^d; tamen habet

33

hæc obedientia suos limites. vnde licet
filiis Israēl præceptum esset a Deo, vt o-
bedirent regi Nabuchodonosor; tamen
cū idem rex iussisset, vt statuam suam
auream adorarent (quod præceptum fi-
nes excedebat potestatis regię) tum po-
rius habuerunt, qui optimi erant inter
filios Israēl, in fornacem ardentem con-
ijci, quam ei præcepto regis obedire.
quorum voluntatē sic Deus approba-
uit, vt illæsos ab igne conseruauerit^e.

e *Dan. 2.*

Quò

Quò spectat quod Christus ait in euā-
 gelio^a: Reddite quæ Cæsaris sunt, Cæsa-
 ri; & quæ Dei, Deo. quod & Paulus A-
 postolus^d p̄sanissimè expressit, cum ait. ^{b ad Rom. 13}
 Reddite omnib. debita, cui tributum,
 tributum; cui vectigal, vectigal; cui ti-
 morem, timorem; cui honorem, hono-
 rem. Ex superioribus quoque colligere
 licet, quòd quæ hætenus de iustis belli
 causis dicta sunt, magis ad æquum & bo-
 num, & viri boni officium, quàm ad iu-
 ris effectus referri debent. cum enim
 summis tantum principibus, qui supe-
 riorem non habent, belli gerendi ius sit,
 de æquitate causæ disceptare non con-
 uenit. hinc certo modo iustum^{*} po-
 34 terit dici bellum, etsi non ex iusta causa
 geratur. iusti enim variæ sunt significa-
 tiones: vt annotauit Budæus^c. neque
 semper æquitatem, & iusticiã designat,
 sed aliquando etiam plenitudinẽ quan-
 dam significat. quo sensu dicuntur iuste
 nuptiæ^d, iustum matrimonium^e, iusta
 ætas^f, iusta persona litem instituendi^g,
 iustus filius^h, iusta libertasⁱ: eo quæ sen-
 su iustum prælium dixit Liuius^k. simili-
 ter iustum bellum dicitur, quod publicè
 legitimeque geritur ab iis, qui bellige-
 randi

^a Matth. 22.^b ad Rom. 13^c l. 3. D. pro socio.^d iust. de

nupt. in prin.

in l. nuptia. l.

et in l. D. de

iure nuptiar.

et in l. Clau-

dus. D. de his

quib. ut in-

dig. l. 1. D.

unde vir et

uxor. Quentil.

l. 5. cap. 10.

^f in l. 2. §. 1

D. de vaca-

mun. l. ait

Diuus. D. de

iure fisc.

^g in l. in u-

niversis. C.

qui dat tutor.

vel curat. pos-

si in l. 2. D.

de adopt.

ⁱ Cicer. in

Topic. l. 1. D.

si quis test.

lib. l. genera-

liter. D. quæ et

a quib. ma-

nu.

^k lib. 49.

DE IURE ET OFF. BELL.

^{a in l. hostes.}
^{D. de captiv.} randi ius habent . Itaque Vlpianus^a,
 Hostes, inquit, sunt, quibus publicè po-
 pulus Roma. bellum decreuit, vel ipsi
 populo Roma. ceteri verò latrunculi,
 vel prædones appellantur. Et Pompo-
^{b l. hostes. D.}
^{le verb. sign.} nius^b: Hostes, dicit, sunt, qui nobis, aut
 quibus publicè nos bellū decreuimus:
 ceteri verò latrones, aut prædones sunt.
 Vnde hoc bello, licet non ex iusta causa
 generatur, iura belli, captiuitatis & postli-
 minij, quæ hostibus cōueniunt, locū ha-
 bebūt. quod ex eo satis probatur, quòd
 cū Romani nō nisi iustis ex causis bel-
 lum mouerent, quod iure feciali diligē-
^{c Dion. Hal.}
^{lib. 2.} ter cautum erat^c: tamen hostes eorum,
 qui iustam belli causam habere non po-
 tuerunt, quæ vtrinque iusta esse non po-
 test, capta hoc bello etiam iure Roma-
 norum sibi acquirebant, & captos in
^{d l. postlimi-}
^{nij. D. de ca-} seruitutem redigebant^d. id quæ verū est,
^{p. iuri.} etiam si liquidò constaret de iniquitate
^{e d. l. postli-} hostiū. quod Paulus I. C. satis indicat^e,
^{minij. in prin.} cū ait: Naturali æquitate inductū esse.
 vt qui per iniuriam ab extraneis detine-
 batur, is vbi in fines suos rediisset, pristi-
 num ius suū reciperet: iure scilicet post-
 liminij. Ex quibus apparet, captum ab
 hostibus etiam ex iniusta causa bellum
 geren-

gerentibus, fieri seruum. nam alioqui non esset opus fictionibus postliminij: sicut nec opus est, cum quis à latronibus captus fuit, cum non fuerit seruus^a. Sufficit itaque, quod ad effectus iuris, & ut iura belli locum habeant, attinet, bellum geri ab iis, qui hostium numero sunt definiti, & belligerandi ius habent^b. Quo sensu videtur defendi posse Alciati opinio^c, & Fulgosij^d: qui vtrinque
 35 iustum* bellum esse posse asserunt, contra receptam interpretum sententiam; quæ si ad iustam belli causam referatur, æquissima est. cum enim hostes contrarij sibi sint, contraria iura necesse est habeant: & vna eademque belli causa hinc inde iusta esse nō potest. Ceterum cum
 36 pecuniam* neruum belli esse plerique existiment (quod spectat illud T. Quintij Flaminij, qui Philippomeni Achæorum prætori, multis equitibus, ac grauis armaturæ militibus instructo, pecunię autem inopi, illudens, manus eum dicebat habere & crura, sed ventre carere. nam & corporis eo habitu prætor erat^e.)
 37 quæri solet, cuius impensis* bellum geri debeat, vtrum principis, an populi. Et quidem si Princeps redditus regales habeat

^a L. qui a latronibus. D. de testam. L. postliminiū. §. a piratis. l. hostes. D. de capti. & post. reuer.

^b Fulg. & Iaso. in l. ex hoc iure. D. de iust. & iur. Petrus Anchoran. in regul. Peccatū. col. 13. vers. Tertio quero. Arctinus in l. qui a latronibus. D. de testam. Albericus de Rosa in l. cū istos populos. col. 6. C. de sum. Trin. Abb. in c. ficut, de iurciu. ran. quos allegat et sequitur Natta cō. fil. 284.

^c In 2. parad. c. vii.

^d In d. l. ex hoc iure.

^e Plut. in apoph.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

habeat a ciuibus assignatos, certè ipsius principis impensis bellum geri debere plerique existimant^a. quod maximam rationem habet. omnes enim omnino principatus, regna, imperia ob publicam ipsorum ciuium vtilitatem, non ob eorum qui reipub. præsunt commodam, inducta esse, communi, frequentissimaque philosophorum, & legumlatorum sententia proditum est. Itaque Cicero^b: Omnino, inquit, qui reipubl. præsunt duo Platonis præcepta teneant. vnum, vt vtilitatem ciuium sic tueantur, vt quicquid agant, ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum. alterum, vt totum corpus reipubl. curent, ne cum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant, vt enim tutela, sic procuratio reipub. ad vtilitatem eorum, qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum quibus commissa est, gerenda est. Quam sententiam latè prosequitur Ferdinand. Vazq. 'Si verò princeps idoneos redditus non habet, totius regni impensis bellum geri debet^d. Neque hic certus tributi modus præscribi potest. nam vt Cleobulus belli dux, sociis Atheniensium in bello contra Philippum certam tributum summam definiri postulantibus,

^a Angel. in l. turres. per illis text. C. de oper. public. Iason. in l. diuortio. §. impendia. Et ibi Zasius, D. sol. matri. Guil. de Cunen. Bald. Et Cyp. in l. neminem. C. de sacros. eccl. ^b offic. lib. 1.

^c quest. illust. cap. 1. et sequ. ^d Bald. in l. si aliquis. D. de offic. procurator. Boerius in tract. de iust. cla.

tibus, respondit, bellum finiti non potest^a. & huc facit, quòd ex sententia Catonis, in republ. bene constituta debet esse domi industria, & rarium opulētum, tenues res priuatæ: qui corruptissimis moribus vitium contrarium posuit, publicè egestatem, priuatim opulentiam, vnde luxu & desidia ciuitas facillè corrumpitur, vt ex Sallustio refert & probat D. August.^b Meminisse tamen debent principes, modestissimi illius responsi Tiberij Cæsaris, qui thesaurariis onerandas tributo prouincias dicentibus, respondit, boni pastoris esse, rōdere pecus, & non deglubere. Memorabilis 38 quoque est Traiani^{*} sententia: qui correptus ab vxore Pōpeia Plotina, quòd calumniis suorum procuratorum prouinciæ diuexarētur, detestari coepit improbas exactiones, & insigni vfuse est similitudine, fiscum appellans lienem. sicut enim, crescente in corporibus nostris liene, artus reliqui tabescunt: ita turgente principis fisco, marcescunt cetera reipub. membra, & grauiter ægrotant^c. Ex superioribus deducitur, ciuem non teneri propriis sumptibus principem ad bellum sequi: sed stipēdium illi

^a Plut. in vita Demost.

^b de ciuit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 12

^c Sex. Aur. Vic. in lictis

a prin-

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

a Aret. in §.
preiudiciales.

instit. de a-
ctionib Bart.

in l. Mania. §

1. per illu tex.

D. de ann. le.

get. Oldra.

consil. 234.

Cas. in cōsuet.

Borgun. tit. de

iust. §. 4. Boe

rius decif. 303

b Reg. l. 3. et

3. tit. 19. par.

2.

c Caesar de

bello gall. l. 3

d Argumento

l. suo vultu.

D. de oper. lib.

Specul. in Tit.

de sen. §. quo-

niam ver. 12

Bald. in c. 1.

quibus mod.

fund. amit.

Ludoni. Rom.

in l. recusare.

§. si quis alio,

col. 1. et 2. D.

ad S. G. Trib.

e Argu. l. 1. et

ibi Angel. D.

ad l. Rhodiā,

de iact.

f Argu. l. 2. §

si conseruati.

D. ad l. Rhod.

de iact.

g Reg. l. 4.

tit. 2. par. 3.

a principe vel repub. constitui debere^a,

Si tamen maxima vrgeat necessitas, vt-

pote pro defensione regis, vel reipubl.

omnes tenentur ad hoc bellum concur-

rere, cuiuscunque sexus, vel conditionis

sint, grauibisque poenis ex constitutio-

nibus regni Hispaniæ afficiuntur, qui

hoc bellum detrectauerint^b. Quò spe-

ctat, quòd more Gallorum*, initiū bel-

lorum erat armatum conciliū indicere,

quò lege communi omnes puberes ar-

mati conuenire consueuerant: & qui

ex his nouissimus conuenisset, in con-

spectu multitudinis omnibus cruciati-

bus affectus, necabatur^c. Vassallus quo-

que feudatarius tenetur dominum suū

in bello iusto, etiam propriis sumptibus

iuuare^d. Sed an dāna*, in quæ quis belli

causa forte incidit, resarciri debeāt, quæ-

ri potest. Et certè, si quis pro defensione

reipub. sine stipendio ad bellum iuerit,

videtur damnum illi ex hac causa illatū

meritò repēdi debere^e. at militi qui sti-

pendium meretur, non refunduntur

damna bello accepta^f: nisi quòd ex con-

stitutionibus regni Hispaniæ ex præda

forte facta istiusmodi dāna resarciri so-

leant^g. Et quidem ad iniustum bellum

voca-

39

40

LIBER PRIMVS.

vocatus, neque ad stipendia, neque ad
damna refarcienda actionē habet. nam
ex causa turpi nulla datur actio.^a

24

a l. generali-
ter, & l. seq.
D. de verbo.
oblig. L. si re-
muerandi. §
rei turpi. D.
mā d. it. l. uno.
in c. sicut, &
infra de iure.
iurand.

DE DVELLO SEV SINGVLARI
CERTAMINE.

- 1 *Duellum quare prohibitum.*
- 2 *Duellum ex causa & famæ illicitum.*
- 3 *Duelli vsus antiquissimus in Hispania.*
- 4 *Duellum fuit in vsu apud quosdam po-
pulos.*
- 5 *Consuetudo duelli non valet.*
- 6 *Consuetudo duelli aliena a Græcorum &
Romanor. institutis.*
- 7 *Duellum cum hoste licitum.*
- 8 *Dauid singulari pugna prostravit Go-
liath.*
- 9 *Singulare certamen magni momenti in
bello.*
- 10 *Duello non nūquam belli finis impositus.*
- 11 *Depugna Horatiorum cum Curiatjs.*
- 12 *Non esse tutum belli euentum duello re-
dimere.*
- 13 *De Metio Suffetio.*

CAP. TERTIVM.

DVelli vsum vt detestabilem, & fa-
briante diabolo inductū, summa
ratione sacri canones, & concilia patrū,
D variis

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variis censuris & pœnis, tam in eos qui decertant, quàm eos, quorū auctoritate, & consilio, atque etiam præsentia istiusmodi certamina ineūtur, statutis exterminandum & abolendum esse censue-

a c. monomachiam. 2. q. 4. c. 1. et toto tit. de purg. vul. & tit. le cler. in duel. pag. 48 cōcul. Triden. sess. 19. runt ^a. quòd scilicet * hoc genere certa- ^I

minis ordo iudiciorum, & legū omnis auctoritas, quæ actiones constituit, quibus vnique ius suum in iudicio prosequi licet, peruertatur: & iniquum sit, vt quis auctoritate propria sibi ius di-

b L. existat. D. quod met. caus. c. l. 1. D. de iust. & iur. cat ^b. ideo enim latæ sunt leges, & creati magistratus, vt licitū ab illicito discernant, & ius suum cuique tribuant^c. tum etiam quòd hac decertandi ratione ipsa

iusticia violetur. nā quàm plurimi, quorum causa iure & æquitate optima erat, stolidissimi deorum Martis arbitrio pugnantes occubuere ^d. præterea quòd Deus tentari non debeat: quod fit, cum ad manifestationem veritatis, vt plerun-

d c. significatibus. de purg. vul. que fit, duellum initur^e. denique cum homicidiū diuino & humano iure prohibeatur, duellum, per quod plerunque ad homicidium deuenitur, esse prohibitum etiam dicendum est. cū enim aliquid prohibetur, prohibitum etiam censetur omne id, per quod eò deueni-
tur.

e d. c. monomachiam. c. porro. de Cle. in duel. purg.

- 2 tura. Sunt tamen* qui existimēt, ex causa
 lēſæ famæ hoc genus pugnæ iniri poſſe:
 Quia, inquiūt, crudelis eſt, qui negligit
 famam ſuam^b. fama enim cōmodo præ-
 ferenda eſt^c, & vitæ æquiparatur^d. ſed
 eorum ſententiam non probo. idcirco
 enim, vt inquit Imperator^e, iudiciorum
 vigor, iurisq̃ue publici tutela eſt in me-
 dio cōſtituta, ne quiſquam ſibi ipſi per-
 mittere valeat vltionem. & non poteſt
 dici honoris ſui prodigus, vel negligēs,
 qui ſuam, ſuorumue iniuriam auctori-
 3 tate iudicis perſequitur. Porrò conſtat*
 hoc genus pugnæ, tam ad oſtentionē
 virtutis, quàm ad cōtrouerſias deciden-
 das, antiquiſſimum fuiſſe, præſertim in
 Hiſpania. nam cū Scipio Carthaginē
 nouam, ad vota ſoluenda diis, munusq̃;
 gladiatorum, quod mortis cauſa patris,
 patruiq̃ue parauerat, rediiſſet, ſpectacu-
 „ lū, inquit Liuius^f, fuit non ex eo genere
 „ hominum, ex quo lanitiſtis comparare
 „ moſ eſt, ſeruorum delectu ac libertorū,
 „ qui venalem ſanguinem habent: volun-
 „ taria omnis & gratuita opera pugnan-
 „ tium fuit. nam alij miſſi a regulis ſunt, ad
 „ ſpecimen inſitæ genti virtutis oſtentan-
 „ dum: alij, ipſi profeſſi le pugnatuſ in
 D 2 gratiam

a Argumento
 l. oratio, D. de
 ſponſ.

b Bald. in c.
 1 col. 5. de
 pace tenend.
 Cagn. Decius
 Curt. ſen.

c Curt. inu. &
 alij, quos re-
 fert Ferdinā.
 Vazq̃ quæſt.
 illuſt. ſb. 1. c.

49
 c l. iud. inu.
 D. ſi qui u.
 miſ. cau. teſt.
 d l. iuſta cau.
 ſa. D. de ma-
 nu. vind.
 e in l. n. lius.
 C. de iudic.

f lib. 8.

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gratiam ducis : alios æmulatio ad certa-
 men, vt prouocarent, prouocatiq; haud
 abnuerent, traxit: quidā quas disceptan-
 do controuersias finire nequiuerāt, aut
 noluerant, pacti inter se, vt victorem res
 sequeretur, ferro decreuerunt. nec ob-
 scuri generis homines, sed clari, illustres-
 que Corbis & Orsua patrueles fratres,
 de principatu ciuitatis, quā Ibē vocant,
 ambigentes, ferro se decertaturos pro-
 fessi sunt. Corbis maior ætate erat. Orsue
 pater princeps proximè fuerat, a fratre
 maiore post mortē eius principatu ac-
 cepto. cū verbis Scipio disceptare vel-
 let, ac sedare iras, negatum id ambo di-
 cere communibus cognatis, nec alium
 deorum hominūue, quā Martem se
 iudicem habituros : robore maior; mi-
 nor flore ætatis, ferox. mortem in certa-
 mine, quā alter alterius imperio subij-
 ceretur, præoptantes. Cū ab tanta ra-
 bie dirimi nequirent, insigne spectaculū
 exercitui præbuere, documentumque,
 quantū cupiditas imperij malum inter
 mortales esset. Maior vsu armorum, &
 astu facilè stolidas vires minoris supera-
 uit. hætenus Liuius. Et hæc quidem de-
 certandi ratio *, etiam posterioribus tē-
 poribus,

poribus, ad lites dirimendas, certis casibus, & legibus apud Hispanos (quâvis eandem iniquissimâ scirent^a) permissa fuit^b. Apud Longobardos quoq; moribus receptum fuit, vt quoties coram iudice defectus quispiam esset, aliquid-que ad plenam intentionis fidem iudici faciendam deesset, duello certis casibus controuersia definiretur^c. Constituit & Fredericus Ænobarbus imperator, vt aliquando duello res decideretur^d. Neq; a Longobardorum legibus Gallorum consuetudo multum dissidet, vt liquet ex eorum legibus, quas Salicas vocant. & exstat apud eos quoque hæc Philippi
 „ constitutio: Si quis occulti criminis, ca-
 „ pitalisque reus sit, atque ita de eo con-
 „ stet, vt quæstioni subijci possit, condem-
 „ nari non possit: is, arbitrato accusatoris,
 duello experiatur. cuius constitutionis meminit Ioann. Faber^e: eamque refert Guido Papæ^f: qui adducit quoque, & interpretatur aliam quandam constitu- tionem imperialem de modo duelli, & qua ratione indici debeat g. Solet quoq; hæc consuetudo duelli admodum fre- quens esse in Italia, præsertim pro con- seruatione honoris^h. Vnde multi hanc

^a Reg. lib. 8.

tit. 14. par. 3.

^b Tit. 4. de

los lides par.

7.

^c in ll. long.

tit qual. quis

se defen. deb.

et tit. de purg.

res, et tit. de

hom. lib hom.

d c. 1. de pa-

ce tenem. §. si

quis hominē,

et §. si miles.

in vsib. feud.

^e in §. per

cōtrarium in-

stit. de hered.

qua ab intest.

§ decis. 617.

^g Decis. 198

^h Deci. cons-

ci. 97. Curt.

luz conc. 173

Curt. sent. in

repetitio. l.

admonēdi. D.

de iur. iuran.

Cagnol et a-

lij quos refert

Ferd. Vazq.

quaest. 1141.

lib. 1. cap. 40.

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rem anxie tractauerunt. vtpote quibus de causis duellum inire liceat : vter pro- uocatoris, vel prouocati vices sustineat: qui ad duellum admittantur: quando de- tractari duellum possit : quando optio- nem, quem vulgo campionem vocant, dare concessum sit: de electione armorū & loci : de iuramento calumniæ a pug- nantibus præstando: & sic de ceteris cō- trouersis, quæ in hoc genere pugne in- cidere solent. Non ignorauerunt tamen viri doctissimi hanc consuetudinē, quip-
pe iuri contrariam, non* valere^a: præfer- 5
tim cū expressè iure canonico sit pro-
hibita, cui standum est in vtroque foro,
cū agitur de peccato^b. sed quia de fa-
cto seruari solet, perinde de huiusmodi
corruptela disputauere, atque si valeret:
quia quæ facti sunt, quādoque ad cau-
sam iuris trahuntur^c. Et quidem con-
suetudo ista*, inter ciues, socios & com- 6
miliones singulari pugna cōtrouersias
decidendi, non solum a Christianis in-
stitutis abhorret: sed etiam plurimū
abfuit a veteri tum Græcorum, tum Ro-
manorum disciplina; qui turpissimum
censebant, belli socios, quos oportet o-
pe mutua causam communē defendere,
stulta,

^a l. 2. C. que
sit long. tens.
consue. l. non
dubium. C. de
legibus.
^b c. nonit de
iud. c. 1. & 2.
de non oper.
nunc.

^c l. mulier. §.
1. D. de cond.
iust. l. qui ha-
bebat. D. de
manu. testat.
Alexan. con.
cil. 107. col. 6

stulta, vt sæpe fit, ac pernicioſa ambitio-
 ne, pugnare, aut velle ſuas priuatas con-
 trouerſias ferro potius dirimi, quàm
 communibus legibus diiudicari. quod
 a ratione admodum alienum eſt. non
 ſecùs quàm ſi duo Philoſophi, aut Iure-
 conſulti inter ſe, vter doctior ſit, gladiis
 decertent. Neque enim de omnibus in-
 iuſticiæ generibus vllũ turpius aut ma-
 ius eſſe poteſt, quàm vt imbecillis ac te-
 nuis, accepta iniuria, ſit infamia dignus,
 niſi cum aduerſario, quãtũcũque vi-
 ribus præſtet, armis decertauerit, ac vitã
 periculis obiecerit: præſertim cùm na-
 tura ſic cõparatum ſit, vt qui minimum
 rationis, plurimum roboris habeant, vt
 de Scythiſ refert Bodinus^a. Qua certè <sup>a iurmetbo.
hiſt.c.5.</sup>
 ratione etiam fortiffimi viri, ſi cum bel-
 luis, quæ robore præſtant, conferantur,
 iure infames ſint. prius itaq; omnia ex-
 periri, quàm armis decertare ſapientem
 7 decet. Ceterum qui hoc genus* pugnæ
 non cauſa vindictæ, aut priuati odij, ſed
 pro bono publico ſubeunt, extra culpã
 ſunt: cùm etiam laudem mereantur^b. <sup>b l. 1. §. qui
operas. D. de
põſto. Hiero.
Cagnol. in l.
favorabili-
res D. de reg-
ur.</sup>
 Itaque ſi quis iuſſu, vel ſaltem conſenſu
 ducis (cùm alioqui extra ordinem pug-
 nare non liceat) cum hoſte publico, ſin-

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gulari certamine congrediatur, non solum non peccat in leges, & statuta Pontificum, sed exemplo Torquati, Coru-
nij, Marcelli, Scipionis, Æmiliani & aliorum, maximam inde gloriam referre debet. eadem enim ratio quæ bellum iustum admittit: in quo pro patriæ, vel ecclesiæ defensione mori gloriosissimum est^a: hæc quoque certamina licita esse ostendit, nam cum hoste pugnare vtcunque in bello, nō est tentare Deum, quod lex diuina vetat, nec hostem tollere, est homicidium patrare, naturæ lege prohibitum; sed officio fungi boni militis^b. Vnde non minus* licuit Dauidi Philistæum Goliath singulari pugna proster-
nere, quàm si hoc idem conferto multorum prælio fecisset^c. Et certè hæc pugna*, non parum sæpe ad totius belli euentum faciunt. Itaque Liuius^d de pugna illa Torquati cum Gallo tractans: Tanti, inquit, eadem imitatio ad vniuersi belli euentum momenti fuit, vt Gallorum exercitus relictis trepidè castris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam trāsierit. Similiter bello sociali, cum ingens Gallus ex Gallicis auxiliis, quæ L. Cluentius cum Sylla decertaturus assumpse-

a c. omni timore. 23. q. 8
c. omni. 23.
q. 5. Reg. Inf.
lib. 3. tit. 25,
par. 2.

b c. miles. c.
homicidium. 23
quest. 5.

c Reg. 1. c. 17

d lib. 5.

sumpserat, procurrens, inuitasset ad singulare certamen, ex Romanis aliquem, & eum parvę staturę Numida confecisset: territi Galli confestim terga vertunt: iamque turbata acie, nec alij Cluetiani perstiterunt, sed Nolam perfugerunt trepidè^a. Committuntur^a quoque nonnunquam istiusmodi certamina, a summis principibus: vel ab vno, aut pluribus hinc inde a principibus pari numero electis, quorum euentus bello finem imponat. quod olim à Tullo Hostilio Romanorum rege, & Metio Sufetio rege Albanorum factum fuisse legimus. quum enim pari robore frequentibus præliis vtrimque comminuerentur, misso in compedium bello, vt inquit L.

II Florus^b, Horatiis*, Curiatisque, triginis hinc atque inde fratribus, vtriusque fata commissa sunt, solemnè prius foedere inter vtrumque regem, & vtrumque populū percusso, & legibus dictis, quibus victi victoribus dederentur^c.

Quod genus pugnæ non quidem illicitum esse censeo: nam & D. Thomas^d, ex æquans duellum iudicio sortis, illicitum quidem esse dicit, si fiat ad probationē, vel reuelationem rei occultę: nō autem

^a Appian. de bell. ciuili. l. 1.

^b lib. 1. c. 3.

^c Livius l. 1.

^d 2. 2. quæst. 85. art. 8.

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si fiat ad diuisionem rerum, vel contro-
uersiæ definitionem: quale fuit certamē
Dauidis cum Philistæo, quod approba-
tum fuit Deo . quod equidem admittō
inter summos principes: vel eorum au-
ctoritate, qui belli gerendi ius habent,
vt scilicet bellorum calamitates vitētur.
Quo casu etiam a Romanis pōtificibus
nonnunquam duellum cōcessum fuisse
legimus . itaque Carolus Andegauen-
sis, & Petrus Tarraconensis, cū de Si-
cilia diu bellum gessissent, auctoritate
Martini pontif. singulari certamine cō-
trouersiam finire decreuerunt^a. Sed hāc
rationē controuersias decidendi * (cū 12
valdē temerarium sit, summam rerum
periculo vnus, aut alterius cōmittere)
non omnino tutam, neque etiam sem-
per bello finē imponere existimo. quod
euentus pugnæ trigeminorum satis o-
stendit, nam Metius Suffetius *, fortunā 13
& euentum totius belli, & virtutem sui
exercitus fortunæ aut virtuti Cuiatio-
rum committendo, regnum & libertatē
tam propriam, quā suorum, pro qua
tuenda multis annis contenderant, mo-
mento amisit; & Romanis fortunæ arbi-
trio (cui temerē se subiecerant) victori-
bus,

^a Vide Frof-
sard, lib. 1.

bus, non omnino tuta victoria fuit. nam quamuis Metius Suffetius victus, protinus se suaque omnia submitteret Romanis: postea tamē in expeditione Vientana, expectata occasione, suæ temeritatis poenitens, Romanum exercitum prodere conatus est ^a. Quare vbi de omnium salute & libertate, vel de tota possessione agitur, non nisi totis viribus cōtendendum est. alias enim non solum victus temeritatem suam inculcabit, sed nec victor omnino securus erit. eius enim animus, vt inquit Liuius, in perpetuum vincitur, cui confessio expressa sit, se neq; arte, neque casu, sed totis viribus cominus collatis, iusto ac pio bello superatum esse. Neque credi potest, vllum populum aut hominem denique (vt senatus Romanorum in causa Priuernatium sensit) in ea conditione, cuius eum poeniteat, diutius quàm necesse sit mansurum ^b.

^a Liuius li. 1.

^b Liuius li. 3.

DE PIGNERATIONIBVS, QVAS
REPRESALIAS VOCANT.

- 1 *Pignerandi potestas antiquissima cōsuetudine permissa.*
- 2 *Pignerationes quomodo hodie permissæ.*
- 3 *Con-*

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- 3 *Consuetudo pignerandi an iure probata sit.*
- 4 *Nonnunquam ex causa etiam sine culpa quem puniri.*
- 5 *Etiam sine culpa potest quis affici pœna bonorum; non etiam pœna corporali.*
- 6 *Pignerationes ad offensionem personarum innocentium illicitæ.*
- 7 *D. Ambrosius Theodosium imper. increpuit.*
- 8 *Ex qua causa sit condita l. vindicari, C. de pœn.*
- 9 *In pignerationibus innocentes ex accidenti occidi possunt.*
- 10 *Pignerationes non alio modo licitæ quàm quo bellum.*

CAP. QVARTVM.

Pignerandi potestatem*, quam Græci 1
Androlepsiam vocant, antiquissima
consuetudine permissam fuisse constat.
moris enim fuit antiquissimi, vt qui ho-
mici- dium perpetrassent, si cùm in ex-
ternam urbem profugissent, ad pœnam
exposciti non dederentur iis, ad quos
facinus admissum pertinebat, ipsis vt
permitteretur pignerandi potestas. sic „
enim sancitum fuisse legimus: si quis vio- „
lenta morte obierit, pro hoc gentilibus „
& co-

» & cognatis Androlepsiæ sunt, quoad
 » iudicium cedis, pœnasque subierint, vel
 » necis auctores dediderint. androlepsia
 » verò ad tres vsque, nec eo amplius esto.

Quæ verba referuntur a Demosthene in oratione in Aristogitonem, qui istic defendit, causæ fortasse inseruiens, Androlepsiam lege esse permissam, non cōtra profugū suscipientes, sed contra eos demum, apud quos cædes facta fuisset. Iulius verò Pollux eam permissam fuisse scribit, etiam contra eos, qui homicidam profugum suscepissent, nec eum petentibus dedidissent, nec ad criminis pœnam, nec ad vindictam: nec ipsi iustè punirent: vt annotauit Budæus^a. Ad
 2 hunc sanè modum * pignerationes hæ, a in l. aut facta. §. euentus. D. de pœ. quas represalias vocant, hodie permittuntur, vt si qua ex gente latrones, aut piratæ, vel quicunque alij homicidia, aliaue scelera perpetraverint, iniuriam damnūue intulerint: nec eam passi potuerint obtinere ab iis, quibus scelerum auctores subiiciuntur, vel qui eos susceperint, vt iidem dedantur, vel pœnas luant, tunc liceat vti pignerationibus. Sed vtrūm hæc consuetudo * iure
 3 defendi possit, controuersum est: præsertim

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a c. Iudei. c. Iam itaque. 1. quest. 4. l. crimen. D. de poen. Aug. 9. 8. super ioseph. b l. sanctus. C. de poen. c. 2. de constitut. c. qua sunt. d. hic que si. a ma p. r. cap. Romana, in fi. de sent. ex communicat. lege 12. l. ad. C. de leg. here. c. Exod. 23. d. Ezech. 18. c. Deut. c. 24. f c. quoniam frequenter. 6. si vero ut lite non cōtejl. c. renouantes, et ibi gloss. 22. dist. cap. anti. quo. de preul. c. vergēis, c. nec huiusmo. di, de heret. glos. in c. 2. de constit. Et est elegās text. in c. eccle. 1. q. 4. g cap. 21. h Leu. c. 20. i c. mulier. 15. quāst 1. k Reg. 2. c. 12. l Genes. c. 19

fertim ex eo, quòd iniquum sit, & a iusticia alienū, ob alterius culpam & crimen innocenti poenam infligi ^a. nam poena sequitur criminis auctorē ^b. Scriptum est, in fontem & iustum non occides ^c. &, anima quæ peccauerit, ipsa morietur. filius non portabit iniquitatem patris, & pater non portabit iniquitatē filij. iusticia iusti super eum erit, & impietas impij super eum ^d. &, non occidentur patres pro filiis, nec filij pro parentibus; sed vnusquisque pro peccato suo morietur ^e. Nihilominus tamen, quandoque ex causa ^{*}, etiam si culpa ab- ^{4.}
 sit, quem puniri posse constat ^f. Quò spectat lex illa Exodig: Si animal hominē occiderit, lapidibus obruatur. quod & lege Draconis, legislatoris Atheniēsis cautum fuit. Similiter pecus licet ratione careat, & a culpa immune sit, cū ipsa foemina, quæ se ei commiscuit, suspendi iubetur ^h. ne tali flagitio contaminatum indignam refricet facti memoriā ⁱ. Præterea puer natus Dauidi ex illicito coitu, ob parentis crimen a Deo extinctus est ^k. & infantes Sodomæ absq; vlllo proprio peccato, simul cū adultis peccatoribus igne consumpti sunt ^l. vnde Deus ipse

ipse ait : Ego sum Deus zelotes, visitans iniquitatē patrū in filios, vsq; ad tertiam & quartā generationē^a. Quæ quidē diuina iudicia quāuis hominibus imitari non liceat, nisi quatenus ex manifestis
 5 causis procedūt; ideoq; nulla lege*, quacunq; ex causa, quis debeat corporali poena affici ob alterius crimen^b: (quæ de causa etiā iniquè ab Arcadio & Honorio imp^p.^c dictum censer Couarruias^d, ex imperatoria lenitate, & indulgentia se vitam concedere filiis eorum, qui crimen læsæ maiestatis commiserāt: cum nullo iure illis vitam adimere possent) tamen ex causis, & propter reipub. vtilitatem; quoq; magis homines a delictis compescantur, humana lex poterit poena pecuniaria, publicatione bonorum, vel simili, punire etiā illos, qui non deliquerunt : & ita passim legibus & canonibus statutum est: præsertim in filiis & nepotibus eorum, qui crimen læsæ maiestatis diuinæ vel humanæ commiserunt : qui afficiuntur infamia, & plectuntur publicatione bonorum^e. quod præclarè legibus comparatum esse dicit Cicero^f; vt charitas liberorum amicio-
 res parentes redderet reipub. quam sen-
 tentiam

^a Exod. c. 20^b August. q.

8. super Iosue.

Thom. Card.

et alij relecti

Covarruias.

variar. reso-

lut. lib. 2. c. 8.

^c in l. quis-

quis. C. ad l.

lul. maiest.

^d variar. re-

solut. lib. 2. c. 8

^e d. l. quisquis

cum similib.

^f in epist. ad

Brutum.

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tentiam ex D. Augustino & aliis, latè
prosequitur & discutit Couarruias ^{a.}
Ex quibus, ni fallor, manifestum est *, ⁶
pignerationes istas licitas quidē esse (vt
communi omnium consensu deducitur
ex D. Augustino ^{b.}) sed non quoad of-
fensionem personarum innocētium, &
qui nullam illati damni culpam contra-
xerunt ; verū bonorum tantum ^{c.}
Quemadmodum enim quis solo con-
sensu se potest subijcere damno bono-
rum, non autem membrorum, vel cor-
poris ^{d.} : sic quoque lege vel statuto, cui
vnusquisque cōsentire prælumitur, po-
test quis ex causa, licet sine culpa, affici
pœna pecuniaria, nō etiam corporali ^{e.}
Quare iustissimè D. Ambrosius* Theo- ⁷
dosium imperatorem increpuit, quòd
milite quodam in tumultu occiso, iussit
populum, vt quisque obuius esset, cædi.
potuit enim imperator militis occiso-
res capite punire: iniquè verò, etiam ex
causa seditionis, innocentes occidi ius-
sit. pro quo delicto culpam cum lacry-
mis professus imperator, publicam pœ-
nitentiam

a *variar. re-
sol. lib. 2. c. 8.*
b *q. 10 super
Iosep, c. Do-
minum, 23 q. 2
c. 1. de iure iu-
in 6. & ibi
Anch. Dom.
et Franc. lac.
de Camb. &
Bart. in trac.
de represa.
Sal. in authē.
omnino. C. de
act. & oblig.
Inno. in c. o-
lum, de rest. t.
spoliat. iacob.
de Bellou in
auth. vt non
fiant pign.
c. 10. f. Papon.
in arrest. li. 5.
tit. 3. nu. 2.
d. l. liber ho-
mo. D. ad l.
Aquil. c. con-
tingit. de sent.
excom. Gloss.
infig. in cap.
cum homo.
23. quæst. 5.
c. Gloss. ele-
gans, in Rub.
C. de decret.
decu. lib. 10
quā glossam*

passim sequuntur interpp. & commendat Bald. in l. un. C. ne filius
pro pat. Alex. in l. sape, num. 10. D. de re iud. Ange. & las. in §.
actiones, nu. 68. instit. de actio.
f. c. cum apud Thessalonica, 11. q. 3, D. Aug. de ciuit. Dei l. 5. c. 26.

nitentiam in totius conspectu ecclesiæ
 8 egit: & lege cauit*, vt si princeps ex ira-
 cūdiā quem seuerius puniri iubeat: sen-
 tentia ad triginta dies suspēdatur^a. Ce-
 9 terum quemadmodum in bello* non
 licet ex professo innocētes occidere, se-
 minas scilicet, nec infantes: (licet tamē
 ex accidenti, si puta oppidum machinis,
 vel tormentis bellicis concutiatur, cum
 aliter bellum geri non possit.) sic quoq;
 in hisce pignerationibus, quamuis in-
 noxij offendi non possint, sed tantum
 bona eorum capere liceat: permittit ta-
 men conditio rei, vt ex accidenti occi-
 dantur: siquidem aliter pignerationes
 istæ exerceri non possunt. Sciendū verò
 10 *pignerationes istas non alio modo esse
 licitas, quàm quo bellū iure diuino, na-
 turali & ciuili licitum censetur. vnde
 omnino requiritur auctoritas summi
 Principis, qui belli indicēdi ius habet^b.
 a iudice autem concedi non possunt, &
 inter ciues locum non habent^c. quam-
 uis olim apud Atheniēses priuato con-
 silio androlepsiā exercere liceret: multa
 tamen constituta non iure ea vtenti; vt
 ex Polluce annotauit Bud^d. Itaque &
 hodie iusta causa subesse debet. Nempe,
 E quod

^a in l. vindi-
 cari. C. de pœ.
 d. cap. Cum
 apud Thessa-
 lomcam.

^b c. Dominus
 noster. 23.
 quest 2.
^c Auth. vt
 null. sud. l. c. §
 quoniam, &
 Au. he. vt nō
 fia. pign.

^d in l. aut fa-
 ctz. §. euen-
 tus. D. de pœ.

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quod ille populus, contra quem pignerationes istæ conceduntur, vindicare neglexerit, quod a suis improbè factum est. alioqui verò, si iusta & vera causa desit, concessio pignerandi nullius erit momentia.

a l. cum vero. §. subuentum. D. de fid. commiss. lib. l. 1. §. hac verba. D. ne via fiat ei qui

DE BELLO CAPTIS ET IVRE
POSTLIMINII.

- 1 *Iusto bello capta sunt capientium.*
- 2 *Alciati opinio reprobata, qui dicit omnia bella hodie esse civilia.*
- 3 *Differentia inter res mobiles & immobiles bello captas.*
- 4 *Præda omnis arbitrio ducis est, non militum.*
- 5 *Imperatores prædam nonnunquam in ærarium inferre soliti.*
- 6 *Nonnunquam militibus diuidere.*
- 7 *Præda pars debetur etiã iis, qui non fuerunt in prælio.*
- 8 *Præda militibus nonnunquam edici solet, & eorum arbitrio permitti.*
- 9 *Principi & duci debetur sua portio ex præda.*
- 10 *Romani partem præda diis vouere soliti.*
- 11 *Non nisi deuietis hostibus & signodato, ad prædam discurrendum.*

- 12 *In diuisione prædæ fraudem committens puniendus.*
- 13 *Fugienti in bello non debetur pars prædæ.*
- 14 *Libendi sunt milites prædam vendere, ne impedimentis grauentur.*
- 15 *Res sacra non cedunt prædæ.*
- 16 *Natura ne, an instituto hominum seruitus sit inducta.*
- 17 *Seruitus non tollit libertatem naturalem.*
- 18 *Nulla vis quæ facti est, seruitutem inducit, quæ iuris est.*
- 19 *Capti hodie inter Christianos non sunt serui, nisi militent infidelibus.*
- 20 *In bello captus, & ad suos reuersus præstinam libertatem recipit.*
- 21 *Nisi iurauerit se rediturum ad hostes.*
- 22 *Transfuga non habet postliminium, nisi sit seruus.*
- 23 *Qui se hostibus dedunt, non habent ius postliminii, licet armis victi sint.*
- 24 *Controuersia inter veteres in causa Mancini.*
- 25 *In bello etiam mulieres capi possunt & pueri.*
- 26 *Iusto bello captus, tenetur ad precium redemptionis, quod promisit.*
- 27 *Captiui cuius sint.*

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- 28 *Privata auctoritate non licet captivum occidere.*
- 29 *Precium conventionis, de quo convenit, non debet augeri.*
- 30 *Qui pro captivo solvit premium redemptionis, quæ remedia habeat.*
- 31 *Redemptio captivorum favorabilis.*
- 32 *Negligens redimere captivum.*
- 33 *Agri redeunt postliminio.*
- 34 *Quæ præterea redeant postliminio.*
- 35 *Res semel ab hostibus capta, & ab iisdem recuperata, an sint restituenda priori Domino.*
- 36 *Res quæ sunt hostium, non sunt in commercio, nisi sint eius generis, quæ postliminio redire possunt.*
- 37 *Præda quando sit facta hostium.*
- 38 *Capta a piratis non sunt eorum: idcircoque recuperata, priori domino restituenda sunt.*
- 39 *Licet aliud constitutionibus regni Hispaniæ statutum sit.*
- 40 *Res furtiva bello capta, an priori domino restitui debeat.*
- 41 *Res incorporales, an bello capi possint.*
- 42 *Quæstio inter Thebanos & Thessalos.*
- 43 *Universitas non perit, quamdiu unus superest.*

Primum iusticiæ munus est, ut inquit Cicero^a, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi la-
 cessitus iniuria. quæ causa est etiam iusti
 belli fundamentum, ut superius latè o-
 stendimus^b. Quam Ciceronis senten-
 tiam quamvis refutet Lactantius^c; ut
 quæ duorum verborum adiectione cor-
 rupta sit: nō enim addi debuisse, nisi la-
 cessitus iniuria: Socratem secutus: qui
 dicebat ultionem esse iniustam, eo quod
 malum inferre iniustum sit: summū ta-
 men principem, qui non ex animi mor-
 bo, sed ex amore iusti, ut hostiū impro-
 bitatem coerceat, & suos defendat, ac-
 ceptam iniuriam bello vindicat, extra
 culpam esse omnino dicendum est. non
 enim est iniuria, ut inquit Seneca, pati
 I quod prior feceris. Vnde dominiū^{*} eo-
 rum, quæ iusto bello capimus, in nos
 transfertur: estque hic iustus modus ac-
 quirendi dominiij^d. quod & Cicero in-
 „ dicat, cū ait: Sunt autem priuata nulla
 „ natura, sed aut veteri occupatione, ut
 „ qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut vi-
 „ ctoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt; aut lege,
 „ aut pactione, conditione, forte^e: idque
 iure gentium inductum est^f, & iure di-

^a off. lib. 1.^b 3. c. 2.^c lib. 6. c. 12.^d §. Item ea
quæ ab hosti-
bus inſtit. de
rer. diuis.^e off. lib. 1.^f l. ex hoc iu-
re. D. de iust.^g iur. c. lu-
riſgentium.

diſt. 1.

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a Reg. 1. c. 30
 b d. c. iurif-
 getum, & c.
 sua mutare.
 dist. 1. & c.
 dicit. 23 q. 5
 c. sicut & in
 fra de iure iur.
 c. d. §. item
 ea que ab ho-
 stibus. l. si
 quid bello. D.
 de captiv. l.
 naturalem. §.
 de l. trans-
 fugam. D. de
 acq. rer. dom.
 d. in l. hostes.
 D. de verbor.
 signif.
 c. l. in orbe.
 D. de statu
 hominum.
 § c. ad men-
 sam. 11. q. 3
 g l. si quis in-
 genuam. §. in
 civilibus. D.
 de captiv.
 h supra de
 bello iusto,
 cap. 2.

uino^a, canonico^b, & ciuili comproba-
 tum^c. Cuius iuris æquitas, non tam ad
 satisfaciendum ei qui iniuriam accepit,
 quam ad coercendam improbitatē eo-
 rum, qui iniusta bella gerunt, spectare
 videtur: vt ex D. Augustino in præfatio-
 ne huius operis dictum est. Neque Al-
 ciato^d assentior^d, qui bello inter Chri-
 stianos capta, non fieri capientium, hoc
 argumento probare conatur: quòd sci-
 licet omnes, qui in orbe Romano erāt,
 Antonini constitutione ciues Romani
 effecti sint^e. vnde hodie omnes Chri-
 stianos, populum Romanum esse, &
 Christi lege fratres^f: ideoque quę inter
 eos mouentur bella, plus quàm ciuilia
 esse: & per consequens, ius belli, quo ca-
 pta fiunt capientium, inter Christianos,
 locum non habere^g. Quod si verum ef-
 fet, nullum iustum bellū inter Christia-
 nos esse posset. quod falsum esse, ex iis
 quę alio loco diximus^h, satis constat. vn-
 de & capta hoc bello fient capientium.
 nisi quòd antiquissima cōsuetudine in-
 troducū est inter Christianos, vt capti
 vtcunque iusto bello, libertatem non a-
 mitterent. de quo mox dicemus. Neque
 ciuile bellū dici potest, quod inter duos
 summos

summos principes, aut populos liberos geritur. non enim sunt ciues, qui non iisdem imperiis, ac iussis tenentur ^a, sed et si cum subditis, & ciuibus rebellibus sit bellum, non protinus cessabunt iura belli, quibus dominiū eorū, quæ ab hostibus capimus, nobis acquirimus. nam qui hostili animo contra imperij maiestatem quid machinatur, ex ciue fit hostis ^b. Itaq; multis rationibus docet Cicerō, iustū esse bellū q̄ inferretur Antonio, hosti rei pub. iniustū verò quod ipse Antonius gerebat: ideoq; iura belli, quæ hostibus tantū conueniunt, ipsi non conuenire ^c. qua de re alibi latius tractauimus ^d: quæ huc referri possunt. Porro 3 illud quidē verum ^e est, dominium rerū iusto bello captarū, in victorē trāsferrī: sed distinctione facta inter res mobiles, & immobiles. immobilia enim, vtpote agri, publicātur ^f. quāuis olim nō semel agros bello captos, militibus ob bene nauatā operā diuisos fuisse legimus ^g. idque a Romulo institutū fuit ^g. Alexāder autē Seuerus agros captos ab hostibus, limitaneis ducibus, ac militibus donauit: ita vt eorū essent, si heredes quoque militarēt, neq; ad priuatos trāferrentur: ^h

^a Latè Bodin. in metho. histor. cap. 6.

^b l. nihil interest. l. postliminium. §. transfuga. D. de captiu. l. amissione. §. qui deficiunt. D. de capti. minut.

^c Philipp. 8. d. 5. de bello iusto cap. 2.

^e l. si captiuus. §. c. pul. fis. D. de capt. f. l. in agris. D. de acq. rer. domin. l. item si verberatū. §. Item si. D. de rer. vend. ^g Dion. Halic. ant. Rom. lib. 2.

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a Aelius
L'ap. in vita
Alex. Sever. attentius illos militaturos existimans, si
 sua iura defenderent^a. Sed cum hi agri
 non militibus, sed principi acquirantur,
 solius principis arbitrio, quid de iis fieri
 placet, relinquetur. ex constitutionibus
 quoque regni Hispaniæ, non solum a-
 gri, sed etiam naues bellicæ, bello fortè
b Reg. l. 19.
lib. 26. par. 2 nauali captæ, regi acquiruntur^b. Quod
 verò ad reliquam prædam rerum mobi-
 lium attinet, nec ea quidem militibus
 acquiri solebat, & ne dux quidem vllum
 ius in eam habebat: sed quæstoris erat
 eam vendere, & pecuniam in ærarium
 referre. quod lege cautum fuisse tradit
c lib. 7. Dion. Halic.^c & hac potissimum de cau-
 sa Marcium Coriolanum, quod præda
 ex Volscis militi diuisa, hanc legem vio-
 lasset, a populo condemnatum fuisse.
 eoq; spectat, quod D. Ambrosius dicit,
 disciplinam militarē docere, vt regi ser-
 uentur omnia, ex èplo Abrahæ, qui ces-
 sit omnem prædam regi Sodomorum^d.
d cap. dicat.
23. quest. 5. Postea tamen apud Romanos, prædam
 omnem arbitrio ducis^e fuisse, certū est^e. 4
e l. si quis pro
ved. p. me. C.
de donatio. idque ex aliquot Liuij locis apertè satis
 liquet. Itaque refert, cū Phocenses,
 portis apertis, pacti ne quid hostiliter
 paterentur, se Romanis dedidissent; &
 nihilo-

nihilominus milites ad diripiendam urbem discurrerent, L. Æmiliū restitisse, & reuocasse milites, dicendo, captas, nō deditas vrbes diripi: & in his tamen arbitrium esse imperatoris, nō militum^a. ^a *Liuius l. 37*
 & alibi idem Liuius dicit, Camillū Veiōs obsidētem, cū iam in manibus videret victoriam, urbem opulentissimam capi, tantumque prædæ fore, quantum nō omnibus in vnum collatis ante bellis fuisset: ne quam inde aut militum iram, ex malignitate prædæ partitæ: aut inuidiam apud patres, ex prodiga largitione caperet: quid de præda fieri placeret, ad senatum reiecisse^b. Solent autem ^b *Liuius l. 5,*
 5 imperatores* nonnunquam prædam totam, vel partem eius in ærariū per quæstores referre^c. Itaq; L. Furrius prætor ^c *Cicero. epist. 27.*
 de Gallis triumphans, trecenta viginti millia æris in ærariū tulit: argenti clxx. millia pondo^d. Ingentem quoque vim ^d *Liuius l. 31*
 auri & argenti M. Heluius & Q. Minucius ex præda Hispaniensi in ærarium tulerunt: & T. Quintius Philippo deuicto^e: & longè maximā L. Æmilius Paulus, deuicto Perseo^f. & Camillo duce, ^e *Liuius l. 34*
 fusis Faliscis, castris eorum captis, præda ^f *Liuius l. 45*
 omnis ad quæstores redacta est, cum magna mi-

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

gna militum ira : sed seueritate imperij
 victi, eādem virtutem & oderant, & mi-
 rabantur, vt inquit Liuius^a, apud quem
 passim inuenias plurimū auri & argenti
 ex præda hostium in ærarium relatum
 fuisse. Nonnunquam imperatores^{*} ven- 6
 dere prædam, & militibus diuidere so-
 lent, donatis ante alios iis, quorū virtus
 in bello maximè eniteret: habita quoq;
 ratione dignitatis cuiusque, & ordinis.
 Sic Iulius Cæsar in Gallia militibus, pro
 labore & tolerātia (qui brumalibus die-
 bus, itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus
 intolerandis, studiosissimè permanserāt
 in labore) ducenos sestertios: centurio-
 nibus duo millia nummūm, prædæ no-
 mine condonanda pollicitus est^b. & ex
 præda, quam L. Æmilius Paulus Perseo
 victo fecerat, pediti in singulos centeni
 dati: duplex centurioni, triplex equiti^c.
 M. Valerius Coruinus Samnitibus præ-
 lio victis, & C. Iunius Bouiano capto,
 prædam omnem militi dederunt^d. & se-
 natus prædam Epiriciuitatum, quæ ad
 Persea defecerant, exercitui dedit. Itaq;
 signo ad diripiendas vrbes dato, tanta
 præda fuit, inquit Liuius^e, vt in equitē
 cccc. denarij, peditibus duceni diuide-
 rentur.

^a lib. 6.

^b A Hyr. de
bel. Gall. l. 8.

^c Liuius l. 45

^d Liuius l. 7.
¶ 9.

^e lib. 45.

rentur. & hæc prædæ diuifio, etiam iure probata viderur^a. Ex facris quoq; literis constat, Dominum præcepiffe Moyfi, vt ipfe & Eleazar tollerēt vniuerfam prædā, factam ex Madianitis, quos Iſraëlita de- uicerant, & ex æquo eam diuiderent in- ter eos, qui pugnauerant: & vt quinquageſima pars daretur Leuitis, qui excu- babāt in tabernaculis Domini^b. & Da- uid, Amalæchitis prælio victis, collegit omnem prædam; cumq; illi, qui in præ- lio fuerant, peterent ſibi tantum diuidi, nec quicquam dari iis, qui cum illis non
7 fuerant: dixit Dauid*, æquam partem habituros, qui deſcendiſſent in prælium, & qui remaniſſent ad ſarcinas. quod deinceps pro lege ſeruatum fuit in Iſ- rael^c. idque etiam conſtitutionibus re- gni Hispaniæ deciſum eſt^d. Quò ſpectat, quòd C. Fabius Ambuſtus tribunus mi- litum, cum ad Auxur oppugnandum acceſſiſſet, collegis ſuis, Cn. Corne- lio Coſſo, & Valerio Potito, cum par- te exercitus ad deuſtandos fines, vt diſtinerent Volſcos, proſectis, capta vrbe a præda militem continuit, do- nec collegæ cum ſuis exercitibus veni- rent: ab illis quoque captum Auxur dicti-

^a c. ius milit-
tare. deſt. 1. l.
ſi quis pro re-
demptio. C. de
donatio. Bar-
to. in l. ſi quid
bello. D. de
captiui. Hiſp.
reg. lib. 1. l. 17.
19. & 20. tit.
26. par. 2.
^b Num. 31.

^c Reg. 1. c. 39

^d Reg. 1. c. 25.
tit. 26. par. 20

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dictitans esse, qui ceteros Volscos a præ-
 sidio eius loci auertissent^a. Solent deni-
 que imperatores^{*} ad excitandos militū 8
 animos, nonnunquam totam prædam
 militibus ante cōflictum edicere, & pati
 habere quod cuique fors belli dedisset.
 vti de præda Veiorum decreuit senatus,
 ex sententiā P. Licinij, gratius id fore di-
 centis, lætiusque, quod quisque sua ma-
 nu ex hoste captum, domum retulisset,
 quàm si multiplex, alterius arbitrio ac-
 ciperet: quamuis refragante App. Clau-
 dio, qui largitionem nouam, prodigam,
 inæqualem, inconsultam arguebat^b. &
 hæc quidem quoad illa, quæ in conflictu
 & prælio acquiruntur. alioqui verò res
 hostiles, quæ citra certamen ad quem-
 cunque perueniunt, sunt eius qui prius
 possessionem nactus est^c. Ceterum etiā
 præda militibus concessa, principi^{*} ni- 9
 hilominus sua portio debetur^d: quæ ex
 constitutionibus regni Hispa. est quin-
 ta pars prædæ^e: quandoq; tertia^f: quan-
 doque dimidia 8. duci quoq; exercitus,
 ex iisdem constitutionibus, debetur se-
 ptima pars prædæ, quandoque decima^h.
 Sed & si fortè bello nauali, rex suppedi-
 tet naues cum armamentis, & præbeat
 anno-

^a *Linus l. 4.*

^b *Linus l. 5.*

^c *L. transfu-
gā. D. de acq.
rer. dom. l. 1.
in prin. D. de
acqui. poss.*

^d *c. omnes mili-
tate. dist. 1.*

^e *R. g. lib. 4.
tit. 26. par. 2.*

^f *Reg. l. 20.
d. tit.*

^g *l. 19. tit. 26
p. 2.*

^h *Reg. l. 14.
dist. tit.*

- annonam, & stipendia militibus ac nau-
tis: ex iisdem constitutionibus, præda
omnis, non ducis vel præfecti, sed regis,
cui acquiritur, arbitrio est. nec quicquā
milites vel nautæ ex ea accipient, nisi
quid ex liberalitate sua rex illis conces-
ferit^a. alias verò regi sua portione præ-
stita, reliquum præfectus maris inter mi-
lites, ac nautas diuidere potest, ex quo
septima pars præfecto maris debetur^b.
- 10 Solent * præterea Romani, vt victoria
potirentur, partem prædæ diis suis vo-
uere. itaque Camillus, cū ad delēdam
urbem Veios pergeret, decimam partē
prædæ Pythico Apollini vouit^c. Neque
- 11 omittendum est disciplina militari * se-
uerissimè fuisse cautum, vt non nisi de-
uictis hostibus, castris eorū captis, arce
vel oppido omnino in potestatem re-
ductis, ad prædam discurrere liceret: &
ne tum quidē, nisi ab imperatore signo
dato, vt maximè ante conflictum prædā
omnem militibus edixisset: ne scilicet a-
uiditate prædæ, vt plerunque solet, ho-
stis è manibus elabatur, aut prælium re-
stauret: vt Samnitibus accidit: qui cū
in noctem æquo Marte cum Romanis
pugnassent, tādē auiditate prædæ, im-
petum

^a Reg. 29. d.
^{lit.}^b Reg. l. 30.
^{dist. lit.}^c Livius l. 5.

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petum in impedimenta Romanorum
(quæ procul ab armatis sine præsidio,
sine munimento stabant) facientes,
a Marco Fabio magistro equitum, ius-
su Cornelij Arinnæ dictatoris dissipati,
impeditique miserè cæsi sunt, &
^a *Liuius* l.8. victoriam Romanis tradiderunt^a. præ-
terea ita ferme euenit, vti App. Clau-
dius dicebat, vt segnior sit prædator,
vt quisque laboris periculi que præci-
puam petere partem solet. Itaque Veis
captis, quorum prædam senatus mi-
liti concesserat, non tamen nisi per-
missu Camilli dictatoris, ad prædam
^b *Liuius* l.5. discurrere licuit^b. sicut nec ad præ-
dam Epiri ciuitatum, quæ ad Persea
defecerant, a senatu exercitui datam,
^c *Liuius* l.45. nisi signo ad diripiendas vrbes dato^c.
Carthagine quoque noua expugnata,
arce demum dedita, signo dato, victo-
^d *Liuius* l.26. res ad prædam versi sunt^d. Atque ita
rectè constitutionibus regni Hispaniæ
fancitum est, vt si quis nondum de-
uictis hostibus prædæ incumbat, par-
tem prædæ amittat, & duplum eius
quod prædatus fuerit, præstet, & in
deteriorem militiam detur. Et qui-
dem si prædantium culpa, hostes præ-
lium

- illum restituerint, & vicerint, aut regem occiderint, non secus quàm si ipsi id admisissent, puniuntur^a. Ille quoque qui in diuisione prædæ * fraudem committit, poena dupli, & amissione partis prædæ, iisdem constitutionibus plectitur^b. Qui verò prædam ab hostibus captam surripuit, lege peculatus teneri, & in quadruplum damnavari Modestinus respondit^c. Sed nec illis *, qui in acie fugerint, aut ignaui & secordes fuerint, debetur pars prædæ. *Bald. in l. si quis pro redempt. C. de donat. l. omne delictum. §. qui prior. D. de re milit. reg. Hisp. li. 1. & 20. tit. 26. par. 2.* Itaque L. Quintius Cincinnatus dictator, cum Lucium Minucium Consullem, & eius exercitum ab obsidione Æquorum liberasset, castris hostium captis, plenis omnium rerum, prædam omnem suo tantum militi dedit, consularem exercitum, ipsumque consulem increpans: Carebis, inquit, parte prædæ miles, ex eo hoste, cui prope prædæ fuisti: & tu L. Minuci, donec consularem animum habere incipias, legatus his legionibus præeris^d. Sed
- 14 & cum nihil magis exercitum grauet *,
neque

^a Reg. l. 2. 3.^c 19. tit. 20
par. 2.^b Reg. lib. 8.
tit. 28. par. 2^c in l. fan.
D. Ad l. ludi
pecul.^d L. ius l. 3.

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neque corrumpat, quàm impedimen-
torum multitudo, disciplinæ militari
maximè conueniens erit, iubere milites
prædam omnem vendere, exemplo P.
Decij: qui expugnatis aliquot oppidis
in Samnio, prædam omnem milites quàm
primùm vendere coëgit, ne impedimē-
tis grauibus oneraret agmen^a. Sciendum
verò est res sacras^{*} prædæ non cedere. 15
cùm enim nullius sint, hostiles, quæ solè
in præda sunt, dici non possunt. quod e-
nim diuini iuris est, vt inquit imperator,
nullius in bonis est^b, & hominum po-
testati non sunt subiecta. qui itaque hu-
iusmodi quid rapuerit, sacrilegij poena,
ex lege Iulia, pro qualitate personæ. &
rei conditione punietur^c. Itaque Sci-
pio, diruta Carthagine, & præda militi
concessa, cùm multis præmiis & donis
afficeret milites; eorum qui fanum A-
pollinis spoliarent & violarent, rationem
non habuit^d. Sed an sacrilegium com-
mittat, qui rem priuatam in ædem sacrâ
depositam furripuit, olim cōtrouersum
fuit^e. Sed Antoninus & Seuerus actio-
nem furti, non sacrilegij dari rescripse-
runt^f. ideoque hanc rem prædæ cedere
dicendum est. Cicero tamen in suis le-
gibus,

^a *Lincol. l. 11*

^b *§. nullius. in sit. de rer. diuis. l. 1. D. de rer. diuisio.*

^c *l. sacrilegij. D. ad l. l. pecul.*

^d *Appian. in bell. pun.*

^e *Quint. Inst. orat. l. 7. c. 4. Cicer. de in- uen. lib. 2.*

^f *l. Diui. D. ad l. l. pec.*

gibus^a, inter rem sacram, & sacro com-^{a lib. 2. de le-}
mendaram non distinguit. quod & ca-^{gibm.}
nonnes nostri sequuntur^b. Quod vt verū^{b in c. quis-}
sit inter ciues, hoc tamen nostro casu nō^{quis. 17. q. 4.}
puto procedere: quia res sacro commē-
data, certē sacra dici non potest, quæ in
nullius bonis est^c. cū itaq; sit res pri-^{c d. §. nullius}
uati, & in alicuius bonis sit, & hostilis,
eam prædæ cedere existimo. vt enim res
prædæ sit, sufficit eam hostilem esse^d. ^{d l. naturalē.}
Porrò quod dicimus iusto bello capta ^{in fine. d. iust.}
fieri capientium: nō solū in rebus, sed ^{fugam. D. de}
etiam personis liberis, iure gentium & ^{acq. rer. dom.}
ciuili receptum fuit: vt mancipia fierent ^{e l. hostes. Et}
capientium, & ex personis res, quæ sunt ^{toto tit. D. de}
in dominio^e. vnde seruitus orta^f. Inter ^{captus.}
16 Philosophos verò quæri solet^{*}, natura ^{§ l. ex hoc iur.}
ne an instituto hominum, hæc persona- ^{re. D. de iust.}
rum diuisio, in liberos & seruos primū ^{Et iur. §. ius}
in mores perducta sit: & Aristoteles na- ^{autem gentiū.}
turalem ait g: Iure consulti verò, contra ^{instit. de iure}
naturam seruitutem inductam, iure gē- ^{natur. cap. ius}
tium esse affirmant^h: iure enim naturali, ^{gentiū, d. iust. l.}
omnes homines ab initio liberos nasci, ^{c. 1. d. iust. 7.}
& natura omnes æquales esseⁱ. quod e- ^{g in Polst. ub.}
tiam Cicer. probat^k. Nihil enim vinum ^{l. c. 1.}
vni tam simile, inquit, tam par, quam in- ^{h §. seruitus.}
ter nosmetipsumus. Id tamen seru- ^{instit. de iur.}
pulo ^{person. §. ius}
^{autem gentiū.}
^{instit. de iur.}
^{natur.}
^{i l. quod atti-}
^{net. D. de reg.}
^{iur.}
^{k de leg. lib. 1.}

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pulo non caret, cùm iura naturalia sint immutabilia, & iure gentium tolli non possint^a, iniustum quoque videtur, & a natura abhorrere, vt homines hominibus seruiât, quamuis id fieri reipub. fortasse expediat. quo potissimū argumento, veteres quidam olim defendere conati sunt, id quod vulgò ferebatur, rempublicam sine iniusticia stare, augeri que non posse: quorum disputationem suscipientem Philum inducit Cicer.^b cui tamen optimè ibidem satisfecit Lælius, vt in præfatione huius operis diximus: vbi ostendimus, non esse iniustum, vt bello victi fiât serui, quibus adde, vt nōdum hūc dissoluamys, quòd libertas sit quidem iuris naturalis, eò scilicet quòd ante constitutionem iuris gētium, omnes liberi nascebantur^c, & omnes homines pares, & æquales habebantur^d: non autem, quòd ius naturale ea de re aliquid præceperit, aut seruitutem prohibuerit^e. Ius verò gentium, quòd naturali ratione constitutum est^f, bella & seruitutes induxit^g. Recta enim ratio naturalis, qua nihil diuinius est, quaque præstamus belluis, hominum crescente malitia, coërcendam humanam improbitatem

^a §. sed naturalia. inst. de iure natur.

^b in libris de repub.

^c l. manumissiones. D. de iust. & iur. d. l. quòd nōtinet. D. de reg. iur. e l. hom. 1. 2. q. 1. 94. art. 5. Præp. in c. ius gentium. dist. 1. fl. 3. l. naturalem. l. adeo. D. de acq. re. dom.

^g §. ius autē gentium. inst. de iur. natur. L. ex hoc iure. D. de iust. & iur.

bitatem bello, captiuitate, & seruitute
 suasit^a. Similiter cū iure naturali, pri-
 mo illo, & aureo, vt ethnici vocabant,<sup>a c. Sexto die.
 25, distinct.</sup>
 sæculo, communia essent omnia, neque
 cuiusquam quicquam proprium: poste-
 rioribus tamē sæculis, quòd communio
 rerum viciatæ naturæ non conueniret,
 ius gentium ex naturali ratione, domi-
 nia, eorūque distinctiones constituit^b.<sup>b lex hoc iu-
 re. D. de iust.
 & iur.</sup>
 Rerum itaque omnium communio, æ-
 qualitas hominum, & omnium vnà li-
 bertas, integræ olim naturæ, & primæ rei-
 pub. Platonis magis, quàm ferreo sæcu-
 lo conuenit: ideoque iure gentium non
 probantur. Quamuis itaq; seruitus iure
 naturali, quo iure omnes homines li-
 beri erant, & pares, & æquales habeban-
 tur^c, fuerit incognita: potuit tamē iure
 gentium constitui seruitus, vtque capti
 iusto bello fierent serui: præsertim cum
 id reipub. conueniat, ad coercēdoseos,
 qui iniusta bella gerūt. vnde eadem ra-
 tio, quæ bella permittit, etiam seruitutē
 constitui suasit. suntque in hanc senten-
 tiam præclara D. Augustini verba^d, cū
 ait: Conditio seruitutis iure intelligitur
 » imposita peccatori. nomen itaque istud
 » culpa meruit, non natura. & deinde sub-

<sup>c l. manumif-
 siones. D. de
 iust. & iur.
 l. quod atti-
 net. D. de reg.
 iur.</sup>

<sup>d de ciuit. Dei
 lib. 19. c. 15.</sup>

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dit : Nullus autem natura, in qua prius
Deus hominem condidit, servus est ho-
minis, vel peccati: verum poenalis servi-
tus ex lege ordinatur: quæ naturalē or-
dinem conseruari iubet, perturbari ve-
tat. quia si contra illam legem non esset
factū, nihil esset poenali servitute coer-
cendum. Itaque Apostolus servos mo-
net subditos dominis suis esse debere, &
ex animo servire^a. & propter peccatum,
Chanaan servus pronūciatus est a Noe
patre, vt serviret fratribus suis^b. Suadet
tamen idem Apostolus, vt Domini ali-
quid de iure suo remittant: & in quibus-
dam pares omnes esse dicit^c. Sciendum
autem est *, hāc servitutem personarum
tollere quidem libertatem; sed non illā
naturalem, quæ in faciendo consistit.
nā servus, vt maximè dominus iubeat,
potest nolle adire hereditatem^d: sed il-
lam, quæ ad iuris effectus est comparata,
& iure gentium inuenta^e. Sed nec vlla
vis *, quæ facti est, servitutē inducit, quæ
iuris est. nam non nisi iusto bello capti,
fiunt servi: nō etiam capti a latronibus,
vel prædonibus, & iis, qui iusti hostes nō
sunt^f. Et quidē inter Christianos * lau-
dabili, & antiqua consuetudine intro-
ductum

^a Ad Ephes. 6

ad Tim. 1. c. 6

ad Titum. c. 2

ad Collos. c. 3

^b Genes. c. 9.

^c Ad Gal. 5.

ad Ephes. cap.

ult. ad Coloss.

cap. 4.

^d l. cum pro-

posas. C. de

hered. inst. l. 1.

et l. manus

firmas. D. de

inst. & iur.

^e l. ius autem

gentium. inst.

de iur. nat. l.

quidam. D. de

pen.

^f l. postlimi-

nium. §. 4. pi-

ratus. l. hostes.

D. de captiv.

l. 1. in prin. D.

de leg. 3. l. qui

D. de testam.

a latronibus.

17

18

19

ductum est, vt capti hinc inde, vtcunque iusto bello, non fierent serui: sed liberi seruarentur, donec soluant precium redemptionis, quod Græci λύτρον vocāt^a. Romulus vero, vt ciuitatem suam auget, & ex parua magnam faceret, bello captos necari, vel etiam venundari vetuit: sed in partem agri hostilis colonos Romanos misit, & multis populis deuictis ius ciuitatis dedit^b. Si tamen qui Christiani militent Saracenis, & infidelibus contra Christianos, eisue auxiliū quoquo modo præbeant, capti a Christianis fient serui: inciduntque in excōmunicationem ipso iure^c. nō enim iam Christianorum, sed infidelium, quibus se adiunxerunt, numero habendi sunt^d: non tamen aliis, quàm Christianis vēdi poterunt^e. at verò si bellum geratur cū infidelibus, & paganis: certè hinc inde capti, eius erunt conditionis, cuius secundum ius ciuile capti ab hostibus. idque cōstitutionibus regni Hispaniæ decifum videtur^f. atque ita locus erit legis Corneliæ & postliminij fictionibus^g. Quàm autem non conueniat, quamq; periculosum sit reipublicæ, numerum seruorum augeri, indicant tot bella ser-

^a Boetius de-
cis. 172. Bald.
in l. hostes. D.
de captiu. Al-
ciat. in l. ho-
stes. D. de ver.
fig. reg. Hisp.
l. i. tit. 29 p. 2
^b Dion. Hal.
ant. Roma. l. 2
^c c. ita quorū-
dam. c. ad li-
berandum. de
Iude. reg. Hisp.
l. 4. tit. 21. p.
4. Reg. lib. 9.
tit. 29. par. 2
^d Text. el. g
in l. 3. §. ult.
D. ad l. Corn.
de Sica. l. pro-
duores. D. de
re milit. l. trāf-
fugam. D. de
acq. rer. don.
o l. unica. C.
de Christi.
mand. d. reg.
l. 9.
^e Reg. l. 2. tit.
21. par. 4 reg.
l. i. tit. 29. p. 2
^f Alciat. in l.
hostes. D. de
verb. signif.
Claud. Cant.
in §. item ca.
instit. de ver.
diuis. Covar.
in c. peccatis.
de reg. iur. in
6. 2. par. elec.

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nilia, coniurationesque seruorum, quæ
 rempubl. Romanam aliquoties affixe-
 runt, & in summum discrimen adduxe-
 runt: vt latè ostendit Bodinus^a. Porro
 liberæ personæ* in bello captæ, & in ser- 20
 uitudinem redactæ, si ad suos reuertantur,
 quocunque modo potestatem hostium
 euaserint, pristinā libertatem recipiūt^b.
 quemadmodum fera animalia, desinunt
 eius esse, qui cepit, vbi eius custodiam e-
 uaserint^c. Recuperant præterea ab hosti-
 bus reuersi omne ius, quod captiuitate
 amiserant: iure scilicet postliminij^d. nisi
 tamē iurauerint* se redituros ad hostes, 21
 vel non abituros. quo casu, ad suos re-
 uersi non possunt dici rediisse postlimi-
 nio. vt in causā Attilij Reguli, & illorū,
 quos post Cannensem cladem iuratos
 ad senatum misit Annibal, in castra redi-
 tuos, nisi de captiuis redimendis impe-
 trassent, responsum est^e. non enim satis
 est, corpore domum rediisse, nisi etiam
 mēte, & animo sis reuersus. vnde & illi,
 qui ea mente venit, vt ad hostes reuerta-
 tur, non est postliminium^f. Transfuga
 quoque* nullum habet postliminium. 22
 nam, vt ait Paulus^g, qui malo consilio, &
 proditoris animo patriā relinquit, ho-
 stium

^a de repub. l.
 1. cap. 5.

^b l. nihil in-
 terest. D. de
 captiui.

^c §. se re au-
 te. inst. de rer.
 dou. s. i. i. i. i. i.
 ralem. D. de
 acq. rer. dom.
 d. l. postlimi-
 nium. in prin.
 D. de captiui.

^e in l. postli-
 minij. §. vii.
 D. de captiui.
 v. g. Hisp. in
 lib. 9. tit. 29.
 par. 2. Cicero
 offic. lib. 3.
^f l. nihil in-
 terest. D. de
 captiui.

^g in l. postli-
 minium. §.
 transfuge. D.
 de captiui.

stium numero est habendus: siue foemina, siue masculus sit, siue filiusfamilias, siue paterfamilias. Neque enim pater filiumfamilias trās fugam postliminio recipit. quia pater sic illum amisit, vt idem Paulus ait, quemadmodū patria, & quia disciplina castrorum antiquior fuit parentibus Romanis, quā charitas liberorum^a. Aliud tamen est in seruo transfuga, in quo Dominus habet postliminium: ne scilicet contrarium ius nō tam sit seruo iniuriosum, quā domino dānosum^b. Sciendum est autem omnibus hominibus esse postliminium, cuiuscūque sexus, ætatis, vel conditionis sint^c. Militibus verò vt sit postliminium, docere debent se bello captos fuisse^d. nam
 23 illi^{*} qui armis victi se hostibus dedunt, carent postliminio^e. Etenim apud Romanos ignominiosissimum habitū fuit, non vi, sed per deditiōem in potestātē hostium venire. Itaque senatus octo illa millia Romanorum, qui non quidem in acie capti fuerant, sed in castris relictī, post cladem Cannēsē se Annibali dederant, potestate sibi facta, redimere noluit: vt scilicet insitum esset Romanis militibus, aut vincere, aut emori^f. qua

^a d. l. postliminii. §. si. l. i.

^b d. l. transfuga.

^c d. l. postliminium. in si.

^d l. nō oēs. §. a barbaris. D. de re milit. e l. postliminio. D. de captiu. reg. in sp. lib. 9. tit. 29. par. 2.

^f L. i. i. l. 32 Cicer. off. l. 3.

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a j. li. 3. c. 15 de re alio loco latius dicendum erit^a. Sed
 militi bello capto, & postliminio reuer-
 so, non deberi stipēdia, & donatiua eius
 tēporis; quo apud hostes fuit, Antonin⁹
 b in l. 1. C. de Imp. rescripsit^b. si tamen expleto militie
 re milit. l. 12. tempore, captus ab hostibus redeat, vt
 veteranum restituendum, & emerita re-
 c in l. 3. §. is cipere, Arrius Mænander respōdit^c. Sed
 qui ad hostes, an ij, qui decreto senatus, vel iussu po-
 in l. 1. C. de puli per feciales hostibus dediti essent,
 §. pen. D. de ad suos reuersi pristinum statum recipere-
 re milita, rent, inter Brutum & Scæuolam variè
 tractatum est. eoque spectat nobilis illa
 causa Mancini *, de quo cum ob pacem 24
 minus legitimè cum Numantinis factā,
 ex S. C. hostibus deditus esset: eumque
 illi non accepissent: an ciuis Romanus
 maneret, quæsitum est: quibusdam exi-
 stimantibus non manere. quare P. Ruti-
 lius, M. filius. trib. pleb. eum de senatu,
 in quem domum reuersus introire non
 dubitarat, iussit educi: quòd eum ciuem
 esse negaret. quia memoria sic esset pro-
 ditum, quē pater suus, aut populus ven-
 didisset, aut pater patratus dedidisset, ei
 d Cicero. de o. nullum esse postliminiū^d. Neq; referre
 rat. lib. 1. videtur, quòd hostes eū non receperint.
 nā ciuis esse definit, quem ciuitas repu-
 diauit,

diauit, licet ab hostibus nō sit acceptus^a.
 nō secus quā is, cui aqua & igni inter-
 dictū est, vel hostis declaratus, vel in in-
 sulā deportatus est^b. cui sentētiæ Mode-
 stinus accedere videtur^c, qui respondit,
 hostibus deditū, & reuersum, nisi esset a
 suis receptus, ciuē non esse. sed Mācinus,
 licet non fuerit acceptus ab hostibus, eū
 ciuem māsisse aliis visum fuit. quod etiā
 Ciceroni probatur^d: deditū enim dici
 nō posse, qui non sit acceptus. nam neq;
 donationē, neq; deditiōnem sine accep-
 tione intelligi^e. Pōpōnius tamē de Mā-
 cino legem postea latam fuisse, vt esset
 ciuis Romanus, scribit^f. vnde videtur
 adhuc locus esse responso Modestini, e-
 tiam in eo, quem hostes non acceperūt,
 vt scilicet reuersus, non aliter sit ciuis,
 quā si a suis receptus sit. nam alioqui
 quid erat opus legem ferre de Mācino?

25 Porro in bello nō solū viri*, sed etiam
 mulieres capi possunt. sic legimus vxo-
 rem Darij, cum matre, totaque familia,
 captam ab Alexandro: Sophonisbam v-
 xorem Syphacis, a Masanissa: Cleopa-
 tram ab Augusto. maximam tamen cle-
 mentię famā sibi conciliauit Scipio per
 totam Hispaniam, quod capta Cartha-

F 5 gine,

^a Argumento

^b l. i. §. si vir l.

quod meo. §. si

a furioso. D. de

acqu. poss.

^b l. amissione.

§. i. D. de cap.

inimic. inst. de

cap. dimitut.

^c in prin.

^c in l. 4. D. de

captiu.

^d in Topic. et

pro A. Caci-
na in fin.

^e l. absent. D.

de donat. l. nec

ambigi. C. de

donat. facit l.

si me in va-

cuam, D. de

acqu. possess.

^f in l. ult. D.

de legation.

^g l. i. l. sedis-

finē. l. praefet.

cum l. seqv. l.

commercio. C.

de poss. reuers.

l. non ut a pa-

tre. l. mulier.

D. de captiu.

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gine, Allucio Celtiberorum principi,
 sponsam suam eximia forma, quā capti-
 uam habebat, intactam gratis restituit^a.
 Sed nec pueri in bello tuti sunt, & capi
 possunt^b. licet Camillus, laudabili exē-
 plo, nobilissimos Faliscorum pueros,
 quos ludimagister ipsorū in castra Ca-
 milli per astū perduxerat, non accepit:
 sed proditorem nudum, manibus post
 tergum religatis, cædendū, ac reducendū
 Faliscis pueris tradidit, inquiring:
 Nobis, quæ pacto fit humano, cum Fa-
 liscis societas non est: quam ingenerauit
 natura, est, eritque. sunt & belli, sicut &
 pacis iura: arma habemus, non aduersus
 eam ætatem, cui etiā captis vrbibus, par-
 citur: sed aduersus armatos. qua benefi-
 centia prouocati Falisci se spōte Roma-
 nis dediderunt^c. Certè sæuire in foeminas,
 vel pueros, admodum foedū semper
 habitum fuit: quos sexus ipse, & ætas,
 periculis bellorum, & sæuitiæ victorum
 eximit. itaq; lege diuina præcipitur qui-
 dem Israëlitis, vt hostes resistentes, &
 pacem nolentes omnes occidant: sed vt
 parcāt mulieribus, & paruulis: quos ta-
 men prædæ cedere voluit, & in seruitutē
 redigi^d. Canones verò iubēt parci pres-
 biteris,

^a *Liuius l. 26*

^b *l. lex Cor-
nelia. D. de
vulg. & pu-
pill. l. pater. in
prin. l. quod si
filius. D. de
captiu.*

^c *Liuius l. 5.*

^d *Deut. c. 20.*

- biteris, monachis, cōuersis, peregrinis, mercatoribus, & rusticis^a. sed hoc contrario vsu abrogatum esse dicit Panor-
mitanus^b. non tamen credo abrogatū, quoad ecclesiasticos: in quos manuū in-
iectio est interdicta, sub graui anathe-
matis pœna^c. nisi fortè se ingerāt rebus
bellicis. quia priuilegium amittit, qui eo
abutitur^d. Est quoque notatu dignum,
quòd inter duos populos bello exorto,
qui ex hostibus apud vtrumque populū
fuerint, capi possint: licet in pace vene-
rint: nam & olim serui efficiebantur^e.
- 26 Iusto autem bello captus^{*}, qui pro sua
redemptione moderatū precium pro-
misit, non eximitur ab obligatione, ex
eo fortè, quòd vi, metuue dicat se id pre-
cium promississe. nam edictū prætoris,
quo per metum gesta rescinduntur, ad
eum metum, qui iure licito alicui infer-
tur, non pertinet^f. Præterea hīc nō tam
metus inferitur, vt preciū promittatur,
quàm timor mortis iustè imminētis ista
promissione aufertur: præsertim cū
precium redemptionis, in locum serui-
tutis successerit^g. Quod autē ad acqui-
sitionem captiuorum attinet^{*}, idē quod
27 de reliqua præda rerum mobilium, quæ
est du-

a c. 2. de trea.
& pa.

b in d. c. 2.

c cap. si quis
suadente dia-
bolo. 17. q. 4.

d c. ubi. 74.

dist. cap. quia
frustra. de re-
sur.

e l. in bello.
§. 1. D. de ca-
ptiui.

f Text. ele-
gans in l. si
mulier. in

prin. D. quod
metus caus.

Panormit. in
c. Abbas. col.

3. in c. cū di-
lectis. de his

quæ vi. Feli-
nus in c. cū m-

ter. nu. 20.

de except. Do-
min. in c. ad

eius verò. col.

vlt. dist. 5.

Syluester. in
ver. metus. q.

6.

g Fort. in l.
couentionum.

D. de pac. fa-
ct. l. Nam &
Seruus. D.

deneg. gest.

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est ducis arbitrio, dicendum est: & ita olim obtinuisse testatur Dionys. Halic.^a hodie verò plerunque captiui, vt & cetera mobilia, conceduntur capientibus; nisi fortè precium excedat summā decem millium coronatorum; vtputa si captus sit Dux, Comes, Baro, vel alius magni nominis: quo casu ex antiqua consuetudine Hispaniæ, Galliæ & Angliæ, est principis^b. non tamen illi redimēdi facultas adimitur, quæ etiam duci hostium capto cōcedi debet, si in eo pacis perturbatio non timetur^c. nam, vt inquit D. Augustinus^d, sicut bellanti, & resistenti violentia redditur, ita victoriis capto misericordia iā debetur. quare bene maiores nostri hoc comparauerūt, inquit Cicero^e, vt neminem regem, quē armis cepissent, vita priuarent. quia quam nobis facultatē fortuna dedisset, iniquum erat in eorum supplicio consumere, quos eadem fortuna paulo ante in amplissimo statu collocarat. ei verò, a quo periculum restaurādi belli esse posset, non est parcendum: quæ esset iniusta misericordia, vt inquit D. Ambrosius^f. Quò spectat, quòd Ferrandus Diaconus, de officio pij & Christiani ducis, ad Rhegi-

^a Antiq. Rom.
lib. 5.

^b Bar. et Bal.
in l. nam &
Seruus. D. de
neg. gest. 102.
de Ana. in c.
significauit. in
1. not. de iud.
Boerius decis.
278. Hys. reg.
l. 5. & 8. tit.
26 par. 2.
^c c. noli. in fi.
23. q. 1.
^d in d. c. noli.
^e ad Heren. l.
4.

^f offic. l. 1. c.
et multa. 23
quæ. l. 4.

Rheginum ducem scribens, inter septē regulas innocentiae, quas duci militum praescribit, refert: Noli esse nimiū iustus. Fuit itaque apud Romanos obseruatū, vt triumphās cū triūphali pōpa de foro in capitolium defleceret, captiuos insignes, qui semina discordiarum, & belli auctores fuissent, in custodiam detrudi iuberet, & exacta pompa neci daret^a.

^a Alex. ab Alex. genal. dier. l. 6. c. 6.

- 28 Alioqui verò priuata auctoritate* nemi-
ni captiuum occidere licet, nec etiam
durius tractare: cū nec olim quidem
licuerit, cū fierēt serui. ius enim ciuile
dominico imperio modum adhibēs, ita
demum necis potestatem domino tribuit
in seruum, si in facinore deprehendat: in
quo repertum liberum occidere ius sit^b.
alias seruum dominus occidere nō po-
test, cui leuis tantū coëctio permessa
est^c: & ex rescripto Diui Pij, seruis cōtra
nimiam seuitiam, & intolerabilem iniu-
riam dominorum prouisum est^d, cui
conuenit constitutio regni Hispaniae,
quoad bello captos inter Christianos
hinc inde: non etiam inter eos, qui di-
uersae religionis dogmata sequuntur^e.

^b l. marito. D.
ad leg. Iuliam.
de adul. l. quid
ergo si maio-
rem. § si heres
D. de leg. 1.
c l. vnic. C.
de emend. seru.
d l. 2. D. de hic
quis sit vel a.
l. e. iur. sunt.

^e Reg. l. 1. tit.
29. par. 2.

- 29 Ceterum si captiuus* semel de precio
redemptionis conuenit cum eo, cuius
capti-

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a Guido ps.
pa q. 113. Pa.
pon. in arrest.
lib. 5. tit. 6. in
prim.
b in l. possibi-
minium. §. si
is qui. D. de
captiv.
c l. nā & Se-
rius. D. de
neg. gest.
d per text. c.
leg. in l. si id
quod. D. de
donat. inter
vir & uxor.
Covarr. in l.
4. decret. de
spō. 2. par. c.
3. §. 4. nu. 14.
e l. 2. l. liber
captiv. C. de
postliminio
reversis. l. se-
vatus. §. ult.
D. de leg. 1. l.
qui testamē-
to. §. 1. D. de
testam. l. qui
status. D. de
ra milit.
f l. quod &
lex. §. si quis.
D. de libe. ho-
mi. exhibi-
iuncta l. liber
captiv. C. de
postli revers.
g d. l. 2. C. de
postli. revers.
h l. is qui. C.
dist. 115.

captivus est, non poterit postea ad du-
riorem conditionē astringi, ex eo fortè,
quòd is a quo detinetur, intellexit cap-
tium esse alicuius nominis, & diuitē:
neque valebit posterior conventio, sed
fiet reductio ad priorem^a. Quò spectat
quod Paulus respondit, si quis captū ab
hostibus emat, & pluris alij ius pigno-
ris, quod in redemptū habet, cesserit: nō
eam quantitatem, sed priorem redēptus
debet^b. Qui autem pro capto^{*} ab hosti-
bus, vt liber fieret, precium redēptionis
vel soluit, vel promisit, nō solum habet
actionem negotiorum gestorum^c: siue
iustus siue iniustus sit hostis, qui capti-
uum cepit^d: sed habet quoque redem-
ptor ius pignoris in redemptum, donec
soluat^e: & edicto de libero homine ex-
hibendo non astringitur, neque redem-
ptus pristinum statū recipit, donec pre-
cium redemptionis soluerit, vel obtule-
rit^f. non erit tamē servus, nec olim erat,
cū servitus passim in vfu esset^g: & fa-
uore ingenuitatis, poterit successionis
iura vindicare, vt ex successione possit
precium pro se datum solvere^h: & filius
ei succedet, etiam si, antequam se luat,
moriatur. imo morte, quasi iure pigno-
ris si-

ris finito, ab ipso redemptore liberatur redemptus: ita vt neque heres eius teneatur ad precium redemptionis, neq; fideiussor^a. Sed etsi ea quæ ex pignoribus nascuntur, pignoris vinculo obligari dicamus^b: imperatores tamen noluerunt eos, qui post redemptionem nascuntur, pignoris vinculo obligari^c. & hæc quidem in liberis ab hostibus captis, & commercio redemptis locum habet: at serui ab hostibus capti, & precio redempti, fiunt redimentis serui: sed oblato ei precio, quod dedit, postliminio rediisse, aut recepti esse creduntur^d. Porro redemptio captiuorum^e est tam fauorabilis, vt datum in hanc causam, quantumcunque sit, repeti non possit, nec in sinuatione opus habeat^e. & quamuis incertæ personæ, ne miles quidem quicquam relinquere possit^f: imperatores tamen pietatis causa, & militum infortuniis moti, relictum in redemptionem captiuorum, non obstante incertitudine personarum, valere voluerunt^g: etiam si quis totum patrimonium relinquat^h. Pietatis quoque causa redempto captiuo, vtpote si mater filium redemerit, de repetitione precij tractare non conuenit: sed

^a l. si patre redempto. D. de captiu. l. 1. §. si filius. D. de suis & legit. ^b l. grege. D. de pignorib. ^c in l. presee provincie. C. de postliminio.

^d l. in bello. §. si quis seruum. D. de captiu.

^e l. si quis pro redemptione. C. de donatio. ^f §. legari autem. in §. de leg.

^g l. nulli. C. de epis. et cler. ^h l. si quis ad declinandum. C. de epis. et cleric.

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a l. liber ca- sed præsumitur donatio^a. & redimens
ptus. §. 1. D. puellam luxuriæ causa, vel illam prosti-
de postl. reuer. tuens, perdit precium, & puella impunè
reg. Hisp. l. ab eo fugere potest^b. Negligens verò
vic. tit. 29. redimere^{*} captiuum, non solum exhe- 32
par. 2. redari potest, si sit ex liberis: sed etiam
bl. fadisi re. lege, proximis agnatis, vel heredibus in-
C. de postl. stitutis, qui in redemptione captiui ne-
reuerf. gligētes fuere, denegatur successio: quæ
applicatur ecclesiæ, expendenda in re-
c Authens. si demptionem captiuorum^c. Diximus
captiui. C. de captis ab hostibus, tam liberis, quam ser-
episc. & cler. uis, & tam masculis, quam fæminis, esse
reg. Hisp. l. 3. postliminium. videamus nunc reliqua,
tit. 29. par. 2. quæ postliminio redeunt: quibus cogni-
d in Topic. tis, intelligemus, quæ sunt ea, quæ post-
e facti tex. in- liminio redeunt: quibus cogni-
tit. de his qui tis, intelligemus, quæ sunt ea, quæ post-
sui vela. de. iu. liminio redeunt: quibus cogni-
sint, in princ. tis, intelligemus, quæ sunt ea, quæ post-
C. l. ult. §. liminio redeunt: quibus cogni-
ult. D. deleg. liminio redeunt: quibus cogni-
3. & ibi Bar. liminio redeunt: quibus cogni-
f in l. si cap- que natura, ut altero posito, vel cogni-
titius. §. ex- to, alterum statim submoueat, vel co-
pulsis. D. de gnoscatur^c. Postliminio itaque redeunt
captiui. in l. si quoque agri^{*}, eorumque ususfructus. 33
ager. D. quib. unde expulsis hostibus ex agris, quos
mod. ususfr. a ceperat, dominia eorum ad priores do-
mitt. l. in tã minos redire, & ususfructum iure post-
in. an prio. D. liminij restitui, Paulus respondit^f.
de rer. divisio. quod verum puto, nullo quantumvis
g. c. prima a- longi temporis lapsu obstante^g. Itaque
ctiōne. cumi
gl. f. ibid. q. 3
l. contra ma-
iores. C. de in-
off. sejam et.

Sagun-

Saguntum oppidum, quod iam octauū
 annum in potestate hostium fuerat, tan-
 dem receptū, cultoribus antiquis, quos
 vis reliquerat belli, restitutum fuit^a. & a L. iiii. l. 24.
 quidem ex cōstitutionibus regni Hisp.
 imperia, regna, comitatus, aliaque do-
 minia maiora, ab hostibus recuperata,
 postliminio redeūt, & ne ex eo quidem
 tempore, quo recuperata sunt, vsucapi
 possunt: quoad alia verò dominia mi-
 nora, si quatuor annis dominus siluerit,
 ex quo recepta sunt, erit locus præscrip-
 tionis, nisi dominus sit minor^b. iisdēque b reg. Hisp.
l. 10. tit. 29.
par. 2.
 cōstitutionibus cautum est, vt si quis ex
 subditis arcem, licet propriam, sua culpa
 amiserit: quamuis sua opera eandem re-
 ceperit, regi tamen petenti eam tradere
 34 debet^c. Denique^{*} nauibus longis, & o- c reg. Hisp. l.
32. tit. 28.
par. 2.
 nerariis, postliminium esse Marcellus
 respōdit. qui equū quoque, & equā fre-
 ni patientem, postliminio recipi voluit,
 quod sine culpa equitis proripere se po-
 tuerūt^d. & idem quoq; testatur Ciceroe, d L. 2. D. de
captiu.
e in Topic.
 cū ait: Postliminio redeunt hæc, ho-
 mo, nauis, mulus, clitellarius, equus, e-
 qua quæ frena recipere solet. nō autem
 idē iuris est in armis, quæ postliminio nō
 redeunt, quod nō sine flagitio amittan-

a d. l. 2.

b j. lib. 3. c. de
iis qui arm.
amis.

c per l. si ca-
ptiuus. §. ex-
pulsis. D. de
captiui.

d Argum. l. si
quid b. llo D.
de capti. Ang.
Salic. l. as.

Mari. laud. &
alij, quos re-
fert Comar. in
c. peccatū de

reg. iur. in 6.
2. relect. §. 11
e Argu. l. ab
hostib. 2. C. de

postl. reu. r. l.
in bello. §. si
quis seruū D.
de capt. Frac.

Ripa. in l. 1.
D. de acq. pos.
Comar. distu

loco, & alij
ab eo citati
f Argu. l. ab
hostib. 2. C. de

postl. reu. r. l.
id quod apud
hostes. D. de
l. 1. et l. Popo.

D. de acq. rer.
do. Ioā. Andr.
Alex. Pyrrh^o,
& alij quos

refert Comar.
in d. c. peccatū
g in l. si quid
bello. D. de

captiue.

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tur^a. de quo alio loco plura dicemus^b.

Ex superioribus (ni fallor) manet ex-
pedita illa quæstio, quæ variè admodum
torsit fere omnes interpp. vtrū scilicet
*res semel ab hostibus captæ, & ab iisdē 35

recuperatæ, prioribus dominis sint re-
stituendæ, nec ne quod alij aiunt, alij
negant, alij temerè secant, & subsecant,

& neque sibi, neque aliis satisfaciūt. sunt
enim qui distinguunt inter res mobiles
& immobiles, & has restitui semper^c; il-

las nunquam existimant^d. alij, quoad res
immobiles, distinguunt rursus, sintne
virtute bellicæ recuperatæ, quas non re-

stitui volunt: an verò commercio redē-
ptæ, quas oblato redemptionis precio,
restituendas priori domino censent^e.

alij denique sine vlla distinctione, tam
mobiles omnes, quàm immobiles res,
receptas, priori Domino omnino resti-

tuendas esse dicunt^f. idque contra eui-
dens responsum Labeonis^g, qui ait: Si
quid bello captum est, in præda est, nec

postliminio redit. & alibi^h; ita demū ab
hostibus captæ, & a nostris recuperata,
postliminio redire respondit, si sint eius

generis, quæ postliminio redire possunt.
quam

h in l. ult. D. de captiue.

quam distinctionē etiā Marcellus pro-

bat^a. Neque vident id quod impp. re-

scripserunt^b, seruos ab hostibus recupe-

ratos, dominis suis restitui debere: ideo

esse, quod nō solū in liberis personis,

sed etiam in seruis sit postliminium^c.

Quare etiam quod Octauenus respon-

dit^d, id quod apud hostes est, legari pos-

se, & postliminiū esse: de eo haud dubiē

intelligi debet, quod eius generis est, vt

postliminio redire possit, secundum di-

stinctionem Labeonis^e. His adde, quod

36 quamuis res, quæ sunt hostium^f, nō sint

in commercio^g: tamen eas res, quas ho-

stes ceperunt, si sint eius generis, quæ

postliminium habent, vendi, legari, &

quocunque modo alienari posse^h. Quō

spectat, quod apud Liuium legimusⁱ:

quod cū Annibal ad quartū lapidem

Romam accessisset, & tātū venditū esse

agrum audisset, in quo castra habebat,

quanti ante aduentum eius valebat: ira

percitus, vocato præcone, tabernas ar-

gentarias, quæ in foro Romano erant,

vendi iussit. & certē agri quidem veditio

valuit, propter spē postliminij^j: nō verō

tabernarum, quæ nunquam fuerant ho-

stium, nec erat in iis postliminium^k.

^a in l. 2. D. de

captiui.

^b in d. l. ab

hostibus, 2.

^c l. postl. §.

ult. l. in bello.

§. si quis ser-

uum. l. ult. D.

de captiu.

^d in d. l. id

quod apud ho-

stes. D. de l. 1.

^e in d. l. ult.

^f l. liber ho-

mo. 1. D. de

verb. oblig.

^g l. itē Labeo.

§. ult. cum l.

§. q. D. famil.

her. & d. l.

id quod apud

hostes.

h lib. 25.

ⁱ d. l. item

Labeo.

^j d. l. liber

homo.

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Neque mouet, quod ex L. Pomponius D. de acq. rer. dom. adducitur, vbi cū pastori meo lupi porcos eriperēt, & hos vicinæ villæ colonus robustis canibus confectus, lupis extorfisset: porcos coloni non esse, responsum est; sed meos manere, quamdiu a quouis recuperari possent: secus ac si feram bestiā vicinus hac ratione mihi abstulisset. quæ si potestatem nostram euaserit, & ab alio capiatur, ipsius fit. non inquam id mouet: nam ibi, disertis verbis I. C. ait, porcos, aliaque animalia mansueta, quæ a lupo nobis eripiuntur, nostra manere, quam diu recipi possunt, quæ erepta sunt: quemadmodum & ea, quæ naufragia amittimus: vnde etiā furtiagi posse dicit. aliud autē est in iis, quæ ab hostibus nobis auferuntur, quorum dominium statim in hostes transire cōstat^b. vnde potius dicendum est, quòd, quemadmodū feræ bestiæ, vbi custodiam nostram euaserint, dominium amittimus, & eedem a quouis postea captæ occupantis fiunt^c: sic quoque capta ab hostibus, quorum dominium statim amittimus, eius fieri, qui recepit, nec priori domino restituenda esse: nisi sint eius generis, quæ postliminio

^a §. Auferū,
instit. de rer.
diuis.

^b l. si quid bel
lo, l. hostes, D.
de captiu.

^c d. l. Pompo-
nius, & §. fe-
re autem, inst.
de rer. diuis.

minio redeunt^a. ex quibus etiā corruit
 eorum sententia, qui sine distinctione
 omnes res mobiles, eorum fieri, qui eas
 hostibus eripuerunt, existimant: & eorū
 quoque, qui inter res bellica virtute re-
 ceptas, & commercio redemptas distin-
 guendum putauerunt. Sit ergo ita con-
 stitutum, vt quę res postliminiū habent,
 eę recuperatę ad priorem dominum, &
 in pristinum statū redeant, siue mobiles
 sint, siue immobiles^b: siue etiam virtute
 bellica, siue commercio, siue quocunq;
 alio modo recuperentur^c. nisi quod ea-
 rum, quę commercio sunt redemptę,
 precium restituatur^d. quę verò postli-
 minio carent, prędę cedunt^e. Illud ra-
 37 men sciēdum est, prędam^{*} tum demum
 fieri hostium, vt primū intra pręsidia
 delata est^f. vnde si recuperetur, antequā
 intra pręsidia hostiū sit delata, omnino
 priori domino restitui debet: quia non-
 dum facta fuit hostium, neque desit esse
 eius, cuius fuit g. Et quidē si ij, per quos
 pręda fuit recepta, fraudulēter passi sint,
 eam prius ab hostibus auferri, & intra
 pręsidia eorū perferri, & eam persequi
 neglexerint: non tantū tenebūtur ad
 restitutionem priori domino faciendam,

a l. ult. D. de
captiu.

b l. 2. & 4. l.
si captiuus. §
expulsis. l. ult.
D. de captiu.
l. ab hostib. 2.
C. de postl. re-
uers.

c per text. ele-
gan. in l. 4. ea
l. nihil inter-
est. D. de ca-
ptiu. §. si ab
hostibus. iust.
quib. mod. ius
p. ut. po. solui.
& d. l. ab ho-
stibus.

d l. in bello. §
si quis seruū.
D. de capt. l.
liber captus.
C. de postl. re-
uers.

e l. si quid bel-
lo. l. ult. D. de
captiu.

f l. postlimi-
niū. in princ. l.
postliminiū.

g. postlimin.
D. de captiu.

g d. l. postli-
miniū. in princ.

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eius quod receperunt : sed etiam eius,
quod servare potuerunt, & eorum cul-
pa amissum, domino præstandum erit,
vt constitutionibus regni Hispaniæ op-
timè cautum est ^a : & facit text. in L. Iu-
lianus ^b. Porro huic distinctioni, sitne
res ab hostibus capta, & per nostros re-
cepta, eius generis, quæ postliminium
habent : & sitne semel in præsidia ho-
stium delata, nec ne, non subiacent res
captæ a piratis*, vel latronibus, & iis qui 38
iusti hostes non sunt. nam capta ab iis,
nunquā in dominium eorum trāseunt.
quare recepta, sine distinctione omnino
priori domino, qui dominio eorum nū-
quam excidit, sunt restituenda ^d. hinc
mirum, cur constitutio* regni Hispaniæ 39
hanc distinctionem : fueritne præda re-
cepta, semel intra præsidia hostiū delata,
nec ne, probauerit, in his rebus, non so-
lūm quæ ab hostibus, sed etiam quæ a pi-
ratis nobis ablata sunt ^e : cū certè, si
bonum & æquum inspiciamus, domi-
nium rerum captarum, nulla lege, neq;
diuina, neque humana, a veris dominis,
in eum qui iustus hostis non est, transire
possit, vnde recuperatas huiusmodi res
omnino dominis restituendas esse, ipsa
ratio,

^a Reg. l. 26.
^c 31. tit. 6.
par. 2. Reg. l.
13. tit. 9. p. 5.
^b §. ult. D. de
res vend.

^c l. hostes. l.
latrones. l.
postliminiū.
§. a piratis.
D. de captiui.
l. qui a latro-
nibus. D. de
testam.
^d l. latrones.
D. de captiu.

^e Reg. l. 31.
tit. 29 par. 2.

ratio, & æquitas suadet. nisi fortè propter vtilitatē publicam, quo milites sint alacriores ad persequendos latrones & piratas, aliud statui conueniat. præsertim cum bono publico, etiam cum damno priuatorū, consuli possit^a. Quò spectat, quod Tacitus ait, omne magnum exemplum, habere aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos vtilitate publica rependitur. alioqui certè istud satis durum videtur. Romani autem, nō solūm, si cum latronibus & piratis, sed etiam si cum iusto hoste res esset, sæpe ea, quæ in præda fortè facta inueniebantur fuisse sociorū, vel ciuium, iubebant illis restitui. itaque Volscis ad deditionem cōpulsis, castrisque eorum captis, prædæ pars, sua cognoscentibus Latinis, atq; Hernicis sociis populi Romani, reddita sunt^b. & Sutrinis, sociis populi Romani, vrbs eorum, quam per pactiōē Hetruscis dediderāt, quòd diutius obsidionem ferre non possent, eodem die Camillo duce recepta, inuiolata, integraque ab omni clade belli, ante noctem reddita est^c. Sic quoque Scipio capta Carthagine, quæ repleta erat statuis, donariisque Græcanicis e Sicilia aduectis, edixit, vt e singu-

^a l. Lucius.
D. de encl. l.
item si verberatum. §. 1.
D. de re vend.
c. licet. de reg.
iur. in 6.

^b Livius l. 4.

^c Livius l. 6.

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lis vrbibus venirent, qui suadinoscerent
 & auferret a. Sed istud certè ex benigni-
 tate imperatoris, in cuius arbitrio omnè
 prædam esse docuimus, pendet. Verùm,
 utrùm res furto* a latronibus, & illegiti- 40
 mis hostibus erepta, quæ postea in po-
 testatem eorum, qui hostium numero
 continentur peruenerit, a ciuibus com-
 mercio, vel virtute bellica redèpta fue-
 rit; utrùm, inquā, hæc res, priori domino
 restitui debeat, meritò dubites. Et qui-
 dem Iauolenus^b, seruū surreptum,
 quamuis postea in manus hostium ve-
 nerit, ab emptore vsucapi non posse, re-
 spondit. quia scilicet verum esset, eum
 surreptum esse, neque quòd hostiū fui-
 set, aut postliminio rediisset, ei rei impe-
 dimento esse. quod in seruo admitto,
 propter ius postliminij: sed in aliis rebus
 quæ postliminio carent, id sequi non au-
 sim. quia certum est, hanc rem factam
 hostium, atque ita dominum eius do-
 minio excidisse. quid enim refert an do-
 mino, an verò furi res fuerit erepta, mo-
 dò iusto bello? Nam quod dicimus, vitiū
 furti, quod rei cohæret, non purgari, nisi
 res in domini potestatem reuertatur:
 (quod lege Atinia sancitum fuit^c) inter
 ciues,

a *Plut. in a-
poph.*

b *in l. latro-
nes. D. de ca-
ptiu.*

c *l. 4. §. quod
autem D. de
vsucapio.*

ciues, non etiam inter hostes locum habere existimo. vt enim res bello capta nostra fiat, sufficit rem hostilem esse^a. & hac sententia mihi videtur iuri consentanea. tamen non impedio, quo minus vnusquisque vtatur suo iudicio. nihilo minus si placet, hanc rem furtiuam manere; illud certè æquissimum puto, vt nō aliter cum his possessoribus agi possit, quàm si ipse fur, vel hæres soluendo nō sunt^b. Et hætenus quidem de rebus corporalibus, & personis tam liberis, quàm seruis bello captis, dictum est. sed quæri potest, vtrū etiam res incorporeales^c bello capi possint, & in victorem transferri: & si possint; vtrū sint postliminij, nec ne. Quò spectat lis illa, quæ fuit inter Thebanos^{*} & Thessalos: de qua Quintilian.^c mentionem facit. cum enim Thebas euertisset Alexander, inuenit tabulas, quibus centum talenta mutuò Thessalis dedisse Thebanos continebatur. has donauit Thessalis; quòd eorum vsus esset cōmilitio. postea restituta a Cassandro, conueniunt Thebani Thessalos. lis omnis ex ec, quòd Alexādereas Thessalis donasse dicitur, pendet. & certè non videtur potuisse Alexan-

G 5 drum,

^a *L. naturalis.*
^{as} *finis. l. trāsc.*
fugam. D. de
acq. rer. dom.

^b *Argumento*
l. 4. §. antep.
D. de pecul.

^c *lib. 5. c. 12.*

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drum obligationem istam Theſſalis donandi animo remittere, cū ſit iuris, & ita perſonæ cohæreat, vt ab ea diuelli nō

poſſit ^a. præterea ex eo, quòd ius, quod incorporale eſt, manu apprehendi non poſſit: id verò tātū fieri victoris, quod ipſe cepit ^b. imo nō diutius eſſe victoris, quā quamdiu poſſidet: cū eodem iure, quo ipſe cepit, ab eo auferri poſſit ^c. & aliam quoque eſſe conditionem heredis conſtat, aliam victoris: quia ad illū ius ^d, ad hunc res tranſit ^e. tum etiam ius publici crediti tranſire in victorem non potuiſſe, ex eo defendi poteſt, quòd id quod populus credidit, ab omnibus debeat, & quamdiu quilibet ſuperfuerit, ſit is totius ſummæ creditor: imo idem populus dicendus ſit, & eadem ciuitas: etiam ſi nemo ex iis, qui tempore contractuſerāt, ſuperſit, ſed alij ſucceſſerint: vt diſertè Alphenus reſpondit ^f. etenim populi ius, non eſt ſitum in perſonis, ſed in vniuerſitate; quæ vniuerſitas * æquè 43 reſentatur per ſucceſſores, vt per eos, qui ſunt hodie. eoq; ſenſu dicitur, quòd vniuerſitas non moritur, nec deſinit, quamdiu vel vnus ſuperet ^g. Denique ad propoſitam facti ſpeciem, dici poteſt, non

^a l. 3. & ibi Accurt. D. pro focco. l. quod debetur. D. de peculbo.
^b l. ſi quid bello. D. de captis. §. nē ea que ab hoſtibus inſtit. de rer. diuſ.
^c l. ſi quid bello. D. de captis. d. l. heredes. D. de peſtuo. hered.
^d d. l. ſi quid bello.

^e in l. propo-
nabatur. D. de
ind. adde l.
quod ius rerū.
§. ult. & l. ſi
grega. D. de
legat. 1.

^f l. ſicut. §.
ult. D. quod
cuius vn.
nom.

non in tabulis fuisse ius, cùm scriptura non sit de substantia contractus, sed adhibeatur tātūm ad probationem ^a. vnde tabularum apprehensione, & donatione, nullum ius fuisse acquisitum Alexādro, neque Thebanis ademptum. Ceterum his non obstantibus, in proposita facti specie, verius videtur, ius publici crediti in tabulis comprehensum, in Alexandrum transisse, atq; ita potuisse Alexandrum, obligationem illam, qua Thessali Thebanis tenebantur, Thessalis remittere. quod donatione tabularum fecisse censetur. cū enim iure belli, victi in victoris potestatem & dominiū transeant, & possit victor iis, quemadmodū velit, imperare; non solum res corporales iis adimere potest, sed etiam ea, quæ sunt iuris, & leges pro arbitrio dare, & priores tollere. vbi enim omnia ei, qui armis plus potest, vt ait Liuius, dedita sunt: quæ ex iis habere victor, quibus multari eos velit, ipsius ius atque arbitrium est. sed & cū obligatio sit in creditoris dominio ^b; protinus ius crediti, quod victi habebāt, in victoris dominium, vna cum victis trāsit. nam qui in aliena potestate est, nō potest quicquam habere in sua ^c.

^a l. contrahi-
tar. D. de ps-
gnorib. l. cūm
te. C. de trasf.
l. in re. D. de
fide in stru.

^b l. 1. §. id
quod. D. ad l.
Ealc. l. si el et si
damni. §. 1.
D. de pecul.
Accurt. in l. 2.
C. de here. vel
act. vend.
c l. qm in ser-
uitute. D. de
reg. iur.

Vnde

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Vnde profectò videtur dominiũ illius obligationis, qua Thessali Thebanis tenebantur, in Alexandrum transisse. qui cùm eandem donandi animo Thessalis remiserit : (nam tabulis donatis cēsetur id, quod in tabulis cōtinetur, donatum

a l. 1. c. de
donat.

esse ^a : & creditor cautionem creditori reddens, pacisci de non petendo intelli-

b l. 2. D. de
pact. l. mortis
causa. § Ti-
tia D. de mor-
tuis. donat.

gitur ^b) Thessalos ab obligatione libe-
ros esse consequens est. nisi dicamus,

Thebanos restitutione Cassandri, iure postliminij ius crediti recuperasse. nam omnia, quæ sunt iuris, postquam quis postliminio rediit, perinde habentur, ac si nunquam in potestate hostium fuisset ^c.

c l. in bello. §
codicilli. ver.
Cetera. D. de
captivis.

itaque dicemus, ciuitatem iure postliminij restitutam eādem, eiusdemque iuris, & status fingi, quo antea fuerat : vt de agrorum captorum, & libera-

d l. si capti-
uus. § expul-
sis D. de capt.
e l. si ager.
D. quem ad.
vsum. amit.
fuit. de reb.
corp. & in-
corp.
g l. cum loca.
D. de relig. et
sumpt. fune.

torum proprietate diximus ^d, & eorundem vsufructu ^e, qui iuris est ^f. quo etiam modo postliminium fingitur in locis sacris & religiosis ^g. Si tamen in proposita hypothesi, fortè Thessali Alexandro victori, in quem ius crediti transisse diximus, soluissent : non existimo Thebanos per restitutionem Cassandri, iure postliminij, ius crediti semel extinctum, recu-

pera-

peraturos fuisse : vt in simili ferè facti specie, iudicatum fuisse tradit Ioan, Paponius^a. solutio enim debitè facta fuit, quæ obligationem tollit funditus ipso iure^b, & naturaliter, vt ait Iurisconsultus^c. naturale est enim vnumquodque dissolui, ita vt colligatum est^d. Ius autè postliminij non restituit ea, quæ factò, & naturaliter legitimè sublata sunt^e. non habent namque ea, quæ sunt iuris, imperium in ea, quæ sunt facti^f. Quò spectat, quod quauis seruus ne naturaliter quidem obligetur^g; tamè si quis pro seruo, qui mutuum accepit, soluat, vel ipse seruus manumissus, solutū repeti non potest^h: quia scilicet factum factò repedit. est enim apta & commoda proportio, & analogia facti cum factò; non æquè iuris cum factòⁱ; sed iuriscum iure maximè^k. vnde si acceptilatione, pacto de non petendo, chirographi redditione, quæ longè minus cautionis habent, quam solutio^l, liberatio contigerit, cum nullum factum interuenerit, ius crediti ad Thebanos, iure postliminij redire, dicendum videtur. neque enim his modis æquè tollitur obligatio, vt solutione, quæ obligationem tollit funditus ipso iure^m.

neque

mod. toll. oblig. l. sed et si lege, §. certè, D. de pet. hered.

a in Arest. l. 5. tit. 6.

b l. sed et si lege, §. certè, D. de pet. hered.

c in l. part. D. de solut. Ac-

curs, in l. solutio-
tionum, D. de

solutio.

d l. nihil tam
naturale. D.

de reg. iur.

e l. in bello, §. facti. D. de

captini.

f l. si vnum, §. pactus ne pe-

teret. D. de

pact. l. iura
sanguinis. D.

de reg. iur. l.

cū proponas.

g l. nec seruus.

D. de pecul. l.

in personā. D.

de reg. iur.

h l. naturaliter. l. si id

quod, D. de

cō dist. inde.

i §. nec per
acceptilatio-
nē. inst. quib.

mo. tol. oblig.

k l. omnia. D.

de reg. iur.

l. d. §. nē, et §.

præterea. inst.

de excep. C.

l. pecunie. C.

de solut.

m inst. quib.

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neque etiam militat eadem æquitas, & bona fides. quæ non patitur, ut idem bis solvatur^a. Et quidē, si hæ tabulæ, de quibus agimus, ab alio quopiam quàm summo principe, qualis fuit Alexāder, captæ fuissent: equidem existimo nullum ius illi acquiri potuisse, per ea quæ in contrariam sententiā adduximus: atque ita non esse opus postliminij fictione: ne quidē si sint tabulæ priuatilicuius crediti, nisi fortè creditor eius, qui tabulas habet, captivus sit: qui olim fiebat servus, qui nihil suum habere poterat: sed omnia cum ipsa persona in dominium transferebātur^b. Verū cū hodie inter Christianos capti, non fiant servi, aliud dicendum videtur. cū enim persona non transeat in dominiū capientis: ne quidem ius, quod personæ ita cohæret, ut ab ea diuelli non possit^c, transire dicendum est.

^a l. bona fides. D. de reg. iur.

^b l. acquiratur. § igitur. D. de acq. rer. dom.

^c l. 3. & ibi Accurs. D. pro socio.

DE FIDE HOSTI SERVANDA.

- 1 *Fidem Romani maximè coluerunt.*
- 2 *Fides hosti data, siue publicè, siue priuatim, servanda.*
- 3 *Edictum quod metus causa, non pertinet ad fidem hosti datam.*
- 4 *Nulla*

- 4 *Nulla latebra, aut calumnia quarenda
perituro.*
- 5 *Obsides dati, an liberent a fide præstita.*
- 6 *Iniuſto hoſti an ſit ſeruanda fides.*
- 7 *Iura belli non conueniunt iniuſti ho-
ſtibus.*
- 8 *Conuentiones per tyrannidem, aut rebel-
lionem expreſſæ, non ſeruanda.*
- 9 *Princeps ea, qua ſunt iuris regû, alienare
non poteſt.*
- 10 *Summum imperium in quibus præcipue
verſetur.*
- 11 *Minimè firmæ ſunt conuentiones, que
ſunt cum ſubditis rebellibus.*
- 12 *Rebelles & latrones armis, non pactione
ſubigendi.*
- 13 *Hoſtibus non ſemper fides ſeruanda.*
- 14 *Iuramentum de re illicita non eſt ſer-
uandum.*
- 15 *Fides a priuato in præiudicium reipubl.
data, non eſt ſeruanda.*
- 16 *Præſtat non dare fidem de re illicita, quàm
datam fallere.*
- 17 *Hoſti fidẽ fallenti non eſt ſeruanda fides.*
- 18 *Indutia an maneant hoſte eas violante.*
- 19 *Indutia etiam longi temporis eſſe poſſunt.*
- 20 *Fidẽ frangenti, fidẽ ſeruandam non
eſſe, quomodo intelligendum.*

21 *Perſi-*

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21 *Perfidiam perfidia ulcisci non licet.*

22 *Pactum dolo malo initum, an servandum.*

CAP. SEXTVM.

Fide nullam rem apud nortales maiorem, aut sanctiorem veteres semper existimauerunt; eamque Romani in capitolio, vicinam Ioui opt. max. esse voluerunt: qua semel data, nihil firmitus fuit. Itaque Aulus Gellius^a, omnibus quidem populum Romanum virtutum generibus colendis, exercendisque, ad tantam amplitudinem peruenisse scribit; sed omnium maximè, atque præcipuè fidem coluisse, sanctamque habuisse, tam publicè quàm priuatim. cuius rei cum permulta exstent argumèta, & testimonia, tum illud perquam memorabile; quòd inter eos, & Perseam pactis indutiis, cum ludi Circenses celebrarentur, ingressi hostium duces curuli certamine contenderint, & victores coronati sint. Sed & cōsules clarissimos viros, populus Roma. confirmandæ fidei publicæ gratia, hostibus dedidit, vt de Postumio & Mancino alibi diximus^b. vnde Ptolemæus Ægypti rex, agnita Romanorum fide, populum Roman. infanti filio, cui regnum

^a noct. Attico
lib. 20. cap. 1.

^b 3. cap. 1.

regnum debebatur, tutorem testamēto reliquit. & certè, vt Vlpianus ait, graue est fidem fallere^a : & nihil fidei humanæ tam congruum est, quàm seruare, quæ placuerunt^b. Porro nullum, vt inquit Cicero^c, vinculum ad astringendam fidem iureiurādo maiores arctius esse voluerunt. id indicant leges in xij. tabulis: indicant sacra : indicant fœdera, quibus etiā cum hoste deuincitur fides. & quidem Romani, cū belli, pacisque iura religiosissimè semper coluerint, tū certè, si tēporibus adducti, hosti quid promississent, in eo ipso fidem sanctissimè seruabant. Itaque præclarè Sex. Pompeius, magni Pōpeij. filius, (cœnantibus apud eum in naui ad Puteolos Antonio & Octauio, cum quibustunc societatem inierat) Menodoro Pompeianæ classis præfecto, per internuncium significanti tempus adesse, quo parentis, & fratris iniurias vlcisci posset, & occasione arrepta, paternum sibi asserere imperium: se enim curaturum, ne quisquā è nauibus euaderet: respondit: Vtinam Menodorus hoc absque me posset perficere. nam illi peritium conuenire, non Pōpeio^d.

^a in l. i. D. de cōst. pecu.
^b in l. i. D. de pact.
^c offic. lib. 3.
^d Appian. de bell. civil. l. 5.

² Sunt autem* qui existiment, hosti quidē

H publicè

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publicè fidem datam seruandam esse, nō
 etiam eam, quæ a priuato sit præstita^a.
 quorū sententia nullis solidis argumen-
 tis fulcitur, est quæ contra veterum exē-
 pla, instituta quæ maiorum, & grauissi-
 morū Philosophorum sententiā. quam
 elegāter prosequitur Cicero^b, & Gell.^c
 itaque quando cum iusto, legitimo quæ
 hoste res geritur, non existimo deberē
 conditiones, pactiones bellicas & hosti-
 les, perturbari periurio, etiam a priuatis
 initas^d. nam graue est fidem fallere^e. &
 sunt quædam officia, vt inquit Cicero^f,
 etiam aduersus eos seruanda, a quibus
 iniuriam acceperis. est quæ præclarum
 in hanc rem M. Attilij Reguli facinus,
 qui primo bello punico captus a Pœ-
 nis, cū de captiuis commutandis Ro-
 mam missus esset, iurasset quæ se reditu-
 rum: primū vt venit, captiuos reddē-
 dos in senatu non censuit; deinde cū
 retineretur a propinquis & amicis, ad
 supplicium redire maluit, quā fidem
 hosti datam fallere^g. quod multis laudi-
 bus effert D. Augustinus^h. Iacobus ve-
 rō iratus fuit Simeoni & Leui filiis suis,
 quia violauerant pactum cum Sychimi-
 tis initumⁱ: ideo quæ moriens maledixit
 illis.

^a Bart. et alij
 in l. commētio-
 num. D. de
 pact. Zaz. in
 apolog. cōtra
 Eckium, &
 de iude. qu. 3

^b offic. lib. 3.
^c lib. 7. c. 18
 lib. 20. cap. 1

^d per text. in
 c. mol. 23. q. 2
 l. postluminij.
 §. ult. D. de
 capti. Fortun.
 & Duareus
 in l. cōuentio-
 num. D. de
 pact. Decius
 in l. ea est na-
 tura. D. de
 reg. iur. Conar.
 in 4. l. de re
 2. par. c. 3. §.

^e l. 1. D. de
 const. pecun.
^f offic. lib. 3.
^g Cicero off.
 lib. 3. Val.
 Max. l. 1. c. 1.
^h de ciuit. Dei
 lib. 1. cap. 18.

ⁱ Genes. 34.

illis^a. Neque recipienda est eorum sententia, qui existimarunt, quod per vim hostium esset actum, ratum esse non debere. viro enim forti, ut inquit Cicero, vis adhiberi nequit: & fides, ut inquit Seneca^b, sanctissimum humani pectoris bonum, nulla necessitate ad fallendum cogitur, nullo corrumpitur præmio. unde Cicero: Nulla res tanta, inquit, existat, ut possit mihi maiorem vim adhibere
 3 metus, quàm fides. Edictum^{*} quoque prætorium, quo per metum gesta, in integrum restituuntur, ad eum metum, qui iure licito, utpote iusto bello inferitur, non pertinet^c: neque ad promissa hostibus facta, sed ciuibus. Et quidem tanti olim fuit iusiurandum, ut M. Pomponius Tribu. pleb. cum diem dixisset L. Manilio A. filio (quod paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidisset, & criminaretur, quod Titum filium, qui Torquatus postea est appellatus, ab hominibus relegasset, & ruri habitare iussisset) ab adolescente filio, qui intelligebat negotium exhiberi patri, remotis arbitris, stricto gladio iusiurandum dare coactus, se patrem missum esse facturum: quamuis nullo iure cogi posset: tamen

^a *Genes. 48.*

^b *Epiſt. 89.*

^c *text. eleg. in l. si mulier. in prin. D. de eo quod met. caus. Panor. in c. Abbas. col. 3. in c. cum dilectus, de his que vi. met. caus. Felinus in cap. cum inter. nu. 20 de except. Dom. in d. c. ad om. vero. col. ult. dist. 5 Syluest. in vers. metus. q. 6.*

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a causa destiterit, Manliumque missum
 fecerit^a. Itaque pulchrè Ferrandus dia-
 conus, ad Rheginum ducem, de officio
 pij & veri Christiani ducis militum scri-
 bens, censet hostem, ut cunque antiquū,
 & reip. infestum, non esse falsa iuratione
 fallendum: etiam si vita eius impediat,
 mors profit paci. humanis enim diuina
 semper sunt præponenda, & ut Petrus
 apostolorū princeps dicebat, Deo ma-
 gis seruiendum est, quàm hominibus^b.
 Quare cum quibuscunq; bella suscepta
 sunt, ut idem Ferrandus ait, aut nulla fi-
 de data, bello aut pace facta, inuiolata fi-
 de iurisiurandi resp. seruanda vel adiu-
 uanda est. quid enim proderit eum vin-
 cere, quem diabolus vicit, ut victoriæ spe
 falsum iuraret? Propterea Psalmista^c, dū
 canit: Domine quis habitabit in taber-
 naculo tuo, aut quis requiescet in mōte
 sancto tuo? respōdet sibi ipsi ex persona
 Dei, talibus verbis: Qui loquitur veri-
 tatem in corde suo, qui non egit dolum
 in lingua sua, nec fecit proximo suo ma-
 lum, & opprobriū non accepit aduersus
 proximum. qui iurat proximo suo & nō
 decipit. ille autem, ut idē Diaconus ait,
 iurat proximo suo, & non decipit, qui
 quod-

^a Cicero, offic.
lib. 3. Livius
lib. 7.

^b Actor, 1.

^c Psalm, 114.

quodcunque iurat lingua, implet opere. neque existimet quis, hostem, cui iurat, non debere proximum deputari. propter hoc enim iuratur, ut proximus deputetur: &, per fœdus pacis, ex hoste fit amicus. Maximum itaque nefas est, falsum iurare, &, si alius consideres, maximè inutile, & damnosum imperatori, vel duci exercitus. nam præcipuum disciplinæ militaris vinculum est, sacramenti religio: quæ si, exemplo ducis, levis æstimari incipiat, tam apud hostes, quàm apud milites, omnia misceri, perturbarique necesse est. neque etiam imperator fide data ab hoste tutus erit, neque suos fidos habebit. Quidquid proinde, iuramento intercedente, adhibita inuocatione nominis Dei confirmatur (siue inimico gratia, siue reo venia, siue militibus, re bene gesta, præmia promittantur) nullius utilitatis cōsideratione, nullius periculi formidine, debet fieri irritum: sed fixus, & immutabilis sit sermo, cuius fidei testis sit adhibitus Deus. Ca-
4 uendum* præterea, ne latebra quæratur periurio, & calumnia quadam, & nimis callida, & malitiosa iuris interpretatione, iurisiurandi fidem violemus. ut ille,

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qui, cū triginta dierum pactæ essent
a Cicer. offic. lib. 1. indutiæ, noctu populabatur agros^a. vt
 Q. Fabius Labeo, quem nonnulli tra-
 dunt, cū Antiocho præliò victo, ex
 foedere dimidiam partem nauium acci-
 pere deberet, omnes medias secuisse, vt
b Val. Max. lib. 7. cap. 3. regem tota classe priuaret^b. & vt vnus
 ex decem, quos, post Cannensem cladē,
 iuratos ad senatum misit Annibal, in ca-
 stra redituros, nisi de redimēdis captiuis
 impetrassent: qui, cū paulò post quàm
 egressus erat e castris, rediisset: Romæ
 mansit. reditu enim in castra liberatum
 se esse iureiurando interpretabatur: nō
 rectè. fraus enim distringit, vt inquit
 Cicero, non dissoluit periurium. itaque
 decreuit senatus, vt ille veterator, & cal-
 lidus, victus ad Annibalem deducere-
c Cicer. off. lib. 3. Linius lib. 22. tur^c. & huc referri posse videtur respō-
d de bello pu- ni. sum Censorini, si Appiano credimus^d:
 qui legatis Carthaginensium (qui que-
 rebantur, quòd contra fidem ipsis datā,
 obsidibus traditis, atq; omnibus armis,
 adhuc Carthaginem delere vellent) re-
 spondit, per Carthaginem, quam liberā
 fore promiserant Romani, Carthagi-
 nienses intelligi, non urbem & solum.
 Neque verum^{*} est id quod nonnulli ar-
 bitrantur,

bitrantur, obsidibus datis, quempiã a fi-
 de data liberari. qua ratione Bodinus^a, a de repub. l. 1. cap. 8.
 Franciscum Gallorum regem religione
 fœderis Madriciani, filiis obsidibus da-
 tis, solutum fuisse contendit: exemplo
 pacis Caudinæ, quam ideo irritam factã
 asserit, quòd obsides dati essent: idque
 contra fidem historiæ. nam ipse Postu-
 mus cons. pacis auctor, sententiam ro-
 gatus, ideo dixit populum Romanum
 sponsione, quam ipse cum Samnitibus
 fecerat, non teneri, quòd iniussu populi
 » facta esset: sic enim ait: Neque ego infi-
 » cias eo, P. C. tam sponsiones, quàm fœ-
 » dera sancta esse, apud eos homines, a-
 » pud quos iuxta diuinas religiones, fides
 » humana colitur: sed iniussu populi, ne-
 » go quicquam sanciri posse, quod popu-
 lum teneat. se tamen seu turpi, seu ne-
 cessaria sponsione astrictum affirmauit.
 ideoque quòd populus religione libera-
 retur, & pax Samnitum repudiaretur, vt
 ipse cum reliquis pacis auctoribus de-
 deretur, suator & auctor fuit. cùm equi-
 tes D. C. obsides dati essent, qui capite
 luerent, si pacto non staretur^b, obsides
 enim, quemadmodum fideiussores, &
 pignora, principali obligationi accedunt,

^b *Liuius l. 9.*
Cicero off. l. 3

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a institut. de fideius. in pr. l. 1. §. verbum. quò diligentius cautum sit aduersario^a.
D. de obli. & actio. & tantùm abest vt principalem obligationem tollant, vt sine ea consistere nequeant^b. non enim magis possibile est, accessorium sine principali esse, quàm accidens sine subiecto, in quo est^c. De-
b i. fideiussor. res obligans. in prin. D. de fideiuss. l. is qui promittit. D. de pigno. Alciat. de sing. ceri. c. 44. buit itaque Franciscus, si non publica, quoad ea fortè, in quibus populi & ordinum consensus requirebatur, saltem sua liberata fide, potius in carcerem redire, quàm fidem datam fallere: exéplo Postumi, Mancini, Reguli, & aliorum. eoque magis, quòd princeps, cui populus omne imperium in se, potestatemq; concessit^d, rectè de negotiis ad remp. spectantibus paciscatur, siue pacem, siue quamcunque conuentionem cum hostibus faciat^e. Rectius itaque Ioânes Gallorū rex, in prælio ab Anglis captus, & fide de reuertendo data dimissus, si minus pacta implerentur: cum omnia præstare non posset, quæ conuenerant, ad hostē redire maluit, quàm fidem violare, cum tamen & ipse filium obsidem dedisset^f.
d l. 1. D. de consens. princ. Et hæc quidem, quæ de fide hosti seruanda diximus, inuiolabiliter tenenda sunt, si cum iusto & legitimo hoste res geratur; sin verò quis metu fortè compulsus,
e l. conuentio-num. D. de pact.
f Bodinus de rep. lib. 1. c. 3. ab eo

- 6 ab eo qui iustus hostis* non est, fidem de
 precio redemptionis soluendo, vel simi-
 libus dederit, eum non astringi, vt fidem
 seruet, dicendum est^a. ideoque si prædo-
 nibus, vt inquit Cicero^b, pactum pro
 capite precium nō attuleris, nulla fraus
 erit: ne si iuratus quidem id nō feceris.
 pirata enim non est ex perduellium nu-
 mero definitus, sed communis hostis
 omnium: cū hoc nec fides esse debet,
 nec iusiurandum commune. & hinc est,
 quòd latrones, & prædones hostium vo-
 cabulo non contineri dicāt I. C.^c Vnde
- 7 iura belli*, captiuitatis, & postliminij,
 quæ hostibus tantum conueniunt^d, nō
 possunt latronibus conuenire^e. atque
 ideo capti a piratis, & latronibus, omni-
 no liberi permanent^f. Cū itaque iure
 belli agere, sibi que acquirere iis tantum
 permissum sit, qui iusti sunt hostes^g:
 nullo iure ij qui non sunt hostium nu-
 mero definiti, quibus iura belli nō sunt
 concessa, de his, quæ iustis tantum hosti-
 bus acquiruntur, pacisci, aut ad paciscē-
 dum metum inferre poterunt^h. quare
 edicto prætoris, quo per metum gesta
 rescinduntur, locus eritⁱ. imo ipso iure
 non tenebit, quicquid ex hac causa actū

^a per text. in
 c. peruenit. c.
 sicut. et infra.
 de iur. iur. c.
 solliciti, de
 rest. spoliat.
^b off. lib. 3.
^c in l. hostes.
 D. de captiu.
 in l. hostes. D.
 de verb. signi.
^d in l. postli-
 minium, in
 princ. D. de
 captiu.
^e d. l. hostes.
^f l. postlimi-
 nium. §. pra-
 tis. D. de capti-
 u. l. qui a latro-
 nibus, D. de
 testam. l. 1. D.
 de leg. 3.
^g d. l. hostes,
 et d. §. a pira-
 tu, cū similib.
^h per text. c.
 leg. in c. sicut
 et infra. et c.
 peruenit. 1. de
 iur. iur. c. Ab-
 bas de his que
 vi met. can.
ⁱ d. c. Abbas.
 l. 1. D. quod
 met. cau. l. 1.
 c. eod.

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a l. qui in car vel promissum fuerit^a: neque iuramēto
cerē, D. quod stabilietur: quia quod nullum est, con-
met. causa. firmari nō potest^b, & nullum vinculum
b l. nō est du. continere dicitur, iuramentum atroci, &
biñ. C. de legi.
c c. pervenit. nefanda coactione extortum^c. poterit
1. c. verum. tamē ad maiorem cautionem absolutio
de iure iur. peti, quę facilē concedi debet^d. Non ob-
d d. c. perue- stat his quę diximus, quod leges prædo-
nit. & d. c. fi- ni actionem pignoratitiam depositi, &
cut & infra commodati, tribuant^e. id enim verum
de iure iur. est, si piguore.
e l. si piguore. est, si cum alio contrahat, quàm qui læ-
l. si prædo. D. sus est. quamvis enim prædo sit, respectu
de pig. actio. eius cui rem abstulit: tamen prædo non
l. 1. §. si præ- est, respectu eius, cum quo contraxit.
do. l. bona fi- quoniam bona fides in contractibus æ-
des. D. depōsi- stimanda est, inter eos tantum, qui con-
ti. l. ita ut si traxerunt, nihil extrinsecus assumpto^f.
fur. D. com- Porro quod de latronibus, & prædoni-
modat. l. non bus diximus, idem & de rebellibus di-
a iudice. D. de cendum est: qui iusti hostes dici nō pos-
iudic. sunt^g. nam aliud est hostis, aliud rebel-
f l. bona fides lis^h. & iniquum est, ut quis ex improbi-
§. incurrat. D. tate sua lucrum sentiatⁱ. quamvis verū
depōsiti. sit, generali nomine, ex usu loquendi,
g d. l. hostes. hostes vocari omnes, contra quos arma
h ex. qui sint feruntur. His consequens est, conven-
rebell. tiones illas*, quę per tyrannidem extor- 8
i l. ita Fallo, quentur, servādas non esse. neque enim
D. de furt. consen-

consensu (qui in omnibus contractibus a l. 2. 3. D. de requiritur^a.) factum videtur, quod per vim exprimitur. ideoque ex hac causa gestum, nullius erit momenti^b. Itaque tyrannorum leges, non esse leges docet Cicero^c: neque legem Valeriam, quam L. Valerius Flaccus interrex a senatu proditus, destituta consulibus ciuitate, Carbone & Mario interfectis, armis Syllæ oppressa repub. tulit; vt Sylla perpetuus dictator reipubl. constituendæ causa crearetur: & quæcunque is, aut tãquam consul, aut tanquam proconsul gessisset, rata essent. quam omnium legũ iniquissimam, dissimillimamque legis esse, idem Cicero ostendit^d. Idem prorsus de illis conuentionibus, quas iniustus populus, quem etiam tyrannum vocat Cicero, per rebellionem a principe suo extorquet, dicendum erit. & quidem si a plerisque dubitatum est, an princeps ex cõtractu cum subditis obligetur^e: quid de conuentionibus publicis dicendum est, quas subditi per rebellionẽ, & summam perfidiam extorquẽt? etenim cum rebelles eo ipso, quod in principem insurgunt, fidem violẽt, frustra sibi seruari fidem postulant. de quo mox dicemus.

a l. 2. 3. D. de
obli. & actio.

b d. l. qui in
carcerẽ. D. de
eo quod met.
caus. l. si per
impressionẽ.
C. de huius que
vi met. caus.
c. conuentionior. 23
quæst. 8.

c de legib. l. 1

d in orat. 3.
contra Rullũ.
e Barto. in l.
prohibere. §.
planẽ. D.
quod vi. Bal.
in c. 1 de nat.
feu. in c. 1. c. x.
de probatio. in
l. vlt. C. de
trãf. p. amor. in
c. nouit. de iu-
dic. Specul. in
tit. de iust. e-
dit. §. nũc vñ-
dendum. An-
chor. consil. 2.
Felinus in c. 1
de probatio-
nib. & alijs
quos refert Bo-
dinus de rep.
lib. 1. cap. 9.

tum

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tum etiam, quod foedus ratum, quam fidem sanctam apud eos fore sperandum est, qui diuini, humanique iuris violatores, per summum nefas & perfidiam, patriam prodere non sunt reueriti? aut quomodo per Deum iurabunt, cuius ordinationi ipsi resistunt? aut quæ conditio pacis esse potest, in qua ei, cum quo pacem facias, nihil concedi potest^a? Sed & cum iniusti sint hostes, iure belli agere non possunt, ut modo ostendimus. nulla enim, ut inquit Cicero, iusta causa videri potest aduersus patriam arma capiendi: & per consequens, aduersus principem: qui est communis omnium parens^b: quique potestatem, quam habet, a Deo accepit^c. Præterea cum populus de rebus ad remp. spectantibus, ne quidem cum extraneis pacisci possit, quod soli principi concessum est^d: cui tota respublica commissa est^e, & penes quem est belli, pacisque arbitrium^f: multo minus principem ad iniquas condiciones adigere poterit. princeps enim, cuius est leges dare populo, non accipere^g, cum legibus solutus sit^h, nullis legibus astringi potest a suis subditis. nemo enim, ut ait Vlpianus, sibi ipsi imperare potest, & coacti

^a Cicero. Phil.
lipp. 12.

^b Auth. neq;
vir. quod ex
donat. in fin.
^c Paulus ad
Roman. c. 13

^d l. conuentio-
nis. D. de pac.
^e l. 1. D. de
constit. princip.
^f c. quid cul-
patur. 23. q. 1
^g c. Dominus.
23. quest. 2.
^h l. 1. D. de
constit. princ.
D. de legibus.

& coacti, & cogentis officio fungi^a. & nulla obligatio consistere potest, quæ a voluntate promittentis statum capit^b. eoque spectat, quod Canonistæ passim tradunt, Pontificem nunquam sibi manus ligare. & hæc quidem multo magis obtinebunt, si princeps ex hoc cōtractu sit læsus: qui vt minor restituitur^c. & omnium maximè, si maiestati principis quid detrahatur. summi enim principes^d, quemadmodum nullā regni partē alienare possunt^e: (cuius sunt tātū v- fructuarij, vel dñi: sed non secus, quàm maritus est dñs dotis, quā alienare non potest^f.) sic nec quidquā ex iis, quæ maiestati eorū cohærent, & sunt iuris regij. itaq; de facto alienata, ad ius pristinū reuocari debēt, & successores ex hoc cōtractu nō obligantur^g. omnia enim illa, quę sunt iuris regij, nō sunt in cōmercio, sed coronæ annexa, ita vt ab ea separari nō possint^h: neq; per ipsum principē alienari, etiam ex certa sentētia, vel motu proprioⁱ. eoque spectat, quod Caius respondit, ea quæ sunt iuris diuini, vel publici, nullius in bonis esse^k. neque etiam

hic

Ioan. probat Omphal. & alij, quos allegat & sequitur Carolus Molinæ in consuetud. Parisien. tit. 1. gloss. 5. nu. 23. Bart. 1. as. Cyn. & alij, quos citat Bodin. de rep. lib. 1. c. 10. k in l. 1. D. de rer. diuis.

a l. ille a quo.

§. tempesti-

um. D. ad S. C.

Tribell. l. pen.

D. de arbit.

b l. a Titio.

§. nulla, D.

de verb. oblig.

c l. resp. C. qui

ex cau. maio.

d Bald. in au-

then. hoc am-

phius. C. de fi-

dei cōmis. latē

Ioā. Papon. in

arrest. lib. 5.

tit. 10.

e l. doce an-

cillam. C. de

rei vend.

f. instit. quib.

alien. licet, in

prim.

g l. peso. §.

fratre. D. de

legat. 2. l. oēs

funds. C. de

funds patrim.

lib. 11. l. 2. C.

de apparit.

procōs. legat.

lib. 12. l. 2. C.

de fund. limit.

lib. 12.

h l. cum ser-

uus. al. apud

Iulianum. §.

constat. D. de

leg. 1. l. ult. D.

ut in pos. leg.

i d. l. oēs fūdi;

et d. l. 2. et de-

cidit Andr. I.

ser. Luc. pen.

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a c. ut super.
de reb. eccl. nō
alien. c. intel.
lecto. de iure.
iur.

b d. l. omnes
funds. C. de
fund. patr. li.
11. et d. l. 2.
C. de fund. li-
mit. l. 12. cum
similib.

c l. legatus
Caesari. D. de
off. presid.
d. l. alia. §. 1.
D. solut. mat.

e Bald. in c. 1
nu. 3. quæ sunt
reg. Fel. in c.
cum nō liceat.
in c. ad audiē-
tiam. de pre-
script. Anto.

Butr. in c. per
venerabilem.
qui sint filij
legit. Abbas
in d. c. cum nō
liceat : quos
refert et sequi-
tur Zoāet. de

Rom. Imper.
fl. sacri affa-
tus. C. de di-
uers. rescript.
l. 2. C. ut ne-
mo priuatus
tit. præd.

g Dion. Hal.
ant. Rom. l. 5.
h de rep. l. 1.
et ult.

hic quicquam operabitur iuramentum. prohibitio enim alienationis, quæ est in rei conditione, facit, ut sit illicitum iuramentum postea præstitum^a. & quidem si illa, quæ sunt reipub. vel regni, neque alienari, neque longi temporis præscrip-
tione acquiri possunt^b: quomodo illa, quæ sunt regiae maiestati in signum su-
premæ potestatis reseruata, illi auferri poterunt, cum nec sponte se abdicando princeps imperiū amittat^c? & si pactū, quo maritus paciscitur, ne conueniatur in id quod facere potest, sed in solidum: seruari oportere negat Vlpianus, tan-
quam contra bonos mores sit: quippe contra receptam reuerentiam, quæ ma-
ritis exhibenda est^d: quid de pacto, quo maiestas principi diuino & humano iu-
re debita lēditur, dicendum est? in quam sententiam multa a multis dicta sunt^e. & hinc est, quod si quis priuatus utatur
titulis, vel insigniis regiis, capite plectatur, publicatis bonis^f. & olim per legem
Valeriam sacrum esset cum bonis caput eius, qui regni occupandi consilia iniis-
set^g. Hinc quoque dicit Bodinus^h, pri-
uilegium concessum a principe, ut liceat
condemnatum restituere, aut a pœna li-
berare

berare, nullius esse momenti. quia scilicet hoc dependet a maiestate principis: cui soli hoc licet^a. & Baldus^b dicit, non posse vlllo tēpore præscribi iuri appellandi ad summū principē^c. porrò summum imperiū^{*}, vt rectè annotauit Bodinus^d, præcipuè versatur in summis magistratibus creandis, & officio cuiusq; definiendo, in legibus iubēdis, aut abrogādis, in bello indicendo, ac finiēdo, in extrema prouocatione ab omnibus magistratibus, & in potestate vitæ ac necis. neque enim si iudices supplicia de sceleratis sumunt, propterea necis ac vitæ ius habēt: cū legibus obstricti teneātur: nec merētes morte liberare possint: quod summi imperij est: vbi clementia cōtra leges locū habet. Itaque, exactis regibus, quidam dolebant mutatum reipub. statum, dicentes regem hominē esse, a quo impetres vbi ius, vbi iniuria opus sit: esse gratiæ locum, & beneficio: & irasci, & ignoscere posse: leges verò, rem surdam, & inexorabilem esse: nihil laxamenti, nihil veniæ habere^e. & Cicero veniam pro Ligario precatus a Cæsare, Apud iudices, inquit, nunquam egi hoc modo: Ignoscite, iudices, errauit, lapsus est;

^a l. i. in fine.
D. de quest.
l. ante-damnū, in fin. l.
relegati. l. ad
bestias. D. de
pen.

^b in authent.
quas successiones. m. 14.
versic. ex his
apparet. C. de
sacro. eccle.
c text. in c.
venientes. de
iurciu.

^d in method.
histor. cap. 6.

^e Livius lib. 2

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est; non putavit; si vnquam posthac. ad „
parentem sic agi solet: apud iudices, „
Non fecit, non cogitavit: falsi testes, fal- „
sum crimen. Sunt itaque hæc, quæ dixi-
mus, principis propria: quæ etiam po-
pulus Romanus, apud quem summum
imperium fuit, cum pleraq; alia senatui
committeret, sibi reservavit. vt multis
locis ostendit Dion. Halic^a. præsertim
quòd ad magistratus creandi, leges ferē-
di, & bellum pacemque decernendi po-
testatem attinet. prouocationem verò,
& vitæ necisue potestatem, populo per
legem Valeriam tributam fuisse cōstat^b.
& hæc quidem, iureconsultorum opi-
nionem, ita maiestati principis cohærent,
vt cum aliis communicari non possint.
& superioribus addunt, pignerandi cō-
cessionem, vectigalium ac tributorum,
nummiq; percutiendi potestatem, &
alia nonnulla. ex quibus tamē quædam,
etiam iis, qui nō sunt summi principes,
tributa videmus^c. & de his omnibus la-
tè Ioan. Pap^d. Porro Bodinus, propter-
ea*, quæ hæcenus dicta sunt, dicit nullas
conventiones minus firmas esse, & plus
cautionis opus habere, quàm quas fa-
ciunt subditi rebelles cum suo principe.
ideo-

^a ant. Rom. 6.
lib. 2. 4. & 6.

^b Dion. Halic.
ant. Rom. l. 5.
Luius lib. 2.
Val. Max. l. 4.
cap. 1. Plin. in
vita P. Valer.
Publicolæ.

^c Guido Papæ
quest. 498.
d in arrest.
lib. 5. tit. 1. cū
aliquos sequē.
tib. Bodin. de
rep. lib. 1. c. 118.

ideoque suadet rebellibus, ne ipsi contrahant: sed alius princeps extraneus, & vicinus, pro eis. at ego suaferim, ut redeuntes in viam, humiliter veniam orantes, poenitentia potius clementiam principis demereantur: quam iniustis & iniquis pactis animum irritent. nihil enim magis pungit principem, quam pacisci cum suis subditis rebellibus, iisdemque fidem seruare. itaque Philippum, ut refert Liuius^a, vna res maximè angebat: ^{a lib. 39.} quòd cum leges a Romanis victo imponerentur, sœuendi ius in Macedones, qui in bello a se defecerant, ademptum erat. Cum ergo conuentiones illæ non subsistunt, per quas maiestas principis imminuitur: quid de iis dicendum, per quas Diuina Maiestas læditur (cui per homines nullo contractu, longa quantumuis longi temporis præscriptione, derogari potest) in aperto est. itaque Themistocles ad Athenienses, & Cato ad Romanos dicebant, homines nihil quicquam eorum, quæ Diuinæ Maiestati deberentur, vñ capere posse: neque priuatos quicquam eorū, quæ essent reipub.^b ^{b Plut. in Them. & Cato Vircen.} ideoque Caius, ea quæ sunt diuini, vel publici iuris, nullius in bonis esse re-

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a in l. 1. D. de
ver. divis.
b epist. 33, spondit^a. & huc spectat locus ille nobi-
lis Ambrosij^b: ubi de Valentiniano im-
peratore loquitur: Convenior, inquit, a
comitibus & tribunis, ut Basilicæ fieret
matura traditio; dicentibus, imperatorē
suo iure uti, eò quòd in potestate eius
essent omnia. respondi, si a me peteret,
quod meum esset, id est, fundum meum,
argentum meum, ius huiusmodi meum
non refragaturum: quanquam omnia,
quæ mea sunt, essent pauperum: verum
ea quæ diuina, imperatoris potestati nō
esse subiecta. Ceterum, quamvis conuē-
tiones cum latronibus, & rebellibus, ra-
tas non esse docuerimus, tamen prin-
ceps, quantum potest, ab iis abstinere
debet: tum quòd maiestati principis nō
cōueniat, tum quòd quævis mala potius
toleranda sunt, quàm malo consentien-
dum^c. turpissimum^{*} autem iudicauere
Romani, de bello, pace, vel indutiis cum
piratis, latronibus, vel rebellibus pacifi-
ci. itaque eos nunquam cum iis, qui im-
perio Romano subiecti rebellarent, foe-
dere, aut pactione rem composuisse, le-
gimus: quin potius non quievere, ante-
quam expugnando, aut in deditionem
accipiendo, omnes subigerēt; ut Latinis,
Campa-

c citant. 32
quest. 5.

12

Campanis, aliisque rebellantibus factū
 fuisse legimus. ideoque Cicero ^a suade- ^a *epist. 6. lib. 10.*
 bat Planco, ne pacem componeret inter
 D. Brutum & Antonium, vocans Anto-
 nianos, foedissimos latrones: qui aut ar-
 mis positis pacem petere debent: aut si
 pugnantes eam postulant; victoria pax,
 non pacatione paranda est. & idem dicit ^b, ^b *Philipp. 3.*
 ignorare iura belli, & exempla maiorum:
 & quid populi Romani maiestas, quid
 senatus seueritas postularet, qui legatos
 ad Antonium mittendos censerent. non
 enim verbis rogandum, sed armis cogē-
 dum esse. & idem vocat hoc bellum in-
 expiabile, negans ideo paci locum esse ^c. ^c *Philipp. 13.*
 Itaque bello sociali, cum socij populi Ro-
 mani sperantes, se non fore amplius sub-
 ditos, sed imperij participes, bellum pa-
 rarent, & legatos Romam mitterent que-
 stum, se non admitti ad ius ciuitatis, cum
 tamen ipsorum opera, & auxilio, longē
 lateque imperium extēdissent Romani:
 ad hæc senatus seuerè respōdit, se, donec
 resipuissent, non audituros legationes
 eorum ^d. Hinc quoque cum Tacfarinas ^d *Appian. de
bel. ciuil. lib. 2.*
 nobilis latro, eò arrogantiae venisset, ut
 legatos ad Tiberium mitteret, sed eque
 ultro sibi atque exercitui suo postularet,

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aut bellū inexpiabile minitaretur. Non
a Ann. lib. 3 alias magis, inquit Tacitus^a, sua, populi-
 que contumelia, Rom. indoluisse Cæsa-
 rem ferunt, quàm quòd desertor, & præ-
 do, hostium more ageret. ne Spartaco
 quidem, post cōsularium exercituū cla-
 des, multum Italiam vrenti, quanquam
 Sertorij & Mithridatis ingētibus bellis
 labaret resp. datum, vt pacto in fidē ac-
 ciperetur: nedum pulcherrimo populi
 Romani flagitio, latro Tacfarinas, pace
 & concessione redimeretur. hæc ille. iis
 tamen, qui se, citra pactionem, fidei im-
 peratorum dederent, parci solet. itaque
 Fabius Max. Æmilianus, Conobæ latro-
 num duci, qui se ei dedit, pepercit^b. &
b Appian. de bell. Hisp. Augustus Crocolæ, insigni latroni in
 Hispania, cū magno in eius caput
 proposito præmio, sese sponte offerret,
 veniam dedit, & præmium exigenti, nu-
 merari iussit. ne scilicet, si eum supplicio
 affecisset, videretur voluisse frustrari
 promisso præmio, vel decepisse fiducia
c Dion. L. 36. iuris publici^c. Porro non solum si cum
 rebellibus, vel latronibus*, & iis qui ho-
 stium numero non sunt definiti, res sit:
 sed & si cū hostibus, & iis qui iusto bello
 nobiscum contendunt agatur, non sem-
 per si-

per fidem seruare cōuenit : & inprimis,
 si quis iurauerit, humana forte infirmi-
 14 tate* lapsus, se facturum id, quod Deum,
 per quem iurauit, possit offendere, non
 faciet, quod iurauit. nam iuramentum
 non debet esse vinculum iniquitatis ^a: a c. inter ce-
tera. 22. q. 4.
 & in malis promissis fidem seruari non
 expedit ^b, neque obligatur quisquam ex b c in malis.
de reg. iur.
 iuramento contra bonos mores præsti-
 to ^c, sed & qui rem illicitam facit, quia c c. nō est ob-
ligatorum. de
reg. iur.
 iurauit, accumulatur peccata peccatis ^d. Est
 itaque contra officium nonnunquam, vt d c. duo ma-
la. 13. c. mō-
lier. 22. q. 4.
 inquit D. Ambrosius ^e, fidem seruare.
 quod & Cicero sensit ^f, & Seneca in
 Hercule Oetæo, cū ait: e off. lib. 1.
f off. lib. 3.

*Præstare fateor posse me tacitam fidem,
 Si scelere careat: interim scelus est fides.*

Nam, vt inquit D. Augustinus, si ad pec-
 catum admittendum fides exhibeatur,
 mirū est, si fides appellatur ^g. vnde longè g c. si ad pec-
catū. 22. q. 4.
 iustius fecit Dauid, quod non stetit iu-
 ramento, de perdendo Nabal, quàm He-
 rodes, qui propter iusiurandum, occidit
 virum sanctissimum ^h. Meritò quoque h c. est etiā.
ca. quod Da-
uid d. c. iurauit.
22. q. 4.
 Cicero ⁱ Agamemnonis factum repre-
 hēdit: qui cū deuouisset Dianæ, quod
 in suo regno pulcherrimum natum es-
 set, Iphigeniam immolauit. promissum i off. lib. 3.

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a Authent. de
iur. C. de nupt.
facti l. repra
bendenda. C.
de institut. &
substitut.

b Gioff. in c.
f. aliquid. 22.
q. 4. Frim. in
c. si vero. de
iureiu. Rol. id.

a Val. con. 98
no. 18 Alc. ad
l. pacta que
conura. C. de
pact. nu. 32.

c l. iurigen-
tium. §. si pa
cisc. r. §. ge
neraliter. l.
ius publicum.
D. de pact. l.
vlt. D. de his

qui satis. co-
gant. Gloss. et
ad. in l. con-
uentionum. D.
de pactis in c.
licet mulier. de
iureiu. in 6.

Bart in l. vlt.
c. quando lic.
fmo iud. Alc.
li. de sing. cer.
q. 44. tex. c. si
cut nostris. de
iureiu. in c. 1.
de iureiu. in 6.
reg. Hisp. l.
vlt. ti. 28. p. 2

enim, vt idem ait, potius non faciendum,
quàm tam tetrum facinus admittendū
fuit. qua ratione etiam facinus Gedeo-
nis non probatur superiori simile, qui vt
votum solueret, Iephthe filiā immolauit.
Illicitæ itaque rei iusiurandum seruari
non debet, & pœna periurij, si qua est, in
eum conuertenda est, qui exegit: id quæ
verum est, etsi tantum agatur de peccato
veniali^b. His consequens est, quod fides
data a priuato*, in præiudicium reipub. 15
velecclesiæ, non sit seruanda c. quod ve-
rum est, si principaliter de eius præiudi-
cio agatur^d. quia propinqua causa inspi-
ci debet non remota^e. Itaque Themis-
tocles in exiliū missus, cum ad Xerxem
se contulisset, ei quæ promississet se Athe-
niensibus bellū illaturum, & a rege mo-
neretur vt promissa seruaret: quamuis
grauis iniuria affectus a ciuibus, & huma-
nissimè exceptus a rege: tamē honestius
sibi vitæ finem imponere ratus, quàm
patriæ bellum inferre, epoto veneno,
mortē sibi consciuit^f. sunt quæ præclara
in hanc rem C. Claudij verba, dum hor-
tatur App. Claudium, & reliquos decē-
uiros,

d l. iurigentium. & ibi DD. de pact. c. quamuis. de pact. in 6.
e l. si mulier. D. de reb. amot. f Plut. in Themisto.

uiros, vt tyrannidem deponerent: non debere eos mouere, inquiēs, si quas fortè pactiōnes arcanas inter se fecissent, fidē-
que dedissent, sponsores facientes deos: docens has conuentiones seruatas impias esse, vt aduersum ciues & patriam; solutas verò, pias fore. quòd dij nō gaudent, se adhiberi ad rem turpem & iniustam^a. Qua de causa etiam Vlpianus respondit, maleficij & rerum inhonestarū nullam societatem esse^b. Itaque non seruare fidem quandoque iustū esse docet Cicero^c. veluti non reddere depositum furioso, vel hosti patriæ. omnia enim quæ agimus, referri debent ad fundamēta iustitiæ: primum, vt ne cui noceatur; deinde, vt communi vtilitati seruiatur, vnde etiam iurisiurādi temeritatem reprehendunt poëtæ in Phaëtonis fabula, & satius fuisse docent, iusiurādum violasse, quàm iuueni imperito solis habenas, totius mundi malo, permisisse^d. & huc facit, quod Paulus ait, si pactum conuentum a re priuata remotū sit, non esse seruandum^e: & Vlpianus^f, quòd generaliter, quoties pactum a iure communi remotum est, seruari non debet, etiam iuratum. nam maior est auctoritas

^a Dion. Hal.
ant. Roma.
lib. 11.

^b in l. quod
autem. l. nec
prætermitten-
dis. D. pro soc.
^c off. lib. 1^a

^d Ouidius
metam. 2.

^e in l. si vnus
§. pacta. D.
de p. et.

^f in l. iuris gē-
nium. §. gene-
raliter. D. de
pact.

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iuris, quàm iuramenti. itaque iusiuran-
dum contra vim legum, & auctoritatem
iuris, nullius est momenti^a. & hinc est,
quod in quolibet iuramento, censetur
excepta superioris auctoritas, quoad ea
quæ ad superioris potestatem spectant;
cui per iusiurandum derogari non po-
test^b. nō enim potest quis pacisci de iis,
quæ non sunt sui arbitrij. qua ratione
Gonsalvus, prorex Neapoli, comitem
Valentinum, quem in suam fidem acce-
perat, postea, ex mandato regis Ferdinā-
di, sine vlla perfidiæ nota, in carcerem
coniecit^c. hinc quoque ei, qui iuravit, se
ordini non interfuturum, gratiam se iu-
rifiurandi facere, imperatores Seuerus
& Antonius rescripserunt^d. imo si ius-
iurandum sit contra remp. ipso iure re-
missum censetur: ex eo quòd Paulus ait,
lege Iulia remitti iusiurandum, de non
contrahendis nuptiis^e. fuit enim apud
Romanos conditio, vel promissio, de
non contrahendis nuptiis tam odiosa,
vt a testamētis, aliisque actibus omnino
remoueretur, & pro non adiecta habe-
retur^f. Licebit itaque priuata fide con-
tempra, publicæ securitatis curā gerere.
apud sapientes enim, inquit Cornelius
Taci-

a l. si quis in-
quisitos. §.
ult. D. de le-
gat 1. l. adi-
gere. §. ult.
D. de iure pa-
tro. l. non du-
bium. C. de le-
gib.
b c. constitu-
tus, & ibi Fe-
lin. de rescript.
c. veniens. de
supplic.

c Bodinus de
rep. lib. 1. c. 8.

d in l. ult. D.
de adminic.

e in l. adigere.
§ v. r. D. de
iur. patro.

f l. 2. C. de
iud. vid. tol.
l. sed et si hoc.
§. ult. cum l.
sequ. l. mulieri
& Titio. D. de
eod. et de mōs.

Tacitus, cassa habentur, quæ neque dari, neque accipi salua rep. possunt. in quam sententiam exstant egregia verba Postumij, quibus ostendit populum Roma. non teneri sponfione, quam cum Samnitibus fecerat, contranitentibus L. Liuius, & Q. Melio Trib. pleb. qui & ipsi auctores pacis Caudinæ fuerant: &, ne hostibus dedrentur, persuadere conabantur, populum Rom. religione astringum esse^a. Ceterum longè tutius*, & ^a *Liuius l. 9.* laudabilius erit, vt quis non permittat se vllius periculi metu ad fidem dādam de re illicita impelli, quàm datam fallere. nam iurans se facturum rem illicitā, ipso facto est periurus^b: & quoduis malum ^{b c. sicut monstru. de iure iur. g. off. in c. 1. de iur. iur. in 6.} potius tolerandum est, quàm malo consentiendum^c. quo nomine constantiam Pōrij Cæsariani militis, meritò laudes: qui pro Cæsaris partibus excubās, a Scipionis præsidio interceptus, cū vno modo salusei daretur, si se futurū, Cn. Pōpei militē affirmasset: ita respōdere nō dubitauit; Tibi quidē, Scipio, gratias ago: sed mihi vti ista cōditione vitæ, nō est opus. Pari fiducia C. Meuius cēturio Augusti, cū Antoniano bello se penūerò excellētes pugnās edidisset, in prouisis hostiū in

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fidijs circumuentus, & ad Antonium Alexandriam perductus, interrogatusque quidnam de eo statui deberet: Iube me, inquit, iugulari: quia nec salutis beneficio, nec mortis supplicio adduci possum, vt Cæsaris miles esse definā; & tuus esse incipiam. sed quo constātius vitam contempsit, eò facilius impetravit. Antonius enim virtuti eius incolumitatē concessit^a. &, ne singulos referam, vniuersa Saguntus, Hispaniæ ciuitas opulēta, magnum, licet triste, fidei erga Romanos monumentum: cū post continuam obsidionem, se diutius ab Annibale tueri non posset, neque Romano peni ferrent, spretis conditionibus pacis minus honestis, se suaque omnia in rogam coniecit potius, quā a Romanis, cum quibus foedus inierat, deficeret^b. Denique hosti fidem fallenti^{*}, fides seruanda non est, etiam iurata^c: & tam publicæ conuentionis, quā priuatæ^d: secundum illud:

Fallere fallentem, fraudemq; repellere fraude,
Exemploq; licet ludere quemq; suo.

Generalis enim lex est, omniū conuentionum, vt nemo illis stare teneatur, nisi ex aduerso, quæ conuenerunt, præstentur.

^a Val. Max. lib. 3. cap. 8.

^b Lilius lib.

21. Val. Max.

lib. 6. cap. 6.

L. Florus, lib.

2. cap. 6.

^c c. peruenit.

2. c. sicut et

infra. de iure.

in. l. qui fide.

D. de trans. l.

Iulianus. §.

offerri. D. de

act. empt. l. si

instituta. D.

de inoff. testa.

l. cum propo-

nas. 2. C. de

paet. l. cum

proponas. l. si

diuersa. C. de

trans.

d per text. e-

leg. in c. sicut

et infra. §.

ult. de iure in.

gloss. in l. qui

fide. D. de

paet.

tur^a, nam frustra quis fidem ab eo præ-
 stari postulat, cui fidem datam seruare
 recusat^b. atque dolo facit, qui id iuris in
 aduersarium valere postulat, quod in se
 non admittit: contra quem edicto præ-
 toris cautum est, vt quod quisque iuris
 in alium statuit, ipse eo vtatur. neque di-
 cendus est quis ex hac causa fidē violare:
 sed potius ex noua, eademque iustissima
 causa, nempe ruptæ fidei, iure belli agere
 cum hostibus, diuini, humanique iuris
 contemptoribus. qua de causa Romani,
 cum Sabinis, Latinis, Priuernatibus,
 Volscis, Hernicis, Apulis, Samnitibus,
 Hetruscis, Equis, Carthaginiensibus, a-
 liisque quamplurimis, ruptis foederibus
 bella gessere: & senatus prædam Epiri
 ciuitatum, quæ rupto foedere ad Persea
 defecerant, muris earū dirutis, exercitui
 dedit. iuramentum enim non extendi-
 tur ad ea, quæ postea accidunt: & noua
 causa superueniente, potest quis nō im-
 plere, quod iurauit^d. Quò spectat, quod
 Cicero^e docet: Tempore nonnūquam
 commutari officium; ita vt non seruare
 fidem, quandoquē iustum sit: veluti non
 reddere gladium depositum furioso, vel
 hosti patriæ. & in omni quoque iura-
 mento

a d. l. c. de
 proponas. 2.
 C. de pact.
 b c. frustra,
 de reg. iur. l.
 cum patet. §.
 liberi. D. de
 leg. 2.

c Lilius lib.
 35.
 d cap. ad no-
 stram. 2. cap.
 quemadmo-
 dū. c. clericus.
 de iure iur. c.
 cum inter. P.
 de re. l. 1.
 §. sed viden-
 dum est. D. de
 success. edict.
 l. cum Aquil-
 liana. l. qui cū
 tutoribus. D.
 de trans. l. tres
 fratres. D. de
 pact. l. si de
 certa. C. de
 trans.
 e offic. lib. 1.

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mento intelligitur hæc conditio, si mihi
 servata fides fuerit ^a: vel nisi per aduersa-
 rium steterit, quo minus pacta seruen-
 tur ^b. nam cum hoc fit, censetur interue-
 nire tacita pacti remissio ^c: & is qui prior
 contrahenit, solus fidem fregisse cense-
 tur ^d: ita ut sequentis factum ad violatio-
 nem referri nequeat ^e. Quò spectat con-
 tentio illa Romuli cum Cluilio Alba-
 norum dictatore, vter scilicet prior cõ-
 ditionibus foederis non stetisset; eum e-
 nim solum foederis violati reum esse ^f.
 unde priorem quoque belli causam ma-
 nere dicendum est. nam si in eo fides vio-
 letur, cuius contemplatione contractus
 initus est, corrumpitur conventio, & omnia
 in pristinum statum redeunt ^g. Itaque Vl-
 pianus ait, non teneri actione pro socio,
 qui ideo societati renunciavit, quia con-
 ditio quædam, qua societas erat coita, ei
 non præstatur ^h. & idem integram dicit
 manere inofficiosi testamenti causam, si
 fides ab herede transactioni non præsta-
 tur ⁱ. reciprocatio enim obligationis, v-
 trinque vinculum iniicit, & ita quidem,
 ut alter ex sua parte non teneatur, si ex
 aduerso, illi quod convenit, non præsta-
 tur. idque verum est, siue conventioni
 poena

^a c. peruenit.
² c. quemad-
 modum. c. sicut
 & infra. §.
 ult. de iurciu-
 van. l. quero.
 §. inter. D.
 loca.
^b l. cum pro-
 ponat. C. de
 non sen.
^c c. constitu-
 tus. de sen.
 d. l. aut facta.
 §. 1. & ibi
 Bar. de pen.
 §. l. nam est
 sub conditione.
 D. de iniust.
 rup. iuris. fac.
 testa. l. cum
 pater. §. li-
 bertus. D. de
 leg. 2.
^f Dion. Hal.
 ant. Ro. lib. 3.
^g l. cum te. C.
 de pact. inter
 empt. & vend.
 l. cum prope-
 nas. C. de pac.
 l. & eleganter.
 D. de dolo.
^h l. si conue-
 nerit. D. pro
 socio.
ⁱ in l. si insti-
 tuta. in princ.
 D. de inoff.
 testa.

pœna sit adiecta, siue non: neque pœna
 debetur^a: & etiam si necessaria causa im-
 peditus aduersarius, fidem non seruet^b,
 quamuis enim impedimentum a mora
 seu pœna excuset^c: ad producendam ta-
 men actionē satis momenti non habet^d.
 idem erit, si vel in minima re fidem ser-
 uare neglexerit^e. nisi tamen tam leuis
 momenti res sit. vt nō sit verisimile, eius
 vtrunque magnā rationem habitā fuisse^f.
 In tantum quoque ex parte sua, quif-
 que ad fidei datæ obseruationē tenetur,
 vt etiam si ipsa promissionis causa cessa-
 ret, nihilominus duret hæc obligatio^g.
 Quod si non constet, vter prior fidem
 datam violauerit, mutua compensatiōe
 vterque a pœna contractus absoluēdus
 est^h. solet enim dici, inter paria delicta
 compensationi locum esseⁱ. vnde rece-
 ptum est, licere litigatori malitiā aduer-
 sarij sui, malitia repellere^k: & cornicum
 oculos, quod aiunt, configere. quod in-
 telligēdum est, dum tamen bonam cau-
 sam habeat^l, & fraude non vtatur, quæ
 in criminis notam trāseat: quale est fal-
 sum stellionatus, & id genus simile^m. Et
 hæc quidem plerisque probantur in pa-
 cto pacis vel foederis, non etiam indutia-

a d. l. quarto.

§. inter. D.
locat.

b Alciat. ad

l. cum propo-

nas. nr. 13.

c. de pass.

c l. si viden-

da. §. idē iu-

ris. D. ad l.

Rhodiam.

d l. si vno. §.

item cum qui-

dā. D. locati-

e Alexād. ad

l. paulat. C. de

his quibus vt

indig. Corr.

cōcil. 246. lib.

3. Alc. conuil.

167. Bald. ad

l. postea con-

uentis. D. de

contr. empt.

Tyracq. lib. de

iud. in reb.

exig. ferend.

f l. i. §. pro-

inde. D. de e-

dil. edict.

g l. vlt. §. vlt.

D. de rescind.

vend.

h c. constitu-

tur. de pen.

i l. viro. D.

solut. metri-

k gloss. in c.

cupietes, vers.

malignantiū.

de elect. in 6.

l c. Dominus.

23. q. 23.

rum, in But. in c.

3. derog. iur. Alciat. in l. cum proponas. C. de transact.

a Vinc. Ioa.
 Andr. Ant. de
 Butr. Card.
 Angel. Cast.
 Felin. las. Al-
 cias. Laud. &
 duo Socyni,
 quas allegat
 Petrin. B. l. de
 re malis. par. 5
 et 3. et Myn-
 sin. cent. 4.
 obser. 7. &
 Dec. 3. concil.
 21.
 b l. possitimi-
 niū. §. indu-
 tie. D. de ca-
 ptiv. Gell. lib.
 1. cap. 25.
 c l. obligatio-
 num fere. §.
 placet. D. de
 act. & oblig.
 l. qui Romae.
 §. Callima-
 chus. D. de
 verbor. oblig.
 d c. nonis, de
 iud. c. ille no-
 mit. c. vlt. de
 test. & pact.
 e l. dolam. C.
 de per. et com.
 rei vend. l. nō
 fraudantur. §.
 nemo. D. de
 regul. iur. l. 3.
 §. 1. D. de do-
 nat. inter vir.
 & uxor.
 f. in l. quaro.
 §. inter. D. de
 eccl.

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rum*, quas inuiolabiliter seruādas esse, 18
 etiam hoste fidem earum fallente, cen-
 sent^a. quorum sententiam vt sanio-
 rem, & æquiorē, amplexos fuisse cameræ im-
 perialis assessores, refert Mynsingerus,
 & addit rationem diuersitatis, qua etiā
 ceteri innituntur: quòd scilicet finito
 indutiarum tempore, quis se vlcisci pos-
 sit. quæ certè ratio neque satis idonea,
 præsertim in bello: (vbi, vt inquit Li-
 uius, si in occasionis momēto, cuius præ-
 teruolat oportunitas, cunctatus paululū
 fueris, nequicquam mox ommissum que-
 raris) neque etiam iure probata videtur.
 cum enim inter pacem & indutias, hoc
 tantum intersit, quòd illa perpetua sit,
 hæ verò ad tempus^b: & tempus obliga-
 tionem neque augeat, neque minuat^c:
 quemadmodum pax alterutro fidē fal-
 lente corrui; ita & indutias dissolui cō-
 sequens videtur: cum vtroque eadem
 subsistat ratio: nempe ruptę fidei^d; & nemo
 ex suo dolo, vel delicto lucrari, aut aliis
 nocere debeat^e. est que in hanc rem, nisi
 fallor, elegans responsum Pauli^f: qui,
 cum proponeretur inter locatorē fundi
 & conductorē conuenisse, ne intra tem-
 pora locationis conductor expelleretur,
 adiecta

adiecta pœna; nihilominus tamen, si cō-
 ductor biennij continui pensionem nō
 solueret, sine metu pœnæ cum expelli
 posse respondit, etiam si nihil de solutio-
 ne pensionum in stipulatione pœnali
 expressum esset. quibus certè argumētis
 moueor, vt potius inclinem in sententiā
 eorum, qui existimauerunt idem iuris
 esse in iudiciis, quod in pace vel fœde-
 19 re^a. præsertim cum indutiæ* etiam longi
 temporis esse possint^b. legimus enim
 Veientibus a Romulo in centum, & a
 Seruio Tullio in xl. & in totidem annos
 L. Furio, & C. Manlio consull. indutias
 datas fuisse^c. & cum populo Cæriti, in
 cētum annos indutias factas fuisse pro-
 ditū est^d. Volsiniensibus verò bello fef-
 sis, in viginti annos indutiæ datæ sunt^e.
 Tarquinienfes, metu compulsi, a Decio
 cons. in xl. annos indutias petiere^f. Æ-
 qui octo annorum indutias impetraue-
 runt^g. Hetrurię capita, Volsinij, Perusia,
 & Aretium, cum pacem peterent, indu-
 tias in xl. annos obtinuerunt^h. vnde le-
 gimus quoque violationē indutiarum
 æquē vt fœderis, Romanis, qui iura belli
 religiosissimè semper conseruarūt, cau-
 sam belli fuisse. atque ita cum Samniti-
 bus,

^a Pan. Imo.

Alex. Decius,

Alciat. Bell.

Cor. quos ci-

tat Mysia-

gerus. cens. 4.

obser. 7. Petr.

Bell. de re mi-

lit. par. 5. tit.

3.

^b Sell. lib. 1.

cap. 25.

^c Linius li. 1.

c. 2.

^d Linius l. 7.^e Linius l. 5.^f Linius l. 9.^g Linius l. 4.^h Linius l. 11

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

bus, quibus biennij indutiæ datæ fuere, 18

eodem anno ruptis indutiis, bellatum

^a *Liuius l. 9.* est^a. & contra Hetruscos, qui pacem fœ-
dusque a Romanis petentes, indutias in
triginta annos impetrauerāt, paulo post
indutiarum fide violata rebellantes, fe-
liciter res gesta est: & eodē anno, inquit
^b *lib. 9.* Liuius^b, cum reliquis Hetruscorum ad
Perusiam, quæ & ipsa indutiarum fidem
ruperat, Fabius cons. nec dubia, nec dif-
ficili victoria dimicauit, & ipsum oppi-
dum (nam ad moenia victor accessit) ce-
pisset, ni legati dedētes urbem exissent.

^c *lib. 11.* & idem Liuius alio loco^c refert, Hetrus-
cis (quòd cūm pax negata, & indutiæ
biennij datæ essent, ac aduersus indutias
pararent bellum) a Romanis bellum il-
larum fuisse. his accedit, quòd maior so-
let esse religio fœderis, vbi precatione
res transigebatur, quàm indutiarum, al-
teriúsue sponfionis: ideoque iniussu po-
puli, nec sine fecialibus, cærimoniaque

^d *Liuius l. 9.* alia solemnī fœdus fieri non poterat^d.
indutias verò, aliasque sponfiones, sine
fecialibus, aliisque solemnitatibus. sæpe
a belli ducibus, iniussu populi factas
fuisse legimus: vt proximo capite latius
ostendimus. atqui nihil quicquam sa-
crofan-

cro sanctum esse potuit, inquit Cicero,
 nisi quod plebs populûsque sanxisset, &
 quod aut genere ipso, aut obtestatione
 legis, aut poenæ, cum caput eius, qui cō-
 trā facit consecratur, sacratum esset ^a. a in orat. pro
l. Corn. Bal.
 cum itaque foedus, quod sanctius est,
 altero fallente rumpatur, multò magis
 indutiæ. Non tamen improbandi sunt ij,
 qui indutiarum tempore, quāuis iniuria
 prouocati, ab omni vindicta abstinent;
 maximè si de leui, & exigui tēporis præ-
 iudicio agatur, vt omne violatæ fidei de-
 decus, sit penes hostem: sed id vsu & cō-
 suetudine potius receptum, quàm iure
 probatum asserit Alexand^b. cui conue- b ad l. cum
proponas. C.
de pact.
 nire videtur, quod Scipio (quamuis non
 modò indutiarū fides rupta esset a Car-
 thaginiensibus, sed etiam ius gentiū in
 legatis suis violatum) tamē se nihil, nec
 institutis populi Romani, nec suis mo-
 ribus indignum facturum dicens: lega-
 tos hostium, qui eodem tempore Roma
 ad eum venerant, inuiolatos dimisit ^c. c Liuius l. 30
 quo nomine Scipio maximam laudem
 meruit: licet, si verè iudicare volumus,
 nullo non iure legatis Carthaginiensiu
 parcere debuit, vt maximè duplici scele-
 re, vt refert Liuius, omnino ruptę essent
 K indutiæ.

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indutiæ . ea enim de causâ Scipioni ad bellum redire, quod fecit, sine vlla perfidiæ nota licuit : non autem hostium legatos lædere , qui citra vllam pacis , vel indutiarum cōventionem, etiam in ipso ardore belli sunt inuiolabiles , & sancti iure gētium^a. neque refert, quod hostes prius indutias fregerint , & legatos hostium violauerint . nam , quod diximus fidem frangenti^{*} non esse fidem seruandam , ad vnam, eandemque conuentionem referendū est, cuius fides rupta est : & ad ea quæ vna , eademque sponsione comprehensa sunt^b : & in promissionibus , quarum altera alterius causa facta est^c. connexorum enim vnum idemque est iudiciū^d. secūs verò est in separatis^e. vnde si quis in vnam legē committit, alterius legis beneficio non exuitur : & heres in primis tabulis institutus , & in secundis substitutus : potest repudiata hereditate ex primis tabulis, adire ex secundis hereditatem^f. Quare in bello^{*},²¹ etiam si cum perfido & fœdifrago hostes sit, & qui semel, iterum, & sæpius fidē fefellit , vicissim fidem fallere non licet : nisi per hostem stet , quo minus cōuentorum fides seruetur : vt superius ostendimus :

a l. ult. D. de
legationib.

b Alexander
ad l. cum pro
ponas. C. de
pact. l. si duo,
et ibi Accurt.
D. de dolo.

c Alciat. ad
l. cum propo-
nas. nu. 31.

d ē. trās lato,
de constitut.

e l. cum su-
dam. D. de vi

et vi armat.
f l. filius. D.
de vulg. et
pupil.

dimus: alioqui verò perfidiam perfidia
 vlcisci semper turpissimum fuit. quo no-
 mine Lucullus malè audiuit, qui Lusita-
 tanos, ruptis fœderibus bella gerentes,
 contra iurisiurandi fidem, dolo circum-
 uentos, per summā immanitatem om-
 nes trucidauit; barbaros imitatus, nul-
 la Romanæ dignitatis ratione habita^a.
 & Ser. Galba a Libone trib. pleb. pro
 rostris accusatus fuit, quòd Lusitanorū
 magnam manum ruptis pactis rebellā-
 tium, interposita fide, prætor in Hispa-
 22 nia interemisset^b. Denique pactum^c
 quoque fœderis, pacis, vel indutiarum,
 dolo malo initum, nullius erit momēti.
 pacta enim conuenta dolo malo irrita,
 non tuetur prætor^d: & dolus dans cau-
 sam contractui bonæ fidei, facit contra-
 ctum ipso iure nullum^e. quod ita verum
 est, vt tamē in arbitrio eius permittatur,
 qui deceptus est, velit nec ne pactis stari:
 alter verò qui dolum admisit, audiendus
 nō est^f. nemo enim ex dolo suo lucrari,
 aut aliis nocere debet^g: & propter malā
 fidem alterius contrahentium, potest
 cōtractus pendere ex arbitrio alterius^h.
 Legimus tamen in sacris litteris, quòd
 Iosue, licet dolo circūuentus a Gabao-
 nitis,

^a Appian. de
bell. Hisp.

^b Val. Max.
lib. 8, c. 1.

^c l. iurisgen-
tium. §. prætor.

§. dolo malo.
D. de pactis.

^d l. elegē-
ter. D. de dolo.

^e l. in cause, 2.
§. 1. D. de mi-
nor.

^f l. transactio-
ne C. de trans.

^g l. 2. D. ad
S. C. Vell.

^h l. dolum. C.
de per. et com-
ra vend. l. si

creditoribus.

C. de fern. pi-
gno. da. man.

ⁱ l. qui offi-
cij. l. donū. D.

de cond. empt.

l. Iulianus. §.

per contrarium.

D. de actio-
empt. l. credi-

tor. §. Lucius
D. mandat.

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nitis, & deprehensa eorum fraude (quòd cùm finitimi essent, & e terra, quæ a Domino Israëlitis promissa erat, aduenas se, & è longinqua terra esse, commentiti essent, vt pacem ab Israëlitis impetrarent) tamen pacem, quam dederat, reuocandã non esse censuit: ne dum alienam perfidiam redargueret, suam solueret^a. sed, vt inquit D. Ambros.^b Veterẽ ibi de dolo, non iuris peritorum formulam, sed patriarcharum sententiã, scriptura diuina expressit: quæ non ad politicam necessitatem, sed ad plenitudinem perfectionis Christianæ pertinet. sed & Iosue quoq; quamuis Gabaonitas liberaret de manu filiorũ Israël, ne occiderentur; maledixit tamen eis, propter fraudẽ ipsorum, decreuitque vt inferuissent cuncti populo^c.

^a Iosue c. 9.
^c innocẽs. 23.
quæst. 4.
^b offic. lib. 3.

DE FOEDERIBVS ET IN- DVITIIS.

- 1 Tria fœderum genera.
- 2 Maiestatem comiter conseruare, in fœderibus addi solitũ, quam vim habeat.
- 3 Romani nunquam cum hoste armato fœdus facere soliti.
- 4 Quid inter fœdus & spõsionem intersit.
- 5 Dux belli pacem cum hoste, iniussu principis facere non potest.

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- 6 *Andux belli, sicut pacem, & inducias facere prohibeatur.*
 7 *Princeps verum utilitatis publicæ causa potest priuatis quid detrabere.*
 8 *Princeps astrictus legibus naturæ.*
 9 *Reges quatenus sint domini omnium.*
 10 *An princeps teneatur ex fœdere iuncto cum principe, cui successit.*

CAPVT SEPTIMVM.

QUOD ad fœdera, quibus hosti fidem obstringimus, attinet, sciendum est tria* fuisse olim fœderũ genera, quibus integrè pacisceretur amicitias ciuitates, regesque: vt disertè Menippus Antiochi legatus, Romam de pace missus, T. Quintio cõs. disseruit. a. vnum, cùm bello victis dicerentur leges. vbi enim omnia ei, qui armis plus posset, dedita essent, quæ ex iis habere victor, quibus multari eos vellet, ipsius ius atque arbitriũ erat. & tale fœdus fuit, quod Æneæ, deserta Troia, pacem deprecanti, ab Achæis, qui eum insequabantur, datum fuit: his cõditionibus, vt Æneas & socij, cum suis rebus quas in fuga exportaerant, intra certũ tempus agro Troiano excederent, castellis in potestatem Achæorum

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^a *Dion. Hal. antiqu. Rom. lib. 1.* chæorum traditis^a: & quod Romani cū
^b *Dion. Hal. antiqu. Rom. lib. 9.* Aquis fecerunt, his legibus: Æquorum
^c *lib. 9.* populi, saluis suis agris, Romanorū sub-
diti sunt: Romanis nihil mittūto, præ-
ter auxilia, quoties accita fuerint, eaque
sumptu proprio^b. Tale etiā fœdus fuit,
quod Apuli a Romanis impetrarunt.
non enim æquo fœdere, vt inquit Li-
uius^c: sed vt in ditione populi Romani
essent, conuenit. eiusdem quoque ge-
neris est fœdus, quo Philippus ex om-
nibus Græcię ciuitatibus p̄fidia dedu-
cere iussus est, naues & elephantes tra-
dere, mille talentū populo Rom. dare,
extra Macedonię fines bellum, iniussu
^d *Liuius l. 43* Senatus gerere prohibitus^d. & quo An-
tiochus, cū omnis Asia cis Taurum
montē Romanis cessit, naues ornamen-
taque tradidit, duodecim millia talenta
attica in duodecim annos p̄fionibus æ-
^e *Liuius l. 48* quis, Romanis dedit^e. Alterum fœderū
genus fuit, cū pares bello, æquo fœde-
re in pace atque amicitia venirēt, quale
inter Romulum & Tatium Sabinorum
regem iētum fuisse legimus. cū enim
iam tertio, æquo Marte, sed maxima v-
trinque accepta clade, acie certassent, in-
tercedentibus Romanorū vxoribus, Sa-
bini

bini generis (propter quas bellū exortum erat,) foedere, quā praelio bello h-
nem imponere potius habuerunt: conuenitq; vt Romulus & Tatiū pari potestate honoreque in vrbe regnarent, & vt Sabinis ius ciuitatis Romanæ daretur^a. Soler autem in hoc foedere de ca-
ptiuis reddendis, vrbibus tradendis, & similibus æquis conditionibus transigi^b, itaque inter Octauium Cæsarem, Antonium, & Pompeium conuenit, vt pace terra marique reddita, negotiatores liberè commeare omni loco possent: Pompeius ex omnibus Italiæ locis præsidia deduceret: seruos fugitiuos, nō amplius admitteret: Sardinia, Sicilia, Corsicaq; & ceteris, quas tunc habebat, insulis imperaret, & præterea Peloponnesum acciperet: Cæsar & Antonius reliqua possiderent^c. & huius generis quoque esse videtur foedus, quo Ætolis pax data fuit a Romanis, his conditionibus: Imperium, maiestatemque P. R. gens Ætolorum conseruato, sine dolo malo: hostes eosdem habeto, quos P. R. armaque in eos ferro, bellumque pariter gerito^d.
quamuis enim æquum foedus istud dici non potest, tamen verum est, non tan-

^a Dion. Hal. ant. Rom. l. 2.

^b L. in bello. in prim. l. si captiuus. D. de captiu.

^c Appian. de bell. civil. l. 5.

^d L. in l. 4.

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quam victis leges dictas, neque quicqua
 ademptum, sed suis legibus liberos reli-
 ctos ^a. Tertium porrò foederum genus
 fuit, cùm qui hostes nunquam fuerât, ad
 amicitiam sociali foedere inter se iungē-
 dam coibant : ij neque dicere, neque ac-
 cipere leges solent : (id enim victoris &
 victi erat,) sed certis cōditionibus vtrin-
 que amicitiam & societatem inibant :
 quale fuit foedus, quod Latinus cum
 Ænea fecit, Troianis in agri partem ad-
 missis, pactus, vt essent illi in bello, quod
 cum Rutilo parabant, socij: vtq̃ue vtriq;
 alteros pro viribus inuicem iuuarent ^b.
 & huc referri potest foedus, quo cum
 Latinis, Postumio Cominio & Sp. Cas-
 sio consl. instaurata est amicitia. quam-
 uis enim constet eos antea fuisse subdi-
 tos Rom. imperio, ex Dion. Hal ^c. tamē
 propter fidelem operam, quā Romanis
 nauauerant, postea sociali foedere iuncti
 sunt, his verbis: Romanis & Latinorum
 populis omnibus mutua pax esto, dum
 cælum & terra stationem eandem obti-
 nent : & neutri alteris bellum inferant,
 aut aliunde hostes inducāt : nec bellum
 inferentibus, iter tutū prębeant, & bello
 infestatis, opē ferant totis viribus: præ-
 damq̃ue

^a l. nō dubito.
 D. de captiu.

^b Dion. Hal.
 antiqu. Rom.
 1 b. 1.

^c lib. 3. & 4.

damque & spolia ex æquo diuidant. Sed
 iidem Latini postea sæpius rebellantes,
 tandem a Camillo perdomiti sunt, & in
 potestatem populi Romani redacti. Hu-
 ius verò fœderis genus dici quoque po-
 test, cum prouincia, vel ciuitas aliqua
 tutelæ & protectioni alicuius principis
 extranei se subijcit, aut regno vel rei-
 publ. certis legibus accedit^a. nã vt Pro-
 culus respondit^b, liber populus est: siue
 æquo fœdere in amicitia venit, siue fœ-
 dere comprehensum est, vt is populus al-
 2 terius populi maiestatem* comiter con-
 seruaret. hoc enim adiicitur, vt intelli-
 gatur alterum populum superiorẽ esse,
 non vt intelligatur alterũ non esse libe-
 rum. & ita quoque hanc clausulam; ma-
 iestatem comiter conseruare, in fœderi-
 bus adiici solitã interpretatur Cicero^c.
 & hoc quidem tertium fœderum genus
 duplex dici potest. aut enim initur causa
 defensionis tantũ; aut defensionis &
 offensionis, vt dicunt: id est, tam ad ar-
 cendum, quàm inferendum bellum. id-
 quẽ vel contra quoscunque, vt fœderati
 eosdem inimicos, amicosque habeant;
 vel cum quorundam exceptione. His
 addi possunt illa fœdera, quæ tantũ

^a l. nō dubito.
 DD. in l. si
 conueniunt. §.
 si nuda. D. de
 pig. act. Frac.
 Rspa cōcil. 55
 Socini, Nepes.
 concil. 6. p. 1.
^b in d. l. non
 dubito.

^c in orat. pro
 Cor. Balbo.

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commercij causâ ineûtur, vt liberè mercatores vltro citroque commeare possint, quæ etiâ cum hostibus esse possunt, fuit tamen Romanis constitutû, vt nunquam cum hoste armato conditionem foederis acciperent: neq; cum aliquibus pacato imperio vti solent, nisi omnia diuina & humana tradidissent, & præsidiû acceperint, aut denique societate aut foedere astricti essent. semper enim populus Romanus diligenter cauit, ne vi-

^a Dion. Hal.
lib. 2.

deretur hostiû metu imperata facere ^a. itaque Sp. Cassius cons. legatis Hernicorum pacē petentibus respondit, prius illis faciendâ, quæ victos & subiugatos deceret, atque ita demum petendam a-

^b Dion. Hal.
ant. Ro. lib. 3

micitiâ ^b. & T. Largius cons. Fidenatibus indutias petentibus, respondit, deponenda esse arma, portasque aperendas, atque tum demû impetraturos colloquium: alioquin nec pacem, nec indutias, nec quicquam humanum, modera-

^c Dion. Hal.
ant. Ro. lib. 1.

tumque sperandû eis a populo Roma.^c Sic quoque cum Pyrrhus, Albino cons. cum magna cæde fugato, magnis copiis aucto suo exercitu, admirans virtutem Romanorum, quod nullam mentionē pacis facerent, prior, licet victor, pacem peteret

peteret æquissimis conditionibus, liberationem captiuorum, & auxilium ad subigendam Italiã populo Romano offerens: pro his nihil aliud, quàm Tarentinis securitatem, sibi amicitiam postulans: ex sententiã App. Claudij Cæci viri amplissimi, responsum est, vti Pyrrhus Italia excederet, tumque si e resua videretur, de amicitia ac societate verba faceret: quoad verò in armis esset, populũ Romanum aduersus eum belligeraturum, etiam si mille Albinos pugna superasserat. Similiter Ætolis pacem petentibus, M. Fulvius conf. respondit, Ætolos, nisi inermes, de pace agentes non auditurum se: arma illis prius equosque omnes tradendos esse: deinde mille talentũ argenti P. R. dandũ ^b. Verminæ quoque Syphacis filij legatis, per quos petebat, vt rex sociusque, & amicus a senatu appellaretur, responsum est, pacem illi prius petendam a populo Rom. esse, quàm vt rex, sociusque, & amicus appellaretur ^c. Porro non semper foedere, sed etiam per sponfionem nonnunquã hæc conuentiones fieri solent. quid autẽ ^d inter hæc duo interfit*, indicant hæc T. » Liuij verba ^d: Consules profecti ad Pontium

a Plac. in vita Pyrrh. Val. Max. lib. 8, c. 13. Cic. de se. m. 1.

b Liuij l. 49

c Liuij l. 51

d lib. 7,

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tium in colloquium, cùm de foedere vi-
 ator agitaret, negarunt iniussu populi
 foedus fieri posse, nec sine fecialibus, cæ-
 rimoniamque alia solemni. itaque, non ut
 vulgò creditur, Claudiusq; scribit, foe-
 dere pax Caudina, sed per sponsionem
 facta est. quid enim sponsoribus in foe-
 dere opus esset, aut obsidibus: vbi preca-
 tione res transigitur? per quem populū
 fit, quo minus legibus dictis stetur, ut
 eum ita Iupiter feriat, quemadmodum a
 fecialibus porcus feriat. spondere
 consules, præfecti, legati, quæstores,
 tribuni militum, nominaque omnium,
 qui sponderunt, exstant: vbi si foedere
 res acta esset, præterquam duorum fe-
 cialium non exstarent: & propter neces-
 sariam foederis dilationem, obsides etiā
 dec. equites imperati, qui capite luerent,
 si pactis non staretur. Ceterum sicut
 summi principis est arma mouere, bellū
 gerere, exercitum cogere, & delectum
 habere^a: sic e contrario foedera, & indu-
 tias pacisci cum hoste, summi quoque
 imperij est: ut superiore capite ostendi-
 mus. itaque a ducibus belli*, citra prin-
 cipis, aut populi consensum, cuius no-
 mine & auspiciis bellum geritur, pax
 consti-

^a l. 3. D. ad l.
 l. vi. m. as. dixi
 supra de iusto
 bello.

constitui non potest. quod olim iure fe-
ciali, & postea lege Iulia de prouinciis,
& lege Cornelia Maiestatis fuit cautū^a. *a Cic. in Pifo.*
iniussu enim populi, aut citra senatus
auctoritatem (cuius potestas omnis in
principem est collata^b) nihil sanciri po- *b l. 1. D. de*
terat, quod populum teneret^c. Et qui- *constit. princ.*
dem, si in ciuilibus ac forensibus nego- *c Cic. pro*
tiis, procurator, qui vel generali mādato *Cor. Balb.*
ad actionē constituitur, transigendi de-
cidendi que negotij facultatem non ha-
bet^d: consequens est, cum qui bellige- *d l. mandato*
randi causa exercitui præpositus est, pa- *generali. l.*
cem cum hostibus faciēdo, muneris sui *procurator*
fines excedere. quod in re militari maxi- *tatorum. D.*
mè vitiosum semper habitum fuit^e. quā *de procurato.*
quidem ob causam, pacem Caudinam a *e l. 3. §. in*
T. Veturio, & Sp. Postumio, cum Sam- *bello. D. de re*
nitibus factam, & foedus a C. Mancino, *milit.*
cū Numantinis ictum, senatus ratum
non habuit: sicut nec Camillus dictator
pactionem illam, qua inter Sulpitium
quondam tribunum militum, & Bren-
num Gallorum regulum conuenerat, vt
Galli, acceptis mille pondo auri a Ro-
manis, obsidionem relinquerent, negās
eam pactionem ratam esse, quæ postquā
ipse dictator creatus esset, iniussu suo ab
inferio-

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a *Lucius lib. 4.* inferioris iuris magistratu facta esset^a.
 penes dictatorem enim summa potestas e-
 rat ^b. & Sallustius, inter Aulū exercitus
 Romani ducē, & Iugurthā Numidarum
 regem facta: Senatus, inquit, uti par erat,
 decrevit, suo, atq; populi iniussu, nullū
 potuisse foedus fieri. Ex quibus constat,
 nemini licere, iniussu principis, citra cri-
 mē læsæ maiestatis cū hoste pacisci: cū
 hoc sit summi principis ^c. qua potissimū
 ratione, Ludouicū, ducē Aurelianēsem,
 iure cæsum fuisse existimat Bodinus ^d:
 quòd scilicet iniussu regis Galliae foedus
 iniisset cum duce Lancastri. quare etiam
 Duareno, quem alij sequuntur ^e, assen-
 tiri non possum: qui hanc sententiam
 veram esse putat, in eo, cui ducendi tan-
 tum exercitus, regendiq; cura cōmissa
 est: nō autem in eo, cui plena liberaq; re-
 rerum omniū potestas est concessa: quē
 etiam ius pacem cum hoste faciendi ha-
 bere vult ^f. quod non admitto. Nam ea
 quæ sunt iuris publici, & regij, separatā
 habēt a iure privato causam ^g, & cū pri-
 uatis cōmunicari non possunt: ut supe-
 riore capite docuimus. vnde, quantum-
 cunq; plena, & libera duci rerum omniū
 potestas sit permessa, pacis tamē faciēdę,
 & cum

b *Pomp. de l.*
2. D. de orig.
iur.

c *l. cōmētio-*
nam. D. de
pac.
d *de rep. lib. 7*

e *in l. 1. cō-*
ventionum.

f *argumento*
l. procurator
eius generali-
ter. D. de pro-
curatorib. et l.
2. C. de offic.
eius qui vicē
alt. et ibi Bar.
g *in l. 1. §.*
his quibus. D.
de leg. 3.
l. 1. §. 1. D.
de iust. & iur.
l. cōventio-
nē. D. de pac.
Pulchrē Co-
man. lib. 5. c. 1

& cum hoste facultatē non intelligi cō-
cessam arbitror. nā ea, quæ sunt iuris re-
gij, nō veniūt sub quibuscunq; generali-
bus verbis: sed demū si specialiter, & ex-
pressè concedantur^a. & quidē hoc casu,
imperatorī vel duci sancientiē pacis po-
testate expressè cōcessa: q̄ sit extra ordi-
nem: nec mandatum egredi poterit, nec
alteri mādare: quia non habet eam iure
magistratus & imperij, sed nudam legis
actionem: ideoq; nihil pro suo imperio
agit, vt inquit Iulianus^b, sed pro eo, cu-
ius mandatum accepit. nam vt iam sæpe
diximus, ius belli & pacis apud summū
principem residet, & in alium transferri
non potest. sicque nimirū consules Ro-
mani, penes quos erat summa auctori-
tas, exercitu accepto, belli quidē gerēdi
potestatem habuerunt: vtq; pro suo ar-
bitrio lacefferent, aut inuaderent hostē,
ac militarem disciplinam sua voluntate
regerēt; bellum autē indicere, aut finire,
nisi ex senatus auctoritate, & iussu po-
puli non potuerūt. itaq; inquit Liuius^c,
decreuit senatus, iubente populo, vt P.
Scipio, ex decē legatorum sentētia, pa-
cem cū populo Carthaginiēsi, quibus le-
gibusei videretur, faceret: & T. Quintio
liberum

^a text. elegās
in cap. quod
translationē;
de off. legat.
& in l. i. &
ibi DD. D. de
off. eius cui
manda. est iu-
risd. & in c.
vnt. quæ sint
Reg. Molm. in
cōsuetud. Pa-
risien. tit. 2.
§. i. gloss. 5.
facit text. in l.
ne procurato-
res. D. de iur.
fis.
^b in l. et si præ-
tor. D. de off.
eius cui mad.
est iurisdic.

^c lib. 40.

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liberum arbitriū pacis ac belli cum Phil-
 ippo permissum est ^a. itē Hetruscis pax
 data est, ijs legibus, quæ L. Æmilio cons.
 viderentur ^b optimæ : & Æquis, lex arbi-
 trio Q. Fabij consulis ^b. idque sæpius a
 Romanis factum fuisse legimus: sciebāt
 enim, neminem imperatore verius æsti-
 mare posse, qua mente pax peteretur, &
 quo statu res essent. Enimvero de indu-
 tiis* idē quod de pace, plerisque respon- ⁶
 dendum placuit ^c: licet contrarium sen-
 serit Bartol. nam & hic a præscripto mā-
 dati, sicut in superiore casu, receditur:
 quandoquidē in ciuilibus negotiis, pro-
 curatori tempus ad soluendum dare, nō
 minus quàm transigere cum aduersario
 interdictum sit ^d. quod equidē admitto,
 si de longi tēporis indutiis agatur, quæ
 non tam cessationem pugnæ cōcedere,
 quàm bello finem imponere videntur:
 quod summi imperij est. ideoque istius-
 modi indutias nunquam a consulibus,
 aliisque Romanorū imperatoribus; sed
 a senatu, populoque Romano concessas
 fuisse legimus. itaq; Samnites victi, pro
 fœdere, quod petebant, biennij indutias
 impetrarunt ^e. Similiter Veientibus,
 Volturniensibus, Æquis, aliisque quam-
 plurimis,

^a L. 1. vel. 42

^b Dion. Hal.
antiqu. Romæ.
lib. 9.

^c ad l. con-
ditionem. D.
de pact.

^d l. qui Ro-
mæ. §. Calli-
machus. D. de
verbor. oblig.
Dumarsius in
d. l. connec-
tione.

^e Livius l. 9.

plurimis, in annos aliquot a senatu, & populo indutię datę sunt^a. illas verò indutias, quę in breue, & in præsens tēpus sunt, ne hostes inuicem se laceffant, (de quibus Paulus loquitur^b) cū bello finem non imponant (nam bellū manet; pugna cessat^c) duces cum hoste facere posse, existimo: præsertim si temporis ratio, vel aliqua necessitas, vel utilitas id fieri suadet. imperio enim duci delato, pro suo arbitrio laceffere, & inuadere hostem potest, & omnia ea, quę ad bellum spectant administrare. solent itaque Romani duces, hostibus pacem postulantibus, propria auctoritate indutias concedere: dum Romam legati ad pacē petendam mitterentur. Itaque Scipio Carthaginensibus in tres menses indutias cōcessit: vt interim per legatos Romę de pace agerent^d. Libo quoque, & Bibulus Pompeianarum partium, qui cum classe erāt ad Oricum, cū summis angustiis rerum necessariarum premerentur, & velle se de maximis rebus cum Cæsare loqui dicerent, vt de compositione acturi viderētur: interim indutias à M. Acilio & Statio Murco, legatis Cæsaris (quorum alter oppidi muris, alter

^a *Linus l. 2. 4. 7. 9. & 10.*

^b *in l. postellimum. D. de captiu.*

^c *Gellius l. 1. cap. 25.*

^d *Linus l. 40*

L præ-

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præidiis terrestribus præerat) impetrarunt. magnum enim, quod adferebant, videbatur, & Cæsarem id summè sciebāt cupere^a. Leges quoque pacis ipsi duces dicere solent: quæ si acciperentur ab hostibus, indutias concedebant, dum de pace legatis suis Romā missis, in senatu agerent. vt Scipio cum Carthaginien-
^a *Cæsar de bel. ciu. lib. 3.*
^b *Linus l. 40.* bus secundò fecit^b: eodemque auctore, L. Scipio frater, Antiocho deuicto conditiones pacis tulit, permisitque vt legatos de pace Romā mitteret^c. & T. Quintus Nabidi, lacedæmoniorum tyranno, sex mensium indutias dedit, vt interim cōditiones pacis, quas illi præscripserat,
^c *Linus l. 47.* a senatu confirmarentur^d. & idē Quintus, Philippo indutiis in duos menses datis, vt de conditionibus pacis, de quibus inter ipsos actum erat, Romam legatos mitteret, permisit^e. soletq; senatus plerunque, consilio ducis, pacem ab hostibus petitam, dare vel negare, vt modò diximus. alij verò populi non tantam facultatem suis ducibus concesserunt. Legimus itaque, cū inter Agidem lacedæmoniorum regem, & Trasylulū, Alciphronemque Argiuorum duces pactę essent quattuor mēsiū indutię, factum
^d *Linus l. 44.*
^e *Linus l. 42.* fuisse,

fuisse, auctore Alcibiade, vt eas Argiui
 ratas non haberent, & Lacedæmonios
 quoque eas irritas fecisse: quoseam ob
 causam adeo in regem suum indignatos
 fuisse scribit Thucydides, vt lege lata,
 duodecim consiliarios ei adhibuerint,
 sine quorum consilio, neque indutias,
 neque quodcūque fœdus cum hostibus
 ferire possêt. reges autem Lacedæmo-
 niorum, nullum imperium habuisse, ne-
 que fuisse sui arbitrij, satis constat^a. Sed
 cum princeps, cui populus omne impe-
 rium in se potestatemque concessit^b, de
 negotiis ad remp. spectantibus, rectè at-
 que vtiliter paciscatur, siue pacem, siue
 aliud quodcunque fœdus cum hostibus
 faciat^c: quærūt iuris interpretes, an pa-
 cem cum hostibus faciēdo, priuatorum
 7 damna* & iniurias, ob causam belli ac-
 ceptas, possit remittere, veletiam bona
 ciuium hostibus concedere^d. & quidem
 quod ad res bello captas attinet, dubiū
 nō est. cum etiam sine vlla principis pa-
 ctione, iure belli, factæ sint hostium. idē-
 que dicendum est de aliis damnis, & in-
 iuriis iure belli illatis. quod ad alia verò,
 quæ non sunt hostibus acquisita, vel ab
 iniustis hostibus ablata: si aliter cōmuni

^a Dion. Hal.
 lib. 2. B. d. m.
 in meth. hist.
 cap. 6.
^b l. 1. D. de
 const. princip.

^c l. conuictio-
 num. D. de
 pact.

^d in d. l. con-
 uentionum. &
 in l. bene a.
 Zenone. C. de
 quadr. præ-
 script. Ferdin.
 Vazq. illust.
 quest. lib. 1.
 cap. 4.

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omnium salutis consuli non possit, etiam illa ciuibus adimi, & hostibus concedi poterunt. communis enim utilitas singulorum commodo præferri debet^a. & ut ait Plinius^b, oportet priuatis utilitatibus publicas, mortalibus æternas anteferre. Quò spectat quod Tacitus ait: Omne magnum exemplum habere aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos utilitate publica rependitur. Itaque Trafybulus, cum ciuitatē Atheniensem triginta tyrannorum sequitia liberasset, plebiscitum interposuit, ne qua præteritarum rerum mentio fieret: quæ malorum obliuio, ἀμνηστία ab ipsis vocitata, concussam & labentem ciuitatis statum, in pristinum habitum reuocauit^c. quod & Cicero aliquando Romæ, publicæ quieti consulere volens, sequendū esse censuit^d. Sed hoc tum maximè necessarium esse constat, cum occupata per iniuriā bona, longo temporis spatio possessa sunt: quæ si a possessoribus auferantur, restituanturque dominis, multa concuti, perturbarique sit necesse. ut in specie non absimili, cōsultusa Plinio Traianus imper. prudentissimè rescripsit^e. alioqui certè nisi ex maxima necessitate, & pro magno reipub.

^a Authent. que res, C. com. de leg. l. actione. §. Labeo. D. pro socio, L. vnic. §. penul. C. de caduc. tollen. ^b epist. lib. 7.

^c Val. Max. lib. 4. cap. 1.

^d Philipp. 1.

^e lib. 10. e. pist. Plinij.

reipubl. bono non licet principi bona
 ciuium ipsis adimere: quod iuri naturali
 & diuino repugnat^a. Etenim quamuis
 8 princeps^{*} legibus solutus sit^b: lege tamē
 naturæ, vt Pyndarus dicebat, omnes re-
 ges, & omnes principes tenentur: & vt
 maximè larga sit principis potestas, ta-
 men ad ea quæ iniusta sunt, non extendi-
 tur. eoq; spectat, quod Plinius ad Traia-
 num scribit^c: Vt, inquit, felicitatis est,
 posse quantum velis, sic magnitudinis,
 velle quātum possis. vnde rescripta prin-
 cipum ita intelligi debēt, vt sine incom-
 modo alterius procedant^d. & non valēt
 illa rescripta, quæ ius alterius tollunt^e.
 Qua ratione donatio ducatus Mediola-
 nensis ab imperatore Maximiliano, Lu-
 douico XII. Gallorum regi facta, causa
 belli fuit, propter ius quod Sfortiæ in
 eundem ducatum prætendebant: quod
 imperator non intelligitur voluisse do-
 nare, nec potuit^f. quamuis enim reges
 9 dicantur domini omnium^{*}, hoc quoad
 maiestatem, & imperium debet intelligi,
 non quoad proprietatem & possessio-
 nem, quæ est singulorum^g. quod elegā-
 ter Seneca expressit^h, cū ait: Ad reges
 potestas omnium pertinet; ad singulos

^a l. n. sm hoc
 iure. D. de
 cond. indeb. l.
 si priuatus.
 D. qui et a
 quib.
 b l. princeps.
 D. de legibus.

^c in Panegy.

^d l. 2. §. si
 quis a princi-
 pe. D. ne quid
 in loc. publ. l.
 rescripta. C.
 de precib. imp.
 offe.
^e l. 2. C. de
 precib. imp.
 offer.

^f refert Bo-
 din. de rep. l. 1.
 cap. 9.

^g l. in rem a-
 ctio. D. de rei
 vend. et toto
 tit. D. de acq.
 rer. d. m.
^h lib. 7. c. 4.
 et §. d. benef.

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proprietas : & paulo post; Omnia rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio : omnia sunt in imperio Cæsaris, in patrimonio propria. Quare Aratum Sicyonium iure laudatum fuisse refert Cicero^a : qui cum oppresso Niocle tyranno patriam liberasset: quæ quinquaginta annis a tyrannis tenebatur, & plurimos exules restituisset, quorum bona alij possederant, & tam longo spatio multa hereditatibus, multa emptionibus, multa dotibus detineri, atque sine iniuria neque possessoribus adimi, neq; his non satisfieri, quorum illa fuerant videret: grandi pecunia a rege Ptolomæo iuuatus, adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim principes, cum quibus causas cognouit, & eorum qui aliena detinebant, & eorum qui sua amiserant : perfecitque æstimandis possessionibus, ut persuaderet aliis, ut pecuniâ accipere mallent & possessoribus cederent; aliis ut cōmodius putarent, numerari sibi quod tanti esset, quàm suum recuperare. itaq; perfectum est, ut omnes constituta concordia, sine querela decederent. Similiter Brutus & Cassius, post necem Cæsaris (quâdoquidem acta eius rata haberet rep. visum erat) veteribus posses-

possessoribus, quibus Sylla & Cæsar bel-
lis ciuilibus agros ademerāt, saltem pre-
cium ex publica pecunia numerari de-
bere censebant: quo & illis satisfactum,
& aliis securior esset possessio^a. Porro
10 queritur an mortuo principe*, cum quo
foedus ictū est, maneat foedus cum prin-
cipe qui successit. & quidem, quamuis
quoad alios contractus, distinguendum
videatur: successerit ne tanquam heres,
qui ex facto defuncti tenetur^b: an verò
ex statuto, vel per electionem, qui factū
defuncti non præstat: personalis enim
obligatio nō manet ad successorem, nisi
hereditariū^c: etiam si quis expressè pro-
miserit pro se, & successoribus suis^d. ta-
men quoad foedera, aliāque conuentio-
nes publicas, quæ non nomine proprio,
sed reip. ineuntur (quæ æquè repræsen-
tatur per successores, vt per eos qui sunt
hodie^e) principem omnino ex cōtractu
defuncti teneri dicendum est, & foedera-
tos foedere astrictos manere^f. Non itaq;
fuit legitima causa rebellandi Veienti-
bus, & Fidenatibus, regnante Tullo Ho-
stilio, neque Latinis, regnāte Tarquinio
Prisco, qui post Anci obitū se religione
foederis solutos existimabāt: neque He-

^a Appian. de
bell. ciuili, i. 2.

^b l. cū a ma-
tre. C. de rei
vendic.

^c l. ult. §. ult.
D. de contr. a.
empt. l. 1. §. si
heres D. ad S.
C. Treb. l. ult.

^d l. stipulatio
ij. a. D. de
verbor. oblig.

^e l. propone-
batur. D. de
iudi.

^f c. 1. de pro-
bat. & ibi
DD. c. quia

suxta. 16. q. 2.
Iason & alij
in l. 1. col. 3.

D. de consti-
t. princ. not. 113
c. v. l. ne prælo-
vices suas.

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truscis, qui defuncto Tarquinio Prisco, cuius imperio se submiserant, nolebant amplius stare conditionibus foederis^a.

^a Dion. Hal.

ant. Rom. l. 3.

¶ 4.

& iure Romani Perseo bellū intulerunt, qui legatis ipsorū, foedus cum Philippo patre ictum, ad se nihil pertinere respō-

^b Livius l. 42

dit^b. Si tamē per istiusmodi foedus resp. enormiter sit læsa, successorē non teneri

^c Cyn. &

DD. in l. di-

gna vox. C.

de const. prin.

cap. Bald. in c.

1. de nat. feud.

d. c. 1. de rer.

permutat. c.

non liceat. 1.

12. qu. 1. latē

104. Papon.

in: rest. lib. 5

tit. 10.

c. c. innot. ut

de elect.

¶ dixi 3. c. 5.

plerisque visum est^c. quod admitto, si hac conventionē quid ex iis, quæ regiæ coronæ sunt annexa, sit alienatum, citra populi vel ordinum consensum, qui ad hoc requiritur^d: vel si maiestas principis sit imminuta, quod in præiudicium defuncti fieri non potuit^e. & ne ab initio quidem istiusmodi conventiones vllō modo subsistere potuerunt^f. Ex his cō-

stat, omnium firmissima esse illa foedera^a, quæ inter vtrumque regem, & vtrumq;

populum hinc inde ineūtur. quò spectat quod Hernici, legatis Romanorum ex-

postulantibus de iniuriis & latrociniiis, responderunt, sibi nunquam foedus in-

tercessisse cum Rom. populo: quod autē cum rege ictum esset Tarquinio, iam fi-

nitū existimare, morte ipsius & exilio^g. Itaq; Eduardo eius nominis quarto regi

Angliæ, regno pulso, cū ex foedere au-

xilium

^g Dion. Hal.

lib. 8.

xilium regis Galliæ imploraret, respon-
sum fuit, antiquo foedere vtrumque re-
gem, & vtrumque populum vtrinque
obstrictos esse: atque ita pulso Eduardo,
foedus manere cum populo, & rege qui
regnabatur. Latini verò, cum Tarquinij
in exilium acti Romanis bellum inferrent,
vtrisque auxilia negauerunt, quod reli-
gione vetarentur, tam contra Tarqui-
nios, quàm cōtra Romanos bellum ge-
rere: quandoquidem ex æquo vtrisque
foedere iuncti essent b.

a refert Bo-
din. de rep. l. 1
c. 7.

b Dion. Hist.
lib. 5.

DE INSIDIIS ET FRAUDE
HOSTILI.

- 1 *Ex insidiis pugnare licet.*
- 2 *Bonus dolus quis.*
- 3 *Stratagemata imperatori laudem pariuñt.*
- 4 *Romani veteres omnes fraudes aspernati sunt.*
- 5 *Veteres nonnunquam sola opinione syn-
cera fidei plus profecere, quàm armis.*

CAP. OCTAVVM.

CVM quis bellum suscepit, inquit
D. Augustinus c, vtrum apertè pu-
1 gnetur; an ex insidiis*, ad iustitiam nihil
2 attinet: & bonum dolum* (quod pro so-

e in c. Domi-
nus noster. 23
quaest. 2.

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lertia accipiebant veteres) dicit esse Vl-
pianus, cum quis aduersus hostem, la-
tronemue quid machinatur^a. itaq; op-
timus imperator Lyfander dicebat, vbi
leonina pellis deficeret, vulpinam esse
assluendam^b. & poetæ finxerunt, Hercu-
lem Nemeæ leonis pellem pro armis
habuisse, & sagittas tinctas felle & san-
guine Hydræ Lernææ. quo indicant bo-
num imperatorem calliditatem simul
cum fortitudine coniungere debere: eo-
que spectat illud Virgilianum:

Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat.

Quæ sententia vera est, quatenus fides
non violetur^c. neque enim Dionysio
tyranno similes esse debemus, qui dice-
bat pueros talis, viros iureiurando fal-
lendos esse^d: aut Persas imitari, quibus
fides dictis factisque nulla erat, nisi qua-
tenus expediret^e. alioqui verò & Iosue
hostibus suis, ipso auctore Deo, insidias
struxisse legitur^f. & Pittaci Mitylenei
(qui vnus ex septē sapientibus fuit) stra-
tagema laudatur, qui cum Phrynone A-
theniensem duce certaturus, cui in cassi-
de piscis imaginūcula erat, rete in stadium
derulit, & exclamans se piscē petere, eum
reti inuoluit, sicque se extricare nescien-
tem,

^a in l. i. §.
non fuit. D. de
dolo.

^b Plut. in A-
lexph.

^c c. noli. 23.
qu. 1.

^d Plut. de for.
vel virt.

^e Iustini. l. 12.

^f Iosue 8.

tem, confecit. Rectè itaq; Agesilaus dicebat, impium quidem esse fidem datam violare, hostes autem decipere, non iustum modò esse, sed suaue etiam, & lucrosum ^a. Cambyfes verò a Cyro apud <sup>a Plut. in A-
poph. -</sup> Xenophontem interrogatus, qua potissimum ratione vincendum esset, respondit, si victoria cupitur, quacunque arte capiendi sunt hostes, occultis insidiis, dolo, fraudeque fallendi, & furto & rapinis exhaustiendi. sic opportunum aliquando mendacium imperatoris, victoriam dedit: vt illud Valerij Leuini, qui exclamauit Pyrrhum a se interemptum esse, cum militis cuiusdam cede gladium cruentum haberet: quo factum est, vt Epirote consternati, in castra quam primùm pauidi ac flentes se reciperent. Similiter T. Quintius cons. cum Volscis pugnās, gradum referentibus suis, salubri mendacio fugere hostes a cornu altero clauitans, concitauit aciem & impetu facto, dum se putat vincere, vicere ^b. Quæ quidem stratagemata * maximā imperatori laudem & gloriam dare solent. Hac autē cauendi & fallendi arte, Philippus Macedo insignis habitus fuit: gaudebat etenim longè magis, decepto per dolum hoste,

^b Linus l. 2.

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hoste, quàm aperto Marte superato : vt
qui diceret, victoriam per dolum & cal-
liditatem sine suorum clade semper esse,
illam autem , quæ collatis signis fieret,
nunquam sine cruore. Poeni quoque,
inter quos Annibal clarus exstitit , &
Græci plurimum hisce calliditatis & fal-
lendi artibus gloriati sunt. quod impro-
bandum non esset, nisi etiam fidem tam
facile violassent. at veteres illi Romani* 4
omnes has fraudes & fallacias aspernati
sunt, & non nisi vera virtute, & aperta vi,
Romanisquæ artibus, vt illi dicebāt, vin-
cere voluerunt. sed posterioribus tem-
poribus Romani, spreta hac maiorum
suorum sententia, fallendi, decipiendiq;
artibus sibi , rei quæ publicæ consulere
potius habuerunt. itaque Q. Martius, &
A. Atilius, qui legati ad Persen Mace-
donum regem missi erant, reuersi, nulla
re magis in senatu gloriati sunt, quàm
decepto per indutias, & spe pacis hoste:
adeo enim apparatibus belli fuisse in-
structum, ipsis nulla parata re, vt omnia
oportuna loca præoccupari ante ab eo
potuerint, quàm exercitus in Græciam
traijceretur : spatio autem indutiarum
sumpto, vêturum illum nihilo paratio-
re ma:

rem : Romanos omnibus instructiores
rebus coepturos bellum. hæc, vt refert
Liuius^a, vti summa ratione acta, magna
pars senatus approbabat. veteres autem,
quibus hæc noua minus placebant sa-
pientia moris antiqui memores, nega-
bant se in ea legatione romanas agnos-
cere artes : non per insidias, & nocturna
prælia, nec simulatam fugam, improui-
sosque in incautum hostem reditus, nec
vt astu magis quàm verà virtute gloria-
rentur, bella maiores gessisse : indicare
prius, quàm gerere solitos bella : denun-
ciare etiam : interdum locum finire, in
quo dimicaturi essent. eadem fide indi-
catum Pyrrho medicum vitæ eius insi-
diantem : eadem Faliscis vinctum tradi-
tum proditorem filiorum regis. hæc Ro-
mana esse, non versutiarum Punicarum,
neque calliditatis Græcæ, apud quos fal-
lere hostem, quàm vi superare, gloriosius
fuit. interdum in præsens tempus plus
profici dolo, quàm virtute, sed eius de-
mum animum in perpetuum vinci, cui
confessio expressa esset, se neque arte,
neque casu, sed collatis cominus viribus,
iusto ac pio bello esse superatos. Hæc, vt
inquit Liuius, seniores, quorū sententia
accepta

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accepta non fuit. Legimus tamē veteres illos*, nonnūquam sola opinione huius veræ virtutis, & synceræ fidei, plus profecisse, quàm inuictis Romanorum armis. idque in primis probatur exemplo Camilli: nam cū Faliscos obsideret, qui alioqui diuturnus videbatur futurus labor, tradēdo ludimagistrum, principum Faliscorum pueros prodentem, quod se non nisi Romanis artibus, virtute, opere, armis, velle vincere diceret: ita fides Romana, vt refert Liuius^a, & iusticia imperatoris, in foro & curia apud Faliscos celebrata fuit, vt consensu omnium, legati ad Camillum in castra, atque inde permissu Camilli Romā ad senatum, qui dederent Faliscos, profecti sint: qui in senatum introducti, inter cetera, hæc verba protulisse traduntur. Euentu huius belli, duo salutaria exempla humano generi prodita sunt: Vos fidem in bello, quàm præsentem victoriā maluistis; nos fide prouocati, victoriā vtrò detulimus. Sic quoque Fabritius pari virtutis specie, Pyrrhum, qui armis superari non poterat, vicit, prodens illi medicum vitæ eius insidiantem: cumq; ei Pyrrhus captiuos gratis redderet, nō accepit

a lib. 3.

accepit ea cōditione, sed totidem captiuos reddidit, ne mercedem beneficij accipere videretur, non gratia aliqua in Pyrrhum collati, sed ne putarentur Romani dolo interficere quenquam, tanquā aperto Marte vincere non valentes. idque eius factum a senatu laudatū fuit, qui magnum dedecus & flagitium iudicabant, qui cum laudis certamen fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatū^a. cui simile est, quod Dauid cum Saule bellum gerens, cum potuisset illū semel, & iterum ex improviso nullo negotio e medio tollere, noluit, & iurauit, nisi fortē in prælio descendens Saul periret, aut dominus illum percuteret, se non extensurum manum in christum Domini^b. Porro Q. Seruilio Cæpioni vitio datum fuit, quod Viriatum per fraudem & insidias & domesticos percussores sustulisset, quare dicebatur non tam victoriam meruisse, quā emissē^c. Fabius tamen Maximus summus imperator habitus fuit, quod non quidem dolo ageret, sed facili celaret, taceret, dissimularet, insidiaretur, præriperet hostium consilia^d.

^a Plut. in Alc.
popl. Cicero
off. lib. 3.

^b Reg. 1. c. 26

^c Val. Max.
lib. 9. cap. 7.
L. Flor. lib. 2.
c. 17.

^d Cicero. offic.
lib. 1.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.
DE IVRE LEGATORVM.

- 1 *Legati inuiolabiles.*
- 2 *Legatum hostium pulsans dedi hostibus solet.*
- 3 *Legati legationis munus excedere non possunt.*
- 4 *Ius legatorum hostibus tantum conuenit.*
- 5 *Rebellis, etiam si munere legationis fungatur, non est inuiolabilis.*
- 6 *Ad rebelles legatos mittere, maiestati principis non conuenit.*
- 7 *In legatis spectanda prudentia & dignitas.*
- 8 *Nonnunquam mulieribus legationes commissa.*

CAPVT NONVM.

Legati apud * omnes gentes semper tuti, & inuiolabiles fuerunt, quod iure gentium inductum est^a: & a Romanis sancti dicti, a sagminibus, quæ legati populi Romani ferre solent: sicut legati Græcorum ferebant ea, quæ *κρυβηλα* vocantur, vt refert Marcianus^b. Itaque qui legatum hostium pulsaſſet *, aut iniuria² affeciſſet, dedi hostibus solet^c: quod & iure feciali cautum fuiſſe diximus. Sic M. Æmilio Lepido, C. Flaminio conſſ. L. Minucius Myrtibus, & L. Manlius, quod

^a l. ult. D. de legatio. c. i. v. gentiū. dist. 1.

^b in l. sanctū. D. de rer. dist. 1.

^c d. i. ult. D. de legatio.

quòd Carthaginienſium legatis manus
 intulerant, iuſſu M. Claudij pr.vrbis, per
 feciales, traditi ſunt legatis, & Carthagi-
 nem auecti ^a. & Q. Fabius & Cn. Apro- ^a *Liuius l. 38*
 nius Ædilitij, quòd legatos, ab vrbe A-
 pollonia, Romam miſſos, orta conten-
 tione, pulſaſſent, continuò per feciales
 dediti ſunt ^b. & quidem niſi dederentur, ^b *Val. Max.*
 qui legatos violaſſent, vel ſi publico cõ- ^{lib. 6. c. 6.}
 ſilio id factum eſſet, bellum legitimè in-
 ferri ſolet. Itaq; Fidenatibus atrox bel-
 lum illatum a Romanis, quòd legatos
 eorum interfeciſſent, iuſſu Tolumnij
 regis Veientium, ad quem defecerant ^c: ^c *Liuius l. 4.*
 & Illyricis ob legatos ſecuri percuſſos ^d. ^d *l. Florus. l.*
 Sed & Dauid intulit bellum regi Am- ^{2. cap. 5.}
 monitarũ, propter deriſos legatos ſuos ^e. ^e *Reg. 2. c. 20*
 iniuria enim facta legatis, cenſetur facta
 principi vel reipub. cuius legatione fun-
 guntur ^f. Sed etſi bello ſubito exorto, ^f *c. accuſatio.*
 qui apud vtrumque populum inueniũ- ^{in ſin. 2. q. 7.}
 tur, ex hoſtibus ſerui efficiantur, licet in ^{et Reg. 2. c. 10}
 pace venerint ^g: tamen legatos liberos ^g *l. in bello. 6*
 manere, Pomponius reſpondit: idque ^{1. D. de capti.}
 iuri gentium conuenire ^h. Et hæc certè ^h *in l. ult. D.*
 ſumma ratione legatis tributa ſunt: vt ^{de legation,}
 eſſent, qui vltrò citroque, de cõditioni-
 bus pacis, foederis, indutiarum, tutò a-
 gere

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gere possent: qui sæpe paruo labore, maximas controuersias tollūt. Itaque Romani, cū belli pacisque iura, tum potissimū ius legatorum inuiolabile esse voluerunt: vsque adeò, vt Scipio Aphricanus, cū onustā multis, & illustribus viris Carthaginiensium nauem, in suam potestatem redegisset, inuiolatam eam dimiserit: quia se legatos ad eum missos dicebant: quāuis manifestum esset, illos vitandi periculi gratia, falsum legationis nomen amplexos fuisse: sed maluit Scipio Romani imperatoris potius deceptam fidem, quā frustra imploratam iudicari^a. Itē cū Tarquinij, iam regno pulsi, Romā legati venissent, res ablatas repetitum, occulteque cum nobilibus adolescentibus, de rege reducendo tractarent: re detecta, quanquam visi essent commisisse, vt hostium loco haberētūr, valuit tamen, vt ait Liuius^b, ius gētium. Similiter cū Volsci misissent aliquos exploratores, specie legatorum in castra Romanorum, qui explorarent eorū numerum, & apparatus belli: quamuis conuictos & cōfessos, tamen Postumius dictator, a concitata ad feriendum multitudine, incolumes seruauit, inani legationis

^a Vel. Max.
lib. 6. c. 6.

^b lib. 2.

tionis nomini tantum tribuens: ne scilicet daretur hostibus aliquis honestus belli prætextus, simulaturis legatos violatos, contra ius gentium ^a. quo tamen ^{a Dion. Hal. art. Ro. lib. 6} exemplo non putarem legatos similia molientes, omnino iure tutos esse, cum
 3 legati nihil extra legationis munus ^{*} agere possint ^b. Iure itaq; Galli, cum Clusinos inuasissent, vidissentque Fabios legatos Romanorum (qui ad eos missi erant, ut peterent ne Clusinos socios offenderent) post exequutam legationem, arreptis armis contra ius gentium, cum Clusinis in acie versantes, missis Romam legatis suis, questum iniurias, postulatumque, ut pro iure gentium violato, Fabij dederentur: cum non impetrassent; imo de quorum poena agebatur, tribunos militum in sequentem annum creatos audirent: flagrantibus ira, ob honorem ultro habitum violatoribus iuris humani, elusamque legationem: omissis Clusinis, Romam rectam perrexerunt, & Romanis acie ad Alliam fuis, urbem ceperunt & deuastarunt. que calamitas, ut inquit Liuius ^c, Romanis superuenit, ob violatum ^{c lib. 51} ius gentium. Porro sciendum est, hoc
 4 ius legatorum ^{*}, quemadmodum & reli-

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qua iura belli, hostibus tantum conuenire, non etiam latronibus, rebellibus, aliisque, qui hostium numero non continentur^a. qua de re alio loco diximus supra^b. vnde Cicero^c reprehendit, quod tantum tributum esset legato Antonij, cui portas vrbis patere ius non erat: & eidem reditum ad Antonium prohiberi debere censebat. Iure quoque Theodosius imperator, legatum tyranni cuiusdā sibi rebellis, in carcerem coniecit: & Carolus V. imper. legatos ducis Mediolanensis sibi subditi, & bellum machinantis carcere cōclusit^d. sed nec ciues, nec subditi*, qui malo consilio, & proditoris animo apud hostes sunt, quos hostiū loco haberi voluit Paulus^e: etiamsi munere legationis fungantur, iure gētium tuti erunt. quamuis enim loco hostium habeantur, non tamen iure, quo hostes vtuntur, vt alibi ostendimus^f. sunt enim rebelles, & iniusti hostes, neque se vlla ratione, principis sui iurisdictioni, & potestati, quæ vbique locorum subditos tenet, eximere possunt^g. non magis, quā Barbarius Philippus seruus, qui cum Romæ prætor factus esset^h, & a domino, qui eum persequabatur, in seruitutem

a l. hostes. D.
de capri. l. ho-
stes. D. de ver.
signif.
b c. 2. & 6.
c Philipp. 8.

d refert Bo-
din. de rep. l. 1
c. 6.

e in l. postli-
manum. §.
transfug. 2. D.
de capris.

f i. de bello
iusto, et de fi-
de hostis ser-
uenda.

g l. ult. D. de
decret. ab ord.
fac. l. merca-
tores. C. de
commer. c. ut
armu. armu. de
constit. in 6.
h l. 2. D. de
off. præ.

ritem vindicaretur, precio se redemit:
 vt ex Suida refert Bodinus^a, qua ratione a lib. 1. cap. 6
 etiam iure cæsi videntur, a Cæsarianis,
 Rangonus & Fregosa, Caroli v. imper.
 subditi, legati regis Galliæ ad Turcam:
 quamuis iniussu Cæsaris id factum sit.
 6 Ad rebelles* verò legatos mittere, maie-
 stati principis nullo modo cōuenit, ita-
 que Cicero restitit, quantum potuit, ne
 legati mitteretur ad Antonium, reipub.
 bellum inferentem. non enim verbis ro-
 gandum, sed cogendum armis: quòd nō
 cum hoste, sed cum ciue res esset ^b. & b Philipp. 5.
dixi se pra c. 2
et 6.
 quidē Deus ipse adeo detestatus est re-
 belles, & schismaticos, vt cū homo
 Dei missus esset ad Hieroboam (ad quē
 decem tribus Israël relicto rege suo de-
 fecerant) qui ei peccata sua exprobraret;
 panem apud illos edere, & aquā bibere
 vetaretur. & cū non custodisset, & cō-
 tra præceptū domini prandisset, ultione
 diuina, in reditu a leone necatus fuerit ^c. c Reg. 13. e.
denique. 7. 9.
1.
 neque solū indignū est maiestati prin-
 cipis, legatos ad subditos rebelles mit-
 tere, sed etiam minimè tutum est. non e-
 nim sperandum est. iura gentium sancta
 fore apud eos, qui iura diuina & huma-
 7 na contemnunt. Ceterum in legatis*

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maximè spectanda est prudētia & dignitas. Carthaginienses enim cū Romam de pace legatos misissent, non impetrauerunt: quōd iuuenes, & nullius dignitatis legati missi essent, & qui per ætatē non meminisse se dicerent, ea quæ superioribus foederibus acta essent: qua de causā etiā suspecti habiti, & punica fraude electi putabātur: qui veterem pacem repeterent, cuius ipsi non meminissent. tandem verò, cū iam maximè attritis rebus Carthaginiensium, Hannonem Magnum & Asdrubalem Hædum, aliosque ætate dignitateque conspectos ad pacem petendam Romā mitterent: tum demū Carthaginienses verè, & ex animo de pace agere dixerunt Romani, quare & pacem dederunt^a. Scitum quoque illud Catonis, de legatis Romanorū missis ad componēdam pacem inter Nicomedem & Prusiam: quorum vnus saxo quondam in caput percussus, foedas cicatrices præferibat: alius laborabat pedibus: tertius vsque ad stultitiā simplex habebatur: ita vt Cato in illam legationem cauillaretur, eam nec mentem habere, nec pedes, nec caput^b. In legato quoque nōnunquam prodest grauitas, & rei-

^a *Linus l. 30*
Appia. de bel.
punic.

^b *Appia. de*
bell. Misbrid.

& reipub. causa seueritas: exemplo C. Popilij: cui cū Antiochus veniēti dextram porrigeret, tabellae ei Popilius S. C. (quo iubebatur, vt rex bello, quo Ptolemæum laceſſebat, abſtineret) continentes tradidit. quibus perlectis, cū ſe cum amicis conſultaturum, quid faciendum ſibi eſſet, Antiochus diceret: Popilius, pro cetera aſperitate animi, virga, quam in manu habebat, circumſcripſit regem, ac, Priuſquam hinc decedas (inquit) redde reſponſum ſenatu, quod feram. quo tam violento imperio obſtupefactus rex, cū parumper hæſiſſet, faciam (inquit) quod cenſet ſenatus: ac tum demum Popilius dextram regi, tanquam ſocio atque amico porrexit^a. Nonnunquam verò etiam mulieribus*, cum maximo fructu & reipublicæ vtilitate, legationes cōmiſſæ ſunt. itaque regnante Romulo, bello Sabino S. C. factū fuit, quo Sabinis mulieribus, filios Romæ habētibus, facultas data eſt, relictis apud viros filiis, legationem ob-eundi apud Sabinos: cuius legationis princeps fuit Herſilia. quæ pacem composuerunt inter Romulum, & Tatium Sabinorū regem. qua de cauſa a regibus

^a *Linus l. 45*
Val. Max. lib.
6, cap. 4.

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^a *Dian. Hal.
ens. Ro. lib. 2*

magni honores illis concessi sunt^a. Preterea cum Marcius Coriolanus, iniquo exilio multatus, ad vindicandam iniuriam, fufis ac cæsis aliquot exercitibus Romanorum, ad ipsa moenia vrbis accessisset, & neque legati ad eum deprecandū missi, neq; sacerdotes cum infulis quicquam proficerent: Veturia mater, Volumniam vxorē eius cum liberis secum trahens, filium precibus suis, & la-


^b *Val. Max.
lib. 5. cap. 4.
L. Florus. li. 1.
cap. 22.
c lib. 1.*


crymis expugnauit, & exarmauit^b. atq; ita, vt inquit Iuius^c, quam armis viri defendere urbem non potuerunt, mulieres precibus, lacrymisq; defenderunt. Populus quoq; Romanus Mutiam, matrem Pompeij, minis adegit, vt legationem ad eum susciperet: qua instigante, vna cum Iulia vxore, foedus inter Pompeium, Antonium, & Octauium Cæsarem percussum est^d.

^d *Appian. de
bello ciuili. li. 5*

estque memorabile, quod de Celtis legimus, qui consultationibus de bello, & pace mulieres suas adhibebant, & lites cum sociis ortas, earum ope discutiebant: ex eo, quod quondam, cum e graui, & implacabili discordia, in bellum ciuile incidissent, mulieres inter media arma progressę cōtrouersias omnes mira quadam dextertate

tate composuerant : & concordiam stabiluerant . vnde in suo etiam foedere, quod cum Annibale percusserunt, scriptum fuit: si Celtæ haberent, quo nomine Carthaginenses acculaient, iudiciū fore Carthaginensium ducum ac præfectorum in Hispania: si verò Carthaginenses Celtis aliquid obijcerent, causæ cognitionem fore penes Celtarum mulieres -. Ceterum prudenter M. Cato ^{a Plut. de virt. mul.} censuit, non esse publicè audiendos tres oratores Atheniensium, Carneadem, Critholaum, & Diogenem: quòd sciret eos tantum valere eloquentia, ut quæcunque vellent, persuadere possent, tam æqua, quàm iniqua. ^{b Pet. Crinit. de honest. discipl. lib. 22. cap. 4.}





DE IVRE ET OFFICIIS
BELLICIS, ET DISCIPLINA MI-
LITARI,

LIBER SECVNDVS.

DE OFFICIIS BELLICIS.

- 1 *Non nisi ex iusta causa bellum gerendum.*
- 2 *Dominandi cupiditas multa mala secum adfert.*
- 3 *Ad bellum non nisi necessario veniendum.*
- 4 *Nonnunquam victoria plus amittitur, quam acquiritur.*
- 5 *Secunda moderatè, aduersa fortiter ferenda.*
- 6 *Romani neque victores insolescere, neque victi deprimi solent.*
- 7 *Dua praecepta Platonis ad officia bellica maximè spectant.*
- 8 *Vir fortis nihil pro sua, omnia pro communi utilitate faciet.*
- 9 *Quaecunque ratione patria consulendum.*
- 10 *Mori pro republica gloriosum.*
- 11 *Non sunt damnandi, qui in bello se obijciunt mortis periculo.*

12 Pro

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- 12 *Pro patria salutelicet patrem vel filium occidere.*
13 *In bello non est suscipienda defensio eorum, quæ commodè defendi non possunt.*
14 *Non temerè deferenda, quæ hostium impetum ferre possunt.*
15 *Non nimium sapiendum in victos.*

CAPVT PRIMVM.

offic. lib. 1.



b Quintus
Curt. lib. 4.
c de iur. Dei
lib. 3. c. 10.

VM primum iusticiæ munus fit, vt inquit Cicero^a, ne cui quis noceat, nisi laceffit iniuria: ad officia bellica in primis spectat^{*}, vt non nisi ex iusta causa^r bellū geratur, ne ius humanæ societatis violetur: & absit omnis dominandi cupiditas, quæ non solum cum iusticia pugnat, sed solet etiam secū adferre multa incōmoda^{*}. nam, vt inquit Liuius, nulla² magna ciuitas quiescere potest: si foris hostē non habet, domi inuenit: vt præualida corpora ab externis causis tuta videntur, sed suis ipsa viribus onerātur: & vt legati Darij Alexandro dicebant, periculosum est prægraue imperium: & difficile continere, quæ capere non possis^b, quare D. August^c. Quemadmodū (inquit) in corporibus hominum, satius est mo-

est modicam staturam cum sanitate habere, quàm ad molem aliquam giganteam perpetuis afflictionibus peruenire: nec cùm perueneris quiescere; sed quanto grauioribus membris, tãto maioribus agitari malis: sic imperium paruum & quietum, præstat magno & inquieto. quod indicasse quoque videtur Calanus Indus, in philosophiæ studiis magni nominis: qui ad Alexandrum Magnum veniens, bubulam pellem aridam, in medium coniecit, obambulan-
 s-
 que eius extrema pedibus premebat: pellis cum ad vnam tantum partem calcaretur, reliquis in altum attollebatur. eo factò, media deinceps firmus institit, atque ita pellis vndique immota conquieuit. tali exemplo Alexãdrum commonens, ne in longinquis locis tempus tereret, sed imperij medium tueretur. ita enim in eius finibus quietura omnia^a. *a in vitæ Alexand.*
 idque etiam Lacedæmoniorum exẽplo satis docemur: qui cùm terra marique vniuersæ Græciæ imperarent, tantaque iam dominandi cupiditate flagrarent, vt Asiam omnem suo imperio subigere affectarent: tantum ex ea re inuidiæ, atque odij contraxerunt, vt & imperium, & libertatem

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bertatem amiserint. Prudenter itaque Theopompus, Spartanorum rex, cum primus Spartæ regibus Ephoros adiunxisset, exprobranti vxori, quòd filiis regnum minus, quàm accepisset, relicturus esset: respondit, tanto id maius esse relicturum, quanto firmitus ^a. & hanc quoque sententiã comprobasse videtur armatus Annibal, cum ad Scipionem ait: Optimum fuerat, eam patribus nostris mentem datam a diis esse, vt vos Italiã, nos Africæ imperio contenti essemus: ita aliena appetiuius, vt de nostris dimicaremus ^b. Cum itaque in omnibus negotiis, vt inquit Cicero ^c, tum præsertim in bello, priusquã aggrediare, adhibenda est præparatio diligens, & percipienda cogitatione futura: & aliquando antè constituendum, quid accidere possit, in vtramque partem, & quid agendum sit, cum quid euenerit: nec committendum aliquid, vt aliquando dicendum sit, Non putaram: quam Iphicrates turpissimam esse vocẽ imperatoris dicebat ^d. Et quidem, vt ad secandum & vrendũ medici *, sic nos ad bella raro inuitiq; veniemus, nec vnquam, nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina, exẽplo Augusti: qui ad-

^a Plut. ad princip. erud.

^b Livius l. 30

^c offic. lib. 1.

^d Plut. in a. popb.

3

qui admodū bella omnia execratus est,
 & nō nisi ex maxima causa vnquam bel-
 lum alicui genti indixit. iactantis enim
 ingenij, & leuissimi esse dicebat, ardore
 triumphandi, & ob lauream coronam,
 in discrimen, per incertos euentus cer-
 taminum, securitatem ciuium præcipi-
 tare. Bellum quoque non suscipiendum,
 nisi maior emolumentum spes, quàm dāni
 metus ostendatur. alioqui verò, vt Ar-
 chidamus Eleos inconsideratè bellum
 mouentes, monuit, bonum erit quiesce-
 re^a. nam vt idem Augustus dicebat, mi-
 nima commoda non minimo sectantes <sup>a Plut. in a-
poph. laco.</sup>
 discrimine, similes sunt haino aureo pis-
 cantibus, cuius abrupti amissi que detri-
 mentū, nullo capturæ lucro pensari po-
 test^b. quare non erit consultum iis, qui <sup>b Trec. in
August.</sup>
 inopes sunt, bellum inferre. Cuius rei
 exēplo esse potest Sesostris rex Ægypti,
 qui primum Scythis bellū intulit, missis
 prius legatis, qui hostibus parēdi legem
 dicerent. quibus Scythæ responderunt,
 se mirari tam opulenti populi regē, sto-
 lidè aduersus inopes occupare bellum,
 cū magis domi fuerit illi timendum,
 quòd belli certamen anceps, præmia vi-
 ctoriæ nulla, damna manifesta essent.
 igitur

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igitur non expectaturos Scythas, ut ad se veniatur: cum tanto sibi in hoste plura concupiscenda sint, utroque prodituros obuiam: quod & fecerunt, & regem in
à Iustini. lib. 2 fugam verterunt^a. Expetenda est itaque magis decernendi ratio, quam decertandi fortitudo: & prius omnia experiri, quam armis certare sapientem decet. quare Spartanorum mos iure laudari potest, qui ante hostium congressum, Amori sacra faciebant: & reges Lacedæmonij, antequam signa inferrent, Musis immolabant, Clementiæ & Amicitiae, non Marti: satius ducetes pacatione hostium animos, & pace incruenta conciliare, quam prælij subire aleam. sed ubi tempus, necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu erit, & honestum bellum, ex Demosthenis sententia, semper turpi paci præferendum erit. prudenter quoque Spartana ciuitas, seuerissimis Licurgi legibus obtemperans, aliquandiu ciuium suorum oculos a contemplanda Asia retraxit, ne illecebre eius capti, ad delicatius vite genus prolaberentur. quod eos non frustra timuisse dux ipsorum Pausanias satis ostendit: qui magnis rebus gestis, ut primum se Asiæ moribus permisit,

misit, fortitudinem suam effeminato
eius cultu, vt ait Valer. Max^a. emollire ^{a lib. 2, cap. 4}
non erubuit. Fit itaque plerumque, vt
4 plus istiusmodi victoriis amittatur*, quā
quærat, vt eadem Asia testis est: quæ
facta Romanorum, cum opibus suis, e-
tiam vitia Romam transtulit^b Est verò ^{b Iustini, l. 36}
fortis animi, qualē in bello requirimus,
secūda moderatē, aduersa fortiter ferre:
5 non perturbari in rebus asperis, nec tu-
multuantem de gradu deiici, vt dicitur;
sed præsentis animi vti consilio: nec a ra-
tione discedere, sed in omni fortuna eū-
dem animum gerere. & is demū vir erit,
vt inquit Liuius, cuius animū nec pro-
spera fortuna flatu suo efferet, nec ad-
uersa infringet: qualis Camillus descri-
bitur, cū ait: Nec mihi dictatura ani-
6 mos fecit, neque exilium ademit, exstāt-
que in hanc rem memorabilia Roma-
norum exempla, vt dubium sit, an admi-
rabiliores in aduersis, an verò in secūdis
rebus Romani fuerint. de quibus fer-
6 tur*, Neque, si vincerentur, animos illis
minui solere, neque, si vincerent, secūdis
rebus inolescere^c. Itaque Albino con- ^{c Iustini, l. 31}
sule, exercitu a Pyrrho cæso, & clade
Cannensī accepta, quæ certē grauissima
N fuit,

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fuit, iam tertiū victis ab Annibale: nulla vel minima quidē abiecti animi signa edita: nulla mētio pacis Romæ fuit: quin potius magno animo de bello restaurādo cogitatum, & octo millia captiuorū, quod per deditionem, & sine pugna, in potestātē Annibalis venissent, cū paruo possent redimi, non placuit. sed octo millia iuuenum validiorum ex seruitiis empta, publicè armata sunt. Hic miles, vt inquit Liuius ^a, magis placuit, cū precio minore redimēdi captiuos copia fieret. Similiter Romanis prælio equestri victis a Perseo Macedonū rege, cū Perseus consilio amicorum, suadētium, vt secunda fortuna in conditione honestæ pacis vteretur potius, quàm spe vana euectus, in casum irreuocabilē se daret, ad P. Licinium cons. legatos misisset: qui pacem iisdem conditionibus peterent, quibus Philippo data erat: summo-
tis arbitris, cū consultarent, vicit Romana constantia in consilio, inquit Liuius ^b: & responderi placuit, ita pacem dari, si de summa rerum liberum senatui permittat rex, de se, de quæ vniuersa Macedonia statuēdi ius: victi victoribus eas leges, quæ victis præscribi solent, statuē-
tes,

a lib. 22.

b lib. 42.

tes. ita namque tum mos erat, in aduersis vultum secundæ fortunæ gerere: moderari animos in secundis. cui simile est factum Marcelli, qui exercitu suo pridie fuso, fugatoque, postridie grauer increpitis militibus, in aciem prodiit: quod cum nunciatum esset Annibali, cum eo nimirum (inquit) hoste res est, qui nec bonam, nec malam fortunam ferre potest: seu vicit, ferociter instat victis; seu victus est, instaurat cum victoribus certamen Marcellus verò magna victoria potitus est ^a. itaque Pyrrhus, fusis aliquot Romanorum exercitibus, cum videret, eorum qui superessent in reparando exercitu festinationem: Video me (inquit) plane herculis sydere creatum, cui quasi ab angue Lernæo, tot cæsa hostium capita de sanguine suo renascuntur ^b. quæ certè animi magnitudo, & constantia Romanorum tantum potuit, ut Pyrrhum, quamuis victorem, & magnis copiis auctorem eius exercitu, priorem ad pacem petendam compulerit. cui, licet æquissimas condiciones pacis petendi, auctore Ap. Claudio cæco responderi placuit, uti rex Italia excederet: tum, si e re sua videretur, de amicitia ac societate verba faceret. quoad

^a Livius l. 27

^b l. Florus, de
gest. Rom. l. 1
cap. 18.

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a *Plut. in
Pyrrho.*

b *Liuius l. 37*

verò in armis esset, populum Rom. ad-
uersuseum belligeraturum, etiâsi mille
Albinos pugna superasset^a. Et quidem,
quemadmodum rebus aduersis, non fa-
cilè Romanorum animos consternari
solere superioribus exēplis ostendimus:
sic nec prosperis insolescere argumento
sit, quod Scipio Africanus Antiocho
victo, pacem petenti respondit: Romani „
(inquit) eosdē in omni fortuna animos „
gessimus, gerimusque: neque eos se- „
cundę res extulerunt; neque aduersę mi- „
nuerunt. eius rei, vt alios omittam, An- „
nibalem vestrum vobis darem testem, „
nisi vos ipsos dare possem. postquā Hel- „
lespontum traiecimus, priusquam castra „
regia, priusquam aciem videremus, cū „
communis Mars, & incertus belli euen- „
tus esset, de pace vobis agentibus, quas „
paribus ferebamus conditiones, easdem „
nunc victores victis ferimus^b. estq̃, pro- „
fectò hæc animi æquabilitas, & modera-
tio, non solū magno viro digna: (nam
vt Varro scribit, sapiens & bonum ferre
debet modicè, & malum fortiter, ac le-
niter) sed solet etiam plerūque in rebus
gerendis, maximi esse momenti. ferme
enim sit, vt secundæ res negligentiam
creent.

creent. qua fiducia L. Marcius exstinctis
 Scipionibus, cum reliquiis exercituum;
 milites hortatus, bina castra Poenorum
 in Hispania, vbi omnia neglecta & soluta
 inuenit: vna nocte inuasit, & cepit, ho-
 stibus cæsis^a Amyntas, verò cum prælio ^a *Liuius l. 35*
 superior, Ægyptios Memphim, quam
 obsidebat, compulisset, & suos ad popu-
 lādum agros eduxisset: ab hostibus, eru-
 ptione facta, quòd victores palantes &
 victoriæ fiducia incautos viderent, cum
 omnibus suis ad internecionem cæsus
 est^b. Prudenter itaque Q. Fabius Max. ^b *Quint. Curt.
lib. 4.*
 dicebat, se magis prospero Minucij col-
 legæ, quàm aduerso euentu, aliquid ti-
 mere mali: nec eum sententia fefellit.
 nam secundis rebus elatus collega, tem-
 merè cum hoste conflixit, & se cum e-
 exercitu in euidēs periculum cōiecit: sed
 a Fabio seruatus fuit^c. Sic quoque cum ^c *Liuius l. 22*
 Terētius Varro cons. homo temerarius,
 in prohibendis prædatoribus, tumultu-
 uario quodam prælio superior fuisset:
 haud ægrè Annibal id damnū passus est;
 quin potius credebat, velut inescatam
 temeritatem ferocis consulis, & nouo-
 rum militum, vt certè accidit. nam stoli-
 da illorum temeritate, nec quicquam re-

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luctate collega L. Emilio Paulo, clades illa Cannensis Romanis illata est. & idem Varro, quemadmodum ante cladem ferox, ita clade accepta humilis, nimirum nudando cladem, Campanorum animos

^a *Liuius l. 22 in fine. C. lib. 23. in princ.*

a Romanis auertit^a. Est itaque viro forti maximè enitendum, non solum ut non frangatur aduersis; sed etiam, ut non extollatur secundis: eoq; magis, quod plerumque melius malam, quam bonam fortunam ferre possumus. vnde Epaminondas, Leuctrica victoria potitus, postridie processit squalidus, & humilis, solitus alias vncto corpore, & vultu sereno videri: inquires, se, quod animo elatior pridie fuisset, immoderatum illud gaudium castigare^b. & prudenter Philippus, cum Athenienses, quibus se aliquot ciuitates Græciæ iunxerant, magno prelio vicisset, ita vicit, ut victorem nemo sentiret: & ita inter tacitam læticiam, & dolorem hostium temperauit, ut neque apud suos exultrasse, neq; apud victos insultasse videretur: cum tamē illa victoria Philippo vniuersæ Græciæ imperium

^b *Plut. in a. poph.*

dederit^c. Porro ad officia bellica, vel maximè spectant duo illa præcepta Platonis^{*}: quæ iis, qui reipubl. præfuturi

^c *Iustin. l. 9.*

sunt,

sunt, præscribuntur: vnum, vt vtilitatem ciuium sic tueantur, vt quidquid agant, ad eam referant, obliti commodorum suorum: alterum, vt totum corpus rei-publicę curent: ne dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deferāt. vt enim tutela, sic procuratio rei publ. ad vtilitatem eorum, qui commissi sunt, non adeorum quibus commissa, gerenda est^a. Quare ^{a Cic. offic. lib. 1.} 8 cauendum erit viro forti*, vt Cicero ait, ne pro sua vtilitate potius bella gerat, & periculis sese offerat, quàm pro vtilitate communi. nam animi magnitudo, quæ cernitur in periculis, & laboribus, si iusticia vacat, pugnatque non solum pro salute communi, sed pro suis cōmodis, in vitio est. Siquidem rectè Stoici, fortitudinem virtutem esse dicunt, pugnantem pro æquitate: nihilque honestum esse posse, quod iusticia vacat. Animus itaque paratus ad periculum, vt idem Cicero ait, si sua cupiditate, non vtilitate cōmuni impellitur in pericula: audaciæ potius nomen habebit, quam fortitudinis. Vnde Callicatridas Lacedæmoniorum dux, meritò reprehensus: qui classis, quā priuatæ gloriæ iacturam facere maluit: atque item Cleombrotus, qui inui-

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diam timens, temerè cum Epaminonda
conflixit. quāto rectiùs Q. Fabius Max.
qui suum imperium minui per vanitatē
populi maluit, quā secunda fama malē
rem gerere. idem L. Æmiliū Paulum,
ad bellum contra Annibalem cum C.
Terētio Varrone collega, temerario ho-
mine, proficiscentem monens, vt sedēdo
cum Annibale bellum gereret, neque
temerè cum hoste conflingeret : ita allo-
cutus est: Resistes autē, inquit, aduersus „
famam, rumoresque hominum, si satis „
firmus steteris: si te, neque collegæ vana „
gloria, neque tua falsa fama mouerit. a „
veritate laborare, ius sæpe aiunt; extin- „
gui nūquam, gloriam qui spreuit, veram „
habebit. siue timidum pro cauto: tardū „
pro considerato: imbellem pro perito „
belli vocent: omnia audentem contēnet „
a *Livy l. 22* Annibal, nihil temerè agētem metuet^a. „
Exstat quoque in hanc sententiam præ-
clara Lentuli principis viri oratio, Ro-
manis ad furcas Caudinas inclusis, & a
Samnitibus legatione accepta, non alias
conditiones pacis esse, quā si inermes
cum singulis vestimētis sub iugum mit-
terentur: in hæc verba: Patrem meum, „
inquit, consules, sæpe audiui memoran- „
tem,

tem, se in capitolio vnum non fuisse au-
torē senatui, redimendæ auro a Gallis
ciuitatis, quando nec fossa valloque, ab
ignauissimo ad opera ac muniendū ho-
ste, clausi essent: & erumpere, si non sine
periculo magno, tamen sine certa perni-
cie possent. quod si, vt illis, decurrere ex
capitolio armatis in hostem licuit (quo
sæpe modo obsessi in obsidentes erupe-
runt) ita nobis æquo aut iniquo loco di-
nicandi tantummodo cum hoste copia
esset: non mihi paterni animi indoles in
coniugio dando deesset. Equidem mortē
pro patria præclaram esse fateor, & me
vel deuouere pro populo Rom. legionibusque,
vel in medios me committere
hostes paratus sum. sed hic patriā video,
hic quicquid Romanar. legionum est:
quasi pro seipsis ad mortē ruere volunt:
quid habent quod morte sua seruent?
recta vrbis, dicat aliquis, & mœnia, & eā
turbā a qua vrbs incolitur. imo hercule
produntur ea magis omnia, deleta hoc
exercitu non seruantur. quis enim illa
tuebitur? imbecillis videlicet & inermis
multitudo? tam hercule, quàm a Gallorū
impetu defendit. an a Veijs exercitum
Camillumque ducem implorabunt? hic

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omnis spes, opesque sunt: quas seruando, „
 patriam seruamus; dedendo ad necem, „
 patriam deferimus ac prodimus. at foeda „
 atque ignominiosa deditio est. sed ea „
 charitas patriæ est, vt tam ignominia eâ, „
 quàm morte nostra, si opus sit, serue- „
 mus. subeatur ergo ista, quantacunque „
 est, indignitas, & pareatur necessitati, „
 a *Linium* 1, 9, quam ne dii quidem superant^a. Qua- „
 cunque igitur ratione patriæ & reipub.^{*} 9
 consulere debemus, & pro ea defenden-
 da, nullam infamiam, nec ipsam quoque
 mortem, si res ita postulat, recusare de-
 bemus. sed, vt inquit Plato: Si patria mād-
 darit verberari te, siue in vincula conijci,
 siue in prælium miserit, ad vulnera acci-
 pienda, mortemque subeundam: obe-
 diendum est omnino, & neque tergi-
 uersandum, neque fugiendum erit, sed &
 in bello, & in iudicio, & prorsus vbique,
 ea quæ respub. vel patria iusserit, facien-
 da sunt. quæcunque enim a nobis ge-
 runtur, non ad nostram vtilitatem & cō-
 modum, sed ad patriæ salutem conferre
 debemus^b. mori autem pro patriā*, glo- 10
 riosissimum semper habitum fuit^c. itaq;
 exclamat Cicero^d: O fortunata mors, „
 quæ naturæ debita, pro patriā est potissi- „
 mūm

^b Cicero, in
 Vatin.

^c l. bello a-
 missi, D. de
 excus. iur.

^d Philipp, 1, 4

mum reddita. turpissimum verò est, cum possis cum summa virtute & honore, pro patria interire: malle per dedecus & ignauiam viuere^a. Qui verò pro defensione ecclesiæ moritur, cæleste regnum
 „ consequitur^b. eoque spectat, quod Cicerò ait^c: Illi igitur, quos cæcidistis, etiã
 „ ad inferos pœnam parricidij luent: vos
 „ verò, qui extremum spiritum in gloria
 „ effudistis, piorum estis sedem & locum
 „ consecuti. & quidem Cimbrorũ antiqui milites, adeo gloriosum duxerunt pro repub. mori: vt non existimarent, nisi in bello morerentur, se felices, quasi ad finẽ vitæ non perseuerãtes. vnde in acie gaudio exultabant, tanquam gloriosè, & feliciter vita excessuri, lamentabantur in morbo, quasi turpiter, & miserabiliter perituri^d. Itaque non statim mortalis
 „ criminis damnandi* sunt duces belli, vel
 „ milites, qui vt victoria potiãtur, se maximo committunt prælij & conflictus periculo, ex quo certior est mors, quàm euasio. nam, vt inquit D. August.^e Non
 „ culpatur in bello, quòd moriantur quãdoque morituri, hoc enim reprehẽdere, est magis timidorum, quàm religiosorũ.
 „ quãuis enim nulli liceat sibi ipsi mortem conscif-

^a Auctor ad Her. lib. 4.

^b c. omni timore. 23. q. 8. cap. omnium. 23. q. 5. Or. Hisp. reg. 1. 3. 12. 25. par. 2. c. Philip. 14.

^d Val. Max. lib. 2. cap. 6.

^e lib. 22. contra Faust. Man. c. quid culpatur, 23. q. 1.

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confiscere: (quo casu mortale crimen contrahitur ^a) licet tamen, ex iusta causa, veluti pro patrię, aut Catholicę ecclesię defensione, se mortis vel maximo periculo obijcere. itaq̃ue Eleazarum, virum fortissimum, a peccato defendit, & laudibus effert Ambrosius ^b: qui supereminentem ceteris elephantem, lorica vestitum regia, arbitratus quòd in eo rex esset, interfecit, & a cadente bestia oppressus est ^c. Pro patrię quoque salute ¹², si quis patrem occiderit, vel filium, non solum sine scelere erit, sed etiam premio afficiendus ^d. quod ita verum puto, si res omnino ad perniciem patrię spectabit, neque filius monendo, neque minitādo quicquam profecerit, vt patrem ab instituto auerteret. patrię enim salutem anteponet saluti patris, ex frequētissima Philosophorum sententia ^e. quod etiam iure probatur ^f: quicquid dicat Bodinus ^g: qui contrarium sensit, & temerè reprehendit iuris interpretes. Præclarè etiam Fulvium senatoris filium, ad Catilinam proficiscētem, retractum exitinere iussit parens necari ^h. qui verò patriā prodit, criminis læsę maiestatis reus est ⁱ. Ceterum, quod ad secundum Platonis

^a c. non licet.
23. qu. 2. D.
Aug. de civit.
Dei l. 1. c. 20
& 21.

^b de offic. l. 1.
cap. 40.

^c Machab. 1.
cap. 6.

^d l. minime.
de relig. &
sumptib. funer.

^e Cicer. off.
lib. 3.

^f in l. veluti.
D. de iust. &
iur. l. advoca-
ti. C. de adu-
diuer. iudicio.
& d. l. mini-
mè. Borradius

in addition.
ad Terraru-
beam. tract. 3

art. 3 faciunt
tradita a C'a
ro in §-feudū
q. 21. nu. 4.

^g de republ.
l. 1. cap. 4.

^h Salustius
in cōu Catil.
l. 1. & 2 D.
ad l. Iul. Mar.

tonis præceptum attinet: illud maximè
cauendum, ne, dum singulas partes tueri
volumus, totum corpus reipub. in peri-
culum trahamus. Quare in bello nō te-
13 merè suscipienda* est defensio sociarum
vrbiū, aliorumque oppidorum, quæ cō-
modè defendi non possunt: præstatque
illa deserta hostibus relinquere, quàm
nec quicquā defendēdo, de summa rerū
in discrimē venire, aut etiā famæ pericu-
lum facere: quæ plerunque latius, infla-
tiusq;, quàm res est, percrebrescere solet,
& sæpe ad vniuersi belli euentū, maximi
esse momenti, itaq; famam bellū gerere
aiunt, & parua momēta, in spē, metumq;
impellere animos. Qua de causa Philip-
pus Macedonū rex, a Romanis prælio vi-
ctus, vrbes socias, aliaq; oppida, quæ de-
fendere nō poterat, incendit ac vastauit:
homines, qui sequi possent, exciuit: rerū
suarū, quas possent, ferendarum secū do-
minis ius fiebat: cetera militis præda e-
rat. quæ quidē faciēti Philippo acerba e-
rāt, sed e terra mox futura hostiū, corpo-
ra saltē eripere volebat^a. in quo Sueuo-
rum morē imitatus videtur, qui cū bellū
ipsis inferretur, cōsilio habito, nūcios in
omnes partes dimittebāt, vti de oppidis
demi-

a Livius l. 32^a

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demigrarent:liberos,vxores,suaq; omnia in silvas deponerent: atque omnes, qui arma ferre possent, in vnum locum conuenirent ^a. Simili ratione Versingetorix, nouis rebus studens, & Gallos ad defectionem a Romanis sollicitans, Bitorigibus persuasit, vt oppida incenderent, quæ non munitione, & loci natura ab omni essent periculo tuta: ne suis essent ad detrectandam militiam receptacula: neque Romanis proposita ad copiam commeatus, prædamque tollendam ^b. Cauendum tamen omnino erit, ne quid horum crudeliter, aut auaritiæ causa fiat. nam cum Annibal, quod neq; omnes Italiæ populos, qui se illi coniunxerant, tenere præfidiis, nisi vellet in multas paruasque partes carpere exercitum, quod minimè tum expediebat, posset: neque, deductis præfidiis, spei liberam, vel obnoxiam timoris sociorum relinquere fidem: præceptis in auaritiam, & crudelitatem ad spolianda, quæ tueri nequibat, inclinasset: quam foedum id consilium esset, inquit Liuius ^c, exitus docuit. non enim indigna patientium modò abalienabantur animi, sed ceterorum etiam: quippe ad plures exemplum,

^a *Cæs. de bel. gall. lib. 4.*

^b *Cæs. de bello Gall. lib. 7.*

^c *lib. 26.*

plum,quàm calamitas pertinebat. Cōsultius verò Romani, qui accepta Can-nensi clade, & circumspectis omnibus imperij sui viribus, lōginquis sociis præsidium implorantibus, non quidem miserunt, quòd vires non suppeterent, sed cōsulere sibi seipsos iusserunt: nihil crudele in illos exercentes^a. Solerter verò ^{a Livius l. 23} M. Porcius Cato cons. in Hispania bellū gerens, cū legati ab Ilergetum regulo Biligaste ad eum venirent, querentes castella sua oppugnari, nec spem vllam esse resistendi, nisi præsidio Romanus miles esset, & consulem anceps cura agitare: nolle deferere socios: nolle minuere exercitum: quod aut moram sibi ad dimicandum, aut in dimicando periculum afferre posset, & statuisset non minuere exercitum, ne interim hostes quid inferrent ignominia: sociis spem pro re ostēdendam censuit: sæpe vana pro veris maximè in bello valuisse: & credentem se aliquid auxilij habere, perinde atq; haberet: ipsa fiducia, & sperando, & audendo servatum. Itaque legatis respondit, quanquam vereretur, ne suas vires, aliis eas commodando, minueret: tamen illorum, tēporis, & periculi, magis quàm sui

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fui, rationem habere: & denunciari militū parti tertiæ ex omnibus cohortibus iubet, vt cibum, quem in naues impo-
nant, maturè coquāt, nauesque in diem
tertium expediri præcepit. legati non
antè profecti, quàm impositos in naues
milites viderunt, id pro haud dubio iam
nūciantes, non suos modò, sed etiā ho-
stes, fama Romani auxilij aduentantis
impleuerunt. consul verò, vbi satis quod
in speciem fuit, ostentatū esset, reuocari
ex nauibus milites iussit. qua ratione so-
ciis, spe auxilij, ad obsidionem ferendam
animum dedit, hostemque ab obsidione
deterruit: & ipse integris viribus ad ho-
stem profectus, præclara victoria potitus
est. Porro quemadmodū non est susci-
pienda temerè defensio* eorū, quæ tueri
non potes: sic nec facilè deferenda sunt,
quæ hostium impetum excipere & fran-
gere possunt. in quo Antiochus turpiter
lapsus fuit, qui prælio nauali a Romanis
victus, quia possessione maris pulsus, lō-
ginqua tueri diffidebat se posse: præsidium
ab Lysimachia, ne opprimeretur ibi a
Romanis, deduci prauo, vt res ipsa po-
stea docuit, cōsilio iussit. non enim tueri
solum Lysimachiā a primo impetu Ro-
manorum

manorum facile erat, sed obsidionem etiam per totam hiemem tolerare, & ob-
sidentes quoque ad vltimam inopiã ad-
ducere, extrahendo tempus^a. Inter ce-
tera denique officia bellica refert Cice-
ro^b, ne sæuiatur * supra modũ in victos.
cũ nihil laudabilius sit, nihil magno &
præclaro viro dignius placabilitate, &
clementia, &

^a *Limul.*, 37*Appia, de bel.**Syr.*^b *offic. lib.*, 1.

Parcere de victis, & debellare superbos.

Parcendum itaque multitudini, & ij qui
in imperatorum fidem cõfugiunt (quã-
vis murum aries percusserit, vt inquit
Cicero) recipiendi, & auctores tantũ
turbarũ puniendi. nam, vt inquit auctor
ad Heren^c. viri fortis est, quide victoria^c
contendunt, eos hostes putare; qui victi
sunt, eos homines iudicare: vt possit bel-
lum fortitudo minuere; pacem humani-
tas augere. De euertendis autem, diri-
piendisq̃ue vrbibus valde illud confide-
randum monet Cicero, ne quid temerẽ,
ne quid crudeliter fiat. Itaque M. Mar-
cellus maximam cõsecutus est laudem:
qui antequam Syracasas vrbem opulẽ-
tissimam, prædæ pro concione militibus
ediceret, fleuit, edictoq̃ue cauit, ne quis
corpus liberum violaret^d, & Scipio, qui

^c *lib.*, 4.^d *refert L.**August. de ci-**uit. Dei lib.*, 14*cap.*, 6,

Q

capta

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capta Carthagine, quæ repleta erat stautis, donariisq̃ Græcanicis, ex Sicilia aduectis, edixit, vt e singulis vrbibus venirent, qui dinoscerent, suaq̃ue auferret: & nihil quicquam suorum quemquam passus est, vel liberum, vel seruū de præda accipere, nec emere quidem, aliis direptioni vacantibus^a. C. Cæsar quoque dicere solet, nihil sibi gratius esse, quàm multitudini parcere: isq̃ue Trebonio legato, Massiliam oppugnanti, per litteras magnopere mandauit, ne per vim oppidum expugnari pateretur: ne grauius permoti milites, & defectionis odio, & cōtemptione sui, & diutino labore, omnes puberes interficerent: quod se facturos minitabantur^b. Est itaque clemētia, non solum magno viro digna, sed solet etiam plerumque esse fructuosa, & gloriosa. quò spectat illud Philippi patris Alexand. Magni, qui suadētibus quibusdam, vt acerbè in Athenienses statueret: absurdè eos sentire dixit, qui tot, tantaq̃ gloriæ causa agentem, ac tolerantem, iuberent gloriæ theatrum euertere^c. Spartani quoque, cū Athenienses ad dedicationem compulissent, & quidem censerent, infestissimam urbem, cum ipso nomine

^a Plut. in a-
popht.

^b Cæsar de
bel. ciuil. lib. 2

^c Plut. in a-
popht.

mine abolendam: negarunt se permissuros, vt e duobus Græciæ oculis, vnus erueretur^a. & Macedonum reges acie debellare solitos scribit Liuius^b; vrbibus parcere, quantum possent: quo opulentius imperium haberēt. nam de quorum possessione dimicaretur, tollentē nihil sibi præter bellum relinquere, quod consiliū esse? Itaque tertium Romuli institutum fuisse scribit Dionysius Halicarnassēus^c, ne captas bello vrbes funditus euertèrent: sed bellorū ius esse scribit Liuius^d, vt victi victoribus cum bona pace dominentur, & imperent. Non alienum videtur, prudētem admonitionem Belisarij, qua Totilam a diruenda Roma auertit, hic subijcere. cū enim Totila urbem victor ingressus, eam omnino solo æquare constituisset: monuit eum Belisarius per literas, ne quid temerè faceret, nam, inquit, alterū e duobus necessariò eueniet: aut victus in hoc bello succumbes; aut annuente fortuna superabis. si victor euaseris, Romamque deleueris, nō alienam, sed tuam perdideris; si seruaueris, regiam certè omnium pulcherrimam, atque ditissimam seruaueris: si verò a nobis deuictus fueris, seruata vr-

^a Paul. Oros.
lib. 2. cap. 17.

^b lib. 31.

^c ant. Rom. 4
lib. 2.

^d lib. 1.

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*a refert Petr.
Crim. de ho-
nesta disci-
plin. lib. 5. ex
Procopio.*

be, atque incolumi, gratias immortales a victore expectare debes; sed ea diruta, nulla humanitate contra te agetur. & his literis motus Totila a diruenda vrbe destitit^a. Simili dilemmate, principis Arausini efferatum animum emolliuerūt nonnulli præstantes viri huius Academix Louanienſis: cū enim in expeditione illa nefanda contra patriam, anno salutis cix, id. lxxii, ciuitatem Louanienſem deſtitutam præſidio, cum validiſſimo exercitu oppugnaret, & viderēt viri prudentiſſimi, ſe vim hoſtium ferre non poſſe: quamuis turpe eſſet paciſci cum nefario, & iniuſto hoſte, ne tamen viderēt diuina, humanaque omnia violari: templa profanari: academiam lōgē præſtantiſſimam deuaſtari a ſceleſtiſſimis hoſtibus: maluerunt neceſſitati cedētes, hæc omnia oblato certo pecuniæ precio redimere, quā crudelitatem hoſtis experiri. cumque ille non contentus redemptionis precio, eò impudentiæ veniſſet, vt etiam iuſiurandum, quod citra crimen læſæ maiestatis illi præſtari non poterat. a ciuibus Louanienſibus exigeret: iidem illi viri, qui mori maluiſſent, quā tātō ſcelere ſe adſtringere hac ratione

tione hostis impudentiam represserūt,
dicentes: Aut in hoc prælio, quod tibi
restat cum regio exercitu, cui Dux Al-
banus præerat, vinces; aut vinceris: si vi-
ceris, nihil certè negotij tibi erit nobis-
cum: qui velimus, nolimus, in tua pote-
state erimus. sin verò victus fueris, (vt
dubia est fortuna belli) non est cur velis
nos indignationem incurrere, & Regis,
& Ducis Albani, atque ita Regis maie-
state illæsa, & pactione necessaria, neque
turpi, maxima prudentia reipubl. consu-
luerunt. Est tamen ita probanda māsue-
tudo, atque clemētia, vt adhibeatur rei-
pub. causā seueritas, præsertim si sic om-
nino reipubl. conueniat. qua de causa
Romani Numantiam & Carthaginem
funditus sustulerunt: quamuis Scipio
Nasica pontifex max. nolebat æmulam
imperij Romani Carthaginem dirui, &
decernenti vt dirueretur, contradicebat
Catonī, timens infirmis animis hostem
securitatem, &, tāquam pupillis ciuibus
idoneum tutorem, necessarium videns
esse timorem: nec eum sentētia fefellit.
ex eo enim tempore cœpit Romana ci-
uitas otio & luxu diffluere. qua de re
pulchrè D. August^a. & Samuel quoque

a de ciuit. Dei
lib. 1 cap. 29
Appian. de
bell. punic.

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a Regum 1.
cap. 12. et lu-
dih. c. 2. 3. &
4.

b Plut. in a-
poph.

c l. ficui. C.
de edific. pri-
vat. l. adifi-
cia. C. de o-
per. public.

satis ostendit populo, Deū excitasse ho-
stes contra Israēlitas, vt eos in officio
contineret^a. solent enim homines, cū
ad externa bella supersunt vires, iis abu-
ti, inter semetipsos certando: quæ bella
longè exitiosissima sunt. Præclarè itaque
Spartani, qui, cū rex ipsorum pollice-
retur, se deleturum urbem, quæ illis ne-
gotium exhibuerat, non permiserunt,
inquiētes: Noli delere cotem virtutis^b.
Porrò tempore belli, si sic reipubl. expe-
diat, non solū hostium, sed etiam ci-
uium ædes, ad moenia cōstitutæ, ex qui-
bus incendiū, vel insidiæ timeri possunt,
prosterni ac dirui posse, etiam nullo so-
luto precio, legibus statutum est.^c

DE IMPERATORE VEL DVCE EXERCITVS.

- 1 *Nihil rarius perfectō imperatore.*
- 2 *Imperatoris nomen quibus commune.*
- 3 *Præstat habere bonum ducem, quàm bo-
nos milites.*
- 4 *Qua atate eligendi duces.*
- 5 *Leges annales Romanorum.*
- 6 *Quatuor in imperatore requiri.*
- 7 *Virtutes imperatoris.*
- 8 *Imperator non temerè cum hoste cōfiget.*
- 9 *Præ-*

- 9 *Præstat ingenio superare quàm gladio.*
- 10 *Cautus imperator præferendus audaci.*
- 11 *Hostis refrumentaria prohibendus.*
- 12 *Ab inceptis non facile discedendum.*
- 13 *Constância & fiducia imperatoris in bello.*
- 14 *Militum animi ante conflictum variis modis confirmandi.*
- 15 *Exercitus incommoda tegenda.*
- 16 *Optimus imperator qui maximè cognitas habet res hostium.*
- 17 *Non temerè transfugis credendum.*
- 18 *Imperator ad omnia aspera se ducem præbeat.*
- 19 *Imperator cautè versari debet in periculis.*
- 20 *Consilium Antigoni.*
- 21 *Non solum bellandi virtus, sed etiam alia virtutes querenda in imperatore.*
- 22 *Imperatori liberum arbitrium permit- tendum.*
- 23 *Carthaginienses asperi in duces belli.*

CAPVT SECVNDVM.

SI bellum gerendum est, in primis cer-
tè videndum, quem exercitui præfi-
ciamus, tanti enim esse exercitum, quàm
imperatorem verè proditum est: nihilq;
rarius inueniri posse perfectò impera-
tore *. quod nomē olim commune erat

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iis, qui exercitui * ad certum tēpus præ-
 essent: quamvis postea Cæsar, quem alij
 secuti sunt, summum principatum ade-
 ptus, perpetuum imperatoris nomen
 sumpserit^a. Itaque Philippus Macedo
 admirari se aiebat, quòd Atheniēses sin-
 gulis annis novos imperatores eligerēt:
 cū ipse in omni vita, non nisi vnum
 ducem bonum Permeniona inuenisset.
 & idem dicebat, præstatiorem esse exer-
 citum * ceruorū imperante leone, quàm
 leonum ducē ceruo. atque ita C. Cæsar,
 cū iret in Hispaniam cōtra Petreium,
 dicebat se non magni eum facere, quòd
 iret ad exercitum sine duce. & C. Fabri-
 cius, cū audiret Romanos a Pyrrho
 victos: non (inquit) Epirotæ Romanos,
 sed Pyrrhus vicit^b. Et certè exemplo
 Marcij Coriolani satis apparet, ducibus
 superiorem, quàm exercitu rem Roma-
 nam fuisse, inquit Liuius^c. Volsci enim,
 semper antea victi, à Romanis; Coriola-
 no duce, victores exstiterunt. Hinc Epicra-
 tes de re militari disserens, ait exercitum
 esse, quasi quoddā animal homini persi-
 mile, cuius caput sit imperator: acies in-
 structa, pectus, ac thorax: pedites, ma-
 nus: equites autem, pedes: & sicut in
 corpore

^a Appian. in
 procem. Rom.
 hist. Tacitus
 ann. lib. 3.

^b Plut. in A.
 p. p. h.

^c lib. 1.

corpore conturbato, commotoque capite, membra reliqua nullum officium præstare possunt: sic perturbato imperatore, exercitus omnis fluctuet, periclitetur, ac pereat necesse est. Et, mortuo Alexandro, exercitum eius vagantem, & in seipsum impingentem, Leosthenes similem dixit Ciclopi esse: qui amisso oculo, usquequaque manus intendebat, nullum ad certum scopum directus: ita sublato duce, magnitudinem exercitus incertis motibus agitari: atque adeo sicut anima deferente, cadauera non subsistunt, non coherent, sed dissipantur, & dissoluuntur: ita exercitum Alexandri, eo mortuo palpitare, concuti, atque æstare^a. Et quidem, quo difficilius bellum instat, eo maiori cura elaborandum est, ut superiorem; sin minus, parem imperatorem hostium duci quæramus. nam, quilibet nautarum, vectorumque, ut Q. Fabius dicebat, tranquillo mari gubernare potest: ubi sæua orta tempestas est, ac turbato mari rapitur vëto navis, tum viro & gubernatore opus est^b. Quare

^a Plut. de fortitud. 29. vir. in Alexand. oratio, 2.

^b Lilius l. 24.

4 Plato ante trigessimum ætatis annum*, neminem militiæ præficiendum statuit: etiam si spectatæ virtutis esset, & aliqua

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militari gloria illustris. Hanc ætatē legi-
timā bellicis muneribus arbitrati quo-
que sunt Athenienses: tametsi huic legi
aliquando derogatū sit: & præcipuē Al-
cibiadis gratia, qui adeò gratus fuit po-
pulo in adolescētia, vt omnium ciu. um
oculos, quoties in publicum prodiret,
in se conuerteret: nemoque ei par Athe-
nis censeretur. is ante ætatem bello Sy-
racusano præfectus fuit: cui tamen duo
longè maiores natu collegæ dati sunt,
Nicias & Lyfimachus, vt tutius reipubl.
consuleret. Romani verò etiā suas leges
annales* habuere, quibus grandior ætas
(quòd adolescentiæ temeritatem vere-
rentur) ad consulatum, aliosque magi-
stratus constituta fuit. veteres tamen il-
los admodum antiquos leges annales
non habuisse dicit Cicero^a: quas multis
post annis attulit ambitio, vt gradus ef-
fet petitionis inter æquales, quo factum
est, vt idem Cicero ait, vt sepe magna in-
doles virtutis, priusquā reipub. prodesse
potuisset, extincta sit. At antiqui illi, ab
excellēti eximiaque virtute progressum
ætatis exspectari non debere existiman-
tes, nulla ætatis, nec generis quoque, aut
conditionis cuiusquam ratione habita:
sed

a Philpp. 5.

sed virtutis cuiusque veri æstimatores:
 vt quisque maximè virtute excelluit, ita
 quemque ad honores prouexerunt: vt
 constat ex Dionysio ^a. Et quidem, vt ait ^{a ant. Romi}
 Cicero ^b, Rulli, Decij, Coruini, multiq; ^{lib. 6.}
 „ alij: recentiore autè memoria superior ^{b Philop. 5.}
 „ Aphricanus, T. Flaminius, admodum a-
 „ dolescentes, consules facti, rãtas res gef-
 „ serunt, vt populi Romani imperium au-
 „ xerint, nomen ornauerint. Alexander
 „ verò Magnus, cùm ab ineunte ætate res
 „ maximas gerere cœpisset, nonne tertio
 „ & trigesimo anno mortem obiit? quæ
 „ est ætas Romanis legibus decem annis
 „ minor, quàm consularis. ex quo, vt idem
 „ ait, iudicari potest, virtutis esse, quã æta-
 „ tis cursum celeriores. Valerius porrò
 „ Coruinus, vigesimo tertio ætatis anno
 „ consul creatus, dicebat consulatum esse
 „ præmium virtutis, non sanguinis. & L.
 „ Quintius Cincinnatus, pauper admo-
 „ dum, quattuor tantùm iugerum agrum
 „ possidens, eundemque suis manibus co-
 „ lens, ab aratro ad dictaturam capeffendã
 „ Romã accersitus est: qui vnica spes po-
 „ puli Rom. fuit. quod operẽ precium esse
 „ audire dicit Liuius ^c, iis, qui omnia præ ^{c lib. 3.}
 „ diuitiis humana spernunt: neq; honori
 „ magno

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magno locum, neque virtuti putāt esse, nisi vbi effusè affluant opes. Attilium quoque, qui ad eum accersendum a senatu missi erant, ad imperium populi Romani suscipiendum, semina spargentem viderunt: sed illæ rustico opere attritæ manus, salutem publicam stabilierunt, & ingentes hostium copias pestum dederūt^a. Porro in summo imperatore^{*} quattuor has res esse oportere, existimat Cicerob^b: scientiā rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, & felicitatem: virtutes autem imperatoris^{*} præcipuas has esse: laborem in negotiis, fortitudinem in periculis, industriam in agendo, celeritatem in conficiendo, consiliū in providendo. nihil tamen quicquam magna laude dignum, sine vsu, & exercitatione consequetur, nam quemadmodum in ceteris artibus, sic quoque in arte imperatoria tria spectantur: natura, doctrina, & vsus. natura ingenio, doctrina scientia, vsus fructu diiudicandus est. Ceterum cum nusquam minus, quàm in bello euentus respondeant: ideoque maximæ cuique fortunę minimè credendum sit, vt Annibal Scipioni dicebat: omnino cauendum erit imperatori, ne temerè cum

^a Vale. Max.
lib. 4. cap. 4.

^b pro lege
Mamil.

8 cum hoste configat*, & aleam belli subeat, sed cauta potius cum ratione, quàm prospera ex casu sequatur : & eum ratio ducat, non fortuna, quæ fallax est, & parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit. Itaq; Cæsarem legimus, extremo vitæ tempore cunctatorem ad dimicandum factum : quo sæpius vicisset, hoc minus experiēdos casus existimās : neque se tantum acquisiturum victoria, quantum auferre calamitas posset^a. Et quidē sicut felicitas rerum gestarum, ut ^{a Suet. lib. 1. c. 6.} inquit Cæsar, exercitus beneuolētiā : sic res aduersæ, odia conciliant. quare consultius, tutius, & gloriosius quoque
 9 erit imperatori, ubicunq; poterit, ingenio & ratione hostē superare, ex Periculis sententia, quàm gladio. ut enim multo maiora sunt opera animi, quàm corporis, ut ait Cicero; sicæ res, quas prosequimur ingenio, gratiores sunt, quàm illæ quas viribus. q̄ etiā significasse videtur Lacedæmonij : apud quos dux, q̄ fortiter dimicasset, & cruēto Marte, magnæque hostium clade vicisset, trophæi loco gallū : qui verò deditiōe, & pacto, industria sua, nec nimis cruēta victoriā potitus, bellū mala vitasset, bouē immolabat.

Dion

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Dion quoq; in libris suis, quide regno
inscribuntur, dicit longè maiora geri
paucorum consilio, quàm multitudine,
aut viribus. quod etià Homerus indicat,
cùm Agamemnonem inducit asserentē,
se longè facilius posse rem Troianam e-
uertere, si decem Nestores, aut Vlisses in
cōsilio haberet, quàm si totidem Aiaces,
& Achilles fortiter dimicantes. quò spe-
ctant illa verba Vlissis ad Aiacem, apud

2 Metamor-
ph.
13.

Ovidium: a

(cundi:

*Quippe manu fortes, nec sunt tibi Marte se-
Consiliis cessere meis tibi dexter abello
Vtilis: ingenium est quod eget moderamine nostro.
Tu vires sine mente geris, mihi cura futuri est:
Tu pugnare potes; pugnandi tempora mecum
Eligit Atrides: tu tantum corpore prodes;
Nos animo: quantoque ratum qui temperat, anteit
Remigis officium: quanto est dux milite maior:
Tantum ego te supero: nec non in corpore nostro
Pectora sunt potiora manu: vigor omnis in illis.
Et cetera, quæ carmine prosequitur O-
vidius: ubi dicit arma Achillis, de qui-
bus cum Aiace contēdebat Vlisses, quæ-
que digniori erant proposita, in præmiū
Vlissi tributa fuisse. non itaque tantum
in viribus corporis, & lacertis fortitudi-
nis gloria est: sed magis in virtute animi,
ut in-*

vt inquit Ambrosius^a. Vnde quoque gi- ^{a de off. l. 1.}
 gantes, de quibus in sacris litteris, quā-
 uis viribus & corpore præstarent: quo-
 niam non habuerunt sapientiam, perie-
 runt propter suam insipientiam^b. contra ^{b Baruch c. 3}
 verò de viro sapiente scriptum est: Sur-
 „ rexit filius sensatus, & propter illum de-
 „ iecit omnem potentiam inimicorum^c. ^{c Eccl. c. 47}
 10 Cautus ergo imperator, & prudens, ex
 Euripidis sententia, audaci & temerario
 præferendus est. consilio enim sapienti,
 vt idem dicebat, magna militum manus
 vinci potest. sic Xerxes, qui tot hominū
 millia contra Græcos duxerat, vnus
 Themistoclis industria superatus fuit.
 Quare Aristides dicebat, non armis so-
 lum contra hostes, sed consilio in primis
 vtendū esse. nam cū consilio, & indu-
 stria superiores euadere possumus, quid
 opus est pericula suscipere? Hinc rei mi-
 litaris periti, in eo præcipuam impera-
 11 toris laudem constituunt*, si ea ratione
 bellū gerat, qua ipse, & exercitus, quam
 commodissimè re frumentaria, aqua, li-
 gno, pabulo vtatur; hostis verò iis om-
 nibus prohibeatur: & inopia, si fieri po-
 test, ad deditionem compellatur: & vt
 maximè se tutò dimicāre posse existi-
 met,

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met, tamē tutius arbitretur, obsessis viis,
cōmeatu intercluso, sine vulnere victo-
ria potiri. quæ ratio Iulio Cæsari, sum-
mo imperatori maximè probabatur:
cui erat propositum, vt non nisi coactus
prælium committeret cum Afranio, &
Petreio, Pompeianarum partium, nam
in eam spem venerat, se sine pugna, & si-
ne vulnere suorum, rem cōficere posse:
quod re frumentaria aduersarios inter-
clusisset: cur etiā secundo prælio aliquos
ex suis amitteret, secum pensitans: cur
vulnerari pateretur optimè meritos de
se milites: cur denique fortunam peri-
clitaretur: præsertim cū non minùs ef-
fet imperatoris consilio superare, quàm
gladio. & tādē omnium rerum inopia
coactos aduersarios, ad deditionem cō-
pulit^a. & hac ratione facile fuisset Pom-
peio, Cæsarem ad Pharsalum egestate
omnium rerum opprimere, vt propo-
suerat: nisi a suis Dirachina victoria elat-
tis, se a proposito dimoueri passus fuisset^b. Fabius autem Max. ex hoc genere
belli gerendi, summam laudem meruit,
etiā ipsius hostis Annibalis testimonio,
qui dicebat, se magis a non pugnante
Fabio; quàm a pugnante Marcello ti-
mere:

^a Cæs. de bel.
mil. lib. 1.

^b Appian. de
bel. civil. lib. 2.

mere^a: nec eum sententia fefellit. nam Fabius suis artibus eò iam Annibalem sedendo redegerat, vt non solùm nihil ex raptis in diem còmeatibus superaret, sed ne vnde raperet quidem, quicquam reliqui esset; omni vndique frumento, posteaquam ager parum tutus erat, in vrbes munitas conuecto, vt vix decem dierum, quod compertũ postea est, frumentum superesset, Hispanorũ ob inopiam transitio parata fuerit, si maturitas temporum expectata fuisset: quam Terentius Varro cons, sua temeritate impediuit: cuius aduentu Annibal, in hisce difficultatibus constitutus, quãuis parte dimidia auctas hostiũ copias cernebat, mirè gaudebat, sperans, id quod accidit, fortunam præpostero ingenio & temeritati consulis materiam daturam: cuius culpa ingens illa clades Cannensis Romanis illata fuit ^a. hoc quoque consilio C. Sulpitio dictatori aduersus Gallos, ^a *Linium l. 22* neutiquam placebat, quando nulla cogeret res, fortunæ se còmittere, aduersus hostem, quem tempus deteriorẽ in dies, & locus alienus faceret, sine præparato comeatu, sine firmo munimento morantẽ: ad hoc iis animis corporibusque,

P quorum

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a *Libri 1.7.* quorum omnis in impetu vis esset: parua eadem languescere mora. Alexâder verò cùm Leucadiam obsideret, passus est ex finitimis locis omnes eò confugere, vt citius alimenta, quæ habebât, consumerentur: quibus cōsumptis, facilem victoriam consecutus est. & Antigonus vastatis Atheniensium agris, sementis tempore decessit, & quod reliquum habebant frumenti, in sationes sparso, reuersus nouo vere adultam segetem protriuit, & ad famem redactos Athenienses, in suam volūtatem pertraxit. Vnde præcepti Cābyfis meminisse debemus, quo Cyrum filium monuit, nunquam exspectandam esse egestatem, & in rerū copia, maximè de inopia cogitandum. sapius enim videmus exercitum consumi penuria, quàm pugna: & vt ait Vegetius, ferro sæuior est fames. Itaq;, vt diximus, hisce artibus præcipuè superandi sunt hostes, neque temerè in acie versandū, nisi vbi tempus necessitasque postulat: exemplo Scipionis, qui in Numantinos missus, cùm vidisset coniunctā cum insania hostium temeritatem, dicebat se tempore redimere hostium temeritatē, & quod loco sapientiæ est, alienā operiri stulti-

stultitiam. bonum enim imperatorem,
 itidem vt medicum, ad malum curandū
 vltimo demum loco ferrū adhibere de-
 bere: nihilominus tamen suo tempore
 adortus Numantinos fudit^a. His ascri-<sup>a Plut. in 2
poph.</sup>
 bi posse videtur consilium Sertorij, qui
 proscriptione Syllana dux Lusitanorū
 fieri coactus, cū eos oratione flectere
 non posset, ne cum vniuersa Romano-
 rum acie confligerent: duos in cōspectu
 eorum constituit equos: alterum vali-
 dissimum, alterum infirmissimum: ac de-
 inde validi caudā ab imbecillo sene pau-
 latim carpi: infirmi a iuvene eximiarum
 virium vniuersam conuelli iussit: subij-
 ciens, equi caudæ consimilem esse Ro-
 manorum exercitū, cuius partes aliquis
 aggrediēs opprimere possit; vniuersum
 conatus prosternere, celerius tradiderit
 victoriam, quā occupauerit. quo exē-
 plo Sertorius barbaros, quos ratione
 flectere non poterat, in suam sentētiam
 pertraxit^b. Porro quemadmodum non <sup>b Val. Max.
lib. 7. cap. 3.</sup>
 temerè fortuna tentāda est, & ardua sus-
 12 cipienda: sic ab inceptis * non facile dis-
 cedendum est, exemplo Marcelli. cū e-
 nim multa, succedentes temerè moeni-
 bus, in oppugnatione Casilini, Roma-

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ni milites acciperēt vulnera, neque satis
 coeptis succederet: & Fabius omittendā
 rem parvam, ac iuxta magnis difficilem,
 & abscedendum inde censeret, quòd res
 maiores instarent: Marcellus, multa ma-
 gnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita
 semel aggressa non dimittenda esse di-
 cendo, quia magna famæ momenta, in
 vtramque partem fierent: tenuit ne in-
 cepto abiretur ^a. Quare laudandi quoq;
 Cæsaris milites, qui cū in obsidione
 Auarici, omnium rerum difficultate affi-
 cerentur, & Cæsar ob inopiam se dimis-
 surum oppugnationē diceret: vniuersi
 ab eo, ne infecta re discederet, petebant:
 hoc se ignominię loco laturos, si inceptā
 oppugnationem relinquerent, dicēdo ^b.
 fama siquidem bella stare meritò summi
 duces existimauere, & eum, qui recede-
 bat, fugere credi. Vnde cū in reliquis
 rebus, tum præsertim in bello cōstantia
 * atque fiducia imperatoris plurimum ¹³
 præstant, & sæpe ad vniuersi belli euentū
 maximi sunt momenti, cuius rei specio-
 sa exempla nobis præbent Romani; & in
 primis, quòd Cannensi clade, exhaustis
 imperij viribus, supplementū exercitus
 in Hispaniam mittere ausi, fecerunt ne
 hosti-

^a *Linus 1. 24*

^b *Cæs. de bel. gall. lib. 7.*

hostilium locus castrorū, tum maximè Capenam portam armis Annibale pulsante, minoris veniret, quàm si Pœni illā non obtinuissent. Ita se gerere, inquit Val. Max^a. quid aliud est, quàm sæuien- ^{a lib. 3. c. 7.} tem fortunam in adiutoriū sui pudore victam conuertere? Quò spectat, quod Cæsar dicebat, si non omnia secunda cederent, fortunam esse industria subleuādam. Pari fiducia Scipio Aphricanus, speculatores Annibalis, in castris suis deprehensos, nec supplicio affecit, nec de consiliis & viribus Pœnorum percūctatus est: sed traditos eos tribunis militū, iussosq; omisso metu visere omnia, per castra, quo vellēt, duci iussit: percunctatusque satin percommode omnia explorassent, datis qui prosequerentur retrò ad Annibalē dimisit. quo tam pleno fiducia spiritū Scipio prius animos hostium, vt inquit Val. Maxim^b. quàm ar- ^{b lib. 3. c. 7.} ma contudit: nam Annibal maximè hostis, fiducia perculsus, protinus nūcium ad Scipionem misit, vt colloquendi secum potestatem faceret, æquiores impetrari posse pacē ratus, si integer, quàm si victus peteret ^{c Livius l. 30}. Porro summi duces facile percipientes, quantum haberet in

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se boni constantia, atque fiducia, solent ante conflictum magno studio illud agere*, quò maximè confidentē sibi red- 14
derent exercitum, & militum animos confirmarent, quod variis modis faciebant. Valerius Corvinus dictator, cum Samnitibus bellum gerens, priusquam signum pugne proponeret, leuibus certaminibus, tentandi hostis causa, aliquot dies moratus est, ne scilicet nouum bellum suos, nouusque hostis terreret^a. Q. Fabius consul, decertaturus cum Hetruscis, quò animus militum multitudine territus restitueretur, Samnitium bella, quæ magna felicitate confecerant, extollebat, eleuabat Hetruscos, nec hostē hosti, nec multitudinem multitudini comparandam esse aiebat: præterea telum aliud occultum scituros in tempore, interea taceri opus esse: quibus ambagibus prodi simulabat hostes, & suos mirū in modum confirmabat^b. in quo certè solertia Fabij meritò laudanda, & ab imperatoribus imitanda est. communi enim sit vitio naturæ, vt Cæsar dicebat^c, vt inuisis latitantibus, atque incognitis rebus magis confidamus, vehementiusque exerceamur. &, vt inquit Liuius, sæpe

^a Liuius l. 7.

^b Liuius l. 9.

^c de bel. ciuil.
lib. 2.

sæpe vana pro veris maximè in bello va-
 luerunt. Veteres quoq; ad confirman-
 dos militum animos, causam religionis
 peridoneam censebant. quò spectât om-
 nia auspicia & oracula, quæ si fortè ad-
 uersi quid signi facere viderentur, solent
 nonnunquam imperatores, solerti qua-
 dam interpretatione, in bonum vertere,
 vt militibus timorem eximerent. cuius
 rei exstant innumera exempla. Et qui-
 dem, quemadmodum multa ad confir-
 mandos militum animos facienda sunt,
 sic quoque magno studio, illa quæ merû
 15 inferre possent*, aut militû animos qua-
 cunque ratione alienare, suppressenda
 sunt. nam, vt Cæsar dicebat, vt corporis
 vulnera, ita exercitus incommoda tegē-
 da sunt: ne ea nudando, militibus timor
 addatur, & hostibus audacia crescat. in
 quo, iure Terentius Varro reprehēden-
 dus videtur. nam cū accepta clade Cā-
 nensi, Campani legatos ad eum Venusiā
 misissent, quò cum paucis, ac semiarmi-
 bus venerat: ita auxit rerum suarum sui-
 quæ contemptum, nimis detegendo cla-
 dem, nudādoque, vt qui prius ægrè ferre
 se, aduersi aliquid accidisse Romanis nū-
 ciallent, polliciti que essent, omnia quæ

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ad bellum opus essent: reuersis domum
legatis (qui ex contēptu consulis, & eius
oratione, quæ desperationē rerū omniū
continebat, quasi deletū videretur no-
men Romanorum, referebant) omnes
ad defectionem spectarent: confisi se to-
tius Italiae imperio potiri posse, atq; ita
a *Liuii* l. 22 foedus cum Annibale fecerunt^a. Simili-
ter Philippus Macedonum rex, impru-
denti consilio, aliquid ad charitatē suo-
rum, & vt promptius pro eo periculum
adirent, ratus profecturum se, si equitū,
qui ceciderant in leui quodā prēlio cum
Romanis, sepeliēdorum curam habuif-
set: afferri eos in castra iussit, vt conspi-
ceretur ab omnibus funeris honos. nam
quod promptiores ad subeundam om-
nem dimicationem putabat facturū, id
metum pigritiamque incussit. qui enim
hastis, sagittisque, & rara lanceis vulne-
ra facta vidissent, inquit *Liuius* ^b, cum
b *lib.* 31. Græcis, Illyricisque pugnare assueti:
postquam gladio Hispaniensi detrūcata
corpora, brachiis abscissis, aut tota cerui-
ce defecta, diuisa a corpore capita, paten-
tiaque viscera, & foeditatem aliam vul-
nerum viderūt: aduersus quæ tela, quos-
que viros pugnādum esset, pauidi vulgò
cerne-

cernebant. Itaque Romani, cū P. Rutilij Lupi cons. bello socialicæsi, cadauere, & aliorum non paucorum nobilium, in urbem relato, viderēt populum eo spectaculo commoueri & terreri: S. C. decreuerunt, vt exinde mortuorum in bello corpora, ibi humarentur, vbi cūque cecidissent: ne ob eorum conspectū reliqui segniores ad militiam fierent. quod decretum mox cognitū, & hostes imitati sunt^a. Ceterum Chabrias Atheniensium dux, optimum hunc imperatorem esse dicebat, qui maximè co-

16 gnitas haberet res^{*} hostium^b: quarum certè ignoratione multos fugatos exercitus, & de summa rerum non semel in periculum ventum fuisse legimus. Itaq; Cassius a Cæsarianis in suo cornu victus, & castris exutus, credens Brutum quoque superatū, qui in suo cornu vice- rat, quasi desperatis rebus, sibi ipsi mortē consciuit. Simili errore, cū inter Romanos & Volscos magno prælio certaretur, & nox incertos diremisset: tantus ab imprudentia euentus vtraque castra tenuit timor, vt relictis faucibus, & magna parte impedimētorum, ambo pro vicis exercitus se in montes proximos reciperent.

^a Appian. de
bel. civil. l. 1.

^b Plut. in
Cass. poph.

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a Linn. li. 4 rent a. & Curio legatus Cæsaris, bello
ciuili, temerè credens perfugis, qui lu-
bam regem (qui Pompeio cum magnis
copiis auxilio venerat) reuocatum fini-
timo bello, & Suburram eius præfectū,
cum mediocribus copiis missum assere-
rent: prælium temerè commisit, & vna
cum exercitu a copiis regis circumuen-
b Cæs. de bel. ciuil. lib. 2. tus, ad internecionem cæsus est ^b. Vnde
cū vitio naturæ, vt ait Cæsar, quæ vo-
lumus, & credimus libèter, & quæ senti-
mus ipsi, reliquos sentire speramus, non
temerè transfugis, & exploratoribus ^{*fi-} 17
dem habere debemus. in quo Gallorū
c d. bello gallico lib. 4. morem idem Cæsar ^c reprehendit: qui
quibuscunque rumoribus, & auditioni-
bus permoti, de summis sæpe rebus cō-
silia ineunt, quorum eos e vestigio præ-
nitere necesse est: cū incertis rumori-
bus seruiant, & plerique ad eorum vo-
luntatem ficta respondeant. Quare ex-
pedit, vt illi, qui cum imperio lunt, vbi
duriora quædam occurrunt, speculatum
ipsi prodeant: exemplo Marcelli, qui ad
collegam dicebat: Quin imus ipsi cum
equitibus paucis exploratum: subiecta
enim res oculis, certius dabit consilium.
Omnium autem maximè proderit im-
perator,

18 perator*, si ad omnia quæ aspera atque
ardua sunt, se ducem præbeat. si quid e-
nim iniungere inferiori velis, id prius
in te, ac tuos si ipse iuris statueris, facilius
omnes obedientes habeas. Imitari itaq;
debet quilibet bonus imperator, fortem
& strenuum ducem, populo Israëlitico
diuinitus excitatum & datum, Gedeonem,
suos ita alloquentē: Quod me vi-
deritis facere, id vos quoque facite. a ca-
pite enim, vt inquit Seneca, bona valetu-
do transit in reliqua membra. suntque
in hanc rem præclara Valerij Coruini
„ verba inquentis: Cùm gloria belli, ac
„ virtute sua quemque fretos, ire in aciem
„ debere; tum etiam intueri, cuius ductu
„ auspicioq; ineunda pugna sit: vtrùm qui
„ audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhor-
„ tator sit, verbis tātum ferox, operum mi-
„ litariū expers: an qui & ipse tela tractare,
„ procedere ante signa, versari in media
„ mole pugnæ sciat. facta mea, non dicta,
„ vos milites sequi volo, nec disciplinam
„ modò, sed exēplum etiam a me petere,
„ qui hac dextra mihi tres cōsulatus, sum-
„ mamque laudē peperī^a. Sic certè C. Cæ- a *Livii l. 7.*
sar inordinatā aciem sæpe restituit, obfi-
stens fugientibus, retinensque singulos,
& con-

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a Sueton, in
Caesar. & contortis faucibus conuertens in ho-
stem ^a. Itaque ancipiti illo praelio, quo
cum iuniore Pompeio in Hispania con-
flictus, suis præ pauore trepidè pugnantibus,
cùm res esset in maximo discrimine,
& nihil exhortationibus proficeret;
arrepto cuiusdam clypeo, increpitisque
militibus, procurrit in hostem, dicens:
Nunc & mihi finis vitæ erit, & vobis mi-
litæ. quo facto pudori cedente metu, a-
ciem restituit, ducentis telis in clypeo
acceptis ^b. In quo tamen maximè indu-
b Appian. de
bell. civil. l. 2. striam imperatoris* requiro, vt sua qui- 19
dem alacritate militum animos ad quod-
uis periculum subeundum paratiores red-
dat: non temerè tamen periculo sese ex-
ponat: præsertim ad quem summa re-
rum spectat: nisi maxima necessitate id
exigente, & cùm de totius belli euentu
agitur. multas enim vrbes euersas, plures
fufos fugatosque exercitus, imperato-
rum temeraria morte legimus. Itaque
mors P. Scipionis in Hispania, dum sese
nimium hostium telis offert, vt hostes
haud dubiè pro victoribus, & Romani
c Livius l. 25 pro victis essent, effecit ^c. & vulnus Cn.
Scipionis ad Mundam vincetibus egre-
giè Romanis, sed de salute imperatoris
solli-

sollicitis pauorem iniecit, & haud dubie
 & præclaræ victoriæ impedimēto fuit. ^{a Lanius l. 24}
 Sic quoque cū Annibal in Sagūti op-
 pugnatione, dum murum incautius su-
 bit, vulneratus caderet, tanta circa eum
 fuga atque trepidatio fuit, vt non mul-
 tum abesset, quin opera ac vineæ dese-
 rerentur ^{b Lanius l. 21}. Sic cum Epaminonda, dum
 non ducis tantū, verū etiam fortis-
 simi militis officio fungitur, vires quo-
 que reipubl. Thebanæ ceciderunt, nam
 vt inquit Iustinus ^{c lib. 6.}, sicuti telo si primam
 aciem perfregeris, reliquo ferro vim no-
 cendi sustuleris: sic illo velut mucrone
 teli ablato duce Thebanorum, reipubl.
 vires hebetatę sunt: vt non tam illū ami-
 sisse, quā cum illo interiisse omnes vi-
 res Thebanorū viderentur. Non itaque
 nimiū fidant fallaci fortunæ principes,
 neque etiam clypeo Iouis: sub quo eos
 versari dixit Homerus: sed in periculis
 suscipiendis, vt inquit Cicero ^{d offic. lib. 1.}, consue-
 tudo imitanda medicorum, qui leuiter
 ægrotantes leuiter curant, grauioribus
 autē morbis periculosas curationes ad-
 hibere coguntur. Huc spectare videtur,
 quod Æmilius Paulus dicebat, cū victo
 Perseo pro gratulatione victorię cōiuiua
 cele-

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*a Pluc. in a
poph.*

b Livii l. 40

celebraret: eiusdem scilicet esse peritiæ,
exercitum hostibus valde terribilem, &
amicis conuiuium valde iucundum red-
dere^a. Et Scipio African. cū eum qui-
dam parum pugnacem dicerent: Impe-
ratorem me mater, non bellatorem pe-
perit, respondit: vt ostenderet, vincendi
rationem in vnius potius scientia & in-
genio, quā in multorum viribus & ar-
mis esse. non enim eadem militares, &
imperatoriae artes sunt. Præterea impe-
rator, vel potius summus princeps*, me- 20
minisse debet cōsiliij Antigoni: qui sæua
tempestate iactatus, cū in eadem naue
secum suos omnes habuisset: præcepisse
liberis dicitur, vt & ipsi meminissent, &
ita posteris proderent: ne quis cum tota
gente simul in rebus dubiis periclitari
auderet. cuius præcepti memor Philip-
pus, Romanis bellum illaturus, duos si-
mul filios in aleam eius, qui proponere-
tur casus, cōmittere noluit: itaque ma-
iorem secum duxit; minorem ad custo-
diam regni remisit in Macedoniā^b: pru-
dentes patresfamilias imitatus, qui soliti
sunt, non omnem vnum in locum pecu-
niam reponere, ne si chasmate, incēdio,
aut bello fortè periret, vniuersa etiam
interi-

interiret hominis substātia. quò spectat
 iactatum inter agricolas adagium, cuius
 admonet Celsus^a: Pecuniā sine peculio
 fragilem esse. quem locum pulchrè ex-
 plicat Corrasius^b. Porro nō solum bel-
 21 landi virtus^{*}, vt inquit Cicero^c, in sum-
 mo & perfectō imperatore quærēda est,
 sed multæ sunt artes eximię huius admi-
 nistræ, comitesque virtutis. In primis
 autem requiritur in eo, qui aliis impe-
 rare vult, vt sibi, & cupiditatibus suis im-
 perare possit, & imperium, quod in alios
 exercere vult, omnium grauissimè & se-
 uerissimè in seipsum exerceat. neque e-
 nim potest exercitum continere is im-
 perator, qui seipsum non continet: neq;
 seuerus esse in iudicando, qui alios in se
 seueros esse iudices non vult. refrenet
 ergo libidines, spernat voluptates, ira-
 cundiam teneat, coërceat auaritiam, &
 ceteras animi labe repellat. cui quidem
 ira affecto, vt inquit Cicero^d, quæ vim
 habere maximam dicitur, præsertim in
 bello, fortuna ipsa cedit: quę, sicut sapiēs
 poëta dixit, suis cuique fungitur mori-
 bus: quemadmodum de M. Porcio Ca-
 tone traditur, viro omnibus virtutibus
 prædito, tantam in eo vim animi inge-
 niique

^a in l. si cho-
 rus. §. 1. D.
 de legat. 3.

^b Miscellan.
 iur. couel. lib. 1
 cap. 13.

^c pro lege
 Manil.

^d in Para-
 dox.

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nūquē fuisse: ut quocunque loco natus
esset, fortunatū sibi ipse facturus videretur,
tam in rebus bellicis, quā civilibus^a. & non temerē creditum fuit, feliciorē futurum Alexādrum Magnum,
si vicisset superbiam, atque iram, mala in-
uicta, aliaque animi vitia: sed quem Per-
sarum arma non fregerunt, vitia vice-
runt^b. Agesilaus verō summus dux, dicebat,
malle se vincere malas cupiditates,
quā maximam hostium urbem capere. melius enim esse, suam ipsius con-
servare libertatem, quā aliis eam adimere^c. & Scipio ex capta Carthagine
non maiorem gloriam meruit, quā
quod captivā adeo eximia formā inter
ceteras, ut quacunque incederet, con-
uerteret in se omnium oculos, inuictā
& intactam sponso Allucio restituerit,
precio redemptionis illi in dotē dato^d.
& idem Scipio, cōciliata sibi clementiā,
& continentiā fama plus in Hispania
profecit, quā inuictis Romanorū ar-
mis. Itaque cū poētæ monstra ab Her-
cule domita, & tyrannos occisos fingūt,
indignant bonum imperatorem, cuius
exemplum nobis Herculem proponūt,
corruptos animi affectus cōprimere de-
bere.

^a Livius l. 39

^b Quint. Cur-
tius lib. 6.

^c Plus. in a-
popb.

^d Livius l. 26

22 bere. Ceterum imperio alicui delato^a, consultum erit, liberum illi de summa rerum statuendi arbitrium permittere, exemplo senatus, populiq̃ue Rom. qui omnium rerum arbitrium, quod ad bellum attinet, imperatori mittebāt, & utrū sedendo, an dimicando rem gerere, hoc vel illud oppidū oppugnare visum esset, ipsius iudicio relinquebant, neque quicquam sibi reseruabāt, quā auctoritatem noui belli indicēdi, aut foederis faciendi cum hoste: quæ summi imperij esse alio loco ostendimus^a. Itaque Q. Fabius cons. in Hetruscos missus, vt sociis Sutrinis, quos Hetrusci obsidebant, opem ferret, Hetruscis prælio fuis, fugatisq̃ue, inconsulto senatu, per siluam Ciminiam hostes persecutus, in Heturiam bellum transtulit^b. & Cn. Manlius cons. Antiocho deuicto, Gallogræcis, quod Antiochum auxiliis iuuisent, sine senatus auctoritate, & iniussu populi, bellum intulit: & nec quicquam criminantibus eum legatis, qui cum eo fuerant, triumphās in urbem inuectus est^c. Similiter Cæsar, cui Gallia prouincia obtigerat, Germanis Gallia expulsis Rhenum trāsiiuit, vt cum Sicambris bellum ge-

^a 3. li. 1. c. 6.

^b *Linus* l. 9.

^c *Linus* l. 38

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lum gereret, quòd illos, qui sibi Galliæ-
que bellum intulerāt, & in fines Sicam-
brorum se receperant, dedere nollent: &
in Britanniam quoque exercitum tran-
stulit, quòd omnibus fere gallicis bellis,
hostibus Romānorū inde subministrata
auxilia intelligebat: hæcque omnia ex
suo tantum arbitrio fecit^a. Cn. autem
Pompeio bellum aduersus piratas lege
Gabinia in triennium ita mandatū fuit,
vt toto mari, quod est intra columnas
Herculis, & in maritimis prouinciis, vsq;
ad quadringentesimum a mari stadium,
potestatem haberet imperandi regibus,
præsidibus, ciuitatibus, vt se omnibus ad
eius belli administrationem necessariis
iuuaret^b. & Q. Fabio Max. dictatori per-
missum fuit, vt omnia faceret, vt e re pu-
blica duceret. & T. Quintio cons. liberū
arbitrium pacis, ac belli cum Philippo
permisum fuit^c. in quo meritò pruden-
tiam senatus populiq; Rom. laudes.
nam qui ex alieno metu, voluntateque
pendet, nihil magnum præstare potest.
Difficile quoque fuisset senatui, ea quæ
oculis subiecta non sunt, suo iudicio ad-
ministrare: & vbi castra locanda essent,
scire: quæ loca præditiis occupanda:
quando

^a *Cæsar de
bell. gal. lib. 4*

^b *Plut in Pō
pe. Cicc. pro
lege man. Ap-
pian. in Mi-
thyrd.*

^c *Linus l. 32*

quando cum hoste configendum: quādo quiescendū esset, præscribere: & terra, quod aiūt, gubernare: præsertim cū puncto tēporis, vt inquit Liuius, cuius præteruolat opportunitas, si cunctatus paululū fueris, ne quicquā mox amissam queraris. Porro quò maiori animo, & omnibus curis libero, ad summā rerum imperatores consulere possent, ne metu supplicij a re gerenda deterrentur: senatus, populusq; Romanus, re fortè male gesta, fortunā tantū belli incusans, nunquam crudelius quicquā in eos statuit: nec vnquam atrocior in eos, qui temeritate, atq; inscitia, exercitus amisisset, fuit, quā vt pecunia eos multaret: capite anquisitum ob rem bello male gestā, de imperatore fere nunquā fuit: ipsam calamitatē satis pœnæ esse existimantes, & laude frustrari. cuius rei exēplo sunt M. Sergius, & P. Virginius tribuni militum cōsulari potestate, bello contra Veiētes, nā cū fortè hostes ea regione, qua M. Sergius præerat, castra adorti essent: nec se iā Romani ab hostibus tueri possent, & sola spes esset, si a maioribus castris subueniretur, quibus Virginius præerat priuatim Sergio inuisus & infestus:

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noluit Virginius collegæ auxilium submittere, nisi peteret: & Sergius, nequam opem videretur ab inimico petisse, vincti ab hoste, quàm vincere per ciuē maluit: ita vt huius pertinaciam arrogantia alterius æquaret: quo factū est, vt milites diu in medio cæsi, postremò desertis munitionibus perpauci in maiora castra, pars maxima atq; ipse Sergius Romam pertenderet: vbi acta vtriusq; causa in senatu, & apud populum die dicta, tantum denis millibus æris grauis rei damnati sunt ^a. Similiter M. Postumius tribunus militum cōsulari potestate, quòd ad Veios eius opera male pugnatū esset, decem quoque millibus grauis æris: & C. Sempronius conf. ob ignominiam Volscici belli, quindecim millibus æris damnati sunt ^b. solum inuenio de Cn. Fulvio prætore, ob exercitum in Apulia amissum (cū omnibus probris oneraretur, & iurati multi dicerent fugæ pauciorisq; initium a prætore ortum, ab eo desertos milites, cū haud vanum timorem ducis crederent, terga dedisse) capite anquisitum fuisse: qui priusquam dies comitiorum adesset, exulatum Tarquinios abiit ^c. Multis verò annis ante, Sp. Ser-

^a *Linus l. 5.*

^b *Linus l. 4.*

^c *Linus l. 36*

Sp. Seruilius, vt consulatu abiit, reus capitis fuit, a trib. pleb. die dicta, quòd Hetruscòs in castra fugientes audacius quàm prudentius persecutus, robur iuuentutis amisisset. sed cùm id indignissimè ferrent patricij, rem non ferendam dictitantes, eos qui se pro republica impigrè hostibus obijciant, si fortuna minus faueat, ignauix accusari ab iis qui nunquàm in acie steterint: rārum potuerunt apud populum, vt omnium calculis reus absolueretur: ostendētes non esse e repub. damnari duces ob infortunium ^a. Atqui in C. Terentium Varronem consulem, cuius temeritate, inconsulto collega L. Æmilio Paulo clades illa Cannēsis Romanis illata est, ex qua relicto exercitu, & collega fortiter mortuo profugit, nō solum non est animaduersum ob rem male gestam, sed etiam ex tanta clade redeunti obuiam itum frequenter est, & gratiæ actæ, quòd de republ. non desperasset: cui, si Carthaginiensium ductor fuisset, nihil recusandum supplicij foret ^b. Fuere enim * Carthaginienses in militiæ negotiis tam asperi, vt imperatores, qui prauo cōsilio, qaamuis prospero euentu rem gessissent, in crucem tollerent:

Q 3

^a Dion Hal.
ant. Ro. lib. 9

^b Livius l. 22

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rent : quod bene gesserant, deorum immortalium adiutorio, quod male admi-

^a *Vale. Max.
lib. 2. cap. 7.
Livius lib. 38*

serant, ipsorum culpæ imputantes^a. Itaque Mago insignis Carthaginiensium imperator, qui primus omnium imperium Pœnorum ordinata disciplina militari constituit, viresque ciuitatis non minus bellandi arte quam virtute firma-

^b *Iustin. l. 19*

uit^b, ob rem male gestam contra Syracusanos, metu supplicij seipsum interfecit : quo non contenti Carthaginienses,

^c *Plut. in vi.
Timoleonis*

morui corpus in crucem sustulerunt^c.

Sciendum autem hanc laxam, & largam de summa rerum liberè consulendi potestatem, imperatori tributam, in magistro equitum, tribuno, vel alio qui imperatore inferior est, admodum restrictā

^d *§. de offic.
legati tribuni
lib. 3.*

fuisse : vt suo loco dicemus^d. & quidem, quantumuis libera permittatur duci rerum omnium, ex arbitrio suo admini-

^e *in l. credi
tor. §. l. lucius.
D. mandati*

stratio : nihilominus, si quid fraudulenter fecerit, de eo tenebitur. nam plenè

^f *l. in perso
nam. §. gene-
raliter. D. de*

quidem, vt inquit Scæuola, sed quatenus res ex bona fide agenda est, mandatum

*reg. iur. l. hec
reditio. D. de*

censetur^e. & quod in arbitrium alius confertur, semper ad boni viri arbitrium

*contr. emptio.
l. si in lege. D.*

referendum est.^f

*locati. l. si so-
cietatem. D.*

pro socio.

SE

LIBER SECVNDVS. 122
 SEQVVTVR PROPO-
 SITIONES QVAEDAM BEL-
 LICÆ, ET CAUTIONES IMPERATO-
 RIÆ, veterum exemplis stabilitæ.

Vnum non plures exercitui præfici debere,
 cum potestate libera, eundemq; c tinuum,
 nec eum quem prius offenderis, ignomi-
 niæ affeceris.

- 1 *Plurium imperium bello inutile.*
- 2 *Quando dictator creari solitus apud Ro-*
- 3 *dictatoris potestas. (manos.*
- 4 *Non nisi confecto bello successor impera-*
tori mittendus.
- 5 *Monarchia optima reipub. status.*
- 6 *Periculosum eum quem offenderis sum-*
ma rerum præficere.

CAPVT TERTIVM.

Quattuor tribuni militum consulari
 potestate Romæ creari, quorum
 tres delectu habito profecti sunt Veios,
 documento fuere, inquit Liuius^a, quàm ^{a lib. 4.}
 1 plurium imperium * bello inutile esset:
 tendendo ad sua quisque consilia, cum
 aliud alij videretur, aperuerunt ad occa-
 sionem locū hosti: incerta namq; acie, si-
 gnū aliis dari, receptui aliis cani iubēti-
 bus, inuasere opportune Veiētes, & in fu-
 gā egere. Cōsimiliter L. Æmilius Paul^{us},

Q 4 ac Te-

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ac Terentius Varro aduersus Annibalē:
nec ita pridem Germanorum principes
aduersus Carolum v. magno suo damno
expertisunt, nihil a pluribus rectē im-
perari posse. Itaque Græci & Romani*, 2
cū graue bellum, aut seditio ciuilis rē-
publicam perturbaret: ad vnus dictato-
ris aut Archi, aut Harmostæ imperium,
velut ad sacram anchoram confugiebāt.
vnde Romanis a Veientibus victis: Mœ-
sta ciuitate, inquit Liuius^a, vinci insueta,
ad dictatorem creandum recursus est.
& alibi, Tumultuante Romæ plebe, cū
res ad maximam seditionem spectaret,
trepidi patres, inquit Liuius^b, ad duo vl-
tima auxilia, summum imperium, sum-
mumque ad ciuem decurrunt, dictatorem
dici placet: dicitur M. Furius Camillus.
Item Flaminio cum maxima parte exer-
citus ad Trasymenum cæso, cū magna
trepidatio Romæ esset, ad remedium iā
diu desideratum, inquit Liuius^c, nec ad-
hibitum, dictatorem dicendum ciuitas
confugit. & vt idem refert^d, cū Præne-
stini discordia Romanorum freti, ra-
ptim agmine factō, peruastratis agris ad
portam Collinam signa inferrent, Ro-
mani a seditione ad bellum versi, dicta-
torem

a lib. 4.

b lib. 6.

c lib. 22.

d lib. 16.

torem T. Quintium Cincinnatum creauere : quod ubi auditum est (tantus eius magistratus terror erat) simul hostes a mœnibus recessere, & iuniores Romani ad edictū sine detrectatione conuenere. Itaque non temerè creditum est, quod Liuius sensit^a, Gallos urbem Romā non a lib. 5. capturo fuisse, si, quēadmodum aduersus Fidenatem ac Veientem hostem, aliosque finitimos populos, vltima experiens auxilia, multis tēpestatibus ciuitas fecerat: dictatorem dixisset, contra inusitatum, & inauditū hostem, ab Oceano, terrarumque vltimis oris bellum cientem. Dictator verò *optima lege creatus, summum imperium belli, pacis, pœnarum ac præmiorū sine prouocatione habebat : vt liber impedimentis omnibus melius ad summam rerum cōsulere posset^b. Qua ratione T. Quintio, & Agrippa Furio cōsulib. in Æquos & Volscos profectis, cū duo cōsules in exercitu Romano pari potestate essent, quod saluberrimum in administratione rerū magnarū est, inquit Liuius^c, summa im- c lib. 3. perij, concedente Agrippa, penes collegam erat. Similiter Aristides, summus vir, & Atheniensium imperator bello

^b Pomp. in l.
2. S. p. palo.
Dedecoriz sur.

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Marothonio, cùm plures imperatores more Atheniensium creati essent, pari potestate, Milciadi collegæ, vt solus imperaret, concessit, atque reliquis collegis, vt idem facerent, auctor tuit. idque consilium constat sublati contentionibus, gloriosissimam de Medis victoriam Atheniensibus peperisse^a. Quàm autem expediat, duci exercitus liberam de summa rerum cōsulendi potestatem permittere, superiore capite ostēdimus. Porro cùm minimè conueniat, interrumpi tenorem rerum, in quibus peragendis continuatio ipsa efficacissima est; non nisi confecto bello successorem imperatori mitti expedit. nam inter traditionem imperij, nouitatemque successoris: qui noscendis prius, quàm agendis rebus imbuendus sit: sæpe bene gerendæ rei occasiones intercidunt. Quare Fabius Max. monuit populum, vt magno iudicio consules crearent, qui possent esse pares Annibali: Nam, inquit, cùm, qui est summus in ciuitate dux, eundem elegerimus, tum repente lectus in annum, aduersus veterem & perpetuum imperatorē comparabitur, nullis neque temporis, neque iuris inclusum

^a *Plut. in A.
regule.*

„ clusum angustiis , quo minus ita om-
„ nia gerat , administretque , vt tempo-
„ ra postulabunt belli : nobis in appara-
„ tu ipso , ac tantum inchoantibus res an-
„ nus circumagitur ^a. Vnde etiam Li- ^a *Liuij* 1,24
uius ^b, cum Romanos duces cum Ale- ^b *lib.* 9.
xandro comparat , eo mirabiliores il-
los quam Alexandrum , aut quemquam
alium regem facit , quod denos vicens-
que dies quidam dictaturam , nemo plus
quam annum consulatum gessit : ab tri-
buno pleb. delectus impediti sunt : post
tempus ad bella ierunt : ante tempus
comitiorum causa reuocati sunt : in ipso
conatu rerum circumegit se annus : col-
legæ nunc temeritas , nunc prauitas im-
pedimento aut damno fuit : male rebus
gestis , rebus alterius successum est : ty-
ronem , aut male imbutum disciplina e-
xercitum acceperunt . At hercle re-
ges (inquit) non liberi solum impedi-
mentis omnibus , sed domini rerum tem-
porumque , trahunt consiliis cuncta ,
non sequuntur . præterea supra hæc om-
nia incommoda , quam arborem quis
conseruit , ab ea legere alium fructum
indignum videtur . vt Qu. Fabius Max.
dicebat , perens Hetruriam , extra ordinem
prouin-

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prouinciam sibi dari : qui aperuisset Cr-
miniam siluam, viamque per deuios sal-
tus Romano bello fecisset*. Et his qui-
dem argumentis, & exemplis, multum
iunatur sententia eorum, qui monar-
chiam* & regiam potestatem vniuersæ
nature congruentem, optimum reipub.
statum constituerunt. Quare etiam Si-
bylla carminibus suis augurata dicitur
reipub. Romanæ salutem in regno posi-
tam esse, & ciues aliter seruari non posse,
quàm si regem haberent. Nam vt Tibe-
rius dicebat, fieri non potest, vt respubl.
bene constituta, quod vnum tantum est
corpus, plura capitâ habeat. Ceterum,
periculosissimum quoque erit*, eum
quē offenderis, vel ignominia affeceris,
summæ rerum præficere. cuius rei exem-
plo esse potest M. Liuius: qui cū ex con-
sulatu populi iudicio damnatus, igno-
miniam ægrè ferens, in rus migrasset, &
octauo post damnationem anno, in urbē
reductus, iterum consul factus esset: me-
moræ proditum est, plenum adhuc ira
in ciues M. Liuium, ad bellum profici-
scientem contra Annibalem, monēti Q.
Fabio, ne priusquam genus hominum
cognosceret, temerè manum cōsereret,
respon-

respondisse, vbi primùm hostiũ agmen
 conspexisset, pugnaturum: cumque
 quæreretur, quæ causa festinandi esset:
 Aut ex hoste egregiam gloriam, inquit,
 aut ex ciuibus victis gaudium meritum
 certè, etsi non honestum capiam^a. Simi-
 liter Harpagus, cum Astyages Medorum
 rex illi infestus, in vltionem seruati ne-
 potis Cyri, filium eius interfecisset, epu-
 landumque patri tradidisset: ad tempus
 dissimulato dolore, odium regis in vin-
 dictę occasionem distulit: & postea cum
 Cyrus Astyagi bellũ inferret, & Astya-
 ges summam belli Harpago cõmisisset:
 exercitum acceptum, statim Cyro per
 deditiõẽ tradidit, & regis crudelitatem
 perfidia defectionis vltus fuit.^b

a Livius 1, 27

b Livii lib. 1

Vtrum lenitate & benevolentia: an verò se-
 ueritate & sũuitia plus proficiet imperator.

- 1 Nullum animal maiore arte tractadum,
 quàm homo.
- 2 Scipio humanitate, Annibal crudelitate,
 parem in rebus bellicis gloriam conse-
 cuti sunt.
- 3 Manlius seueritate, Valerius benigni-
 tate milites in officio continuerunt.
- 4 Cavendum ne nimia lenitas pariat con-
 temptum,

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- temptum, neque nimia sæuitia odium.*
5 *In principe requiritur beneuolentia.*
6 *Non potest amor cum timore misceri.*
7 *Imperator apud suos milites plus proficiet comitate, quàm morum asperitate.*
8 *Homo beneficio & beneuolentia inuitari cupit.*
9 *Obsequio mitigantur imperia.*
10 *Beneuolentia etiam apud hostes multum potest.*

CAP. QVARTVM.

NON solùm belladi virtutem in summo, ac perfecto imperatore quærendam esse alibi diximus: sed multas alias esse artes eximias, huius administras, comitesque virtutis. & quidem, cùm nullum sit animal*, vt sensit Seneca, maiore arte tractandum, quàm homo: queri solet, vtrùm in imperatore requiratur magis asperitas & sæuitia; an verò humanitas, & beneuolentia. qua de re in ytramque partem innumera possent adduci exempla: & in primis sese offerunt Annibal, & Scipio*, summi duces, qui diuersissimis ingeniis, longè diuersiore modo, ac ratione, parem ex rebus belli-

bellicis gloriam reportauere. hic enim in Hispaniam missus, innata sibi humanitate, & beneuolentia, non solum militum animos sibi deuinxit: sed etiam conciliata clementiæ fama, totam Hispaniam Romanæ dirionis fecit: ille cōtrā, magna violentia, crudelitate, & rapina Italiam deuastauit, & omnes populi Italiæ, omnia fere oppida ad eum defecere: ita ut, quemadmodum Hispania, beneuolentia Scipionis, sic Italia, timore Annibalis subacta fuerit. Simile exemplum habemus in Manlio Torquato, & Valerio * Coruino, qui pari virtute & gloria vixere Romæ: dispari tamen ingenio, & ratione procedendi. Manlius enim ferox natura, maxime seuerus in disciplina militari fuit: Valerius verò omni genere humanitatis, & beneuolentiæ milites prosecutus est. usque adeò, ut ad milites in officio continendos, ille filium victorem, & speciosa spolia referentem, quod eius iniussu pugnasset cū hoste, virgis cæsum securi percussit: hic verò neminem vel offenderit quidē. at tamen pro tam dissimili ratione agendi, non dissimile fructū & gloriam retulere. nulla enim ynquam
seditio

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seditio inter vtriusque ducis milites orta fuit : nūquam vllus pugnam detrectavit, aut dicto minus obediens fuit : & vterque maximas res gessit. Manlius itaq; sua seueritate & imperiosis edictis, disciplinam militarem mirum in modū stabiliiuit : Valerius verò, tātum in militari disciplina seruans, innata sibi humanitate & lenitate militum animos flexit, & obedientissimos habuit : & si quos forte legum, & disciplinæ contemptores puniebat, non hoc imperatoris seueritati, sed constitutioni legū ascribebant. non enim vbi imperio, vbi lege agi poterat, volebat. & hæc exempla propositā questionem satis dubiam relinquunt. Porro illud certè* magno iudicio, vtramuis viā 4 sequamur, cauendum : ne nimia lenitas pariat contemptum : quod Scipioni euenit : inter cuius milites maxima seditio mota est in Hispania : neque nimia sæuitia odium excitet : quod Annibali accidit : qui crudeliter & auarè spoliādo ea, quæ tueri nequibat, vt vasta hosti relinqueret, omnium animos a se abalienauit, neque indigna patientium modò, sed ceterorum etiam : quippe ad plures exemplum, vt inquit Liuius^a, quā calamitas

^a lib. 36.

lamitas pertinebat. Ceterum qui de in-
 5 stitutione principis * scripsere, potius
 Valerium, & Scipionem imitādos pro-
 ponunt, & humanitatem, beneuolentiā,
 & similes virtutes in principe requirūt:
 vt de Cyro scripsit Xenophon. maluse-
 6 nim cuflos *, vt inquit Cicero ^a, diutur- ^{a offic. lib. 2.}
 nitatis metus, contraque beneuolentia
 „ fidelis est, vel ad perpetuitatem. & Præ-
 „ textatus apud Macrobiū ^b, Qui colitur, ^{b Satyr. lib. 1}
 „ inquit, etiam amatur: non potest amor ^{c, 2.}
 „ cum timore misceri. vnde putas arrogā-
 „ tissimum illud manasse prouerbiū, quod
 „ iactatur: Totidē nobis hostes esse, quot
 „ seruos? non habemus illos hostes; sed fa-
 „ cimus, cū illis superbissimi, contume-
 „ liosissimi, crudelissimi sumus. Itaq; præ-
 „ clarè Ennius.

Quem metuunt, oderunt;

Quem quisque odit, perisse expetit.

Et multorū odiis nullas opes posse ob-
 sistere, interitu C. Cæsar̃s ostendit Ci-
 cero^c. atque hanc sententiam, etiam in ^{c offic. lib. 1.}

7 Imperatore* confirmat exemplum Ap-
 pij Claudij, & T. Quintij consl. Appius
 enim in Volscos missus, vexando sæuo
 imperio exercitum, hoc sua acerbitate
 effecit, vt milites omnia segniter, ociosè,

R neglig-

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negligenter, contumaciter agerent : & eos nec pudor, nec metus coërceret, odio consulis exacerbatis omniū animis: vsque adeo vt Romanus exercitus in aciem productus, non solū vincere noluerit, sed vinci voluerit, & turpi fuga petierit castra. Quintius verò in Volscos missus, naturalenior, comitate & beneficiis animos militum sibi concilians, præda omni militi data, & laudes addens, quibus haud minus quàm præmio gaudent militum animi, rebus egregiè gestis, in urbem rediit ^a. Item Cæso Fabius cons. in Veientes missus, cū præter ceteras imperatorias artes, quas parando, gerendoque bello ediderat plurimas, ita instruxisset aciem, vt solo equitatu emisso, exercitum hostiū funderet, insequi fusos, pedes odio consulis, propter morum asperitatem, noluit, & iniussu signa retulit: nec huic tam pestilenti exemplo, inquit Liuius ^b, remedia vlla ab imperatore quæsitæ sunt : adeo excellētibus ingeniis citius defuerit ars, qua ciuem regant, quàm qua hostem superent. Similiter L. Papyrius dictator, ob sæuitiam, qua M. Fabium magistrum equitum (quod eius iniussu quāuis prospere

^a *Liuius lib. 2*
Dion. Hal.
lib. 9.

^b *lib. 2.*

sperè pugnauerat cum hoste) constanter ad supplicium poposcerat, neque militibus gratus fuit, neque hostibus terribilis: quam tamen maximam imperatoris laudem esse cēset Agesilaus. itaque cū hostes ad castra Papyrij accessissent, tantum momenti in vno viro Papyrio erat, inquit Liuius^a, vt si ducis consilia fauor^{a lib. 8.} subsecutus militum foret, debellari eo die cum Samnitibus potuisse pro haud dubio proditum sit: ita instruxerat acie loco ac subsidiis, ita omni arte bellica firmauerat: sed cessatum a milite, ac de industria, vt obrectaretur laudibus ducis, impedita victoria fuit. verū sensit peritus dux, quæ res victoriæ obstaret: temperandum ingenium suum esse, & seueritatem miscendam comitati: atque ita maxima dexteritate, fauciorum præcipuè curam suscipiēs, tantum profecit, vt medēdis corporibus, animi prius militum imperatori conciliarentur: & re-
fecto exercitu, cum hoste congressus, haud dubia spe sua militumque, fudit fugauitque Samnites. Est itaque comi-
8 tate condienda* grauitas, nam vt sapienter a Xenophonte scriptum est: cū tribus præcipuè rebus ad obtemperandum

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adducantur alia animalia, cibis abiection-
 ra, delinimentis erectiora, verberibus
 contumacia: homo, quod est animal ge-
 nerosissimum, neque minis, neque sup-
 pliciis cogi vult, sed beneficio & bene-
 uolentia inuitari cupit. Cum enim bruta
 se vi trahi sinant, homo non nisi ratione
 seduci patitur. Nihilominus tamē scien- 9
 dum est, regum, ducumque clementiam,
 ut Alexander Magnus dicebat, non in
 ipsorum modò, sed etiam in illorū, qui
 parent, ingeniis sitam esse: obsequio e-
 nim mitigantur imperia. ubi verò reue-
 rentia excessit animis, & summa imis
 confundimus, vi opus est, ut vim repel-
 lamus^a. Ceterum beneuolentia^{*} & hu- 10
 manitas, nō solum apud milites & ciues
 prodest, sed etiam apud hostes nō semel
 plus potuit, quàm inuicta Romanorum
 arma, ut exemplo Scipionis iam ostēsum
 est. & facit quoque exemplum Camilli,
 cum Faliscos obsideret, qui alioqui diu-
 turnus videbatur futurus labor, nisi sua
 beneficentia, tradens proditorem filio-
 rum regis, ipsos ad deditionem pellexif-
 set^b. Fabricij quoque liberalitas, cum in-
 fidiantem vitæ Pyrrhi medicum, ipsi in-
 dicaret, regis animum fregit & vicit.
 Huma-

^a Q. Curt. l. 8.

^b Livius l. 5.

Humanitas itaque, vt inquit Valerius Maximus^a, vincit iram, prosternit odiū, ^{a lb. 5. ca. 4} hostilemque sanguinē hostilibus lacrymis permiscet.

Temporum rationem præcipuè in bello habendam.

- 1 *Aliter in bello, aliter in pace agendum.*
- 2 *In pace consuetudini, in bello utilitati parendum.*
- 3 *Sententia Fabij Max. de Altinio transfuga.*
- 4 *Marcellus L. Brantium beneficio sibi conciliare, quàm pœna cohibere maluit.*
- 5 *Scipio Nasica, priuato consilio conuocatis bonis, Gracchum oppressit.*
- 6 *Octavius Cæsar sua sponte bellum intulit Antonio.*
- 7 *Silent leges inter arma.*
- 8 *Necessitas ex illicito facit licitum.*
- 9 *Non dicitur fieri contra legem, quod urgente necessitate fit.*
- 10 *Ex occasionibus belli ratio commutanda.*
- 11 *Fabius natura cunctator non iudicio.*

CAP. QVINTVM.

QVi de officiis scripsere, in omnibus actionibus maximam tēporum ra-

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tionem habendam censuerunt, præsertim in iis, quæ in casu consistunt. unde, vt Q. Fabius Max. Q. Fabio Max. filio consuli dicebat, aliter in medio ardore belli *, aliter in pace tranquilla arbitrandum, & agendū est. in pace enim liberè, prout æquitas & iustitia dicat, consulendum est, & legibus insistendum: in bello autem, & turbulentis temporibus, ordinariis hisce remediis, irritantur sæpe magis, & accenduntur bella & seditiones, quàm sedantur. Vnde fit plerunque, vt leges quæ in pace latæ sunt (nisi forte eæ quæ perpetuæ utilitatis causa in æternū latæ sint) bellum abroget; quæ in bello pax ^a. vt in naui administratione alia in secunda, vt inquit Liuius, alia in aduersa tempestate vsui sunt. Itaq; maiores nostri inquit Cicero ^b, semper in pace consuetudini *, in bello utilitati paruerunt: ² semper ad nouos casus temporum nouorum cōsiliorum rationes accommodarūt. & alibi ^c: Necesse est, inquit, in tāta concursatione perturbationum ac rerum, temporibus potius parere, quàm moribus. Qua ratione Q. Fabius Max. * ³ parer, Classium Altiniū Arpinatem (qui clam nocte in castra Romana venerat, promit-

^a l. vn. in pr.
C. de cad. l. l.

^b pro lege
Mamil.

^c Philipp. ii.

promittens si sibi præmio foret, se Arpos proditum esse) noluit pro transfuga verberari necarique, quod aliis videbatur, quia post Cannensem cladem, tanquam cum fortuna fidē stare oporteret, ad Annibalem defecisset, traxissetque ad defectionem Arpos: & tum posteaquam res Romana, contra spem vota-que eius, veluti resurgeret, novā refert prodicionem. documentum enim statui oportere censebat Fabius, si quis resipisceret, & antiquam societate respiceret, nam si abire a Romanis liceret, redire ad eos non liceret, cui dubium esset, quin brevi deserta ab sociis Romana res, foederibus Punicis omnia in Italia iuncta visura esset. non tamen fidei quicquam Altinio habendum cēsebat, sed mediam contectus cōsiliij viam, neque eum pro hoste, neque pro socio habēdum^a. Item *a Livius li. 24.*

4 cū in maximo discrimine Nola esset*, quam non tam fiducia sui præsidij, quam volūtatē principum Marcellus habebat, plebe ad defectionem spectāte, quæ plurimū timebatur, & ante omnes L. Brantius iuuenis acer, quem consensus attētatæ defectionis, ac metus a prætore Romano, nunc ad prodicionem patriæ, nūc

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ad transfugiendum stimulabat: & Marcellus eum aut poena cohibendum, aut beneficio conciliandum videret: sibi assumpsisse, quam hosti ademisse, fortem ac strēnum maluit socium, accitumque ad se, ita comitate sua, additis etiam præmiis, ferocis iuuenis animum emolliuit, ut nemo inde sociorum, rem Romanam fortius ac fidelius iuuerit. De ceteris verò Nolanis prodicionis reis Marcellus, Annibale demum prælio victo, clausis portis quæstionem habuit. Et huc quoque spectare videtur, quod de Scipione Nasica proditum est *. nam cum 5 Tib. Gracchus, in tribunatu profusis largitionibus, fauore populi occupato, rempub. oppressam teneret, palamque dictitaret, interempto senatu, omnia per plebem agi debere, & consentientibus cunctis, ut cōsul armis rempub. tueretur, Mucius Scæuola consul negaret se viquicquam esse acturum: tum Scipio Nasica: Quoniam, inquit, consul, dum iuris ordinē sequitur, id agit, ut cum omnibus legibus Romanum imperium corruat: egomet priuatus voluntati vestræ me ducem offero: & sublata dextra proclamauit: Qui rempub. saluam esse volunt, me se-

- me sequantur: eaque voce, cunctatione bonorum ciuium discussa, Gracchum cum scelerata factione, quas merebatur poenas soluere coëgit^a. Hinc quoque
- 6 Cicero^b laudat Octaviū * Cæsarem, qui non exspectato senatus decreto, bellum contra Antonium sua spōte susceperat. Decernendi enim tempus, vt ille ait, nōdum venerat, belli autem gerendi tēpus, si prętermisisset, videbat repub. oppressa nihil posse decerni. Silent ergo nōnun-
- 7 quam leges* inter arma, nec se exspectari sinunt: cū ei qui exspectare velit, ante poena luenda sit, quā iusta repetenda^c. Eoque spectat, quod de C. Mario proditum est, qui cū duas cohortes Camertium, quod mira virtute vim Cimbrorū in acie sustinuissent, aduersus conditionem foederis, ciuitate donasset: excusauit factum dicendo, inter armorum strepitum, verba se iuris ciuilis exaudire nō potuisse. erat enim id tempus, quo magis defendere, quam audire leges oportebat^d. Et certē necessitas sæpe facit lici-
- 8 tum*, quod alioqui esset illicitum^e. Itaque clade Cannensi afflictis Romanorū viribus, eò res deducta est, vt M. Iunij dictatoris opera, spolia hostium affixa tē-

^a Val Max.
lib. 3. cap. 2.
Appian. de
bel. ciuil. lib. 1.
^b Philipp. 8.

^c Cicero pro
Milone.

^d Val Max.
lib. 5. c. 2.
^e c. discipul. 8
de cōsec. di. 11.
4. cap. si quis
propter cessatū.
de furt.

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plis, deorum numini consecrata, instrumenta militiæ futura, conuellerentur: ac prætextati pueri arma induerent: addictorum etiam, & capitali crimine damnatorum, atque seruorum aliquot milia (cùm ad id tempus capite censos habere milites fastidierant) conscriberentur^a. Quæ si per se aspiciantur, ut inquit Val. Maximus^b, aliquid ruboris habent: si autem adiunctis necessitatis viribus, ponderentur, sæuitiæ temporis conuenientia remedia videbuntur. nam ut idē ait: Cedendum fortunæ est, ubi nisi tutiora eligantur consilia, speciosa sequenti concidendum est. Sic quoque C. Mario, & Cn. Carbone cons. bello civili cum Sylla dissidentibus: quo tempore non rei publ. victoria quærebatur, sed præmiū victoriæ res erat publica: SC.^{to} aurea atq; argentea templorū ornāmēta, quæ Numa Pōpilius solēnibus deorū sacris dicauerat, ne militibus stipendia deessent, conflata sunt, tanta fuit in summa egestate honoris publici ratio. non autē patrū conscriptorum voluntas, ut inquit Valerius Max^c. sed tua teterrima necessitas, truculenta manus illi consulto stylū impressit. Neq; etiam dicitur fieri contra legem,

^a Liv. lib. 23

^b lib. 7. cap. 6

^c lib. 7. cap. 6

9 legem*, quod urgente necessitate fit, & suadete utilitate publica. Supremo enim iure, quod Iuppiter sanxit, ut inquit Cicero^a, omnia quæ reipub. salutaria sunt, a Philipp. 3. legitima & iusta habentur. Itaq; Scipio Africanus, cum ad necessarium reipub. usum, pecuniâ ex ærario pmi opus esset: idq; quæstores, quia lex obstare videretur, aperire non auderët, protinus claves poposcit, patefactoq; ærario legē utilitati cedere coëgit^b. & Lacedæmonij, necessitati leges posthabere coacti, dixisse feruntur: Dormiāt leges hodie^c. Hinc nōnulli existimāt, si subitū & improuisum bellū timetur, vel alias ex maxima necessitate, teneri ecclesiā ad contributionē.^d

^b Val. Max.
lib. 3. cap. 7.

^c Appian. de
bel. punic.

^d Ab. Panor.
in o. sicut. ult.
de iur. iur.

Ceterū etiam q̄ ad ipsā belli administrationē attinet, vel maximè imperatori, vel duci exercitus, tēpori seruiendū
10 est*, & ex occasionibus, belli ratio cōmutanda est, & nūc impetu quodam & alacritate animi ferociter tēporis beneficio vtēdo: nunc cunctando & sedēdo, cautē res geri debet. quod quia difficile est, repugnante natura, cum non omnia eidē, ut inquit Liuius, dii dederint, magna cura & diligētia, ut ingenium tempori accommodemus, enitendum: neque semper
exem-

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exemplo Fabij bellum trahamus; neque exemplo Marcelli, Scipionis, & aliorū, studio pugnādi facile prælium committamus. Nam Fabius^a natura cunctator, II non iudicio, temporis beneficio tantam in rebus bellicis gloriā meruit: qui impetum hostis Annibalis bellicosi, & aliquot victoriis ferocis, cū prælio facile vinci non posset, afflictiis Romanorum viribus, sedēdo fregit. sed idē naturam secutus, non tempus etiam restauratis Romanorum viribus, in eadē sentētia perstitit, & Scipioni Africam provinciam sibi decerni petenti, cōtradicebat: cū tamen ea sola ratio esset trahendi ex Italia Annibalem, vt euentus docuit: & Scipio si eo tempore, quo Fabius in Annibalem missus fuisset, verisimiliter nimio studio pugnae, exemplo Flamini, & aliorum, qui Fabium præcesserant, rem Romanam amplius afflixisset. adeo difficile est ingenium & naturam mutare. Qua ratione Monarchiæ præferre solēt liberam rempub. in qua inuenias diuersissima ingenia temporibus apta. Ceterum quā plurium imperium bello in-

^a *supra* 6.3. utile sit, alio loco obiter ostendimus.^a

Conten-

Contentiosas & lentas de rebus bellicis deliberationes admodum noxias esse, præsertim ubi facto, magis quàm consulto opus est.

- 1 *Saluberrimum in consultationibus, ut omnes vnum sentiant.*
- 2 *Tarda & læta deliberationes perniciose.*
- 3 *In rebus asperis fortissima consilia tutissima sunt.*
- 4 *Præclarum Scipionis facinus.*

CAP. SEXTVM.

CVM in omnibus deliberationibus & consultationibus, tum præsertim in
 1 bellicis, saluberrimum est*, ut vnum omnes sentiant, neque dissensione & pertinacia (quæ plerumque rem in summum discrimen deducere solent) bona consilia corrumpantur. Quod Appollonides principum vnus, Syracusanis, mortuo Hieronymo Syracusarum tyranno, maximaque inter eos orta dissensione, aliis Carthaginensium, aliis Romanorum amicitiam expetentibus, in tanta perturbatione rerum, cum non procul a seditione res esset, oratione salutari, ut in tali tempore disertè ostendisse videtur,
 „ inquit: Nec spem salutis, nec perniciem
 „ propiorē vnquam ciuitatum vlli fuisse:
 si enim

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si enim vno animo omnes, vel ad Ro-
 manos, vel ad Carthaginienses inclina-
 rent, nullius ciuitatis statum fortuna-
 tiorem gratioremque fore: si alios aliò
 trahat res, non inter Pœnos Romanos-
 que bellum atrocius fore, quàm inter
 ipsos Syracusanos: cùm intra eosdẽ mu-
 ros, pars vnaqueq; suos exercitus, sua ar-
 ma, suos habitura sit duces. Itaq; vt vnũ
 omnes sentiãt, summa vi agendum esse:
 vtra societas sit vtilior, longè minoris a-
 deo rem momenti consultatione esse.
 Porro quemadmodum contentiosæ hæ,
 sic & tardæ & lentæ *deliberationes per-
 niciosissimæ esse solent, præsertim in bel-
 lo, vbi non semel consilium, alioqui per
 se tutum, & salubre, mora temerarium
 & infoelix factum fuisse legimus. cuius
 rei documento fuere Lanuuii, qui cùm
 deliberando tempus terunt, Latinis vi-
 ctis demum auxilium ferre cœperunt.
 itaque cùm iam portis prima signa &
 pars agminis esset egressa: & nuncio al-
 lato de clade Latinorum, cõuersis signis
 retro in urbem redirent, prætorem eo-
 rum Milonium dixisse ferunt, pro pau-
 lula via, magnam mercedẽ Romanis esse
 soluendam b. potuerãt autem Lanuuii,
 vel

a *Li. li. 24.*

b *Li. lib. 3.*

vel quiescendo Romanorum amicitiam
 conseruare, vel suo tempore auxiliū fe-
 rendo Latinis, coniunctis viribus supe-
 riores esse. Et huc facere videtur, quod
 Latinis ad defectionem a Romanis spe-
 ctantibus, & decem principibus eorum
 Romam euocatis, cōsultantibus quid ad
 ea, quę secum actum iri crederent, respō-
 deri placeret: Annius prātor eorum di-
 cebat: Quanquā ipse ego (inquit) retuli,
 „ quid responderi placeret: tamē magis ad
 „ summam rerum nostrarū pertinere ar-
 „ bitror, quid agendum nobis, quā quid
 „ loquendum sit: facile esse explicatis cō-
 „ filiis, accommodare rebus verba^a. Nul- ^a *Liv. lib. 8.*
 lus itaque cunctationi locus est, vt in-
 quit Tacitus, in eo consilio, quod non
 potest laudari, nisi per actum. & in rebus
 3 asperis, & tenuibus*, vt inquit Liuius,
 fortissima quæq; consilia tutissima sunt:
 quia si in occasionis momento, cuius
 præteruolat opportunitas, cūctatus pau-
 lulum fueris, nequicquā mox omissam
 queraris. Vnde C. Cæsar, audacia &
 magna facinora facienda, non delibe-
 randa esse dicebat. estque in hanc rem
 4 præclarum P. Cornelij Scipionis* faci-
 nus. nam cū post Cannensem cladem,
 ij qui

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ij qui Cannusium perfugerant, ad Ap. Claudium Pulchrum, & P. Cornelium Scipionem tribunos militum, summam imperij detulissent, & iis consultantibus de summa rerum, P. Philus cōsularis viri filius, nequicquam eos consultare nunciaret, perditam spem fouere, desperatā esse rempub. nobiles iuvenes quosdam, quorum princeps esset L. Cæcilius Metellus, mare ac naues spectare, vt deserta Italia ad regum aliquem confugerent: cumque tam malo nuncio omnes stu- perent, & qui aderant concilium con- uocandum censerent, negabat consilij rem esse Scipio iuuenis fatalis illius bel- li: audendum atque agendum, non con- sultandum, in tanto malo esse: irent se- cum armati, qui rempub. saluam vellēt: nusquam verius, quā vbi ea cogitaren- tur, hostium castra esse. pergit deinde ire sequētibus paucis in hospitium Metelli, & cū concilium ibi iuuenum, de qui- bus allatum erat, inuenisset, stricto super capita consultantium gladio: Ex mei a- „ nimi sententia, inquit, iuro, vt ego rem- „ pub. non deferam, neque alium ciuem „ Romanum deferere patiar: si sciēs fallo, „ tum me Iuppiter opt. max. domum, fa- „ miliam,

miliam, remque meam, pessimo leto afficias. In hæc verba C. Cæcili iures expos-
tulo, ceterique qui adestis : qui non iurauerit, in hunc gladium strictum esse sciat. haud secus pauidi, quàm si victorẽ Annibalem cernerent, iurant omnes, custodiẽdosque semetipsos contra Annibalem Scipioni tradunt^a. Quod certè ^a *Lin. lib. 22*
facinus maiorem Scipioni gloriã peperit, quàm omnes postea acti ab eo triumphi. Non itaque cunctatione opus est, ut inquit Tacitus, ubi perniciosior est quies, quàm temeritas. quod omnium maximè in discordiis ciuilibus & rebellionibus locum habet : in quibus, ut idẽ Tacitus ait, nihil festinatione tutius, & magis facto quàm cõsulto opus est. omne enim malum nascens, ut inquit Ciceron^b, agens de bello Antonio quàm pri- ^b *Philipp. 5.*
mum inferendo, facilè opprimitur, inueteratum fit plerumque robustius. atque ita Cæsar, Gallis belli consilia renouantibus, coniurationesque faciẽtibus, magnis itineribus, repente omnibus locis occurrit, nec dabat ulli ciuitati spacium de aliena potius, quàm de domestica salute cogitandi : qua celeritate, & fideles animos retinebat, & dubitantes terrore,

S ad con-

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^a *Cæsar de
bel. gal. lib. 8.*

ad conditiones pacis adducebat, & maxima facilitate Gallorum conatus compescuit ^a. Quare ut est in proverbio, tempus nosse debemus: ne ut in infelicibus consiliis evenire solet, optima videantur, ut inquit Tacitus, quorum tempus effugit, & inutili cunctatione agendi tempora consumantur.

Dum res adhuc sunt integræ, ne minimum quidem regi, vel reipubl. de maiestate sua concedendum esse: & errare eos qui arrogantiam hostium, modestia & patientia vinci posse exultant.

- 1 *Regum maiestas ubi cæpit labi, facile præcipitatur.*
- 2 *Hosti non facile quid concedendum.*
- 3 *Præstat bello victum cedere regno, quàm sine certamine.*
- 4 *Patientia & modestia hostes fiunt ferociores.*
- 5 *Malis obuiam eundum in tempore.*
- 6 *Apologus de cane.*
- 7 *Malis conatibus hostium nunquam belli metu concedendum.*
- 8 *Apologus de lupo, pastoribus & canibus.*

CAP. SEPTIMUM.

Nihil quicquã verius profectò, quàm quod Scipio Africanus Antiocho dicebat,

dicebat, monens ne conditiones pacis,
quas dabat, respueretur: regum scilicet
1 maiestatem * difficilius ab summo fasti-
gio ad medium trahi, quàm a mediis ad
ima præcipitari^a. Quare dum res adhuc
sunt integræ, tum reges vel respubl. secū
reputare debent, quicquid de maiestate
2 sua cesserint *, cum eo simul de summa
rerum periclitandum esse: quod iis qui-
bus cesserint, animum ad plura conse-
quenda accendant; ac suis ad ea defen-
denda adimant, & omnibus contemptui
esse incipiant. Præstat itaque pro fortu-
3 na *, dignitateque, ut viro forti dignum
est, quodcunque belli casus tulerit, quā-
diu aliqua spes in armis est, pati, quàm
singula concedendo, sine bello, tota pos-
sessione: excidere, & id de quo cōtendi-
tur bello, omnibus ne quicquam rētatis,
amittere potius est, quàm metu belli cō-
cedere. ita enim bello & pace quæritur,
ut inquit Liuius^b, ut inter omnes con-
ueniat, nec quicquam turpius esse, quàm
sine certamine cecidisse regno, nec præcla-
rius quicquam, quàm pro dignitate ac
maiestate omnem fortunam expertum
esse. eoque magis, quòd ita natura com-
paratum sit, ut quorum arrogantia pa-

^a Liui. li. 37^b lib. 34.

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timentia* & modestia vincere arbitramur, 4
 ferociores nobis plerunque reddamus:
 quod pulchrè ostenditur exemplo Latinorum. nam cùm Latini vna cum Campanis bellum Samnitibus inferrent, & Samnitium legati Româ missi in senatu questi essent, eadem se foederatos pati, quæ hostes essent passi, & precibus infirmis peterét, vt Latinos, Campanosque, qui sub ditione populi Romani essent, pro imperio arcerent Samniti agro, sin imperium abnuerent, armis coërcerent, & aduersus hæc anceps responsum datū esset: quia fateri pigebat, in potestate sua Latinos iam non esse, timerentque ne arguendo abalienarent: Campanorum verò aliam conditionem esse, qui non foedere, sed per deditionem in fidem venissent: itaque Campanos, seu vellent, seu nollét, quieturos: in foedere Latino nihil esse, quo bellare cum quibus vellet, prohiberentur. Responsum hoc, inquit Liuius^a, sicut dubios Samnites, quidnam facturum populum Romanū censerent, dimisit: ita Campanos metu abalienauit: Latinos, veluti nihil iam concedentibus Romanis, ferociores fecit. itaque per speciem aduersus Samnites
 belli

^a lib. 8.

belli parandi, crebra concilia indicētes,
 omnibus cōsultationibus inter se prin-
 cipes Romanum coquebant bellum: ad
 quod Annius prætor hac oratione eos
 » accendit: Si quando, inquit, vnquā con-
 » sociandi imperij, vsurpandæ libertatis
 » tempus optastis: en hoc tempus adest, &
 » virtute vestra, & Deūm benignitate vo-
 » bis datum. tentastis patientiam: negādo
 » militem, quis dubitat exarsisse eos, cū
 » plus ducentorum annorum morem sol-
 » ueremus? pertulerunt tamen hunc do-
 » lorem: bellum nostro nomine cum Pe-
 » lignis gessimus, qui ne nostrorum quidē
 » finium per nos tuendorum ius antea da-
 » bant, nihil intercesserunt. Sidicinos in
 » fidem acceptos, Campanos ab se ad nos
 » descisse, exercitus nos parare aduersus
 » Samnites, foederatos suos audiuerūt, nec
 » mouerunt se ab vrbe. vnde hæc illis tāta
 » modestia, nisi a conscientia virium suarū
 » & nostrarum? Atque ita Romanis tum
 anceps cum Latinis bellum fuit, quod
 nimia patiētia Romanorum, qua se bel-
 lum euitaturos sperabāt, infestissimum
 fuit: cū alioqui, si primis conatibus
 Latinorum obstitissent; paruo negotio
 eos in officio continere potuissent. non

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itaque Romani modestia sua euitauerūt
bellum, sed distulerunt magno Latino-
rum incommodo, in tempus, quo hostes
omnibus rebus paratiores ad bellum es-
sent. Præcipienda igitur sunt cogitatio-
ne futura, & aliquando ante constituen-
dum, quid accidere possit in vtramque
partem, & quid agendum sit, atque ante-
quam eueniat*, obuiam eundum, neque
expectandum donec obruaris, & malum
in dies crescat, & incurabile fiat, quod in
morbis etiam præcipiunt medici. Itaque
Regulus quidam in Gallia, Commano
Segoregiorum regi dixit, & affirmavit
Massiliam (quam Senanus, cui Comma-
nus successerat, Græcis cōdendam con-
cesserat) aliquando exitio finitimis po-
pulis futuram, opprimendam ergo in
ipso ortu, ne mox validior ipsum obrue-
ret, suasit: subnectens hanc fabulam: Ca-
nem aliquando* partu grauidam, locum
a pastore precario petiisse, in quo pare-
ret: quo obtento, iterato petiisse, ut sibi
educare eodem loco catulos liceret: ad
postremum adultis catulis, fultam do-
mestico præsidio, proprietatem loci sibi
vendicasse. non aliter Massilienses, in-
quiens, qui nunc inquilini videantur,
quan-

quandoque dominos regionū futuros^a. ^{a Iustin. l. 43}

Si itaque bellum timetur, præstat imparatos hostes inuadere, quàm belli in præsentiarum euitandi causa, longè infestius bellum in futurum excipere. neq; enim
 7 malis conatibus* hostium vnquam belli metu concedendum est. nam hac ratione non tamen euitatur bellū, quàm cum maximo incommodo differtur. & sæpe etiā te bellum ostendēdo, potius pacem habiturum confidas, quàm hostium arrogantia, armis positis, concedendo. quo non tam sedatur ferocia hostium, quàm irritatur & alitur. Quò spectat quod Cicero ait^b, suadens senatui, ne pacem fa- ^{b Philipp. 7.}
 cerent cum Antonio: Cauete per deos immortales, P. C. ne spe præsentis pacis, perpetuam pacem amittatis. Prudenter itaque Romani, Philippo, atque Antiocho occultè bellum molientibus, primi vtrò bellum intulerunt, & in Græciam bellum transferre, quàm in Italia excipere maluerunt. eoq; spectat, quod Vegetius ait: Qui pacē desiderat, præparet bellum: & quod Manlius Capitolinus dicebat: Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videāt vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsi remittent. Salutaris enim seueritas,

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vt inquit Cicero, vincit inanē speciem clemētiæ. Quod si clementes esse voluerimus, nunquam deerunt bella ciuilia. & ^{a epist. lib. 10} vt idem alio loco ait^a: Hostibus non aliter pax dari debet (de bello ciuili agens) quàm si armis positis eam petāt: sin autē pugnantes eam postulent, victoria pax, non pactione parienda est. Quò spectat quod Mimus ait: Ignoscere humanum, vbi pudet, cui ignoscitur: alioqui verò veterem ferendo iniuriam inuitas nouā, & huc etiam referri posse videtur apologus ille a Demosthene prolatus. nam cū Alexander Macedo, sub prætextu quodam libertatis, magnam Græcię partem inuasisset, & Athenas obsideret, ex eufaretque se nō ea facere, vt libertatem eis eriperet, vrbē mē in seruitutem redigeret: sed quòd decem eorum ciues infensos haberet, qui eum continuò maledictis incesserēt: proinde si pauci illi dederētur, fore vt ab obsidione decederet, populumque a bello & fame liberaret: poscebat verò in primis Demosthenem, & nouem itidem alios ciues præstantissimos: cumq; anceps esset senatus, multiq; acclamarent multitudini potius, quàm paucis esse consulendum: formidarent.

daréntque pauci illi, qui ad supplicium
 poscebantur, vixque fari auderent, quòd
 eorum interitu reliqui omnes pacem ac
 libertatem sperarent: ventum fuisset in
 sententiã vt dederentur, nisi Demosthe-
 nes huiusmodi fabella regis dolũ & in-
 8,, fidias aperuisset. Lupus aliquando *, in-
 „ quit, pastoribus, quorum diligentiam
 „ decipere cupiebat, persuasit, vt secum in
 „ amicitiam conuenirent, ea conditione,
 „ vt canes qui sibi infensi erant, & causas
 „ inimicitiarum præbebant, obsides tra-
 „ derentur. audiunt pastores, canesque ob
 „ fidem seruandæ pacis traduntur, qui o-
 „ uium diligentissimi custodes erant. tunc
 „ Lupus adempta formidine, omne pecus
 „ pro facietate & libidine lacerat, ac deuor-
 „ rat, & pastores ipsos laniat. Sic etiam in-
 præsentiarum, inquit, viri Athenienses
 Alexander facit: qui omnes illos, qui in
 eius conatus concionantur, qui que eius
 insidias pandunt, deposcit, quòd facilius
 urbem custodibus spoliata inuadere ac
 diripere possit.³

a Plutar. in
 vita Demost.

An præstet bellum domi excipere, an verò in
 hostilem agrum inferre.

1 Scipionis sententia.

2 L. Fabij Max. sententia.

S 5

3 Athe-

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- 3 *Atheniensibus feliciora bella fuere domi
quàm foris.*
- 4 *Fabula de Antreo.*
- 5 *Multum animi addit patria aspectus.*
- 6 *Agathocles cùm domi obsidionem ferre
non posset, tamẽ Africa bellum intulit.*
- 7 *Consilium Annibalis.*
- 8 *Sententia Agidis.*
- 9 *Consilium Hieronis Syracusarum regis.*
- 10 *Aliter foris, aliter domi bella tractari.*
- 11 *Melior miles extra patriam.*
- 12 *Fabij exemplum utile.*

CAP. OCTAVVM.

FVit hæc quæstio variè admodum agitata a summis ducibus, multis in vtramque partem adductis argumentis & exemplis : vt vtra sententia sequenda sit, non faciliè dixeris : fuitque in senatu Romanorum olim magna hac de re cõtentio, inter Q. Fabium Max. & P. Scipionem, qui Africam prouinciam sibi decerni petebat : non aliter asserens finem belli cum Annibale fore*, quàm si exercitus in Africam deportaretur, & eo bellum ex Italia auerteretur : referens quale esset, vltro metum inferre hosti, & ab se remoto periculo, alium in discrimen adducere :

ducere : idq; exemplo ipsius Annibalis : & multum interesse, alienos populari fines; an proprios vri excindi que videas. plus enim animi esse inferēti periculum, quàm propulsanti : tum etiam ad dignitatem populi Romani, famam que apud reges gentes que externas pertinere, non ad defendendam modò Italiam ; sed ad inferenda etiam Africæ arma videri Romanis animum esse: castra que Romana potius esse, si Carthaginis portis imminerent, quàm Romani iterum vallum hostium ex mœnibus suis viderent : Africa esset reliqui belli sedes, illic terror fuga que, populatio agrorum, defectio sociorum, cetera belli clades. Contra ea

2 Fabius * Annibalem recto itinere Italia prius expellendum, quàm per circuitus in Africam trahendum censebat : id que natura prius esse, tua cùm defenderis, aliena ire oppugnatum, & pacem prius in Italia optandam, quàm bellum in Africa : & vt ipsis prius decederet timor, quàm aliis inferretur : vbi nō portus vllus classi Romanæ apertus, non ciuitas socia, non rex amicus, non consistendi vsquam locus, non procedendi: quacunque circumspexeris, hostilia omnia atq; infesta:

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infesta : aliter quoque Carthaginienſes
moenia patriæ, templa Deûm, aras & fo-
cos deſenſuros, quàm Hispaniam deſen-
derant : vbi Annibal eſſet, ibi caput atque
arcem illius belli eſſe : quem in Africam
tractum propinqua Carthago, & tota
ſocia Africa potentioſorem armis viriſque
a *Liv. li. 28.* faceret^a. Et pro Fabio quoque facit exē-
plum Athenienſium *, qui quoad domi 3
bella geſſerunt, victores ſemper exſtite-
runt : ſed magna claſſe in Siciliam tranſ-
miſſa, vna nauali pugna florentem rem-
pub. ſuam in perpetuum afflixerunt. fa-
cit quoque quod de Antæo * Lybiæ re- 4
ge fertur : qui ab Hercule Ægyptio, dum
in ſedibus ſuis bellum geſſit, ſuperari nō
potuit : fraude verò Herculis, extra fines
ſuos tractus, cæſus fuit, & vitam cum
regno amiſit. quod fecit locum fabulæ,
quæ fingit Antæum Neptuni e Terra fi-
lium fuiſſe, robore & fortitudine ne-
mini cedentem : cuius membra quotiēs
labore deſecta eſſent, tactu Terræ matris
ſuæ recreabantur : quem Hercules cum
eo pugnans, medium complexus, quòd
aliter ſuperari non poſſet, e terra ſubla-
tum, aſtrictum pectori expirare coë-
git^b. Thomyris quoque Scytarum re-
gina,

^a *Liv. de
bel. civ. lib. 4*

^b *Liv. de
bel. civ. lib. 4*

gina, nequaquam Cyri aduentu territa,
 maluit aduentum eius operiri, quàm
 obuiam ire, feliciorem sibi pugnam in-
 tra regni sui terminos futuram rata, vbi
 Cyrum in angustias pertractum ex in-
 fidiis cum ducentis millibus Persarum
 trucidauit ^a. Item Lacedæmonius ^a ^{a Iustm. l. 1.}
 lia bella aduersus finitimos gerentibus,
 cùm Thebani Epaminonda duce, oc-
 cupandæ vrbis eorum spem cepissent,
 tacitiq; Lacedæmona proficiscerentur:
 non amplius centum iam effoetæ ætatis
 viri, qui domi manserant, aduersus quin-
 decim millia militum pugnx sese obtu-
 lerunt. tantum animorum viriumque
 patriæ & penatum conspectus submini-
 5 strat*, tantoque præsentia, quàm recor-
 datione sui maiores spiritus largitur, in-
 quit Iust.^b nã cùm viderent, intra quæ, & ^{b lib. 6.}
 pro quibus starêt, aut vincendũ sibi, aut
 moriendum censuerunt. Et huc spectare
 videtur consiliũ T. Quintij Flaminij cõs:
 quo Achæos bellum inferre Zacyntho
 molientes, monuit, ne instar testudinis
 (quæ vbi collecta in suũ tegmẽ est, tuta ad
 omnes ictus est; vbi exierit aliquas partes,
 quodcũq; nudauit, obnoxiũ atq; infirmũ
 habet) prolato extra Peloponesũ capite,
 peri-

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^a *Li. lib. 36.* *Pintar. in A. poph.* periculo sese exponerēt^a. Pro Scipione verò facit ipse euentus belli, quo Annibalem (qui tredecim annis in Italia impunè bellum gesserat) tractum in Africā superavit, & præclara victoria potitus est. Similiter Agathocles tyrānus*, cūm 6 Poeni Syracusas obsidione cinxissent, & sese nec viribus parem, nec ad obsidionē ferēdam instructum videret: mira prorsus audacia (vt qui sua tueri non poterat, impugnaret aliena) bellum in Africam transtulit, & castra quinto lapide a Carthagine posuit: & Hannone Pœnorum duce superato, vastata Africa, plurimas & nobilissimas vrbes, amicitiarum iura non fide, sed successu ponderātes, a Pœnis deficientes, ad se pellexit^b. Facit quoque pro Scipione cōsiliū Annibalis*, 7 quo cum ipse primū in Italia per tredecim annos cum maximā gloriā bellū gessit: tum etiam Antiocho consilia volutanti de Romano bello, auctor fuit, vt in Italia bellum gereret: Italiam & milites, & commeatum præbituram externo hosti: in Italia Romanos, suis opibus, suis viribus, suis armis vinci posse: si nihil ibi moueatur, licerētq; populo Rom. viribus & copiis Italiæ, extra Italiā bellum ge-

lum gerere, neque regem, neque gētem
 vllam parē Romanis fore^a. & hæc quo- ^a *Liv. lib. 34*
 que fuit sentētia Agidis Lacedæmonio-
 8 rum regis*, qui dicebat Ætolis intra fi-
 nes suos bellum inferendum, nec per-
 mittendum, vt Peloponnesi claustra in-
 trarent^b. Idem consilium post cēdem C. ^b *Plut. in vā-*
 Flaminiij, exercitusque Romani ad Tra- ^{ta} *Agidii.*
 symenum, populo Romano dedit Hie-
 9 ro Syracusarū rex*, amicus populi Rom.
 vt scilicet prætor, cui Sicilia prouincia
 euenisset, classem in Africam trajiceret,
 vt hostes in terra sua bellum haberent,
 minusque laxamēti daretur iis, ad auxi-
 lia Annibali submittenda^c. Hoc quoq; ^c *Liv. lib. 22*
 consilio senatus populusque Rom. Ma-
 cedonicum bellum indixit, persuadente
 Seruio Sulpitio conf. cui Macedonia
 prouincia euenerat: qui populo, vt ro-
 gationem de bello Macedonico indicē-
 do iuberent, his rationibus suasit: non
 hoc agi, vtrum bellum, an pacem habē-
 rent Romani (neque id liberum iis per-
 missurum Philippum, qui terra marique
 ingens bellum moliretur) sed vtrum in
 Macedoniam legiones transportarēt, an
 hostes in Italia acciperent. Hoc quātum
 interesset, Punico proximo bello exper-
 tos esse.

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tos esse. quis enim dubitaret, quin si Saguntinis obsessis fidem Romanorum implorantibus impigrè tulissent opem, sicut patres ipsorum Mamertinis tulerant, totum in Hispaniam auersuri bellum fuissent: quod cunctando cum magna clade Romanorum in Italia acceperunt. Nec illud quidem dubium esse, quin Philippum pactum iam per legatos, literasque cum Annibale, in Italiā trajcere, misso cum classe Leuino, qui ultra ei bellum inferret in Macedonia, continuissent. multo magis florentem Italiam, multo magis integras res, saluis tot ducibus, saluis tot exercitibus, quos Punicum postea bellū absumpsit, aggressum Pyrrhum, tamen cōcussisse, & victorem prope ad ipsam urbem Romam venisse: nec Tarentinos modò, orāque illam Italiæ, quam maiorem Græciam vocant, sed etiam Lucanos, & Brutios, & Samnites ab ipsis defecisse: quæ quoque, si Philippus in Italiam transmissurus esset, quietura, aut mansura in fide non esse: quemadmodum nec bello Punico manserūt. si piguisset Romanos in Africam trajcere, etiamnum tunc in Italia Annibalē futurum fuisse, & Carthaginiēses hostes habi-

habituros. potius igitur esse, ut Macedo-
 nia, quàm Italia bellum haberet, ho-
 stium vrbes agrosque ferro & igni vasta-
 ri: expertos iam esse, foris ipsis, quàm
 domi feliciora potentioraq; arma esse^a. ^a *Liv. lib. 31.*
 Ex quibus certè constat, id quod Aga-
 10 thocles quoque dicebat: Aliter foris*; a-
 liter domi bella tractari: domi ea sola
 auxilia esse, quæ patriæ vires submini-
 strent: foris hostem etiam suis viribus
 vinci. His adde, quòd melior procul
 11 a domo futurus sit miles*, vbi nullum
 est refugium, & necessitas pugnandi
 imminet. qua ratione Annibal in Hi-
 spania bellum gerens, Africam Hispa-
 norum præsidio firmavit: & pro eo sup-
 plementum ipse ex Africa petiit^b. Sed ^b *Liv. lib. 10*
 & tanto audacius, fortiusque pugna-
 turus est miles in hostili agro, quanto
 maior spes, maiorque animus inferen-
 tis est bellum, quàm arcentis. huc ac-
 cedit, quòd hostes denicti, extra fines
 suos, facilè restaurare bellum possint,
 & fines suos tueri: vbi si domi suæ ho-
 stes superaueris, nullo spacio recrean-
 di dato, facilè eos opprimere possis, &
 bello finem imponere. quod Annibali
 victori ad Cannas non difficile fuisset,
 T si victo-

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si victoria & beneficio fortunæ vsus fuisse: & satis constat moram tantum suam
a *Li. lib. 22* salutem vrbi atq; imperio Romano fuisse.
Et his quidem argumentis, & exemplis
in medium prolatis, unicuique liberum
hac de re constituendi relinquimus arbitrium. illud tamen etiam atque etiam
pensitandum est, si de bello inferendo, vel
excipiendo consultetur, an facilis sit accessus in fines hostium, an arcibus muniti, an plani campi, an loca montuosa, ubi insidiæ timeri possent, an cum hoste armato & bellicoso; an verò inermi & imbelli, & cuius vis omnis in pecunia consistat, res sit: qui suis viribus domi sue facile superari poterit, exemplo Cai thaginiensium: secus si cum hoste armato, & bellicoso, cui domi omnia ad bellum parata sunt, quales fuere Romani, res sit. Ceterum si cum hoste bellicoso & vincere solito domi tuæ bellandum erit, non inutile videbitur Fabij exemplum sequi^r, 12
qui Annibalē iam aliquot victoriis ferocem, cum facile certamine vinci non posse videret, sedendo fregit, & vincere Annibalem prohibuit, ut ab aliis vinei posset: satis cito incipi victoriam rarus, ubi prouisum foret ne vinceret: qua ratione

.tione imperium Romanum multis cla-
 dibus afflictum restituit. Suntque præ-
 clara in hanc sententiam eiusdem Fabij
 verba, quibus L. Æmilius Paulus con-
 tra Annibalem euntem ita affatus est :
 „ Vna ratio belli gerendi aduersus Anni-
 „ balem est, qua ego gessi, nec euentus mo-
 „ dō hoc docet : stultorū iste magister est :
 „ sed eēdem ratio quæ fuit, futuraque, do-
 „ nec res eadē manebunt, immutabilis est.
 „ in Italia bellum gerimus, in sede ac solo
 „ nostro, omnia circa ciuium ac sociorum
 „ sunt : armis, viris, equis, cōmeatibus iu-
 „ uant iuuabuntque. id iam fidei documē-
 „ tum, in aduersis rebus nostris dederunt.
 „ Meliores, prudentiores, constantiores,
 „ nos tempus diesque facit. Annibal con-
 „ trā, in aliena, in hostili terra, inter omnia
 „ inimica infestaque, procul a domo, pro-
 „ cul a patria, neque illi terra, neque mari
 „ est pax: nullæ eum vrbes excipiunt, nulla
 „ moenia, nihil vsquam sui videt. in diem
 „ rapto viuit, partem vix tertiam exerci-
 „ tus eius habet, quem Iberum amnē tra-
 „ iecit: plures fames quàm ferrum absum-
 „ psit: nec his paucis iam victū suppeditat.
 „ Dubitas ergo quin eum sedendo supera-
 „ turi sumus, qui senescat in dies? non cō-

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meatus, non supplementum, non pecuniam habeat ^a? Et certè eò Annibalem tunc redactum fuisse constat, vt nullo negotio superari potuisset, nisi temeritas Terētij Varronis occasionem rei bene gerendæ hosti præbuisset. Simili ratione Cn. Sulpitius dictator, aduersus Gallos in Italia bellum trahebat, nolens se committere fortunæ aduersus hostem, quem tempus deteriore in dies & locus faceret: sine præparato comœatu, sine firmo munimento morantem: ad hoc iis animis corporibusque, quorum omnis in impetu vis esset, parua eadem ^b Lin. lib. 7. languescere mora ^b.

An præstet initio prælij magno clamore, & concitato cursu in hostes pergere; an verò loco manere, & hostium impetum excipere.

- 1 *Leuissima quæque in bello nonnunquam magni momenti sunt.*
- 2 *Samnites & Galli primo impetu feroces.*
- 3 *Fabius sustinuit impetum hostium & vicit.*
- 4 *Decius impetum faciendo in hostem uictus fuit.*
- 5 *Faby exemplum secutus T. Veturius.*
- 6 *A. Cornelius Cossus dictator hostium impetum excipiendo vicit.*

7. *Caesar*

- 7 *Cæsar reprehendit consilium Pompeij, qui prædixerat isus, ut impetum Cæsar exciperent.*
 8 *Mos Gallorum & Germanorum initio prælij.*
 9 *Syri ex clamore indicium sumebant de futura victoria vel clade.*
 10 *Cyri consilium.*

CAP. NONVM.

- 1 **I**N bello nihil tam leue est*, quod non magnæ interdum rei momentū faciat. cuius nobis fidem faciunt Q. Fabius, & P. Decius consf. bello contra Samnites & Hetruscos. instructa enim acie, ita ut Fabius aduersus Samnites in dextro cornu, & Decius aduersus Gallos in sinistro cornu cōsisteret, haud similis pugna, inquit Liuius^a, in dextro læuoque cornu ^{a lib. 10.} fuit. Romani apud Fabium arcebāt magis, quàm inferebant pugnam, extrahebantq; in quàm maximè serum diei certamen: quia ita persuasum erat duci, &
 2 Samnites & Gallos* primo impetu feroces esse, quo sustineri satis sit: longiore certamine sensim residere Samnitium animos: Gallorum quidē etiam corpora intolerātissima laboris atq; æstus fluere,
 T 3 prima-

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primaque eorum prælia plus quam virorum; postrema minus quam feminarum esse. in id tempus igitur, quo vinci solebat hostis, quam integerrimas vires militi seruabat Fabius*. Ferocior De- 3
cius, & ætate & vigore animi, quantumcunq; virium habuit, certamine primo effudit*, impetum faciendo in hostem: 4
quod illi nō bene cessit: nam sui milites, primo cōflictu in fugam acti sunt, & dissipati: quos cū nulla vi sustinere posset, vt morte sua eam, quam per victoriā consequi non poterat gloriam, sibi pararet, exemplo P. Decij patris, se legionesque hostium pro exercitu populi Rom. quiritum deuouit: & quā cōfertissima cernebat Gallorum aciem, concitauit equum, interensque se ipse infestis relis, interfectus est: & Romani amisso duce, quæ res terrori alias esse solet, sistere fugam, ac nouam de integro instaurare pugnam cœperunt: quibus cū superuenissent subsidia ex nouissima acie iussu Fabij ad præsidium collegæ missi, victoria potiri sunt. Et Fabij exemplum secutus T. Vetulus cōf.* in Volscos missus, cum ad dimicandum hostes acie exciuisset. & multitudine aliquantulum Volsci superarent:

rarent: nec promouit aciem, nec clamorem reddi passus est, sed defixis pilis stare suos iussit: ubi ad manū venisset hostis, tum cohortes tota vi gladiis rem gererent: in quo genere pugnae Mars est atrocissimus. Volsci cursu & clamore fessi, cum se velut stupentibus metu intulissent Romanis, postquam impressionē sensere ex aduerso factam, & ante oculos micare gladios, haud secus quā si in insidias incidissent, turbati verterūt terga, & ne ad fugam quidem satis virium fuit: quia cursu in praelium ierant. Romani contrā quia principio pugnae quieti steterant, vigentes corporibus, facilē adepti fessos, & castra impetu ceperūt, & castris exutum hostem, Velitras persecuti, vno agmine victores cum victis irrupere ^a. a Liv. li. 2

6 Similiter A. Cornelius Cossus dictator*, acie decertaturus cum Volscis, quorum ingenserat exercitus, milites suos ita affatus est: Nostra victoria est milites, si
 „ quid dii vatesque eorum in futurum vident. itaque ut decet certę spei plenos, &
 „ cum imparibus manus conferturos pilis ante pedes positis, gladiis tantum detrasarmemus: nec procurfari quidem
 „ ab acie velim, sed obnixos vos stabili
 T 4 gradu

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gradu impetum hostium excipere : vbi
illi vana iniecerint missilia, & effusi stan-
tibus vobis se intulerint, tum micet gla-
dij, & veniat in mentem vnicuique deos
esse, qui Romanum adiuuent, deos qui
secundis auibus in prælium miserint, &
sic vt præceperat pugnant, nec dux le-
giones, nec fortuna fefellit ducē^a. Hoc
quoque consilio Pompeius, prælio de-
certaturus cum Cæsare ad Pharsalū, suis
prædixerat, vt Cæsaris impetum excipe-
rent, neue se loco mouerent, aciemque
eius distrahi paterentur : idq; admonitu
C. Triarij fecisse dicitur, vt primus ex-
cursus, visque militum infringeretur, a-
ciesque distenderetur : leuiusque casura
pila sperabat, in loco retentis militibus,
quàm si ipsi immixtis telis occurrissent:
simul fore, vt duplicato cursu, Cæsaris
milites examinarentur, & lassitudine cō-
ficerentur: quod Cæsari tamen nullo cō-
silio factum videbatur*: propterea quod
est quædam animi incitatio, atque ala-
critas naturaliter innata omnibus, quæ
studio pugnae incenditur : hanc non re-
primere, sed augere imperatores debere,
neque frustra antiquitus institutum esse,
vt signa vndique concinerent, clamo-
remque

remque vniuersi tollerent : quibus re-
 bus & hostes terreri , & suos incitari exi-
 8 stimauerūt^a. Sic Galli & Germani^{*}, qui-^a *Ces. de bel. civil. lib. 3.*
 bus inconsulta ira & furor erat, si quādo
 cum hoste congredi pararent, dissono &
 truci cantu, quem harritum vocabant,
 cum ululatu & tripudiis scuta quatien-
 tes, prælium inibant, ex quo futuræ pu-
 gnæ fortunam augurabantur. Similiter
 9 Syri^{*} primo congressu, Solem venerati,
 cum classico signo dato pugnam inirent,
 primo occurſu ad ardorem excitandum,
 ardentissimo clamore concurrebant, &
 signa inferebant : qui si consona voce
 editus, neque impar, varius, vel dis-
 sonus foret, haud dubiè satis animo-
 rum ad certamen esse, & futuram victo-
 riam spondebant. nam is erat index vo-
 luntatis & animi cuiusque : si verò ex-
 citatior crebriorque ab hoste sublatus
 esset : quò euentus prælij casurus fo-
 ret, indicium haud dubiè præbebat.
 Quò spectat quod Liuius^b refert, in-^b *lib. 4.*
 cautè, inconsulteque a C. Sempro-
 nio consule prælium commissum cum
 „ Volſcis : Clamor, inquit, indicium pri-
 „ mum fuit, quò res inclinatura esset,
 „ excitatior crebriorque ab hoste subla-

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tus: ab Romanis dissonus, impar, segnis, „
sæpe iteratus incerto clamore prodidit „
pauorem animorum. Cyri verò consiliū „
fuit*, vt si hostes tumultuosius irruerēt, 10
taciti milites impetum exciperent: sin
autē taciturni, clamore & strepitu acies
inuaderent^a. Plurimum certè refert, v-
trum cum tyronibus, & militiae insuetis,
qui faciliè inusitato clamore, & impres-
sione commoueri possint, an verò cum
veteranis & bello assuetis, qui non faciliè
terreri solent, res sit.

^a Alex. ab A-
lex. genial.
dier. l. 4. c. 7.

Non esse consilij, inuicem infensos ciuilibus
dissensionibus hostes, sola discordia fretum
inuadere.

- 1 *Seditio remp. alioqui aeternam, mortalem
facit.*
- 2 *Fouenda seditiones hostium.*
- 3 *Hostes dissentientes non sunt inuadendi.*

CAP. DECIMUM.

ÆTernam esse magnam rempub.* nisi 1
ciues inter semetipsos seditionibus
sæuiant: id vnum venenum, eam labem
ciuitatibus opulētis repertam, vt magna
imperia mortalia essent, non temerè ab
antiquis creditum est, cuius rei exemplo
esse

esse potest Romana resp. quæ tam diu imperium totius orbis tenuit, donec ciuilibus, & intestinis bellis, suis viribus consumpta, & ad nihilum redacta est. Vnde solent prudentes duces fouere se-
 2 ditiones hostium*, si quando possent: vt hac ratione incruenta victoria, hostium viribus potiri possent. Quo cōsilio Marcius Coriolanus, victor ad urbē pergens, cū agrum Romanum popularetur, a Patriciorum agris abstinere iussit, quō illos suspectos plebeiis redderet, & discordiam ciuium iam ante natam incitaret^a. Et Annibal cū videret Q. Fabiū solerti cunctatione illi victoriam præripere, qui bellum ratione, non fortuna gereret: quo nomine contemptui erat Romanis, & timidus dictus, ad augendā Fabij inuidiam ab agro ipsius omnē vim hostilem abstinere iussit, omnibus circa solo æquatis, vt occulti alicuius pacti ea merces videri posset^b. Quam inuidiam vt euitaret Fabius, fertur agros illos vendidisse, & precium in redemptionem captiuorum conuertisse: Periclem imitatus, cuius agros in populatione ceterorum Spartani intactos reliquerāt, sperantes acquirere se illi posse, aut periculū
 ex in-

^a l. iij. lib. 1.
 Dura. tidal.
 lib. 8.

^b Liv. lib. 22

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ex inuidia, aut ex suspitione prodicionis infamiã: quod ante perspiciebat Pericles, & futurũ populo prädixerat, ad inuidiæ imperum declinandũ: agros ipsos dono reipub. dederat, atque ita vnde periculũ quæsitum fuerat, ibi maximam gloriam inuenit^a. Porro non erit consultum seditiosos hostes *, sola discordiæ fiducia ³ inuadere. Nã externus timor, vt inquit Liuius, optimum concordiæ vinculum. Itaque cùm Prænestini, ex discordia Romanorum, occasionem sibi dari rati, raptim agmine facto peruaſtatis protinus agris, ad portã Collinam signa inferrēt: ingensque in vrbe, trepidatio eſſet: conclamatum ad arma, concursusq; in muros atque portas eſt: tandemque ab seditione ad bellum verſi, dictatorem T. Quintium Cincinnatum creauere. quod vbi auditum eſt (tantus eius magistratus terror erat) simul hostes a mœnibus recedere, & iuniores Romani ad edictum sine detrectatione conuenere^b. ciuilia enim certamina terror externus cohibet. Sicque cùm Cæſar Britannis bellũ inferret, summam imperij belli que administrandi Britanni communi conſilio permiferūt Caſſinellauno, cui cum reliquis ciuitatibus

^a *Liuius, l. 3.*

^b *Liuius, lib. 6.*

bus continentia bella intercesserant: sed
aduētu Cæsaris permoti, eum toti bello
imperiôq; præfecerunt^a. Similiter Veiē- <sup>a Cæs. de bel.
gal. lib. 5.</sup>
ti bello, Cn. Manlio, & M. Fabio consi.
cùm ciuilibus dissensionibus exaspera-
tis militum animis, consules castris se te-
nerent, nec prælio rem committere au-
derent: quòd arma militi non crederēt:
& his freti hostes, omnibus modis lacef-
ferent ad pugnam Romanos, probrain-
gerentes, & Romanis insultantes: Ro-
manus non vltra contumeliam pati po-
tuit; cumq; externa & domestica o-
dia certarent in animis, tandem supe-
rabant externa: adeo superbè insolent-
terq; hostis illudebat. itaque acie in-
structa, irritatis in hostem, & sibi inui-
cem reconciliatis militum animis, non
alio ante bello, inquit Liuius^b, infe- ^{b M. 2.}
stior Romanus prælium iniit. cùm si se
continuissent hostes, propriis ipsorum
viribus, & suo milite facilè Romanos
superare potuissent: vt exemplo sunt
Æqui & Volsci: inter quos agrum Ro-
manum ingressos ex certamine Vol-
sci, Equiue imperatorem coniuncto e-
xercitui darent, seditio deinde atrox,
prælium ortum, & inuicem hostes per-
nicioso

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a *Lin. lib. 2.*
Dion. Hal.
lib. 8.

nicioſo & pertinaci certamine ſe con-
fecerunt, & Romanis victoriam tradi-
derunt^a. Prudenter itaque Scorio Da-
corum dux, cū ſciret ciuilibus armis
diſtineri populum Ro. non tamen occa-
ſione inde arrepta laceſſendum arbitra-
batur, proſpiciens externo bello inteſti-
num plerumque reſtingui: & ſuorum a-
nimos, qui ſtudio pugnæ ardebāt, lepidè
repreſſit, reprehenditque: canes ſiquidè
duos iſſis inſpectantibus commiſit: iſſ-
que mox acriter pugnātibus, lupum in-
geſſit: quem canes, omiſſa protinus inter
ſe ira, communem hoſtem alacriter in-
uadentes confecere.^b

b *Cael. Rho-*
dig. leſt. an-
tiq. l. 9. c. 50.

Neceſſitatem pugnaudi magno ſtudio impo-
nendam militibus eſſe, & hoſtibus remit-
tendam.

- 1 *Vis neceſſitatis.*
- 2 *Milites neceſſitate ad certamē cōpellendi.*
- 3 *Fuga ſpecie omnibus modis adimēda mi-
litibus.*
- 4 *Neceſſitas pugnandi hoſtibus remittēda.*
- 5 *Hoſtibus aperienda via, qua fugiant.*

CAP. VNDECIMVM.

Quanta ſit vis neceſſitatis*, a Philo- 1
ſophis abundè ſatis diſceptatum eſt,
qui

qui ex necessitate omnia fieri contendent. Itaque Thales interrogatus quid validissimum esset, respondit necessitas: eam enim solâ superari non posse. Cuius vi ac virtute cognita, & quantum cùm in reliquis omnibus actionibus, tũ præcipuè in bello posset, quâ tum animi adderet, considerantes summi duces, solent hoc studiosè agere, vt milites suos necessitate astringerèt ad certamen*. nam, vt inquit Q. Curtius, necessitas ante rationem est, maximè in bello. Atq; ita Q. Fabius dictator, cùm per aliquot dies, post ancipitem pugnâ cum Samnitibus, cõtinuissset suos intra vallum, obsessi magis quàm obsidentis modò, signum repente pugnæ proposuit: & efficacius ratus ad accendendos virorum fortium animos, nullam alibi, quàm in semetipso cuiquam relictam spem, de C. Fabio magistro equitum, nouo què exercitu, qui Roma aduenerat, militem celauit, & tanquam nulla nisi in eruptione spes esset, locorum angustias, & commeatus inopiam, militibus exposuit: & nisi quam victoria patefacerent, viam nullam habere: castra quoque, ne infecta victoria, sicut pristino die, in ea se reciperent, incendi

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cendi iussit: armis munimenta, non munimentis arma tuta esse debere inquires. itaque oratione dictatoris, quæ necessitatis index erat, accensi milites, ibant in hostem: & respectus ipse ardentium castrorum haud paruum erat irritamentum ad victoriam^a. Sic quoque M. Portius Cato in Hispania bellum gerens, circumducto exercitu, procul a navibus suis castrisque, ubi spem nisi in virtute haberet, inter medios hostes prælium commisit, hac exhortatione usus ad suos: Nusquam nisi in virtute spes est milites; & ego sedulo ne esset feci. inter castra nostra & nos, medij hostes, & a tergo hostium agger est. quod pulcherrimum, idem tutissimum, in virtute spem positam habere^b. Et Annibal superatis Alpibus, cum P. Scipione dimicaturus, necessitatem pugnandi suis exposuit, inquiens: Dextra lævaque duo maria claudunt: nullam ne ad effugium quidem navem habemus: circa Padus amnis, maior ac violentior Rhodano: a tergo alpes vrgent, vix integris vobis ac vigentibus transitæ. hic vobis vincendum, aut moriendum milites est, ubi primum hosti occurristis: & eadē fortuna, quæ necessitatem pugnandi imposuit,

^a *Liv. lib. 9.*

^b *Liv. lib. 34.*

„ posuit, præmia vobis ea victoribus pro-
 „ posuit, quibus ampliora homines ne a
 „ diis quidem immortalibus optare solēt.
 „ Duos consules huius anni, vnum in A-
 „ fricam, alterum in Hispaniam Romanī
 „ misere: nihil vsquam nobis relictum est,
 „ nisi quod armis vindicauerimus, illis ti-
 „ midis & ignauis licet esse, qui receptum
 „ habent, quos suus ager, quos sua terra,
 „ per tuta, per pacata itinera, fugientes ac-
 „ cipient: vobis necesse est, fortibus viris
 „ esse, & omnibus inter victoriam mor-
 „ tē tue certa desperatione abruptis, aut
 „ vincere, aut si fortuna mutabit, in prælio
 „ potius, quàm in fuga mortem oppetere.
 „ Si hoc bene fixū omnibus, destinatum-
 „ quē in animo est, iterum dicam vicistis.
 „ Nullum incitamentum ad vincendum,
 „ inquit Liuius^a, homini a diis immorta-
 „ libus acrius datū est. Item Vectius Mes-
 „ sius Volscorum dux, cū videret suos in
 „ medio circumuentos a Romanis, eos in-
 „ crepans clara voce: Hic perituri, inquit,
 „ vos telis hostium estis, indefensi, inulti?
 „ quid igitur arma habetis? aut quid ultro
 „ bellum intulistis, in otio tumultuosi, in
 „ bello segnes? Quid hic stātibus spei est?
 „ an deum aliquem protecturum vos, ra-
 „ pturum-

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pturumque huic putatis? ferro via facie-
da est. hac qua me progressum videtis, a-
gite, qui visuri domos, parentes, coniu-
ges, liberos estis: ite mecum. non murus,
nec vallum, sed armati armatis obstant,
virtute pares, necessitate, quæ ultimum
a *Liv. lib. 4.* ac maximum telum est, superiores estis^a.
Porro ut necessitatem militibus impo-
nerent summi duces, solent variis modis,
fugæ spem adimere*. itaque Cæsar pri-
mum suo, deinde omnium e conspectu
remotis equis, ut æquato omnium peri-
culo, spem fugæ tolleret, cohortatus suos
b *Cæs. de bel. gal. lib. 1.* prælium commisit cum Heluetiis^b. idque
apud Germanos frequens fuit. Agathoc-
les tyrannus cum in Africā traiecisset,
omnes naues consentiente exercitu in-
cendi iussit: ut omnes scirēt auxilio fugæ
adempto, aut vincendum, aut moriendū
c *Liv. lib. 22.* esse^c. Astyages Medorum rex cum Cyro
& Persis prælio decertans, pugnantibus
suis partem exercitus a tergo posuit, &
in tergiuersantes ferro agi, ut in hostes
iussit: ac suis denunciari, ni vincerent, nō
minus fortes etiam post terga inuentu-
ros, quàm a fronte viros: atque ingens
ex necessitate, pugnandi animus militi-
d *Liv. lib. 1.* bus accessit^d. Et fuit apud Romanos fre-
quens,

quens, vt fugientes pro hostibus cædi iuberentur : profuitque sæpius salubre consiliū, quod in magna cōsternatione, abscissis rebus, ac desperata salute, a Romanis factitatum legimus : vt dispositis equitū turmis ante munimenta, fugientes temerè ex prælio ad castra, pro hoste haberent; illosque strictis gladiis inuaderent, vt non minus a tergo, quàm a fronte infestas acies viderēt. Hæc vltima desperatio nonnunquam militū animos ita incendit, vt inclinatas, & turpi fuga profligatas acies plerumque repararit : tantoque ardore pugna fuerit restituta, vt milites ancipiti coacti metu, victoriā ex hostium manibus sæpe eripuerint. Ceterum eadem ratio, quæ necessitatem pugnandi militibus imponendā suadet, 4 eandem hostibus remittendam * esse ostendit. fit enim plerumque, vt desperatio in virtutem conuertatur, secundum illud Maronis,

Vna salus victis nullam sperare salutem.

Itaque bello Veienti, cum hostes ex prælio subtractis subsidiis ad castra Romana oppugnanda iuissent, & Cn. Manlius cōsul euectus in castra, ad omnes portas milite opposito, hostibus viā clausisset:

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a Liv. lib. 2.
Dion. Hal.
lib. 9.

b Liv. lib. 2.

hæc desperatio hostibus rabiem magis
quàm audaciam accendit: ita ut cæso cõ-
sule, vis hostium amplius sustineri non
posset, & ad extrema ventum foret, ni
legati patefecissent vna porta hostibus
viam, qua erumperent^a. Quare meritò
Scipionis sententia laudata fuit, qui viam
hostibus, qua fugerent, esse muniendam
dicebat*. Quanto enim plus spei, ut in- 5
quit Tacitus, tanto minor ad resistendum
animus erit: nam ignaviam quoque ne-
cessitas acuit, & sæpe desperatio spei cau-
sa est: aut saltem, ut Q. Curtius ait, ma-
gnum ad honestè moriendum incitamen-
tum. Vnde prudenter Themistocles,
Græcis volentibus Xerxis prælio victi
transitum impedire, ipsumque regem
cum exercitu intercludere, timens ne in-
terclusi hostes desperationem in virtutē
verterent, & iter quod aliter nō pateret,
ferro patefacerent, cum vincere ceteros
consilio non posset, per servum Xerxem
monuit, ut maturata fuga, transitum oc-
cuparet^b. Prudenter quoque M. Furius
Camillus dictator, cum Veios oppugna-
ret, & cuniculo per Veientanam arcem
actō, per quē electos milites immiserat,
urbem suis militibus impleisset, & omni-
bus

bus locis pugnaretur, multa iam edita
cæde, quo facilius vrbe potiretur, neces-
sitate defendendi hostibus remissa, edi-
cere per præcones iussit, vt ab inermi ab-
stineretur: quo factum est, vt finis san-
guinis esset, & dedi inermes inciperent. ^{a Liu. lib. 5.}

Similiter cùm Fregellæ Colonia, nec o-
pinato aduentu Samnitium, nocte occu-
pata esset, & Fregellani pugnam aliquã
diu æquam (quòd pro aris & focis dimi-
caretur, & ex rectis adiuuaret imbellis
multitudo) sustinuissent: fraus deinde
rem inclinauit, inquit Liuius^b, quia vo- ^{b lib. 9.}

cem præconis audiri passi sunt, incolu-
mem abiturum, qui arma posuisset: eaq;
spes remisit a certamine animos & pas-
sim arma iactari coëpta. Eodem astu C.
Fabius Ambustus, in Auxuris oppugna-
tione, cùm vrbe capta, magna adhuc re-
sistentiũ (quia cedentibus nihil speierat)
pugna esset, pronunciari repente iussit,
ne quis præter armatos violaretur, reli-
quam omnem multitudinem volonta-
riam exiit armis: qua ratione facili vi-
ctoria potitus est^c. Simili modo cùm ^{c Liu. lib. 4.}
Sutrium ex sociis populi Rom. eodem
die, quo ab Hetruscis oppugnatum erat,
Camillus ex improviso recepisset, & pas-

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a lib. 6.

b Appian. de
bel. civil. i. 2.

sim trucidatis Hetruscis portas claudi iussisset, spe fugæ adempta, restitutum & accensum desperatione hostium præliū fuisse refert Liuius^a, ni præcones per urbem dimissi, poni arma, & parci inermi iussissent, nec præter armatos quēquam violari. tum verò etiam, quibus animi in spe vltima obstinati ad decertandum fuerant, postquam data spes vitæ est, iactare passim arma, inermesque, quod tutius fortuna fecerat, se hosti offerre. Cæsar quoque prælio Pharsalico inclinata iam acie Pompeij, prudentissimo consilio, ne hostes rursus instaurarent ordines, quoque facilius victoria potiri posset, dimissis circumquaque præconibus, edixit suis, ut ciuibus parcerent, & in sola sæuissent auxilia: simulque victores victis occurrentes, iubebant stare securos, quo facto hæc vox, Sta securus, Pompeianis coepit esse pro tessera: itaque Cæsar victoriam obtinuit^b. huc spectare videtur, quod Lycurgus suis præcepit, ut si prælio hostes fudissent ac vicissent, tantisper modò insequerentur fugientes, dum victoriam stabilirent, deinde statim se reciperent: nō modò quia græcanicum non esset, cedentes interficere, sed & utilis hæc

hæc esset ratio. hostes enim, si scirent cedentibus parci; repugnantes occidi, fugâ pugna vtiliorem sibi arbitratos.^a

^a Plut. in a-
poph.

In victoria potissimum de pace cogitandum.

- 1 *Melius malam, quàm bonam fortunam
ferre possumus.*
- 2 *Nec secunda, nec aduersa res immoderate ferenda.*
- 3 *In victoria paci studendum.*
- 4 *In bello nihil miseriùs victoria.*

CAP. DVODECIMVM.

I Ta profectò natura comparatum est *,
vt melius malam, quàm bonam fortunam ferre possimus. etenim, vt inquit Tacitus, secundæ res acrioribus stimulis animum explorant, quàm aduersæ: quia miseriæ tolerantur, felicitate corrumpimur. quod cognoscens Abdolominus e stirpe quidem regia, sed inops admodû, & pauper, à Sidonibus permissu Alexandri rex constitutus, rogatus ab Alexandro, qua patientia inopiam tulisset, respondit: Vtinam eodem regnû pati possem^b. & huius quoque rei exemplo est ipse Alexander Magnus, qui priusquam

^b Q. Curtius
lib. 4.

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eam moderatè & prudenter tulit; ad ultimum verò magnitudinem eius nō tulit^a. Fit enim plerunque, vt rebus prosperis insolescat animus humanus, vt iā nec alios ferre possit, nec se. vbi tamen maximæ cuiq; fortunæ minimè credendum sit: cūm quid vesper feret, incertum sit. Vnde vt aduersās res*, sic secūdas im-² moderatè ferre maximæ leuitatis est. & rectè præcipere videntur, qui monent, vt quanto superiores simus, tanto nos submissius geramus. Sicuti enim equos, vt ait Cicero^b, propter crebras contentiones præliorum ferocitate exultantes, dormitoribus tradere solent, vt his facilio-ribus possint vti: sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos, sibiq; præfidentes, tanquam in gyrū rationis, & doctrinæ duci oportet: vt percipiant rerum humanarū imbecillitatem, varietatemque fortunæ. nam non statuendo tandem felicitati modum, nec cohibendo effrentem se fortunam, quanto quis altius elatus fuerit, eo foedius corruet. Itaq; in victoriā*,³ quæ alioqui insolens & superba est, potissimum paci studendum: neque expectandum, donec (vt Demades de Atheniē. intempestiuo belligerandi studio deditis

^a Q. Curtius
lib. 4.

^b offic. lib. 1.

deditis dicebat) atrati eādem petere cogamur^a. nusquam enim minus, quā in bello euentus responderet. Quare cū Magonūcius victoriæ Annibalis ad Cānas, Carthaginem venisset, & senatu ei dato, res fratris in Italia amplissimis verbis extolleret, & quo propior spes belli perficiendi esset, eo magis omni spe iuandum Annibalē esse diceret: his nihil motus Hanno, quē semper belli suscepti aduersus Romanos pænuit, prudenter monuit, vt in secundis rebus fortuna vti vellent, & de pace potius, quā de bello cogitarent: Nam, inquit, si prætermittas
 „ hoc tempus, quo magis dare quā acci-
 „ pere possumus videri pacem, vereor ne
 „ hæc quoque lætitia luxuriet nobis, &
 „ vana euadat^b. cuius sententia tunc temporis spreta, postea sed serò nequicquam a senatu laudata fuit: cum eò adacti essent, vt quas dare potuissent cōditiones pacis, postea sibi dari petentibus, denegatæ fuerint: & eo statu essent, quo de Latinis refert Liuius, vt neque pacem, neque bellum ferre possent, qui status rerum omnium miserrimus est. Idem euenit Antiocho, cui (iam Romanis in Asiam contra ipsum transuectis) de pace

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componenda agentī, respondit Scipio,
hoc prius faciendum fuisse; non iam, ubi
frenum, fessoremq; rex accepisset^a. Non
est itaque sapientis, pacem certam, quæ
in victoris manu sit, fallaci spe incertæ
victoriæ, quæ in fortunæ manu sit, redi-
mere. Quare Hasdrubal Hoedus Car-
thaginiensium legat⁹, cū de pace in senatu
Romę ageret, dicebat, raro simul homi-
nibus bonam fortunam, bonamque mē-
tem dari, & populum Rom. eò inuidum
esse, quòd in secundis rebus saperet, &
consulere meminisset: si in secundis rebus
bonam quoque mentem donarent dii,
non solum ea quæ evenissent, sed etiam
ea quæ evenire possent, reputaremus. Et
Cicero^b ad Marcellum scribens: Licet,
inquit, omnia sint misera in bellis, mise-
rius tamen nihil, quam ipsa victoriā^{*}: 4
quæ etiam si ad meliores venit, tamen
eos ipsos ferociores impotentioresque
reddit: ut etiam si natura tales non sint,
necessitate tamen tales esse cogantur. Ita-
que Cæsar memor huius impotentie hu-
mani animi, hoc vnum esse tempus, de
pace agendi cum Pompeio inquit, dum
sibi vterque cōfideret, & pares ambo vi-
derentur: si verò alteri paululum tribuif-
set for-

^a Plut. in a-
popb. App. de
bel. Syr. L. 11.
lib. 37

^b epist. fam.
lib. 4. epist. 3.

set fortuna, non esse vsurum conditionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur, neque fore æqua parte contentum, qui se omnia habiturum confideret.^a

^a *Cas. de bel. civil. lib. 3.*

Deuictis hostibus, qua potissimum ratione perpetua pace quieti obtineri possint.

- 1 *Non minor virtus parta tueri, quàm acquirere.*
- 2 *Consilium Herennij Pontij de Romanis ad Furcas Caudinas inclusis.*
- 3 *Sententia Camilli de Latinis victis.*
- 4 *Iudicium senatus de Priuernatibus ad deditionem coactis.*
- 5 *M. Catonis sententia in rebellantes.*
- 6 *Romani non permiserunt sociis sine Romano duce bellum gerere.*
- 7 *Mos deducendi colonias.*

CAPVT XIII.

¹ **C**VM non minor sit virtus *, quàm querere parta tueri: & victoria rectè uti, quàm vincere, (nā vt rectè Ouidius: *Casus inest illic, hic erit artis opus:*) ideoq; bella geramus, vt in pace viuamus: deuictis hostibus tota cōsultatio esse debet, qua potissimum ratione in perpetuū a rebellando eos contineamus. Quid enim profuit Pyrrho, in deuincendis hostibus

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stibus magnū fuisse, cū acquisita tueri
non potuerit: tanto melius studebat ac-
^{a lusi. l. 23.}quirere imperia, quā retinere. 2. quam-
obrem collatus fuit ab Antigono indo-
cto lusori, qui cū & multa & feliciter
edat, iis tamen nesciat vti. in quam rem
longè vtilissimum censeo consilium He-
rennij Pontij* C. Pontij patris. nam cū 2
Samnites, duce C. Pontio, Romanos
fraude ad furcas Caudinas inter duos
saltus pertraxissent, & inopes consilij in
tam lætis rebus Herēnium Pontii con-
sulendum censerent, consultus a nuncio
filij Herennius, cēsuit omnes inde quā
primū inuiolatos dimittendos. quæ
vbi spreta sententia esset, & iterum ite-
rumque eodem remeante nuncio con-
suleretur, censuit ad vnum omnes inter-
ficiendos: indicans priore cōsilio, quòd
optimum duceret, cum potētissimo po-
pulo, per ingens beneficium perpetuam
firmare pacem amicitiamque: altero in
multas ætates, quibus amissis duobus e-
xercitibus, haud facile receptura vires
Romana res esset, bellum differre: tertiū
nullum consilium esse. & cū filius, alij-
que principes percūctando exquirerēt,
quid si media via consilium caperetur, vt
& dimit-

& dimitterentur incolumes, & leges iis
 » iure belli victis imponerentur : Ista, in-
 » quit, sentētia ea est, quæ neq; amicos pa-
 » rat, neque inimicos tolli, seruare modo
 » quos ignominia irritaueris. ea est Ro-
 » mana gēs, quæ victa quiescere nescit: vi-
 » uet semp in pectoribus illorū, quidquid
 » isthuc præsens necessitas iniunxerit, ne-
 » que eos ante multiplices poenas expeti-
 » tas a vobis quiescere sinet. At neutra sen-
 tentia accepta fuit : sed Romanis sub iu-
 gum missis, pax illa Caudina facta fuit:
 qua postea spreta a senatu, quod minus
 ritè facta esset, deditis pacis auctoribus:
 & Samnitibus pro superba pace infestis-
 simum cernētibus renatum bellum, om-
 nia quæ inde venerunt, non in animis
 solū, sed propè in oculis erant : &
 sero nequicquam laudata senis Pontij
 vtraque consilia : inter quæ se inedia
 lapsos victoriæ possessionem pace in-
 certa mutasse, & beneficij & maleficij
 occasione omissa, pugnatueros cum iis,
 quos potuerant in perpetuum vel ini-
 micos tollere, vel amicos facere ^a. a *Lin. lib. 9.*
 prudentius verò Romani. nam cū
 3 Camillus * victis & perdomitis Lati-
 nis, ad senatum quid de iis fieri pla-
 ceret,

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ceret, referret, ita locutus fuisse fertur: „
Reliqua consultatio est, quoniam rebel- „
lando sæpius nos sollicitant Latini, quo- „
nam modo perpetua pace quietos ob- „
tineamus. Dij immortales ita vos po- „
tentes huius consilij fecerunt, vt sit La- „
tium, deinde an non sit, in vestra manu „
posuerint. Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad „
Latinos attinet: parare in perpetuū, vel „
sæuiendo vel ignoscendo potestis. Vultis „
crudeliter consulere in deditos victos- „
que? licet delere omne Latium, & vastas „
inde solitudines facere, vnde sociali e- „
gregio exercitu, per multa bella magna- „
que sæpe vti estis. Vultis exemplo maio- „
rum, augere rem Romanam, victos in ci- „
uitatem accipiendo? materia crescendi „
per summam gloriam suppeditat. Certè „
id firmissimum longè imperium est, quo „
obedientes gaudent. sed maturato opus „
est, quicquid statuere placet. Tot popu- „
los inter spem metumq; suspensos ani- „
mo habetis: & vestram itaque de iis curā „
quàm primū absolui, & illorū animos „
dum exspectatione stupēt, seu beneficio, „
seu pœna præoccupari oportet. hæc ille,
cuius relationem de summa rerum sena-
tus laudans, sed quòd aliorum causa alia
esset,

esset, ita expediri posse consilium dicere, ut pro merito cuiusque statueretur, relatione habita de singulis populis. Quo facto ex decreto senatus, aliis ciuitas data, sacraque sua reddita: aliis ciuitas quam habebant seruata, crimenque rebellionis a publica fraude in paucos auctores versum: aliis muri deiecti, & alio habitari iussi^a. Est quoque in hanc rem memorabile iudicium senatus de Priuernatibus*, quibus ad deditionem coactis, & ex senatus decreto dirutis Priuerni muris, Vitrubioque eorum duce necato, cum sociis eius noxæ: cum Placius cons. quid de reliqua multitudine fieri placeret, ad senatum referret: vnus ex Priuernaribus legatis, magis conditionis, in qua natus esset, quam præsentis necessitatis memor, interrogatus a quodam ex senatoribus, quam poenā meritos Priuernates censeret: eam inquit, quam merentur, qui se libertate dignos censent. cuius feroci respōso cum infestos factos videret consul eos, qui Priuernatium causam impugnabant, ut ipse benigna interrogatione mitius respōsum eliceret: Quid si poenā, inquit, remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobiscū habituros speremus?

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remus? si bonam dederitis, inquit, & fidam, & perpetuam; si malam, haud diuturnam. Quibus verbis concitatis nonnullorum animis, pars tamen melior senatus ad meliora responsa trahere, & dicere, viri & liberi vocem auditam: nec credi posse, vllum populum, aut hominē denique, in eā cōditione, cuiuseum pēniteat, diutius quān necesse sit, mansurum: ibi pacem esse fidam, vbi voluntarij pacati sunt: neque eo loco, vbi seruitutē esse velint, fidem sperandam esse. Itaque ex auctoritate patrum latum ad populū

a *Liv. lib. 8.*

est, vt Priuernatibus ciuitas daretur a. M. verò Cato * ita maximè rebellantes 5
contineri in officio posse censebat, si effectum esset, ne possent rebellare. itaque arma omnibus cis Iberum Hispanis ademit, vna die muris omnium dirutis: quam rem adeo ægrè passi sunt, vt multi mortem sibi metipsis consciscerent: ferox gens nullam vitam rati sine armis
esse b. In quo Cato videtur secutus exē-
plum Cyri, qui Lydis iterum rebellantibus arma & equos ademit, iussitq; cauponias, ludicras artes, & lenocinia exercere. Qua ratione effeminati molli-
tie, pristinam virtutem perdiderunt, &
quos

b *Liv. lib. 34*

quos ante Cyrum inuictos bellae effecerant, in luxuriam lapsos ocium atque desidia superauit^a. Annibal autem Sargentum capto, signo dato, omnes puberes ^a *Luftia. l. 1.* interfici iussit. quod imperium crudele, ut inquit Liuius^b, ceterum prope necessarium cognitum in ipso euentu est. cui enim parci potuit ex iis, qui aut inclusi cum coniugibus, ac liberis domos super seipsum concremauerunt, aut armati nullum ante finem pugnae, quam morientes fecerunt? Quò spectare videtur Agesilai dictum, difficile esse misereri simul & sapere^c. Hoc quoque consilio Romanis, ^c *Plut. in A. paph.* ut omnem rebellandi occasionem sociis

6 adimerent, non placebat^{*}, socios sine Romano duce exercituque propriis viribus consilioque bella gerere^d. Vnde ^d *Dion. Hal. l. b. 8.* cum Aequi Latinum agrum inuasissent, & oratores Latinorum a senatu peteret, ut aut mitterent subsidium, aut seipsum tuendorum finium causa capere arma sineret: tutius visum est defendi inermes Latinos, quam pati retractare arma^e. Mos ^e *Liui. l. 1. 2.* quoque verustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere, nec æquis legibus esset amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tanquam pacatum uti, quam omnia diuina huma-

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naque dedisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, præsidia urbibus imposita forent^a. Fuit præterea mos Romanis, nunc hos nunc illos Italiæ populos subiugando, parte agri multare *, in eumque colonias ducere: aut in iam ante condita oppida novos colonos sui generis ascribere. hæ colonix tanquam præsidia, partis bello provinciis imponebantur^b. Itaque prouidè Sylla, licet tyrannicè, armis oppressa republ. eos, quorum opera in eo bello usus fuerat, colonos deduxit in agros & oppida eorum, qui illi restiterant: qui opportunis locis dispositi, in ipsius potestate continerent Italiã, translatis ad eos veterum possessorum prædiis: quo beneficio eos per totam vitam habuit obnoxios, & dominationem suã mirum in modum stabiliuit. cùm enim res suas, nisi actis Syllæ ratis, tueri nequirent, propugnatores eius dignitatis fuerunt etiam post illius obitum: neque illi, quorum arces, mœnia, pecunias, immunitates sustulerat, propter inopiam nocere poterant^c. Perseo autem victo, & Macedonibus liberis esse iussis, regis amicos, purpuratosque, duces exercituũ præfectos nauium aut præsidiorum, aliosque


^a Lib. lib. 8.

^b Dion. Hal. lib. 3. 4. 5. App. de bell. civil. lib. 1.

^c Appian. de bel. civil. lib. 1.

liosque ministros omnes , regi seruire humiliter, aliisque superbè imperare as-
fuetos, Macedonia excedere Romani, &
in Italiam migrare iusserunt : ne fortè
quid noui in Macedonia molirentur^a. *a Liv. l. 45.*
Huc spectasse videtur Lycurgus in legi-
bus suis, quas Retras vocant, quibus ve-
tuit sapius còtra eosdem bellum gerere:
ne ijbellandi rationem discerent. Itaque
Agésilao continenter cū Thebanis bella
gerente, & in pugna quadam vulnerato,
Antalcidam ei dixisse ferunt: Pulchram
a Thebanis mercedem reportas , quos
nescientes pugnare docuisti. nam reuera
narratur , nunquam bellicosiores fuisse
Thebanos, quàm tum temporis, ob cre-
bras Lacedæmoniorum aduersus eos
expeditiones^b. fortuna enim belli,
vt inquit Q. Curtius, artem
victos quoque docet.

*b Plut. in A.
poph.*




DE IVRE ET OFFICIIS

BELLICIS, ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI, LIBER TERTIVS.

DE DISCIPLINA MILITARI.

- 1 *Disciplina militaris magni est momenti.*
- 2 *Tyrones & imbelles disciplina militari sunt bellicosi.*
- 3 *Capuanâ delicia perdiderunt Annibalis exercitum, alioqui inuictum.*
- 4 *Neglecta vel reuera disciplina militaris testimonium.*
- 5 *Mulieres castra sequi turpe.*
- 6 *Cura recidendorum impedimentorum.*
- 7 *Muli Mariani.*
- 8 *Exercitus unde nomen habeat.*
- 9 *Leges militares.*
- 10 *Tria curare debent milites.*
- 11 *Militaris disciplina.*

CAP. PRIMVM.

I  Vantum momenti * in disciplina militari positū sit, docēt nos historiæ, & ipsa quotidiana experientia. & certè nulla alia re populum Rom. sibi orbem terrarum subegisse, nisi armorum exercitatione, disciplina castrorum, vsuque

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^a Vegetius de
milit. lib. 1.
lib. 2. in proo.
hist.
^b in milite
Marian.

militiæ, satis constat^a, idq; pulchrè ex-
pressit Quintilianus^b cum ait: Si verè „
existimemus, imperium populi Rom. ad „
hanc diem militari disciplina stetit. non „
enim nobis aut multitudo maior, quàm „
Cimbris: aut maiores opes, quàm locu- „
pletissimis regnis: aut mortis contèptus „
facilior, quàm plerisq; barbaris, causam „
vitæ non habentibus. principes nos facit „
seuèritas institutorū, ordo militiæ, amor „
quidam laboris, quotidianæ exercitatio- „
nes, assidua belli meditatio. Vnde Valeri⁹ „
^c lib. 2. c. 7. Max^c. præcipuum decus, & stabilimentū
Romani imperij, disciplinæ militaris te-
nacissimum vinculū fuisse dicit: in cuius
sinu serenus, tranquillisque beatæ pacis
status acquiescit. Et quidem plures exer-
citus seruatorum*, tyronum, & imbelliū, ²
sola disciplina & imperio inuictos, &
bellicosissimos factos fuisse legimus: &
econtra, plurimos exercitus veteranorū
militum, inuictos alioqui, sola licentia,
omnibus vitiis, neglecta disciplina mili-
tari, corruptos & consumptos fuisse, &
longè ante periisse, quàm hostem vidis-
sent. cuius rei fidē facit Tullus Hostilius
Romanorum rex, qui Romanos qua-
draginta iam annos in ocio agentes, ad
bellum

bellum exciuit, & belli expertes, sola disciplina optimos milites reddidit^a. & T. ^a *Liv. lib. 1.*
 Sempronius Gracchus, cùm ei feruorum exercitus datus esset, breui effecit exercitatione & ordine militis, vt nemo eorum generis ac sanguinis sui memor in acie esset, præsidio sociis, hostibus terrori essent^b. Sic quoque Pelopidas & Epaminondas, liberatis Thebis, a seruitute Spartanorum, faciliè eos institutis militaribus ex imbellibus optimos milites effecerunt: ita vt non solum pares essent Spartanis, sed etiam superiores. Scipio verò Æmilianus, optimus imperator, & qui imperatorias artes optimè callebat, vt Numantinae vrbs magnos spiritus superiorum ducum culpa nutritos contunderet, collapsam militiæ disciplinam, vt primùm castra intrauit, ciectis duobus millibus scortorum, & omnibus iis quæ voluptatis causa comparata erant, restituisse fertur. qua ratione acrem illam & animosam Numantiam, incendiis exustam, ruinisquæ prostratam, solo æquauit. ita vt neglectæ militaris disciplinæ iudicium, vt ait Valerius Max^c. Mancini miserabilis deditio, seruata merces, Scipio-

^b *Liv. lib. 21.*^c *lib. 2. c. 7.*

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nis speciosissimus triumphus exstiterit. quem secutus Metellus, cùm exercitum in Africa Iugurthino bello, nimia Sp. Albinii indulgentia corruptū accepisset, disciplinam militarem in statum suum redegit: & edicto primū adiumenta ignauiae sustulisse dicitur: atque præclaras ex hoste victorias adeptus est ^a. Et Scipio Africanus posterior, consul in Africam missus, videns corruptam disciplinam militum sub Pisone assuetorum ocio, rapinis & avaritiæ, & nunquam le deuicturum hostes, ni suos in potestate haberet: castigatis graui oratione militibus, omnibusque, qui non militarent, exactis, disciplina militari stabilita, potentem illam Carthaginem Rom. imperij æmulā euertit ^b. Annibalis verò exercitum, aduersus omnia humana mala sæpe ac diu durantem, bonis inexpertum atque insuetum, quem nulla malivicerat vis, perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates immodicæ Capuanæ*. Somnus enim, & 3 vinum, & epulæ, & scorta, balneaque, & ocium cōsuetudine in dies blandius, ita eneruauerant corpora, animosque, inquit Liuius^c, vt magis deinde præteritæ victoriæ eos, quàm præsentis tutarentur vires;

^a Valerius
Max. lib. 2,
ab. 7.

^b App. de bel.
pun.

vires: maiusque id peccatum ducis apud peritos artium militarium habitū, quàm quod non ex Cannensi acie protinus ad urbem Romā duxisset: illa enim cunctatio distulisse victoriā videri potuit: hic error vires ademisse ad vincendum. Itaque hercle, velut si cum alio exercitu a Capua exisset, nihil usquam pristinæ disciplinæ tenuit. nam & redierunt plerique scortis impliciti: & ubi primū sub pel- libus haberi cœpti sunt, viaque & alius militaris labor excepit, tyronum modo, corporibus animisque deficiebant: & deinde per omne æstiuorum tempus, magna pars sine com meatu ab signis dilabebantur, neque aliæ latebræ, quàm Capua desertoribus erat. Itaque M. Marcellus in aciem copiis suis eductis apud Nolas, ut suorum militum animos erigeret, hosti exprobrabat Capuam Annibali Cannas fuisse. ibi virtutē bellicam, ibi militarem disciplinam, ibi præteriti temporis famam, ibi futuri extinctam: atque ita prælio commisso hostes fudit. & quemadmodum Annibalis exercitui Capua, sic militibus Alexandri Babylo- nia plurimum nocuit, & disciplinam mi- litarem admodum corripit: usque adeo,

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a lib. 5.

vt Alexandrum ad discrimina, quæ postea sequebâtur, haud dubiè debiliorem futurum fuisse, si hostem habuisset, scribat Q. Curtius^a. Et vt breuiter dicam, nullum maius neglectæ, vel retentæ disciplinæ militaris testimonium * habere⁴ possumus, quàm de Romanis: qui cùm ante iusticiæ opinione, ac belli gloria omnes populos superarent: postea labente disciplina, ab omnibus superati sunt. Itaque Cato apud Sallustium: No-
lite, inquit, existimare, maiores nostros
armis rempubl. ex parua magnâ fecisse.
si ita res esset, multo pulcherrimam eam
haberemus: quippe sociorum atque ci-
uium, præterea armorum, atque equo-
rum maior nobis copia, quam illis est.
sed alia fuere, quæ illos magnos fecere,
quæ nobis nulla sunt: domi industria,
foris iustum imperium, animus in con-
sulendo liber, neque delicto, neque libi-
dini obnoxius. pro his nos habemus lu-
xuriam, atq; auaritiam: publicè egestatē,
priuatim opulētiam: laudamus diuitias;
sequimur inertiam: inter bonos & malos
discrimē nullum est. omnia virtutis præ-
mia ambitio possidet. Scitè vero Fabri-
cius, legat^o ad Pyrrhū profectus, cū apud
eum

cum Cyneam Thessalum narrâtem audisset, quendam Atheniensem clarum sapientia, suadere, ne quid aliud homines, quàm voluptatis causa facerent : pro monstro eam vocem accepit, continuo-
 que Pyrrho & Samnitibus hostibus istâ sapientiam deprecatus est^a. Prudenter
 quoque Spartana ciuitas, diu ciuium suorum oculos ab Asiæ aspectu retraxit, quia inde omnes manare delicias, certa corporis & animi venena perniciosissima cognoscebat, & plus similibus victoriis amitti, quàm bello quæri^b. Hinc quoque
 5 mulieres castra* sequi apud maiores maximæ turpitudinis fuit, & seuerissimæ animaduersionis. & militi uxorem vel familiam apud se habere non conceditur, nisi cum venia principis^c. Et ne quidem
 in prouincia vxorē ducere militi licuit^d. Sed & procōsul tenetur de delictis vxoris, quam secum in prouinciam duxit^e. Melius quoque esse dicit Vlpianus^f, vt
 procōsul sine vxore in prouinciam proficiscatur. idque Seuerus Cæcina apud Tacitum^g censuit : inesse enim dicebat mulierum comitatu, quæ pacem luxu, bellum formidine morentur, & Romanum agmē ad similitudinem barbari incessus

^a Val. Max. lib. 4. cap. 2.

^b Val. Max. lib. 2. c. 6.

^c l. quicumque. C. de romi it. lib. 12. dl et si cōtra. C. de nupt. l. cus. ff. de ritu nups.

^d l. 4. §. proficisci. ff. de off. procons. l. in d. §. proficisci.

^g Aunal. l. 3.

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cessus conuertant. Olim quoque ex cōstitutione Constantini, abiectionum mulierum coniunctiones, quibusdam militibus interdicebantur. quod tamen imperator Iustinianus correxit, concedens militibus, vt quascunque vellent, modò

a Auth. vt liceat mat. vel auie. §. illo indubuanter. l. a calig. 120. C. de nupt. ingenuas vxores ducerent *a*. Præcipuè etiam ad disciplinam militarem spectat * 6 cura recidendorum impedimentorum, quibus maximè agmen grauari solet.

Vnde Philippus Macedo, cū primū exercitum conscriberet, vehiculorum vsum interdixit : equitibus non amplius, quàm singulos calones habere permisit, peditibus verò denis singulos, qui molas & funes ferrent. Scipio culcitra haberi prohibuit, primusque ipse culcitra foenea vsus est : milites in itinere asinos, aut mulos inequitare vetuit, dicens parū ab eo homine in bello expectandū esse,

b Appian, de bell. Hisp. qui suis pedibus ire non posset *b*. C. Marius recidendorum impedimentorū gratia, vasa & cibaria militum in fasciculos aptata furcis imposuit, sub quibus & habile onus, & facile esset : vnde & in pro-

c Reg. lib. 1. tit. 22. par. 2. d Tusc. ques. lib. 2. uerbium tractum, Muli Mariani *. idque 7 & constitutionibus regni Hispaniæ cautum est *c*. Quò spectare videtur Cicero *d*,
cūm

- 8,, cùm ait : Nostri exercitus* vnde nomen
 ,, habent vides : deinde qui labor, quantus
 ,, agminis : ferre plus dimidiati mensis ci-
 ,, baria, ferre si quid ad vsum velint, ferre
 ,, vallum. nam scutum, gladium, galeam,
 ,, in onere nostri milites non plus nume-
 ,, rant, quàm humeros, lacertos, manus.
 ,, arma enim membra militis dicunt : quæ
 ,, quidem, inquit, ita ferunt aptè, vt si vsus
 ,, foret, abiectis oneribus, expeditis armis,
 ,, vt membris pugnare possent. Alexander
 verò cùm graue spoliis apparatuque lu-
 xuriæ agmè vix moueretur, totius exer-
 citus sarcinis, exceptis admodum neces-
 sariis, conferre iussis, primū suis face sub-
 dita, ceteras incendi præcepit, vt potius
 sarcinarum, quàm disciplinæ iactura fie-
 ret^a. Præterea quod ad militarem disci-
 plinam attinet, lege militari cautū fuit,
 9 ne* lixæ permixti cū equitibus vagētur,
 néue frumentum publicè datum miles
 vendat, aut prædas pecorum vel manci-
 piorum vino commutet, néue gregarius
 miles in acie, vel in castris seruum aut iu-
 mentum habeat, neu quis, vbi tribunus
 militum fuisset, postea ordinum ductor
 esset, neque qui ordines duxisset, miles
 postea fieret. Itaque refert Liuius^b, Vo-
 leronem

^a Q. Curtius
lib. 6.

^b lib. 2.

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leronem quendam de plebe hominem,
 qui superioribus expeditionibus ordi-
 nes duxisset, inter gregarios ascriptum,
 recusasse militiā : quia negaret, eo quòd
 ordines duxisset, se militem fieri debere,
 nullam ignominiam in militia meritū^a.
 Miles quoque qui suo tempore annonā
 non exegisset, ea fraudabatur^b. Docen-
 dos etiam milites monebat Cato, vt fe-
 roces aduersus hostes essent; humani er-
 ga ciues ac socios : timidi ad iniurias in-
 ferendas; prompti verò ad vindictam: vt-
 que nihil magis cuperent, quàm laudem
 & gloriam adipisci. Sedulo quoq; olim
 cauebatur, vt primum vinculum militū
 putarent sacramenti religionem, secun-
 dum singulorum amorem, velut inex-
 plicabilem nexum, tertium deserēdi ne-
 fas. L. Æmilius Paulus dicebat, vnū im-
 peratorem in exercitu providere & cō-
 sulere, quid agendum sit, debere, nūc per
 se, nunc cum iis quos aduocauerit in cō-
 filium : qui non sint aduocati, eis nec
 palam, nec secretò iactare consilia sua:
 militem hęc tria curare debere*: corpus, 10
 vt quàm validissimum, & perniciosissi-
 mum habeat: arma apta: cibum paratum
 ad subita imperia : cetera scire de se, diis
 immor-

^a Dion. Hal.
 lib. 9.

^b fortissimi.
 l. nulli. C. de
 ex g. milit. 47.
 110, lib. 12.

immortalibus & imperatori suo curę esse debere. in quo exercitu cōsul & imperator rumoribus vulgi circūageretur, ibi nihil salutare esse ^a. Nam, vt inquit Tacitus, tam nescire quādam milites, quā scire oportet. Ita se ducum auctoritas, sic rigor disciplinæ habet, vt multa per centuriones tribunosq; tantum iuberi expediat Parendo quoq; potius. quā imperia ducū sciscitando, res militares continētur: & fortissimus in ipso discrimine exercitus est, qui ante discriminē quietissimus. Itaque Cæsar apud Auaricū temeritatem, cupiditatemq; militum reprehēdit, quod sibi ipsi iudicassent, quò procedendū, aut quid agendū videretur: neque signo receptui dato cōstitissent, neque a tribunis militū, legatisq; retineri potuissēt: & quāto opere corū animi magnitudinē se admirari dicebat, q̃ non castrorū munitiones, nō altitudo montis, nō murus oppidi tardare potuisset: tātō opere licentiā arrogātiāq; reprehēdere, q̃ pl⁹ se, quā imperatorē, de victoria atq; exitu rerū sentire existimassēt: nec minus se in milite modestiā, & continentiā, quā virtutē atq; animi magnitudinē desiderare ^b. Ceterū exstat apud Flauīū Vopiscū

^a *Lin. lib. 44*

^b *Cæs. de bel. gal lib. 7.*

Aure-

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

Aureliani Cæsaris epistola ad tribunum
quendam : qua disciplina militaris * bre- 11
uiter perstringitur, in hæc verba : Si vis „
tribunus esse, imo si vis viuere, manus „
militum cõtine : nemo pullum alienum „
rapiat, ouem nemo cõtingat, vuam nul- „
lus auferat, oleum, sal, lignum nemo exi- „
gat, annona sua contentus sit, de præda „
hostium, nõ de lacrymis prouincialium „
habeat : arma tersa sint, ferramenta san- „
nata, calciamenta fortia, vestis noua, ve- „
terem vestem excludat, stipedium in bal- „
teo non in popina habeat, torquem bra- „
chiale & annulum apponat, equum sa- „
ginarium suum defricet, animal non vè- „
dat, mulum centuriatum comiter curet, „
alter alteri quasi seruus obsequatur, a „
medicis gratis curetur, at uspicibus nihil „
dent, in hospitiiis castè se gerant, qui litè „
fecerit, vapulet. hæc ille. Sed & quò me- „
lius milites in officio contineantur, præ-
cipitur præsidibus prouinciatũ, per quas
fit militum transitus, vt in parato habeãt
vnde exercitus ali possit, sine querela
prouincialium : & expensæ eo nomine
factæ imputantur tributo, quod forte
principi debetur : milites quoque iubẽ-
tur iis cibariis contenti esse, quæ in sin-
gulis

gulis inueniuntur locis, nec alia exigere possunt^a: quod & cōstitutionibus Gal-
liæ statutum est.

^a *Authen. de
trans. militi:
coll. 10.*

De officio legati, tribuni & aliorum qui mi-
litibus præfunt.

- 1 *Præcipua militiæ mania apud Rom.*
- 2 *Legati qui.*
- 3 *Alia legati partes, alia imperatoris.*
- 4 *Mandati fines in bello non licet excedere.*
- 5 *Vtrum ex noua rei bene gerenda occasione
a mandato recedi possit.*
- 6 *Officium regentis exercitum.*
- 7 *Commeatus parcè dandus militibus.*
- 8 *Milites pro meritis promouendi sunt.*
- 9 *Tribuni militum imperium habuerunt in
milites, iisdemque vires præferri solent.*
- 10 *Tribunorum munus.*
- 11 *Falsum numerum militum referens quo-
modo puniatur.*

CAPVT II.

1 **Q**VÆ præcipua fuerint olim apud Ro-
manos * militiæ munia, satis indi-
cāt hæc Papyrij dictatoris verba a Liuiio
„ prolata^b, cū ait: Non miles centurio-
„ nis, non centurio tribuni, non tribunus
„ legati, non legatus consulis, nō magister
Y equitum

^b *lib. 8.*

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equitum dictatoris pareat imperio: non „
 edicta imperatorum obseruentur. De „
 officio autē imperatoris seu ducis exer-
 citus, & eius potestate alibi diximus. Le-
 gati verò erant* comites expeditionis & 2
 adiutores negotiorum, qui consulibus,
 & imperatoribus decernebātur, vt ipso-
 rum vices gererent, & eorum cōsilio res
 administrarent. consiliorum quoque, &
 fortium factorum, ac meritæ virtutis &
 ignauix cuiusque, qua cura, qua fide, &
 diligentia, quaq; disciplina militari du-
 ces exercitui & castris præessent, si quid
 fictum vanumque, aut parum integra
 veritate afferrent, locupletissimi testes e-
 rant legati. quorū etiam auctoritas, tam
 in administranda prouincia, quā du-
 cendo exercitu, acieque instruenda tanti
 fuit, vt absentibus, vel impeditis consuli-
 bus vel imperatore, summam imperij te-
 nerent^a. Porro illud constat, alias esse le-
 gati* partes, atque imperatoris, vt ait Cæ- 3
 sar^b, alter omnia ad præscriptum agere,
 alter liberè ad summam rerum cōsulere
 debet. Ideoque Cæsar dicebat Syllæ, quē
 decedens castris præfecerat, consilium
 non reprehendendum videri, qui suos
 longius Pompeianos persequentes re-
 uocauit:

^a Alex. ab A-
 lex gen. duc-
 rū lib. 6. c. 3.
^b de bell. ci-
 vil. lib. 3.

uocauit: quamuis tamen plerique existi-
 marent, si acrius insequi voluisset, bellū
 eo die potuisse finiri. Sylla enim a Cæsa-
 re castris tantum relictus, liberatis suis,
 hoc contentus fuit, neque prælio decer-
 tare voluit. Simili ratione Q. Titurius
 Sabinus, legatus Cæsar's, bello Gallico
 castris se continuit, hostibus iam ad vallū
 castrorum accedentibus: quòd cum tāta
 multitudine hostium, præsertim eo ab-
 sente, qui summam imperij teneret, nisi
 æquo loco, aut opportunitate aliqua da-
 ta, legato dimicādum non existimaret ^{a. a Caesar de}
 Et quidē quemadmodū Romani in im- ^{bel. gal. lib. 3.}
 peratores (quibus liberā de summa rerū
 consulendi potestatem concedebant) re
 male gesta, remissi admodum fuere, vt a
 lio loco dictum est: sic imperij sprete vel
 non seruati, in legatos, tribunos, & alios
 imperatore inferiores, asperi vindices
 4 extiterūt. Mandati enim fines excedere*
 in re militari viriosissimum semper ha-
 bitum fuit, & capite vindicatum, etiam
 re bene gesta ^{b. l. 3. §. in}
 & veteri instituto vicit cōtentio Papyrij ^{bello. ff. de e}
 dictatoris, poscētis Q. Fabium magistrū ^{milite.}
 equitum ad supplicium, quòd cōtra eius
 imperium exercitum eduxisset, quamuis

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fufis Sānitibus in castra redierat : intercedente etiam pro Fabio populo Rom. tribunisq̃ue plebis: quibus tandem oratione Papyrij victis, & ad preces & obtestationē verfis, vt sibi pœnam magistri equitum remitteret, dictator concessit, testatus tamen, non noxæ eximi Q. Fabium, qui contra edictum imperatoris pugnasset, sed noxæ damnatum donari populo Rom. donari tribunitiæ potestati, precarium, non iustum auxilium ferenti: sibi sufficere vicisse disciplinam militarem & imperij maiestatem, quæ in discrimine fuerat a. Sunt tamen qui existiment, si noua occasio rei bene gerendæ offeratur, recedi a mandato posse, si puta repentinus aliquis casus felicem successum & pæne certam victoriam polliceatur: ne oblata diuinitus rei bene gerendæ occasio amittatur b. quod tamen scrupulo non caret, præsertim si alicui Papyrio, Manlio, vel Postumio, hominibus duris & inexorabilibus ratio reddenda sit: qui existimauerunt corrumpi atq̃ue dissolui officium omne imperātis, si quis ad id, quod facere iussus est, nō obsequio debito, sed consilio non considerato respondet. Etenim diligenter custodiendi sunt

a *Liu. lib. 8.*

b *Argumento
l. si hominem.
ff. mandati.
Latè Felinus
inc. 1. col. 14.
de const. ut
c. quod super.
col. 3. de maio.
¶ obed. Cre.
men. sing. 150
¶ Rochus
Curt. inc. ult.
de cōsuet. col.
2.*

sunt fines mandati, & nihil contra faciē-
dum est, etiam si eo facto videri possit res
euentura prosperius, exq; vtilitate eius,
qui id tibi negotium mandauit^a, fuitque <sup>a l. diligēter.
ff. mandati.</sup>
hæc quæstio etiam a philosophis variè
tractata^b. Papyrij certè seueritas, alios a <sup>b Aul. Cel.
nost. Aul. lib. 1
cap. 13.</sup>
re bene gerenda, occasione oblata deter-
ruit: atque ita M. Valerio legato, qui ca-
stris præerat, absente Papyrio, in oculis
exemplū erat Q. Fabius, inquit Liuius^c, ^{c lib. 8.}
ne quam vim hostium magis, quàm tru-
cem dictatoris iram timeret: itaque fru-
mentatores cū circumuēti ex insidiis,
cæsi loco iniquo essent, creditum vulgò
est, subueniri eis a legato potuisse, ni tri-
6 stia edicta exhorruisset. Porro officium^{*}
regentis exercitum, non solum in dāda,
vt Marcianus respondit, sed etiam in ob-
seruanda disciplina consistit. & qui mili-
7 tibus præest, quàm parcissimè^{*} iis com-
meatum dare debet: vsque adeo, vt neq;
piscatum, neque venatum liceat militem
mittere: quod in disciplina Augusti cau-
tum fuit^d. Et quidem, vt maximè omnia
tuta sint, nō pluribus quàm triginta tri-
bunus commeatum dare potest. si pluri-
bus datus fuerit, eorum stipendia in fiscū
deferuntur: iubeturque tribunus, qui

<sup>d l. officium.
§ 1. & l. ne
mo C. de re
milit. lib. 12.</sup>

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com meatum dedit, illa militibus refun-
 dere, vltra pœnam amissionis cinguli^a.
 Tempore verò expeditionis, vel hostis
 imminētis, nulli omnino a signis abesse
 licet, & capitale erit com meatum dare^b.
 Adeo autem odiosum est, a signis abesse,
 vt miles, qui in com meatu agit, non vi-
 deatur reipub. causa abesse^c. Non potest
 præterea is, qui exercitui præest, milites
 a numeris ad alios numeros pro libidine
 *transferre, nisi vtilitatis publicæ causa &
 princeps concesserit. Nam vt ait impe-
 rator^d, honoris augmentum, non ambi-
 tione, sed labore ad vnumquemque cõ-
 uenit peruenire : & non debet quis ad
 dignitatem suffragio, sed laboribus atq;
 ordine numerorum prouehi^e. Is namq;
 ceteros debet antecedere, quem stipen-
 dia longiora, vel labor anteire fecerit^f.
 Iraque Q. Metellus consul; quâuis nulla
 lege impediretur, quin filium contuber-
 nalem perpetuum haberet, maluit tamẽ
 eum in ordine merere. & egregio strata-
 gemate vsus fuisse Theogenes Atheniẽ-
 sis dicitur, qui cùm exercitum Megaram
 duceret, perētibus militibus ordines re-
 spondit, ibi se daturum : deinde equites
 præmisit, eosque hostium specie impetũ
 in suos

*a l. inbemu.
 § super his. §
 non dāda. C.
 de erog. mil.
 anno lib. 12.
 b l. 1. C. de
 cōmeat. l. 12.*

*c l. 1. ff. de re
 milit.*

*d in l. contra
 publicam C.
 de re milit.
 no. 12.*

*e l. 1. & 2.
 C. de of. mag.
 off.
 f l. 2. C. de
 pref. prat. A-
 fri.*

in suos retorquere iussit. quo facto, quos
 tum habebat tanquam ad hostium oc-
 cursum præparatos, permisit ita ordinari
 aciem, vt quo quisque voluisset loco cō-
 sisteret: & cū inertissimus quisque re-
 tro se dedisset, strenui autem in frontem
 prosiluissent, vt quemque inuenit stan-
 tem, ita ad ordines militiæ prouexit. Ve-
 teri quoque instituto ad tribunatū ne-
 mo admitti poterat, nisi prius alam du-
 xisset: neque alam ducere nisi cohorti
 præfuisset. fuitque antiqui moris, vt mi-
 les in castris ad centurionem, centurio
 ad tribunum mane salutatum iret, & ad
 edictum præsto esset. Hadrianus verò
 Cæsar, viros ætatis exacte, & summę pru-
 dentię, doctos etate & usu ad tribunatum
 euexit, vetuitque edicto, ne imberbis a-
 dolescens tribunus fieret. & Alexander
 Macedo tanti tribunos & cēturiones fe-
 cit, vt neminem, nisi sexagenarium, or-
 dines ducere permiserit. constat tamen
 & olim nōnunquam in indignos, imo in
 impuberes has dignitates collatas fuis-
 se a. Fuit quoque lege militari cautum,
 ne quis vbi tribunus fuisset, postea ordi-
 num ductor esset. namque centurio, de-
 curio, & ordinum ductor tribuno infe-

a l. si d. cessi
 miles. §. i. m.
 autem. ff. de
 excus. tut. C.
 l. si C. de
 test. milit.

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riores erant . id tamen non in fauorem
tribunorum, sed in odium P. Salonij, qui
alternis fere annis & tribunus militum,
& primus centurio erat ad postulationē
coniuratorum militum, lege sacrata mi-
litari cautum fuisse, auctor est Liuius ^a.
Ac licet tribunis, militum centuriones
& decuriones subsint, ipsi tamen legati
imperio parent. Porro tribunos militū,
qui castris & legionibus præerant *, im- 9
perium in milites habuisse, peruulgatū
est: iisque non virgas, vt consuli aut præ-
tori, sed ad terrorem audacię, vites lic-
tores præferebant: contumacesque milites
Romani non virgis, sed vitibus per cen-
turiones; externos verò fustibus plecte-
bant, quę poena minus infamabat, quàm
quæ a licitore esset illata ^b. Sciendum est
tamen, non licuisse tribunis in caput ci-
uis Romani animaduertere, neque alte-
rius quidē militis, vt alio loco dicemus ^c.
Fuit quoque prisca moris, vt quū prin-
ceps ad tribunatum quēpiam eueheret,
gladium illi in manu darēt: quo signifi-
cabatur in milites iure militari habere
imperium. Præcipuum verò tribunorū
inunus * fuit, castrorum & exercitus cu- 10
ram gerere, ne sine munimento, sine cu-
stodiis

^a lib. 7.

^b Plin. lib. 14
cap. 1.

^c §. de iudi-
cis militari-
bus.

stodiis sint : peruigiles excubias iubere, ne quid occultè hostes moliri possint: milites in castris habere dicto audientes, & intentos imperio, ad exercitationes ducere, in stationes mittere, clauas portarum suscipere, vigilias circumire, frumentationibus cõmilitonum interesse, frumentum probare, mēforū fraudem coërcere, querelas militum audire, eorumque delicta, secundum suæ auctoritatis modum castigare, valetudinarios inspicere, sauciorum curam gerere, in primisque milites ad solenni iusiurandum adigere^a. Præterea a tribunis, siue ^{a. l. officium.} in hostes ducere, siue castra metari, siue ^{§ officium.} in prima acie, & fronte locari, aut in sub- ^{ff. de re milit.} sidijs poni, vel in stationes, & vigilias ire conueniret, tesseram milites petebant: ipsi verò ab imperatore, quod dari oportebat signum, assumebant. Milites quoque in conflictu præliorum singulos & vniuersos hortari, et monere, atque incessantes animaduertere tribuni propriū munus erat. missionem quoque militibus perfunctis militia, si causam probarent, ex auctoritate & iussu consulum dabāt: propria verò auctoritate hoc facere tribunis non licuit. Itaque Q. Fuluius

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Flaccus censor, Fulvium fratrem, quòd cohortem legionis, in qua tribunus erat, iniussu consulis missam fecerat, senatu mouit^a. Denique ducibus, tribunis & centurionibus olim præcipuè curadum erat, in locis ubi æstiva habebant, cogere tyrònes milites, cùm primum merere cœpissent stipendia, per turmas hinc inde crebro concurrere, decurrere, clamare, locum tenere, imperium facere, iussa exequi, seque in orbem colligere, cuneum facere, & phalangem, & sequi signa, & pati tædium, æstus ac vigilias assuescerent: ne sine consilio, sine imperio in hostes tenderent, ne pulsì loco cederent, & ut in acie quisque agnosceret ordines suos, ita ut usu quotidiano, non minus ipsi sibi præscriberent, quid factò opus foret, nec hoc incitante ullo, nec imperante quoquam ab aliis discederèt. Quæ disciplina præcipua Iphicrati traditur, ut sine ducis opera, milites ita institueret in acie consistere, ut peritissimè dispositi viderètur. Ceterum tribunus*, II vel centurio, vel alius, qui refert falsum numerum militum, stipendia intercipiens, condemnatur in quadruplum, & dignitate priuatur^b: ex constitutionibus verò

^a Val. Max.
lib. 2. cap. 7.
Liv. lib. 31.

^b l. ult. §. pro
limitis in C.
de off. pref.
Afric.

verò Galliæ capite punitur. Item lege Julia repetundarum tenetur, qui ob militem legendum mittendūmve pecuniā acceperit^a: ideoque exilio, vel etiam gravius puniri solet^b. & tyrocinij causa datum, repeti potest, tanquam datū ob turpem causam^c. Porro qui occasione transitus, ab urbibus vel prædiis per concussionem quid accipit, tenetur in duplū^d, qui verò provinciam nudavit, solet eo remitti, & quadruplū restituere iuberi^e.

^a l. eadē lege.

^b l. lege Julia.

^c ff. ad leg. Jul.

^d repet.

^e l. lex Julia.

^f l. hodie. ff.

ad leg. Jul. repet.

^c l. 9. C. de

cond. ob turp.

caus.

^d Auth. de

transf. milit.

col. 10.

^e l. 1. C. ad

leg. Jul. repet.

DE METATORIBVS SIVE MENSORIBVS.

- 1 Metatores siue mensores qui.
- 2 Hospitia quomodo designentur militibus.
- 3 Qui liberi sint a molestia accipiendi hospitio.
- 4 Solum hospitium militibus concedendum.
- 5 Metatorum qui ab hospitibus pecuniam accipiunt, pœna.

CAPVT III.

- I Metatores, siue mensores^{*}, non solum illi dicti, qui castris ponendis, tentoriis ac tabernaculis collocandis locum deligunt, ac metas præfiniunt: quæ de re pulchrè Polybius^f; sed etiam qui hospitio excipiendis militibus, in urbibus domos designaturi præcedunt,

^f de Rom. mi-

lit. & castro.

mes. & Vege-

tius lib. 2. c. 1.

& notas

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& notas præfigūt, adiecto nomine eius, qui in quaque domo hospitio accipien-
 dusest: quas qui delere ausus fuerit, vt
 a l. 1. C. de falsi reus cōdemnatur^a. Porro ex rescri-
 ptō imperatorū Arcadij & Honorij^b, do-
 mo in tres partes diuisa, * tertia pars mi-
 liti deputata fuit: ita tamen vt dominus
 primam haberet eligendi facultatem, se-
 cundā hospes, tertia rursus domino re-
 linqueretur. Tabernæ quoq; mercibus
 deputatæ, liberæ ab hac diuisione manere
 solēt: nisi fortè stabulum militi in tertia
 dom^o parte deesset. Illustribus autē viris,
 nō tertia pars dom^o, sed dimidia deputa-
 ri solet: hac videlicet conditione, vt alter
 eligeret, alter æquis partibus diuideret^c.
 Antigonus verò edixit, ne quis minor
 quinquaginta annis hospitio matris fa-
 milias vteretur: & cū filiū diuertisse au-
 disset in domum cuiusdam, cui tres filia
 insignes specie essent: Audio, dicebat, fi-
 li, angustè habitare te, pluribus dominis
 domū possidentibus, hospitium laxius ac-
 cipe: & cōmigrare iussit. Miles præterea,
 qui in ea vrbe domum habet, non potest
 petere aliam sibi hospitij gratia designa-
 ri^d. Sunt autem liberi^e ab hac hospitio
 accipiendi molestia, medici sacri palatij,
 & vrbis

a l. 1. C. de
 metat. & E
 pid.
 b in l. 2. C.
 d. 2.

c d. l. 2.

d l. omnes. C.
 de metat. &
 epid. lib. 12.

2

”

”

”

3

& vrbis Romæ magistri liberalium artiū,
 & pictores ingenui^a. vacant quoque ab
 hac molestia consulares, patricij, consu-
 les, eorumque heredes, & alij qui digni-
 tate præfulgent : quibus omnibus ma-
 gnam immunitatem tribuit Arcadij im-
 perator constitutio^b. & Claudius im-
 perator patrū decreto prohibuit milites
 domos senatorias etiam salutandi causa
 ingredi^c. Tenuēs quoque vitæ homines
 cogi non debent ad suscipiendos hospiti-
 um milites^d. Ceterū in vrbibus vbi sunt
 4 milites^e, solum hospitium illis concedi-
 tur: ita vt nihil ab hospite, quod vel ipsis,
 vel animalium pastui necessarium sit, pe-
 tere possint, nec quidem volentibus ho-
 5 spitibus accipere^f. Metatores verò^g qui
 ab hospitibus per concussionem pecu-
 niam acceperint, duplum eius reddere
 cogentur, & exilio plectentur^h: & consti-
 tutionibus quidem Galliæ capite pu-
 niuntur.

^a l. Archia-
 eos. C. d. 118.

^b in l. hac les-
 ge. C. d. 118.

^c Suet. in vi-
 ta Claud.

^d l. illicitas.
 §. tenuis. C.
 de off. pref.

^e l. deuotum.
 C. de metat.
 & epid. l. 12
 l. vii. C. de
 salga. hosp.
 non prob. l. 12
 l. 3. C. de ero-
 mitit. anno.
 lib. 12.
^f aut. en. de
 trans milis.
 col. 10.

DE MILITIBVS, ET QVI MILI-
 TARE POSSVNT.

- 1 *Militare non est peccatum.*
- 2 *Militi permissum hostem occidere.*
- 3 *Milites qui dicantur.*
- 4 *Clerici in militiam non sunt recipiendi.*

5 Nec

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

- 5 *Nec coloni.*
- 6 *Nec serui.*
- 7 *Nec capitalis criminis rei.*
- 8 *Nec hæretici.*
- 9 *Nec infamia laborantes.*
- 10 *Nec membris debilitati.*
- 11 *Milites prohibentur agriculturã exercere.*
- 12 *Duas militias diuersi generis nemo habere potest.*
- 13 *Miles non potest esse procurator.*
- 14 *De ætate militari.*
- 15 *Veterani legendi.*
- 16 *Proprio milite potius quàm externo utendum.*
- 17 *Romani quamdiu suo sumptu meruerint.*
- 18 *Stipendium militum Rom. quantũ fueris.*

CAPVT IIII.

Militare in bello * iusto delictum nõ 1
est, vt alibi ostēdimus: sed propter
prædam militarem peccatum est^a. vnde
vir ille Deo acceptissimus Ioānes, roga-
tus a militibus de salute sollicitis, quid
faceret: non prohibuit illis militare, sed
dixit, Neminem concutiatis, neq; calū-
niam faciatis, sed estote contenti stipen-
diis vestris^b. Itaque tam lege canonica,
quàm ciuili permissum est militi * hostē 2
in bel-

^a c. militare.
23. q. 1.

^b Luca 12.
6. paratus. 6.
nam si Chri-
stiana. 23. 5
q. 1.

in bello occidere^a: imo nisi fecerit, reus
 erit imperij deserti vel contempri^b. Mi-
 3 lites autem hi demum dicuntur*, qui sa-
 cramento rogati, adactique, & in nume-
 ros relati sunt. sed & in classibus nautæ, &
 remiges sunt milites^c. Porro non quiuis
 ad militiam recipiendi sunt, neque qui-
 4 cunque cogendi. nam clerici* in primis
 militiæ vacationem habent: quod olim
 Druidibus apud Gallos, qui rebus diui-
 nis intererant, concessum fuit, qui om-
 nium rerum immunitatem habuerunt^d.
 Sacerdotes quoque, quos Romulus cō-
 stituit, a bellicis muneribus liberi fue-
 re^e. Cui tamen legi post captam a Gallis
 urbem, adscriptum fuit: ita sacerdotibus
 militiæ vacationem esse, nisi bellū Gal-
 licum oriretur^f. Cicero verò g dicit bel-
 lo Gallico vacationes valere solitas, tu-
 multu verò Gallico & Italico nō valui-
 se. vnde etiā infert grauius esse tumultū,
 quàm bellum. Sed & prohibetur clerici
 militare, de quibus & de seipso dicebat
 Ambrosius: Non pila querant ferrea, nō
 arma Christi milites, sed dolor, fletus, la-
 crymæ, & orationes fuerunt mihi arma
 aduersus hostes^h. Nemo enim, vt inquit
 Apōstolusⁱ, militans Deo implicare se
 debet

^a c. miles. c. si
 homicidum.

^b 23. q. 5. l. 3.
 ff. ad l. Corn.

^c de sicar. l.
 proditores ff.
 de re milit.

^d d. c. miles.
 c. l. vn. §. pe.
 nult. ff. de bō.
 poss. ex test.
 milis.

^e d. Caesar de
 bel. gal. lib. 6.

^f Dion. Hal.
 ant. Ro. lib. 2

^g App. de bel.
 ciuil. lib. 2.
 Plut. in vita
 Marcel.

^h Philop. 5. et
 8.

ⁱ c. non pila.
 23. q. 8. c. si
 quis vult. 26.

^j dist. c. 1. c. si
 quis episco-
 pus. 6. si-
 lis. 23. q. 1.
 i ad Ten.

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debet negotiis secularibus. Quod si ve-
a c. clerici. c. statum. 23. quest. 8. rō clericus, militauerit, amittet gradū:
in minoribus tamen cōstitutus, in bello
iusto pugnans, nisi quem occiderit, aut
b c. petitio. de homicid. glos. in c. scis. citatis. 7. q. 1. vulnerauerit, non fit irregularis^b. Præ-
terea coloni *, nec vltro se offerentes, ad
militiam admittendi sunt, neque cogēdi
inuiti^c. Non enim minus e repub. est, vt
c l. 3. C. Qui milit. pos. lib. 12. l. colonos. C. de agric. et cens. lib. 11. d. l. origina- rios. C. de a- grico. Et cēf. lib. 11. e l. ult. C. de Man et colo. patr lib. 11. f l. 2. C. de prep sac. cub. lib. 12. g l. ab omni. C. de remilit. sint qui agros colant, quam qui bella ge-
rant^d. Hinc edictum est, vt coloni, qui se
militiæ dederunt, ad priorem conditio-
nem reuocentur^e. etenim agrorum sor-
des cū decore militiæ non cōueniunt^f.
Qua ratione quoque seruos * ab omni⁶
militia arceri Marcianus voluit: alio-
quin capite puniri^g. Refert tamen, ex
rescripto Traiani, voluntarij se obtule-
rint, an lecti sint, vel etiam vicarij dati.
lecti enim si sint, inquisitor peccauit: si vi-
carij dati, penes eos culpa est, qui dede-
rūt: si ipsi cū haberēt conditionis suæ cō-
scientiā, venerunt, aduertendū in illos e-
rit^h. Et quidem si sciente domino, serui
obtinuerint militiam, priuabitur domi-
nus & dominij & patronatus iureⁱ. Por-
rō primū M. Iunius dictator, & T. Sē-
pronius magister equitum, post Can-
nēsem cladem, delectū edicto, necessitate
cogen-

cogente, octo millia iuuenū validorum
 exseruitiis, sciscitantes singulos, vellent
 ne militare, vnde volones dicti, publicè
 empta armauerunt^a: eosdemque postea ^a *Lin. lib. 22*
 disciplina & imperio optimos milites
 effecere. & idem T. Sempronius consul
 factus, legis tribunisque præcepit, ne
 qua exprobratio cuiquam veteris fortu-
 næ, discordiam inter ordines seieret. vt
 vetus miles tyroni, liber voloni sese ex-
 quari sineret: omnes satis honestos ge-
 nerososque ducerent, quibus arma sua
 signaq; populus Rom. commisisset: quæ
 fortuna coëgisset ita fieri, eadem cogere
 tueri factum^b. Neque solū serui, sed ^b *Lin. lib. 23*
 qui status controuersiam patiūtur, pro-
 hibentur per id tempus, nomen militiæ
 dare: licet reuera sint liberi. Item nec in-
 genui qui bona fide seruiunt, nec qui ab
 hostibus redempti sunt, priusquam se-
 luant, inter milites recipiendi sunt^c. Le- ^c *l. qui sta-
 tu. ff. de re
 mi it.*
 gimus quoque olim populum Rom. de-
 disse operam, ne imperatoribus capite
 censos sacramento rogare necesse esset,
 quorū nimia inopia suspecta erat: ideoq;
 his publica arma non committebantur:
 & primus C. Marius hanc diutina vlur-
 patione firmatam cōsuetudinem, capite

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a *Val. Max. lib. 2. cap. 3.* censum legendo militem abruptit^a. Præ-
 terea rei capitalis * criminis, voluntarij 7
 b *l. qui cum. §. reus ff. de re milit.* milites capite puniuntur b. Similiter &
 ij qui ad bestias dati, vel in insulam de-
 portati militiæ se dederint, lectiue diffi-
 mulauerint^c. Ad tēpus verò relegatus,
 c *l. qui cum. §. ad bestias. §. in insulā. ff. d. tit.* si expleto spacio fugæ, militiæ se dedit,
 causam damnationis quærendā respon-
 dit Arrius Menander: vt si contineat in-
 famiam perpetuam, sacramēto soluatur:
 alioquin in ordinem redire, & honores
 d *d. l. qui cum. §. ad tempus.* militiæ petere non prohibeatur^d. Sed &
 is qui cum adulterio vxoris suæ pactus
 erit, sacramento solui deportariq̃ue iu-
 betur^e. nihilominus tamen M. Iunius
 e *l. miles. ff. ad leg. Jul. de adult.* dictator, post Cannensem cladem, cū
 populus bellis attritus, milite indige-
 ret, edixit, vt qui capitalem fraudē ausi,
 quiq̃ pecunia iudicati in vinculis essent,
 qui eorum apud se milites fierent, eos
 f *l. qui cum. §. noxa pecuniaq̃; exolui iussurum.* Pro-
 hibentur præterea militare hæretici * g 8
 g *l. qui cum. §. de hæret.* & omnes infamia laborantes * h. Vnde 9
 h *l. 2. §. mi- les. ff. de his qui not. infam.* ignominia missi in milites recipiendi nō
 i *l. qui cum. §. ignominia ff. de re milit.* suntⁱ. Item in fraudem ciuiliū mune-
 k *l. 2. c. Qui mil. poss. li. 12* rum, nemo armatæ militiæ nomen assu-
 mere potest^k. & qui litis causa militiam
 appetierit, postulante aduersario solui
 sacra-

sacramento debet^a. Sic & qui metu cri-
 minis, in quo reus fuerat postulatus, no-
 men militiæ dederit, statim sacramento
 soluendus est^b. Vagus quoque & vetera-
 nus non debet in tyrocinium assumi^c,
 indignus etiam militia iudicandus est, qui
 parêtes, a quibus educatus est, maleficos
 10 appellauerit^d. Porro mēbris debilitati*,
 ita vt inhabiles militiæ sint, in milites re-
 cipiendi non sunt^e. Quo numero nō est
 habendus, qui cum vno testiculo natus
 est, quīue amisit. nam iure militabit, se-
 cūdm Traiani rescriptum. Sylla enim,
 & Cotta duces memorantur eo habitu
 fuisse naturæ^f. Legimus quoque Narse-
 tem eunuchū a Iustiniano exercitui præ-
 positum fuisse, qui bello Ostrogotorum
 in Italia finem imposuit. Neque enim
 morbosus vel vitiosus est, qui vnum tan-
 tum testem habet, cūm generare possit^g.
 Cyrus autē custodes corporis eunuchos
 habuit, quo magis in officio essent, eos
 præter illecebras voluptatum firmissi-
 mum præsidium ratus^h. Ceterum ne o-
 misso armorum vsu, ad aliud opus se cō-
 11 ferant milites, prohibentur* agriculturā
 vel mercaturam exercere, aut quæcunq;
 negotia gerereⁱ. Nam vt Plato in sua re-

a l. i. c. Quib
 mil. pos. li. 12
 l. qui cum. §.
 nō omnia. ff.
 de re milit.
 b l. vlt. ff. de
 re milit.
 c l. i. C. de
 tyro. lib. 12.

d l. i. in fi. ff.
 de obse. lib.
 e l. qui cum.
 §. qui filium.
 ff. de re milit.

f l. qui cum
 vno in pr. ff.
 de re milit.

g l. Pompo-
 nius. §. vlt.
 ff. de Aedit.
 edict.

h Xenō in
 ped. Cyril. 7.

i l. vnu. C. de
 erog. mil. an-
 no lib. 12. l.

officium §. i
 ff. de re mi it.
 l. nemo miles.

C. de re mi it.
 lib. 12. l. mi-
 lites. l. vlt. C.

locat.

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publ. constituit, singulos singulas artes exercere conuenit. vnde etiam miles agrum in prouincia comparare non potest, ne studio agriculturæ militiā negli-

a l. milites, ff. de rem. it. gat^a. hinc quoque duas* militias diuersi¹²

generis, aut dignitatem & militiam eo-

b l. 3. c. Qui mil. pos. l. 12 dem tempore quis habere non potest^b.

& ex eadem causa miles procurator* esse¹³

non potest, ne quidem pro patre, vel

c l. militem. l. qui stipēdia C. de procur. matre, vel vxore, sed tantum in rem suā^c.

Et quidem ratione possessionum, quas

sibi donatas asserit, si iudicij mutadi cau-

sa donatio facta fuerit, agere miles non

potest^d: sed prior dominus debet ex-

d l. per. ff. de alie. iud. mut. causa. periri, ne magis litem, quam rem in mi-

e l. vl. C. ne lic. pos. litem transtulisse videatur^e. Prohiben-

f l. qui accu. sare. ff. de accus. tur denique milites accusare^f, nisi in cri-

g l. famosi. ff. ad leg. iul. maiest. mine læsæ maiestatis^g, vel suam vel suo-

rum iniuriam prosequantur^h. Qui verò

milites priuatis negotiis implicarint, &

reipub. subtraxerint, eos Iustinianus pu-

h l. non pro- hibentur. C. Qui accus. nō poss. blicatione bonorum plecti voluitⁱ. Re-

liquum est, vt de ætate* militari aliquid¹⁴

dicamus: & quidē Romanos haud fere

quenquam minorem septem & decem

annis, aut sex & quadraginta maiorem,

tyrocinio ascribi voluisse constat. idque

a Seruio Tullio vetere censione caurum

fuisse

fuisse prius: quod æuo subsequente a C. Graccho lege sacrata sancitū fuit ^a. La- ^a *Plat. lib. 2.*
 borantibus tamen Romanis contra Ve- ^{ta} *Graccl. lib.*
 ios, delectu habito, non modò iuniores
 conscriptos refert Liuius ^b, sed etiam se- ^b *lib. 5. & 6.*
 niores coactos nomina dare, vt vrbis in-
 terea custodiam facerēt, quod & Camil-
 lus iussit. Rursūque post Cannensem
 cladem Decius Iunius dictator, iunio-
 res decem & septem annis, imo & præ-
 textatos militiæ ascripsit, notatiq; sunt,
 qui maiores annis sexdecim illo bello nō
 militassent ^c. Phociō verò, vt Athenien- ^c *Lib. 32.*
 ses nimis bellicosos, a belli furore, dele-
 ctu acerbo cohiberet, lecta iuuentute, e-
 tiā octogenarios emeritis stipēdiis coë-
 git nomina dare. Exstat tamen constitu-
 tio Frederici imperatoris ^d, quæ dicit de ^d *in §. cons-*
 duello agens, maiorem sexaginta annis, ^{stitution m.}
 & minorem viginti quinque non teneri ^{de qual. &}
 per seipsum pugnare. Historia verò sa- ^{etat. pug. in}
 cræ ^e dicit, Dominum præcepisse Moyse, ^e *num. 1.*
 vt omnes Israēlitas vigesimum ætatis an-
 num excedentes, militiæ ascriberet. quā
 ætatem etiam idoneam militiæ censuit
 Plato. Vt vt sit, bene præcipitur, vt tyro-
 nem quærat, qui veteranum non habet.

15 Longè enim pluris faciēda est exercita-
 torum

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torum veteranorū parua manus, quā indocta & belli expers multitudo, quæ cædi exposita minima quæque formidat, & fugam magis quā gloriā meditatur². Itaque Alexander, mortuo patre Philippo, cum quadraginta millibus veteranorum, quos illi pater optimè eruditos, & rei bellicæ peritos reliquerat, varias innumerabilesque hostium copias superavit, & plurimas orbis terrarū provincias subegit, & idem ducturus contra Dariū veteranos peritos belli, magna cura militiæ ascripsit, & parua manu ingentem Persarum numerum fudit, fugavitque. Solēt quoque veteres ex corporis habitudine, si apti militiæ, si lato pectore, si ceruice erecta, si fortes, si strenui, quæ species, qualisque vigor, & quod robur virium foret, internoscere, ut illorum forti fideliq̃ opera respubl. uti posset. Vnde Cato pingue militem, velut reipubl. inutilem censuit, cuius inter guttur & inguen cuncta sub ventris dominio forent. Admonendi quoque sunt principes, ut potius proprio milite*, quā externo, qui non tam proglo- 16
ria, quā stipendio militant, in bello vantur: exemplo Tulli Hostilij: qui cū
Romani

Romani quadraginta annis in pace & otio vixissent belli expertes, & bellum gerere instituisset, aspernatus externa auxilia, suos tātū ad arma exciuit, & breui tēpore disciplina optimos milites effecit. Longè enim tutissima sunt domestica præsidia, & longè aptiora sunt propria arma, quàm aliena. quod nobis quoque ostēdisse videtur historia sacra. nam David cū se offerret ad singulare certamen cum Goliath Philistæo: & Saul, vt illi animum adderet, suis armis illū armasset: David noluit iis vti, quod iis impediretur, sed propriis tātū, funda scilicet, & baculo congressus hostem prostravit^a. Et quidē si omnino externis auxiliis dux belli vti velit, aut necessitas cogat: illud cauendum præcipuè, ne ita illis credat, vt non plus sui roboris, suarūque virium in castris habeat: ne meritò ei eueniat, quod Cn. Scipioni in Hispania cum Asdrubale bellum gerenti, nam Asdrubal, animaduertens exiguum Romanorum exercitum in castris Cn. Scipionis, & spem omnem in Celtiberorū auxiliis esse, per occulta colloquia cum Celtiberorum principibus conuenit, magna mercede, vt copias inde ab-

ducerent,

^a Reg. I. c. 13

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a *lib. 25.*

b *Liui. lib. 38*
App. in bello
Syri.

c *leg. lib. 18.*

ducerent, néue bellum gererēt: nec metus a Romanis erat, quippe tam paucis, ne se retinerent. Quod exemplum pro documento habendū Romanis ducibus suadet Liuius^a. Constantinopolitanus autem imperator, cū propriis armis careret, accercitis auxiliis Turcarum, ut se a vicinis tueretur, eosdem finito bello expellere nō potuit. vnde vniuersa Græcia Turcarum dominio subacta est. Non itaque Cyri consilium probo, qui non ex ciuibus legendos milites, sed velut optimos equos e longinquo quæri oportere dicebat: neque Alexadrinorum vetustum morem, qui nullos milites nisi peregrinos admittebant. Rectius Romani qui quò milite proprio abundarēt, in foedere quod cum Antiocho percusserunt, cauerūt ne milites sub ditione populi Rom. conducere, aut volūtarios habere liceret^b: & cū bello cum Pyrrho contenderent, quamuis bis prælio victi, auxilia tamen a Carthaginensibus missa remiserunt^c. Ceterum notatū dignum est, milites Romani nominis^{*}, a 17. condita vrbe, per annos fere trecentos quinquaginta, suo sumptu & impensa meruisse. partem enim anni sub pēllibus milita-

militabant; partem verò liberis, vxori, &
 penatibus, sibi quæ ac familiæ, agrum co-
 lendo & rei rusticæ nauâdo operam pa-
 rabât. Quo autem tempore de bello in-
 dicendo Veijs agebatur, vbi diutina &
 difficili obsidione opus erat, & hyeman-
 do continuare bellum, Romani vtili &
 necessario exêplo docti, senatus decreto
 militibus stipendium de publico collata
 stipe statuere: cùm ante id tēpus de suo
 quisquē functus eo munere esset^a. Por- ^{a Liv. lib. 4.}
 rò post Cannensem cladem illatam, tâta
 inclinatio animorum fuit, ad sustinendâ
 inopiam ærarij, vt non eques, non cen-
 turio, stipendium acciperent: mercena-
 riumque increpantes vocarent, qui ac-
 18 cepisset^b. Stipendium verò * militum ^{b Liv. lib. 24.}
 Rom. fuisse decem asses diurnos indicat
 Tacitus^c, cū ait: Milites in illa seditione <sup>c apm. ab
excess. Aug.
lib. 1.</sup>
 Pannonica inter alia cōquestos, denis in
 diem assibus animam & corpus æstima-
 ri: hinc vestem, arma, tentoria, hinc sæ-
 uitiam centurionum, & vacationes mu-
 nerum redimi: itaq; petiisse vt singulos
 denarios mererent. Ex quibus apparet
 quod quamuis denarius primum æsti-
 matus fuerit decem assibus, quapropter
 & decusse x. signabatur: tamen postea

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temporibus auctam fuisse denarij æstimationem. Itaque Q. Fabio Max. dictatore, cum Annibal premeret rempubl. denarium xvj. assibus permutatū fuisse scribit Plinius: qui tamen in militari stipendio denarium pro decem assibus semper datum fuisse asserit^a. prætorianæ verò cohortes binos denarios accipiebāt^b. Hunc verò denarium si cum nostri temporis moneta conferamus in pondere & valore, fere æqualem fuisse regali Hispanico post Endæum & alios apertè ostendit Couarruuias^c: ita ut stipendium nostrorum militum, nihil aut parum a Romano stipendio differat^d. Stipendium verò equitum Rom. quantum fuerit, nō satis constat, quàm quòd assignabantur illis equi publici, & in prædæ diuisione nonnunquam triplum, nonnunquā duplum eius quod pedites ferrent. Itaque ex præda, quam L. Æmilius Paulus fecerat, Perseo victo, pediti, inquit Liuius^e, in singulos centeni dati, duplex centurioni, triplex equiti, ex quo nonnulli de stipendio equitis coniecturam faciunt. sed alio loco idem Liuius^f, ex præda Epiri cluitatum, quæ ad Persea defecerant, tantum fuisse, ut in equites cccc. denarij, pediti-

a lib. 33. c. 3

b Tacitus
Anna. lib. 1.
c de vera. col.
num. cap. 2.
Hadr. in na-
oncel. rei
num.

d Alc. in
Tac.

e lib. 53.

f lib. 55.

peditibus duceni diuiderentur. Itaque nihil certi hac de re affirmare ausim. illud certè cōstat, equites in maximo honore apud Romanos fuisse.

DE SACRAMENTO MILITARI.

- 1 *Militia sacramento non ascriptus militare non poterat.*
- 2 *Sacramentum quomodo præstari solitum.*
- 3 *Varia formula iurandi.*
- 4 *Quale iuramentum apud Lacedæmonios præstari solitum.*
- 5 *Quoritu Samnites iurarent.*
- 6 *Iusiurandum puberum Atheniensium.*

CAPVT V.

NEMINI apud Romanos * militare permissum fuit, nec quidem hostē gladio petere, qui sacramento militari non esset ascriptus: perindeque in eum militaris animaduersio fuit, qui hostem militiæ sacramento non ascriptus occideret, quàm qui ciuē aut socium iniuria affecisset. itaque cūm Pompilius, vel ut alij legunt, Paulus Æmilius, vnam legionem, & Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisisset, & Catonis filius ardore pugnandi in exercitu

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citu mansisset: Cato ad Pompilium scripsit, uti, si eum pateretur in exercitu manere, secundo eum obligaret militiæ sacramento: quia priore amisso, iure cum hoste pugnare non posset. Idem quoque scribebat ad filium, ut caueret, ne prælium iniret, negans ius esse, qui miles non sit, pugnare cum hoste^a. Sed prius^a sua spō-² te decuriati equites, centuriati pedites, sacramenta mutuò præstabant. Paulo deinde Emilio & Terentio Varrone cōsulibus, primū, quod nunquam ante factum erat, milites a tribunis militum, a voluntario sacramento ad legitimū iusiurandum adacti fuere. Quod quidem imperator præstare tenebatur primus, suo mox ordine subsequebantur legati, deinde tribuni, deinde centuriones, postea decuriones, mox præfecti castrorū, demum milites: quod singulis annis, calendis Ianuariis denuo præstabatur. Iurabant autem per deos^a solenne iuramentum; se iussu consulum conuenturos, neque iniussu abituros: sese fugæ neque formidinis ergo non abituros, neque ex ordine recessuros, nisi teli sumendi, aut petendi, aut hostis feriendi, aut ciuis seruandi causa^b. Posterioribus verò temporibus, ut re-

^a Cic. offic.
lib. 1.

^b Liv. lib. 22

vt refert Vegetius^a, iurabant milites per Deum, & Christum, & Spiritum sanctū, & per maiestatem imperatoris (cui, inquit, tanquam corporali deo fides & deuotio præstanda est) se omnia strenuè facturos, quæ imperator iuberet, militiam nunquam deserturos, neque mortem recusaturos pro Rom. rep. Nonnunquam verò cū ingens subeūda dimicatio esset, & in extremū discrimen res venisset: milites nisi victis, debellatis, fuisq; hostibus victores forent, se in castra nunquam redituros, iurare solitos fuisse legimus. Quod M. Fabio & Cn. Manlio consl. bello cōtra Veientes & Hetruscos factum fuit. nam cū consules castris se tenerent, neque militi arma crederent: (quòd priore anno odio Cæsonis Fabij consulis, fusos hostes ab equitatu pedes insequi noluisse, iniussuq; consulis signa in castra retulissent) primus M. Flauolenus, ardore pugnae: Victor, inquit, M. Fabi reuertar ex acie: si fallat, Iouem patrem, gradiumq; Martem, aliosq; iuratos inuocat deos: & idem deinceps omnis exercitus in se quisque iurabat^b. ^b Lib. lib. 2.

Similiter cū prope Dyrrachium Pōpeius constitisset, castraq; metari iussisset,

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fisset, perterritito exercitu, Labienus ut exercitum cōfirmaret, princeps iurabat se Pompeium non deserturum, eūdemque casum subiturum, quemcunque ei fortuna tribuisset: hoc idem reliqui iurabant legati, hoc tribuni militum, centurionesque sequebantur, atque idem omnis exercitus iurabat^a. Et idem Labienus, cū Pompeius prælio decertare cum Cæsare cōstituiisset, primus iuravit, se nisi victorem in castra nō reuersurum, reliquosque ut idem facerent, hortatus est. hoc laudās Pompeius, idem iuravit, nec ex reliquis fuit quisquam, qui iurare dubitaret^b. Petreius quoque legatus Pompeij, suis de transitione ad Cæsarem per colloquia agētibus, ab omnibus iusiurandum exegit, se exercitum, ducesque non deserturos, neque prodituros, neque sibi separatim a reliquis cōsiliū capturos: & princeps in hæc verba iurabat ipse, & ad idem iusiurandum adegit Afranium: subsequēbantur tribuni militum, centurionesque: centuriatim producti milites idem iurabant^c. Alexandri verò milites in verba ipsius ipso præeunte iurabant, eosdem se inimicos amicosque abituros, quos ipse habuisset^d. Hoc etiam

^a *Cas. de bel. simil. lib. 3.*

^b *Cas. de bel. simil. lib. 3.*

^c *Cas. de bel. simil. lib. 1.*

^d *Q. Curtius lib. 7.*

4 etiam iuramentū apud Lacedæmonios*
 præstare soliti sunt milites, eosdē scilicet
 cum imperatore amicos inimicosq; ha-
 bituros: vtq; bonorum, malorumq;
 firma cōsensio inter eos & fœderatio ef-
 5 set. At Samnites* in magno discrimine,
 ritu quodam sacramenti vetusto, velut
 initiatis militibus, delectum habebant;
 & sacrificio solenni more perfecto, per
 viatorem imperator acciri iubebat no-
 bilissimum quemque genere, factisq;
 & circumstantibus cēturionibus, strictis
 gladiis, admouebatur altaribus miles,
 magis vt victima, quàm vt sacri parti-
 ceps: adigebaturq; iureiurando, quæ
 visa auditaq; in eo loco essent, non e-
 nunciaturum: deinde iurare cogebatur,
 diro quodam carmine in execrationem
 capitis, familiæ & stirpis composito, nisi
 issent in prælium quò imperatores duxis-
 sent: & si aut ipse ex acie fugisset, aut si
 quem fugientem vidisset, non extemplo
 occidisset. idq; abnuentes iuratu-
 ros se obtruncabantur circa altaria: iacentes
 deinde inter stragem victimarum, docu-
 mento ceteris fuere ne abnuerent^a. Ius-
 6 iurandum autem* puberum Athenien-
 siū, ex Æschino tale fuisse constat: Arma
 sancta

^a Liv. lib. 10

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sancta neutiquam cum dedecore tractabo, commilitonem, quicumque mihi in acie adiunctus fuerit, in periculo nō deseram. pro aris & focis, tam solus quam cum multis strenuè pugnabo. patriam, qualem & quātam inuenero, neque minorem, neque deteriore, sed & maiore & meliorem relinquam. Memoriam quoque proditum est, Athenienses, cum propter quotidianas contentiones, & violatum ius gentium, infensi Megarensibus, & animo hostili essent: quoties milites solito militari sacramēto adigebant, hoc etiam iusiurandum illos subire coëgisse, se intra militiæ tempus, quotannis quoquo modo possent, Megarensium agros, finesque infesto exercitu inuasuros, & peruastatis agris, nihil intactum relicturos, atque in eos omni clade belli grassaturos. Ceterum illud notandū est, quod si ab vniuerso exercitu Romano iusiurandum consuli præstādum esset, satis fuisse sicuturio, vel tribunus, exercitus nomine, conceptis verbis sublimi voce iuraret: omnisque multitudo, & singuli milites communi conspiratione, & consensu in eadem verba silentio in se quisque iuraret: hocque iusiurandum, ac si concepta

cepta verba singuli expressissent, perinde tenebat, atque sanctum & illibatum habebatur. Non omittendum quoque solere tribunos conuenientes, vbi castra metati essent, ab omnibus, qui in castris essent, liberis pariter & seruis, singulatim iusiurandum exigere, se nihil e castris furto ablaturos: imo si quis etiam inuenisset quippiam, id allaturum ad tribunos^a.

^a Polyb. de
Rom. castr.

DE MISSIONE.

- 1 *Militia semel ascriptus deleri nequibat.*
- 2 *Miles a signis abesse non potest.*
- 3 *Tria missionum genera.*
- 4 *Honestamissio.*
- 5 *Causariamissio.*
- 6 *Ignominiosamissio.*
- 7 *Ignominia differt ab infamia.*
- 8 *Qui ignominia mitti possint.*
- 9 *Quartum missionis genus.*
- 10 *Solus imperator missionem dare potest.*

CAPVT VI.

1 **M**ilitiæ semel ascriptus*, nisi propter demerita exauكتورatus foret, ipso nolente deleri nequibat. fuit enim lata lex sacrata militaris, M. Valerio Coruino dictatore, ne cuiusquam militis

a

scripti

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scripti nomen, nisi ipso volente, deleretur^a. Sed nec miles*, donec sacramento solutus esset, a signis abesse, vel militiam deferere poterat^b. Fuere autem tria* mil-³ sionum genera, quibus miles exauctorabatur, & sacramēto soluebatur: honesta, causaria, & ignominiosa^c. honesta*, quæ⁴ emeritis stipendiis, & functis commodis missionum, vacationis munere donabatur. quo tempore scuta, gladios, & arma dicare solent Laribus, sicut gladiatores Herculi: quòd diis iuuantibus perfuncti militia, rudem accepissent, quod missionis tempus militi quinquagenario fuit definitum. Augustus tamen his, qui maiores quinque & quadraginta annis equum retinere nollent, reddendi equi gratiam fecit, illosque velut emeritis stipendiis dimisit. Alij nisi decennio stipēdia meruisset, missionem petere neminē putarunt posse. More tamen Romano militare sacramentum in vndecimū diffunde batur annum, quo exacto, militia perfunctis missio dabatur. Deinde vt decimus sextus annus stipendij finem faceret, Tyberio imperante cautum fuit, qui etiam militiæ tempus ad vigesimum annum produxit: cauitque vt nisi post vigesimum

^a Liu. lib. 7.

^b l. pen. ff. ex quib. caus. ma. l. nō omnes. ff. de re milit.

^c l. milites agrum §. missionum. ff. de re milit. l. 2. ff. de his qui nos. infra.

gesimum

gesimum annum missio militi daretur,
 quod iuri nostro conuenit^a. & ita missus
 habet a ciuilibus muneribus vacationē,
 & plurimis priuilegiis gaudet^b. *Causaria*
 5 verò^{*} missio dicitur, cū senecta, aut va-
 letudine aduersa, vitiōue corporis, mi-
 nus idoneus militiæ quis renunciatur.
 Quæ non facilè concedi solet, nisi renū-
 ciantibus medicis, & iudice diligenter
 examinante vitium: & semel concessa,
 nō solet missus iterum admitti prætectu
 recuperatæ valetudinis^c. sed & ex qua-
 cunque causa missus, denuò in militiam,
 sine mandato principis, admitti non po-
 test^d. & quidem ex his causis missus, ha-
 bebit quoque vacationem a muneribus,
 quamuis non perpetuam^e. nec enim iis
 priuilegiis fruitur, quibus ij, qui imple-
 tis stipendiis missi sunt: aliis tamen ve-
 teranorum priuilegiis gaudebit, & præ-
 mia veteranis concessa percipiet^f. *Cau-*
saria enim missio, nullam existimationis
 maculam aspergit^g: & honesta quoque
 missio dicitur^h. Ita verò missos vocat Li-
 uiusⁱ *causarios*, cū ait: Tertius exerci-
 tus ex *causariis* senioribusq; a T. Quin-
 tio scribatur, qui vrbi mœnibusque præ-
 6 sidio sit. Ignominiosa verò^{*} missio, quæ

^a l. sed et mil.

lites. §. quan-

doque. ff. de

excus. tut. l.

ult. C. de his

qui non impl.

stip. sac. mis.

sunt, lib. 10.

^b d. §. quan-

doque. & l.

pen. C. d. tit.

de his qui nō

implet.

^c l. semel. C.

dere nul. l. 12

^d l. 2. C. de

diuer. off. l. 12

^e d. l. sed et si

miles. §. quā-

doq; cum seq.

ff. de excus.

tut.

^f l. milites a-

grum. §. illud

ff. de re milit.

^g l. causaria.

C. de re milit.

lib. 12.

^h in d. l. sed

et si miles. §.

qui autē. ff.

de excus. tut.

ⁱ lib. 7.

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& probrosa dicitur, est cum miles obdelictum, vel crimen sacramento soluitur.

a l. 1. ff. de his qui not. inf.

b l. 3. C. de re milit. li. 12

l. 1. C. de his qui non impl.

stip. lib. 10.

c l. milites a. grum. §. missi.

§. ignominia. ff. de re milit. l. 2.

ff. de his qui not. inf. l. 2.

C. de re milit. lib. 12.

d in d. l. milites agrum. §. missionis.

ff. de re milit. c in d. l. 2. §. ignominia.

ff. de his qui not. inf.

f l. 1. C. de his qui in ex. il. dati sunt.

lib. 10.

g de rep. lib. 4 apud Non. & in oratione pro Cluent.

h l. infamem. ff. de pub. iud.

i l. 1. ff. de his qui not. inf.

& ita missus ex edicto prætoris fit infamis^a: & dignitatē consequi non potest^b:

nec in vrbe cōsistere potest, nec alibi vbi princeps est^c. Et quidem sine ignominia

mentionem missus, nihilominus ignominia missus intelligitur, vt Marcianus voluit^d. Vlpianus tamē causam ignominia

addendam missioni censet^e. Ad tempus verò missis, tempore impleto non por-

rigitur infamia^f. Sciendum autem est^{*} 7

ignominiam ab infamia differre, vt ex Cicerone satis cōstat^g: qui dicit animad-

uersionem censoris non eam vim, quam res iudicata habere. censoris enim iudi-

cium nihil fere damnato adferre, quàm ruborem, & ignominia notare: quæ in

nomine tantummodo versatur: & sic notatis ad honorem aditum, & in curiā

reditum esse: alias verò turpi iudicio dā-

natos, in perpetuum omni honore ac dignitate priuari, & infamia notari. infamia enim non nisi per sententiā inferri

potest^h. Sic ignominia missi olim non erant infames, donec prætoris edicto ef-

fecti essent infamesⁱ. Itaque ignominia illa dici potest, quam interpretes nostri vocant

vocant infamiam facti: infamia verò, quā
 infamiam iuris appellant. Non ignoran-
 8 dum quoque est*, non solum gregarium
 militem, sed etiam centurionem, tribu-
 num, imo etiam qui exercitui præest, li-
 cet consularibus vtatur insigniis, igno-
 minia causa ab imperatore mitti posse,
 & ita missum nota infamiae laborare ^a.
 Itaque C. Cæsar C. Anienum tribunum ^{a l. 2. in pr.}
 decimæ legionis in præsentia exercitus ^{ff. de his qui}
 cum ignominia dimisit, his verbis: C. A- ^{not. inf.}
 niene, quod in Italia milites populi Ro.
 contra rem publ instigasti, rapinasq; per
 municipia fecisti, quodque mihi, rei que
 publicæ fuisti inutilis, tuaque opera mi- ^{b Ant. Hir.}
 litibus tempore necessario resp. careat, ^{lib. 5. de bell.}
 obeas res, causa ignominia, ab exercitu ^{Hisp.}
 meo ter remoueo, hodieque ex Africa a- ^{c in d. l. 2. §.}
 besse, & quanto longius potes, proficisci ^{ignominia ff.}
 iubeo ^b. Ultra hæc tria missionū genera, ^{de his qui}
 9 quæ enarrauimus, Vlp. adiecit* quartū ^{not. inf.}
 Si quis enim euitandorum munerū gra- ^{d d. §. igno-}
 tia militiam subiit, exauctorari iubetur ^{munus. Et l.}
 quæ missio existimationem non lædit ^e. ^{qui cum uno.}
 Ceterum solus imperator*, vel dux exer- ^{§ non omnis.}
 citus missionem dare potest ^f. Vnde Q. ^{ff. de remitt.}
 Fuluius censor Fuluium fratrem cohor- ^{e d. §. igno-}
 tem legionis, in qua tribunus militum ^{minia. et d. l.}
 erat, ^{qui cū. § ex-}
 a 3 ^{auctoratus.}
 erat, ^{ff. de re milit.}
 erat, ^{l. 1. ff. de}
 erat, ^{his qui not.}
 erat, ^{inf.}

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^{a Val. Max.}
^{lib. 2. cap. 7.} erat, iniussu cōsulis domum mittere au-
sum, senatu mouit^a.

DE PRIVILEGIIS MILITVM.

- 1 Miles ex causa aris alieni in carcerem duci non potest.
- 2 An nobiles idem priuilegium habeant.
- 3 Priuilegium ne quis cōueniatur, nisi quatenus facere potest, quale sit.
- 4 Militis abscentis bona creditoribus addicere non possunt.
- 5 Miles excusatur a tutela & a dicendo testimonio.
- 6 Res militis non cadit in commissum ob nō solutum vectigal.
- 7 Res emptā pecunia militis, est militis.
- 8 Miles transfert onus probandi indebitum in aduersarium.
- 9 Militi non nocet iuris ignorantia.
- 10 Iuris ignorantia in delictis non excusat.
- 11 Miles non subijcitur quæstioni nec plebeiorum pænis.
- 12 Militia non liberat filiū a patriā potestate.
- 13 Filius familias miles, quoad castrense peculium, pro patrefam. habetur.
- 14 Quid censeatur castrensis esse peculij.
- 15 De testamentis militum.
- 16 Ex militari delicto capite damnatus testamentum

mentum condere potest.

- 17 *Bona militis, qui successorem non habet, deferuntur legioni.*
- 18 *Miles qui inconsulto adiit hereditatem, non tenetur ultra vires hereditarias.*
- 19 *Mulier concubinae donare non potest.*
- 20 *Mortuus in bello in aeternum vivere intelligitur.*
- 21 *Miles in bello mortuus prodest patri ad ius trium liberorum.*
- 22 *Priuegia militum ad aliorum iniuriam non porriguntur.*
- 23 *Premia mortuis debita, dantur filiis.*
- 24 *Militaria priuegia ius tantum, qui strenue militant praestantur.*
- 25 *Non solum militibus, sed etiam aliis qui castra sequuntur, quaedam priuegia militaria conceduntur.*
- 26 *Mulieres quae castra sequuntur, quae priuegia habeant.*
- 27 *An milites nostri temporis gaudeant priuegiis militum.*

CAPVT VII.

CVM, vt rectè Cicero ait^a, honos alat^a artes, & omnes incendamur ad studia gloriae, iaceantq; ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur: prudenter pro-

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à l. miles. l. l.
tem miles. ff.
dere iud.
h. Dio. sicul.
lib. 2.
e. in §. sunt
præterea. inst.
de actioib.
d. l. in condē-
uatione. ff. de
reg. iur. l. in
ser eos. ff. de
re iudic.
e. in d. l. mi-
les. & Bald.
in d. l. 1. in fi.
C. Qui bo-
ced. pos. Alex.
in l. centurio.
col. 5. in p. ff.
de vulg. &
pupil.
f. gloss. &
DD. in d. l.
miles & facit
text. in l. ult.
C. de test. mil.
g. l. vi. C. ad
S. C. Maced.
h. l. alia cau-
sa §. elegan-
ter. & ibi A-
lex. ff. sol.
mat.
i. Dec. in l.
Diuus. n. §.
ff. de reg. iur.
k. Bald. in l. 1.
in fi. C. Qui
bon. sed. poss.
Alex. in l. Cē-
turio. ff. de
vulg. & pup.
sub. l. 1. in d. l. miles. ff. de re iud.

fecerō Romani (qui belli gloria præcipuè
 ad tantum fastigium peruenere) magno
 in honore disciplinam militarē habuere:
 vnde etiam militibus plurima & amplif-
 sima priuilegia concessere, quorū sum-
 ma tātūm capita breuitatis causa hic per-
 stringemus. Et in primis miles * ex causa
 æris alieni in carcerem duci non potest:
 & non nisi quatenus facere potest, cōue-
 niri^a. quod & apud Egyptios lege cautū
 fuit^b. non conuenitur, inquam, nisi qua-
 tenus potest, id est quatenus facultates
 eius patiuntur, vt ait Iustinianus^c: habita
 scilicet ratione ne egeat^d. vnde bonis
 cedere nō tenetur, vt est communis do-
 ctorum opinio^e. Quod tamen ita pleri-
 que procedere arbitrantur, si debitum sit
 cōtractum in castris & ex causa militiæ^f.
 quod in dubio præsumitur^g. Et quidem
 huic priuilegio renunciari non potest^h,
 cum personæ cohæreat, non cōtractui.
 Idem putant esse plerique in priuilegio
 eorum, qui * nobilitatis dignitate deco-
 rantur^k. Quod licet iure communi du-
 bium sit, regia tamen Hispaniarum lege
 constitutum est in his, quos Hidalgos
 vocant^l. Sed nec iure communi, nec Hi-
 spano, hi nobiles habent priuilegium ne
 conue-

1 Reg. l. 4. & 5. tit. 2. l. 4. ord. et l. 69. Tauri.

conueniantur vltra , quàm facere possunt, cùm id nullibi expressum sit: sed tantùm ne ex causâ æris alieni in carcerem ducantur^a. Arma tamen, & equi, & domus vbi hi nobiles habitant, oppignorari, vei in causam iudicati accipi nō possunt^b: nisi forte regi quid debeat^c. Iure quoq; communi, arma militū in causam iudicati accipi nō possunt^d: idq; meritò: arma enim veteres mēbra militum esse dicebant. Sed nec in stipendia militum fieri debet executio, si aliūde potest creditori satisfieri^e. Sciendum verò istud^{*} priuilegium, ne quis conueniatur nisi quatenus facere potest, non esse obligationis, nec actionis, nec iudicati. nā actor potest solidum petere, sed iudex cōdemnabit tantū in id, quod facere potest^f. Et quamuis iudex per errorem condemnauerit in solidum, non potest actor iudicatū exequi, nisi quatenus reus facere potest^g. eoq; sensu dicitur spectari tēpus rei iudicatæ^h. Vnde quamuis tempore sententiæ fuerit reus soluēdo, proderit nihilominus exceptioⁱ. Porro fauore militiæ non solum milites, sed nonnunquam etiam militare volentes, carcerē soluti fuerunt, nam P. Seruilius cō-

^a Cinnæ. &
alij in d. l. mī
les. & in d. l.
centurio.

^b Reg. l. 3. cō
s. tit. 2. lib. 4.
ord.

^c Reg. l. 2. 4.
cū addit. ne.

^d 21. part. 2.
d. A. c. &

Alc. in l. nepos
Procuro. ff. de

verb. signific.
Bald. in Rub.

C. quib. ced.
poss. & n. &

Sahc. in l. 1.
C. d. t. col. 13

^e l. stipendius.
C. de exec. rei

red.
f. l. maritum.

ff. sol. mat. l.
verum. vers.

condemnare.
ff. pro socio.

gl. Nescimus
ff. de re iudic.

h l. rei iudi-
cata. ff. sol.

matrim.
i l. verum. §.

tēpus. ff. pro
socio.

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ful, Volscis bellum inferentibus, edixit, ne quis ciuem Romanum vinc̃tum, aut clausum teneret, quo minus i inominis

a Liv. lib. 2. edendi apud consules potestas fieret^a. & deinde M. Iunius dictator, post Cannensem cladem edixit, vt qui capitalem fraudem ausi, quiq; pecunia iudicati, in vinculis essent, qui eorum apud se milites fierent, eos noxa pecuniaque se exolui iussurum^b. Superiori primæ legi affine est & istud *, quod scilicet, si non defen-

c l. ignorare. C. de rest. milit. d l. ult. C. de iur. dum. nup. e l. si cum militibus. C. de rest. milit. f latè in tit. C. de rest. milit. & C. de tēp. in integ. restit. & C. Qui non ob leg. tēp. pref. g Liv. lib. 1. h §. idem & in multis inst. de excus. tut. i l. 3 §. his qui ff. de mun. et honor. k l. 3. §. ult. l. in iust. ff. de testib. datur miles absens reipublicæ causa, possideri quidem eius bona ex causa iudicati possint, non tamen omnino creditoribus addici^c. & si quidem creditores militis bona distraxerint, iure pignoris, secundum normam^l restituetur miles, persoluto debito, vel refuso pretio vēditionis, si fortè minoris venit pignus quàm sit debitum^e. miles enim dum reipublicæ operam suam præstat, quomodocunque læsus, in integrum restituitur^f. Itaque P. Servilius consul, bello Volscō edixit, ne quis militis, donec in castris esset, bona possideret, aut venderet^g. Præterea miles excusatur a tutela^{* h}, & ab aliis muneribus publicisⁱ. miles quoque non cogitur inuitus testimonium dicere^k: ne propter priua-

priuatam vtilitatem cogatur abesse a signis, vbi tuetur rempublicā vniuersam.

6 Item quamuis miles non sit liber * a vectigalibus^b: non tamen cadent res suæ in commissum, ex eo quòd nō profiteatur, neque soluat vectigal^c. Et quamuis res emptā pecunia mea non sit mea^d: res ta-

7 men emptā^e pecunia militis, potest a milite vèdicari^e. Et licet ei qui se indebitas pecunias soluissē cōtendit; probatio in-

8 cumbat, miles tamen * eo onere leuatur, quod in aduersariū transfert, qui se bene accepisse probare debet^f. quod ita verū est, si totam summam indebitam esse cō-

9 taria, quod militi * non nocet iuris ignorantia, magis enim arma scire tenetur, quàm leges^h. vnde permittitur militi, si

exceptionem peremptoriam per iuris ignorātiā non obiecit, vt eam post sententiam possit opponereⁱ. idem constitutionibus regni Hispaniæ cautum est^k.

non tamen excusāt iuris ignorantia in

10 delictis^{*l}: a quibus natura duce abstinēdum est. in eo tamē fauetur militi, quòd

11 non subiiciatur quæstioni^{*}, nec plebeiorum pœnis, etiamsi emeritis stipendiis missus

^a l. miles.
C. locati.

^b l. ex praestatione C. de vectigalib.

^c l. 2 C. de vectigal.

^d l. si ex ea, C. de rei ven.

^e l. si ut proponi. C. de rei vendicat.

^f l. cum de debito §. si autem is. ff. de cōd. indeb.

^g d. §. si autem.

^h l. regule. ff. de iur. & facti ignorat. l. ult. ff. eodē.

ⁱ l. 1. C. de iur. & facti ignorantia.

^k Reg. l. 24. tit 21 part 2

^l l. 2. ff. de re milit. l. miles.

in principio. ff. ad leg. iul. de adulter.

à l. miles. C.
de question.
l. nullus. C.
ad l. lul. ma-
iest. c. miles de
pace tenend.
b l. 3. §. is
qui. ff. de re
milit.
c Reg. l. 24.
tit. 21. part. 2
d l. 1. et 3. ff.
de priu. vet.
e l. Diao
Marco. C. de
question.
f d. l. nullus.
g l. 3. §. is
qui. ff. de re
milit.
h l. et si exco-
pta. C. de ma-
iest. & Maib.
i l. si quis de-
curio. C. de
fals.
k l. 1. C. de
priuat. carc.
l §. filius fa-
miliæ. insti.
Quomodo iua-
patr. potest.
solu. l. erat. C.
de castres. pe-
cul. lib. 12.
m l. vit. C. de
inoff. testam.
n l. miles præ-
cipuz. l. ex
nota. C. de
cast. pec.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

missus sit^a. itaque nec ad bestias, nec in
furcam damnari potest^b. Idem in nobi-
libus locum habere voluit cōstitutio re-
gni Hispaniæ^c. quod & in filiis militum,
& veteranorum locum habet^d. Imo vsq;
ad nepotes exeditur, eorum scilicet qui
ad summum gradum militiæ peruene-
runt^e. Non erit autem locus huic priui-
legio, si agatur ex causa criminis læsæ
maiestatis^f, prodicionis^g, maleficij^h, fal-
siⁱ, vel priuati carceris^k. Porro quamuis
militia non liberet filium^a a patria pote- 12
state^l: tamen quod ad castrense peculiū
attinet^m, habetur pro patre familiasⁿ: in 13
quo nihil iuris pater habetⁿ. vsque adeo,
vt inter patrem & filium militem, quem
in potestate habet (inter quos alias nulla
lis esse potest) ex causa castrensis peculi
sit actio^o. Qua ratione etiam filius fami-
lias miles, ex quacūque causa pecuniam
creditam acceperit, non iuuatur S. C.
Macedoniano p. hinc quoque, quamuis
inter patrem & filium, quē in potestate
habet, donatio non consistat: q donatio
tamen a patre filio familias causa militiæ
facta valet, & datum efficitur castrensis
peculij.

o l. lis nulla. ff. de iud. p l. vit. §. penult. C. ad S. C. Macedo.
q l. 2. l. donationes. §. pater. ff. de donat.

peculij^a. & ex eadem causa donatio inter
 virum & vxorem, quæ alioquin non va-
 14 let^b, consistit^c. Castrensis verò peculij^{*}
 censetur, quidquid filiusfamilias occa-
 sione militiæ acquisiuit^d. Sed & heredi-
 tas vxoris, ex rescripto D. Hadriani mi-
 litis affectione marito filiofamilias reli-
 cta, castrensis peculij erit^e, quod tamen
 secus est in dote marito data, vel promissa,
 quæ cohærens matrimonij oneribus,
 liberis communibus, qui in aui sunt po-
 testate, confertur^f. Fratris quoque pa-
 truelis, vel alterius commilitonis here-
 ditas commilitoni delata, iure castrensis
 peculij habetur^g. Quod ita verum est, si
 in eadem prouincia militauerint, vel af-
 fectione militiæ relinquatur: alias se-
 15 cus^h. Porro quod ad testamēta^{*} militum
 attinet, tam larga illis testandi facultas
 permittitur, vt omnes omnino solenni-
 tates, in testamentis requisitæ, illis remis-
 sæ sint. Nam D. Traianus permisit mili-
 tibus, vt quoquo modo vellent, facerent
 testamenta, sufficereq; nudā voluntatem
 voluitⁱ. vnde Papinianus respōdit, mili-
 tis voluntatē esse testamentū^k. Quod ita
 demum verum est, si dum in expeditio-
 ne agunt, testentur^l: & duobus ad hoc
 vocatis

a l. si mulier.

l. miles precii-

pua. l. castrē-

se. ff. de cast.

pecul.

b toto tit. de

donat. inter

vir. & vxor.

c l. si miles. l.

si forte. ff. de

cast. pecul.

d l. castrēse.

ff. de cast.

pecul.

e l. diuus. l.

dotem. ff. de

cast. pecul.

f d. l. dotem.

g l. cum alle-

gas. C. de ca-

strens. pecul.

lib. 2. l. miles

filium. in fin.

ff. de castrēse.

pecul.

h d. l. dotem.

in si. ff. de ca-

strens. pecul.

i in l. 1. ff. de

test. mil. §. 1.

in si. de milit.

test.

k l. eius mili-

tis. ff. de test.

milit.

l. d. §. 1. et l.

penult. C. eo-

dem tit.

a §. cateru.
inst. de mi-
lit. testa. l. di-
uus l. Lucius.
ff. de test. mil.
b l. mulier.
ff. de test. mi-
lit.
c §. illi au-
tem. inst. de
milit. testa.
d Reg. l. 4.
tit. 1. par 6.
e § post mis-
sionem insti-
tu de milit. test.
l. testa. eorū.
ff. eodem tit.
f l. si miles v-
rū. ff. de test.
milit. l. 1. et 2
C. eod. titulo.
g l. in frau-
dem. §. miles.
l. miles ita. ff.
de milit. test.
h l. si duo.
bus. l. ex mili-
tari. §. filiū.
ff. de mil. test.
i l. sicut cum.
l. sequ. C. de
milit. testa. l.
qui iure mili-
t. militis. §.
miles. D. eod.
k l. 2. §. he-
reditas. D. de
iure codicil. l.
hereditatem.
C. de codicil.
§. codicillis
autē insti de
codicil.
l. l. militi co-

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

vocatis testibus voluntas militis probe-
tur, quod in fauorem eorum inductum
est^a. in ipso tamen prælio testamentum
militis factum valet, etiam nullo vocato,
& sufficit si in clypeo, vel in puluere he-
redem scribat^b. sed citra expeditionis ne-
cessitatem, tenetur miles iure communi
testari^c. quod & regia Hispaniarum lege
decisum est^d. In expeditione verò testa-
mentum iure militari factum, valebit vs-
que ad annum post missionem^e. in quo
tam laxa illi testandi, prout vult, permessa
est facultas, vt pro parte testatus, pro par-
te intestatus possit decedere^f, & ad certū
tempus possit heredem instituere, & po-
stea hereditatem adimere, & alij directo
dare, & si neminem vocauerit, legitimī
heredes hereditatem capient^g. neque
iuri accrescendi locus erit in testamento
militis^h. Potest quoque miles filium si-
lento præterire in testamento, cuius
præteritio pro tacita exheredatione erit,
modo prudens id fecerit: vnde & agna-
tione filij testamentum militis nō rum-
pitur, si de mēte eius constetⁱ. Et quam-
uis in codicillis directo relinqui heredi-
tas non possit^k: militi tamen id permis-
sum est^l. Miles quoque incertus de statu
suo

suo rectè testari potest^a. & testamentum a pagano iure militari factum valet, si miles decedat^b. Licet quoque nuda voluntate, vel coëpto tantū & non perfectō testamento non rumpatur testamentum pagani^c: militis tamen testamētum nuda voluntate facile rumpitur^d: licet etiā duob⁹ testamētis validis miles decedere possit^e. Præterea vltra dodrantē miles legare potest, & eius legata non minuūtur per Faicidiam^f. Mutus quoque & surdus miles testamentum rectè facit^g. & filius familias miles de castrensis iure testabitur^h. quod etiam ad inermem militiā extenditurⁱ. & testamenta militum non subiacent querelę inofficiosi^k. neque solum sibi testamentum facere filius familias miles poterit, sed etiam filio pupillares tabulas de castrensis^l. hoc tamen priuilegium testandi filio familias militi concessum, ad impuberes extendi non debet, qui forte fauore in militiā recepti sunt, quod fieri quandoque solet^m. huic enim impuberi testari non licēbit, neque communi, neque militari iure, propter lubricum

dicillu. in
prin. i. quære-
batur. D. de
milita. testa.

a l. ex militib.
ri. § miles.
D. de testa.
mil.

b l. in frau-
dem § testa-
mentum. D.
d. sit.

c § ex eo. in-
stit. quib. mo-
t. § infir. l. 2.
D. de inuisto
rup. vni test.

d heres § si
quid post D.
de testamēts.

e l. in frau-
dem. § sicut
cū. § seq. D.

de mil. testa.
e l. 1. et 2. D.
de inuist. rup.

f l. quærebatur.
in prin. D. de
mil. test.

g l. si certarū.
§ vlt. cum l.
seq. D. de test.

h l. in te-
stamento mi-
litis. C. rodē.

i l. 1. D. ad l.
Faicidiam.

l. iure milita-
tari. D. de te-

flam. mil. §. quūquid in stat. de milit. test. h l. ex militari. §. de
testam. milit. i l. vlt. D. de inoff. testa. k l. testamentum.
l. vlt. C. de inoff. test. l l. cum filius familias miles. l. in fraudem.
§. miles. D. de test. vult. m l. sed & milites. D. de excus. tut.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

a l. ult. C. de testa. milit.
b l. ult. inst. de pupil. substit.
c l. centurio. ff. de vulg. & pupil. l. in testa. mento. C. de milit. test. l. 5 §. miles i. ta heredē. §. exheredato. D. eodem.
d l. ex militari. D. de testa. milit. l. si quis filio. §. sed et si quis fuerit. D. de inst. rup. irrit. fac. test. c l. si quis. §. miles. D. de leg. 3. l. cum hic. §. si miles. D. de don. inter vir et vx. f l. eius qui. §. 1. & ult. D. de testa. g l. 1. & 2. D. de ver. milit. suc. h l. si quis filio. §. eius qui. D. de inst. rup. irrit. l. 2. c. de hered. decem. i l. ult. in fi. C. de iure delib.

lubricum illius ætatis consilium, qua de
 causa Iustinianus ius antiquum, quo id
 licebat, correxit^a. Præterea licet paga-
 nus extraneo, vel filio puberi heredi in-
 stituto ita substituere directo nō possit,
 si heres exstiterit, & intra aliquod tēpus
 decesserit, alius ei sit heres: sed tantum
 per fideicommissum testator heredē ob-
 ligare possit, hereditatem vel totam vel
 partem restituere^b: id tamen militi con-
 cessum est^c. Porro ex militari delicto ca-
 pite^{*} damnatis testamentum condere li-
 cet, de bonis scilicet castrensibus, & ita si
 sacramenti fides rupta non sit^d: & per-
 mittente in sententia eo qui damnauit^e.
 quod secus est in pagano^f. Et quidem ex
 militari delicto damnati, si intestati de-
 cedant, succedent proximi ab intestato
 excluso fisco^g, bona verò militis^{*}, qui
 successorem non habet, deferuntur le-
 gioni non admissio fisco^h. Miles denique
 qui inconsultò adiit hereditatem^{*}, non
 tenetur ultravires hereditariasⁱ. Ceterū
 fauor militum non semper in extendēda
 testandi facultate, sed aliquando etiam
 in restringenda consistit. Itaque quam-
 uis concubinæ vel meretrici testamento
 quid relinquere vel donare permissum
 sit:

- sit: miles tamen mulieri, in quam turpis
 19 cadit suspicio*, nihil donare vel testamē-
 to relinquere potest^b. Militis quoq; di-
 spositio, quæ vel turpis, vel bonis mori-
 bus contraria est, nihilo magis quàm a-
 licuius pagani valebit^c. Superioribus
 adde singulare & præclarū militare pri-
 20 uilegiū, quòd scilicet mortuus in bello*
 pro repub. per rerum gestarum gloriam
 in æternum viuere intelligitur: modo in
 acie & in conflictu moriatur; non etiam
 in obsidione, vel alias ex causa belli. itaq;
 filius familias miles, qui in acie pro re-
 pub. pugnās cecidit, prodest patri ad ius
 21 trium liberorum*, quòd eum a tutela ex-
 cusat^d: & aliorum munerum excusatio-
 nem præbet^e. Itaque cū lege Iulia de
 maritandis ordinibus cautum esset, vt
 priori ex consulibus fasces sumendi po-
 testas esset, qui plures liberos quàm col-
 lega in potestate haberet, eorum quoq;
 ratio habita fuit, qui bello amissi essent^f.
 idq; ad multa alia adaptari posse videtur.
 atque ita si forte statuto cautum sit, vt
 certè multis locis est, vt filius secundò
 genitus patri superstes, in successione e-
 iusdem patris præferatur nepoti ex filio
 primogenito mortuo ante patrē: si filius
 b ille

a l. affectio-
nis. l. donatio-
nes. D. de do-
nat.

b l. miles. §.
mulier. D. de
milit. testamē-
t. mulierē. D.
de his quib. vt
indig. l. i. C.

c l. si a milite
§. editū præ-
toris. D. de
milit. testa.

d. l. bello a-
missi. D. de
excusat. tut. §.
filij autē. in-
stit. de excus.
tut.

e l. ult. D. de
vac. et excusi-
munt.

f Gell. l. 2. c.

15.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

ille primogenitus in acie pro repub. cecidit, putarem hoc casu nepotem præferendum: quia scilicet pater eius censeretur in æternum viuere, cui successio aui iure primogenituræ debetur. & ita in prorsus simili facti specie iudicatum fuisse accepi. non obstat quòd priuilegia militum * ad alienam iniuriam porrigi non 22

a l. impuberi.
D. de adm. & per ius.
b l. sed cum.
D. ad S. C. Treb. l. nec a-
uus. C. de e-
manc. l. re-
scripta C. de
prec. imp. off.
l. imperatores
D. de ser. rus.
pre.
c l. nō vidē-
tur. D. de reg.
iur.
d l. nō potest.
D. de reg. iur.
e in l. non
fraudentur.
D. de reg. iur.
l. qui autem.
in princ. D.
que in frau-
credito.
f d. l. impu-
beri. D. de
adm. & per
ius.

debeant a. & beneficia in damnū alterius neque porrigi, neque conferri solent b. nam nulla iniuria hic infertur filio secū- dō genito, cui nihil adimitur, sed tantum non acquiritur. non enim, vt Vlpianus respondit, videtur rem amittere, quibus propria non fuit c. & ex regula Pauli, nō potest videri desisse habere, qui nunquā habuit d. Quò spectat quod Vlpianus ait, non fraudari creditores, cum quid nō acquiritur a debitore, sed cum aliquid de bonis suis diminuitur e. Sed & quod Papinianus respondit, militum priuile- gia ad alienam iniuriam non porrigi, nō ita huc facit: nam loquitur in casu, ad quem militis priuilegium non extendi- tur, & quo evidens fieret iniuria alteri f. Itaque in proposita facti specie nepotem patruo in successione aui, non obstante statuto, præferendum existimo: cum & iure

- iure communi nepos in parentis sui locum, etiam extrabellum mortui, succedat^a. vnde etiam statutum iure cōmuni contrariū quā strictissimè intelligi debet^b. His adde lege regia Hispaniæ statutum esse, vt præmia*, quæ forte quis meruit ob egregiam operam in bello præstitam, eo mortuo debeātur filiis & proximis agnatis^c. quod & a Romanis obseruatum fuit, & lege Solonis apud Athenienses cautum fuit: vt illorum filij, qui occubuissent in bello, publicè alerentur, & bonis disciplinis imbuerentur. Constātinus verò filios in paternam vocari militiam voluit^d. Sciendum porrò
- 24 militaria hæc priuilegia* non aliter concedi militibus, quā si fortiter & strenuè militent^e, & ad veteranos non extendi^f: quamuis & veterani sua habeāt priuilegia^g. In classibus verò remiges & nautæ sunt milites, & militari priuilegio fruuntur^h. Præterea nō solum militibus,
- 25 sed etiam aliis*, qui castra sequuntur, militaria quædam priuilegia conceduntur. & in primis omnibus omnino qui sunt eius gradus, vt iure militari testari non possint, si in hostico deprehendantur, quomodo velint & quomodo possint
- b 2 testa-
- de exc. tur. h l. unica. §. in classib. D. de bon. poss. ex test. milit.

a §. cum filius. inst. de hered. quæ ab intest. defe.

b Panor. in c. ex parte. ex. de decum. tex. in c. 1. in fin. de filius presbyt. lib. 6.

c Reg. l. 5. tit. 27. par. 5. d l. 1. §. 2.

C. de filius, off. milit. l. 12 c l. ult. C. de restit. milit. l. cum de indebito. §. si autem. D. de probat.

f l. idem est, et si testamento. c. in l. seq. in prin. ff. de milit. testa. l. ult. §. quis militibus. C. de inof. testa. l. ad veterani

D. ad l. Falc. l. filius. §. veterani. cū §. sequi. D. de proc.

g tit. D. de priuileg. veter. l. 1. et 2. D. de veter. mil. succ. l. 1. 2. 3. 4. C. de vetera. l. 12

§. illi. inst. de mil. test. l. sed & milites. D.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

^{a l. ult. D. de milit. testa.} testabuntur^a. Itē mulieribus*, quæ cum 26
 maritis absunt in bello reipubl. causa, in
 actionibus temporalibus, si exclusæ fue-
 rint, ad exemplum militum subueniri so-
 lere Alexander rescripsit^b. & Diocletia-
 nus & Maximinianus mulieri, quæ in ex-
 peditione fuit cum marito, non officere
 lōgi temporis præscriptionem rescripse-
 runt^c. Quò spectat quod Vlpianus re-
 spondit, bello amissos ad tutelæ excusa-
 tionem prodesse, cuiuscunque sexus vel
 ætatis sint, modò in acie perierint. ete-
 nim mulieres in acie versari solitas, & e-
 gregiam nonnunquam in bello operam
 præstitisse in veterum historiis satis ob-
 uium est. itaque bello Sabino mulieres
 Sabinæ, quæ Romæ erant, quarum ex in-
 iuria bellum ortum erat, crinibus passis,
 scissaque veste, victo malis muliebri pa-
 uore, vt inquit Liuius^d, ausæ se inter tela
 volitantia inferre, ex transuerso impetu
 facto, dirimere infestas acies, dirimere i-
 ras. Estque memorabile, quod de Cim-
 bricis mulieribus memoriæ proditū est,
 cum quibus non minor quàm cum ma-
 ritis eorum Mario pugna fuit: & specio-
 sior mors earum fuit, quàm pugna. nam
 cum missa ad Marium legatione, liber-
 tatem

tatem non impetrassent, suffocatis elisis-
 que passim infantibus, mutuis vulneri-
 bus conciderunt, aut vinculo e crinibus
 suis factó, ab arboribus iugisq; plaustro-
 rum pependerunt ^a. Apud Germanos
 verò femina nō semel inclinatam aciem
 restituisse feruntur ^b. Ceterum licet a
 plerisque dubitarum sit, vtrum milites
 27 nostri temporis * gaudeant hisce priui-
 legiis militaribus, tamen verius est, mili-
 tibus, qui in numeros sunt relati, & for-
 titer & strenuè militant, hæc priuilegia
 concedi, saltem ea quæ vsus nō coarguit.
 neque refert, quod quædam solēnitates,
 quibus olim milites sacramento militiae
 ascribebantur, exoleuerint. Nam simili-
 ter videmus solennitatem actionum an-
 tiquam nostra tempestate nullam esse ^c:
 cū tamē eiusdem nihilominus sint ef-
 ficaciæ ^d. Causa quoque & ratio conce-
 dendi militibus tā ampla priuilegia fuit,
 vt pro tutela & defensione Romani im-
 perij omnibus soluti curis expeditissimi
 operam armis darent ^e. quæ & nostris
 militibus conuenit: ergo idem ius quo-
 que manere debet ^f. & hæc sententia etiā
 viris doctissimis probatur g.

b 3

DE IV-

centurio. m. 23. D. de vul. & pup. Decius in Rubr. C. de mi u test.
 quæ refert Francisc. Zoanest. de Roma, imp. m. 80.

a l. Flo. de
 gest. Rom. l. 3
 cap. 3.
 b Crinit. de
 honest. disc.
 lib. 12 c. 8.
 c l. 2 §. de in-
 de ex his l. gi-
 gib. D. de o-
 rig. iur. l. 1. &
 2. C. de form.
 & impet. sub
 d l. actio. D.
 de neg. gest.
 facit l. ordo.
 D. de publ. in-
 dic. l. decreto.
 C. ex quibus
 causis inf. iro.
 e l. aduocati.
 C. de aduo.
 diuersi iud. l.
 militem. in fi.
 C. de proc. l. c
 D. de mil. test.
 l. milites. C.
 locati.
 f l. illud que
 situm. in prin.
 D ad l. Aquil
 g Iacob. de
 Raven Cyn.
 Bald. Bart.
 Saluet. & a-
 lii in l. 1. C.
 de ier. & sac.
 igno A. d. m. l.
 militem. C. le
 proc. Rom. si-
 ui. 43. & c.
 cil. 506. Ale-
 xander in l.

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.
DE IVDICIIS MILITARIBVS.

- 1 Miles non nisi ante suum iudicem conueniri potest.
- 2 Fallit in milite desertore.
- 3 Item in eo qui pactus est se non usurum fori præscriptione.
- 4 Item in eo, qui postquam in ius vocatus est, miles esse cæpit.
- 5 Item in eo qui falsum testimonium dixit.
- 6 Item in milite negociatore.
- 7 Consules Romani, non nisi in castris in caput cuius Rom. incōsulto populo, animaduertere poterant.
- 8 Tribuni non habuerunt vitæ necisq; potestatem in milites.

CAPVT VIII.

Milites* non nisi ante suum iudicem 1
conueniri possunt, nec si in culpa
sint, coërceri^a. vnde capti a præside ad
proprium iudicem remitti debent^b, nisi
forte in desertione agens* miles com- 2
miserit delictum valde enorme, de quo
præses prouinciæ cognoscere poterit, &
punire militem in loco delicti^c. alioqui
verò neque dux exercitus, vel magister
militum in prouinciales, neque præses
prouinciæ in milites vllam iurisdictionē
habent.

a l. magiste.

C. de iurif.

omn. iud. l. 1.

C. de exhib.

reō.

b d. l. 1.

c l. desertorē.

D. de re milit.

l. 1. C. vbi se

mat. vel clar.

l. ult. D. de

accus. l. mili-

tibus. D. de

cust. reo. l. 1.

C. de falsi.

monz.

- habent. si tamen miles in instrumento
 3 professus fuerit*, se non vsurum fori præ-
 scriptione propter cingulum militiæ, pa-
 ctum seruandum erit^a. Sed & si quis, po-
 4 steaquam* in ius vocatus est, miles esse
 cœpit: in ea causa est, vt ius reuocandi
 forum non habeat, quasi præuentus^b.
 nam vbilis cœpta est, ibi finiri debet^c.
 5 Præterea miles*, qui falsum testimoniū
 dixit, subiicit se iurisdictioni illius iudi-
 cis, etiam si paganus sit^d. Miles quoque
 6 negociator* subest iudici illius negocia-
 tionis*. Porro vnusquisque super causis
 publicis, quas dum militaret exercuit, &
 super ratiociniis militaribus in militari
 iudicio respondere debet, nec fori præ-
 scriptione vti potest: etiam si militiæ cin-
 gulum deposuerit^e. & capitalis criminis
 reus, volūtarius miles (qui ex D. Traiani
 rescripto capite puniendus est) non est
 remittendus eò, vbi reus postulatus fuit,
 sed vbi accedente causa militiæ audiendus
 est, puniri debet^f. Sciendum autem est,
 quamuis lege Valeria, quā Valerius pu-
 blicola tulit, & L. Portia cōsulibus pro-
 7 hibitum esset*, ne in caput ciuis Romani
 iniussu populi animaduertere possent, &
 solū illis relictū esset, vt coërcere pos-
 sent,

^a l. si quis.
C. de pact.

^b l. si quis
postea. D. de
iudic.

^c l. ubi cre-
ptum. D. de
iurisc.

^d l. nullū. C.
de testibm.

^e l. ult. D. de
iurif. om. iud.

^f l. 2. C. ubi
de ratio. tam
pub. quā priu.

^g l. qui cum
vno. §. vlt.
D. de re iur.

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a in l. 2. §. in initio. D. de orig. iur. Dion. Hal. lib. 10. b Poly. lib. 6. de remilit. ac domest. Rom. c Iunus l. 2. C. 4. Cicero Philop. 3. d l. de militib. D. de cust. et exhib. reo. e Auth. quib. mod. nat. eff. legit. §. quis quis. f in l. officiū. in fin. D. de re milit. g annal. l. 1. h l. Diuus. D. de feriis.
 sent, & in vincula publica duci iubere^a: in castris tamen ius habebant arbitrato suo supplicium sumere^b. quod & prætoribus, aliisque ducibus exercituum permissum fuit^c. id tamen Venuileius I. C. ad milites caligatos tantum restrinxisse videtur^d: qui erant abiectiones & viliores^e. Vnde videtur inferri, quod in alios incōsulto principe animaduerti nō possit. & quidem tribuni^{*}, aliiq̃ue duce in-
 feriores, vitæ necisque potestatem non habuerunt in milites, sed tantum levis coërcitio illis permissa est. id quod Marcianus satis indicasse videtur^f, cum ait: Tribuni officium esse delicta secundum suæ auctoritatis modum castigare: cui cōuenit, quod Tacitus ait^g de seditione illa Pannonica, scribens, Municipi præfectum castrorum, penes quem erat tum summa rerum, absente duce, coëptam seditionem sedasse, duorum militum supplicio: bono magis exemplo quam concessio iure. Ceterum quod ad militaria iudicia attinet, ex D. Traiani rescripto etiam diebus feriatis peragi possunt^h.

DE POENIS MILITVM.

1 *Duplex causa in puniendis peccatis.*

2 *Pæna*

- 2 *Pœna militares.*
- 3 *Militum delicta aut propria, aut cōmunia.*
- 4 *Fustuarium quid.*
- 5 *Decimatio.*
- 6 *Romani militaribus pœnis asperi.*
- 7 *Capitalis pœna per vinum aut lasciviam lapsis remittitur.*
- 8 *Romani in iudicādo beneficia cum delictis non compensabant.*
- 9 *Contrā Persæ.*

CAPVT IX.

1 **D**Vplicem* in puniēdis peccatis causam esse cēset Plato in Gorgia, vt refert Gellius^a: vnā castigādi & corrigēdi ^{a not. Att. l. 6. cap. 14.} cum qui peccauit, quò attentior fiat, & ad bene viuendum promptior. quòd in minoribus delictis fieri solet pecunia, vel leui cōērtione, multa dicta. alteram exempli causa, vt alij a similibus delictis metu pœnæ deterreantur: quod in grauioribus delictis fieri publicè interest.

2 Itaque pœnæ militares* nonnullæ maiores, quæ capitis supplicio luebantur: aliæ minores, prout grauius aut leuiter delictum esset, delinquentibus militibus, necessariò ad disciplinam militarem stabilendam, a ducibus inferri solent. mi-

b 5 litum

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litum autem delicta * aut propria sunt, 3
aut communia. Proprium militare de-

a l. 2. D. de
re milit.

b l. omne de-
lictū. D. de re
milit.

c in l. 3. Pœ-
ne. D. de re
milit.

d d. l. 2. §.
pœna. & §. in
quis. D. de re
milit.

e l. moris. §.
ille. D. de pœ-
l. honor. C. de
pœn. o. i. x. §. de
privat. militū.
f d. l. 3. §. in
bello. D. de re
milit.

g de Rom.
castris.

lictum est, quod quis ut miles admittit^a:
si puta aliter faciat, quàm disciplina mi-
litaris exigit^b. Pœnæ verò militares, ut
ait Modestinus^c, sunt huiusmodi: casti-
gatio, pecuniaria multa, munerum indi-
ctio, militiæ mutatio, gradus deiectio,
ignominiosa missio, in metallum autem
non dantur, nec torquentur, nec ad be-
stias, nec in furcam damnantur^d, nec ple-
beiorum pœnis subiiciuntur^e. At ex gravi
delicto solent milites capite puniri^f, aut
fuste percuti. id supplicium^g huiusmodi 4
erat, ut refert Polybius^g, accepto fuste
tribunus vix tantum attingebat damna-
tum: quod ubi factum erat, omnes qui in
castris erant, cædentes fustibus, lapidi-
busque, plerosque in ipsis castris confici-
ebant: at si qui euassissent, ne sic quidem
servari poterant, quibus nec in patriam
redire licebat, neque aliquis ex necessa-
riis domi eum recipere audebat, unde
penitus peribant, qui in talem calamita-
tem incidissent. hoc genus animaduer-
sionis fustuarium dicebatur, teste Cice-
rone^h, cum ait: Fustuariū meruerunt le-
giones, quæ consulē reliquerunt. Simile

pœnæ

pœnæ genus etiam num hodie in castris
 in vsu est. De hac pœna censent I. C. cùm
 dicūt, fuste percuti, occidi, animaduertia,
 Alioqui verò, cùm dicunt fustibus cædi,
 castigari, admoneri^b: non de capitali,
 sed de leuiori pœna agunt. nam multo
 leuiorem esse fustium, quàm flagellorū
 pœnam iudicat Marcellus^c, Calistratus^d,
 & Hermogenianus^e: vt annotauit Hie-
 ronymus Verrutius^f. Porro si multi mi-
 lites in aliquod flagitium conspirent, vel
 si legio deficiat, exauctorari solent^g. nō
 nunquam auctores turbarum ad palum
 deligare, aut securi percutere, reliquæ ve-
 ro multitudinis decimum quemq; sorte
 5 ductum* ad suppliciū petere peruulgata
 pœna fuit. quod ex verbis Ciceronis
 pro Cluëtio intelligi potest, vbi inquit:
 Statuerunt maiores nostri, vt si a multis
 esset flagitiū rei militaris admissum, sor-
 titione in quosdam animaduerneretur,
 vt metus videlicet ad multos, pœna ad
 paucos perueniret. Inter alias quoque
 pœnas militares fuerunt hæ: stipendium
 anni differre militibus, neq; his æra pro-
 cedere, qui ære diruti dicebantur, aut in
 politia, aut in frequentia notare, vel citra
 commoda stipēdiorum exauctorare, lo-
 cum in

a vt in l. 7.

§. 1. D. ad l.

Aquil. l. 1. §.

occisorum. D.

ad S. C. Syl-

lianum. in l. 8

§. 1. D. de

pœn.

b vt in l. 1. §.

cū n patro-

nus D. de cf-

fic. pref. urb.

l. ult. D. de

iniuriis. l. 7.

D. de pœn. l. 3

§. 1. & l. ult.

D. de offic:

pref. vig. l.

10. & l. 28.

§. 1. D. de

pœn. l. 3 §. in

bello. D. de re

milite. l. 1. C.

de his qui

not. in fa.

c in l. in seruo

rū D. de pœn.

d in l. capita-

liū §. nō oēs.

D. de pœn.

e in l. ult. D.

de inur.

f de verb. si-

gnif lib. 6.

g l. 3. in fin.

D. de re milit.

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cum in quo tenderent in castris adimere, ut humi ac sub dio accubarent, extra vallum sine tentoriis relinquere, vitibus cedere, hastas dare iubere, quæ censio hastaria dicebatur, quæ non pro leui noxa, sed pro graui delicto animaduersionis loco a ducibus inferri solita est. Hastas autem dare iuebantur milites, quibus propter probra ignominiae & luxuriae hasta adimebatur. etenim sicut gloriæ causa, fortes viri donabantur hasta pura, hi qui primū victores in prælio fuissent: ita ignavis & cōtumacibus adimebatur. hoc notabat, tanquam spes merendi illis adempta foret. in politia & in frequētia notabantur hi, qui rudibus, aut parum nitidis armis, vel strigosiore equo, & macie confecto utebantur, qui quæ prædicto ad pugnam die, occasionibus quæsitis contumacius parerent^a. Fuit quoque antiquitus militaris animaduersio, iubere ignominiae causa venam militi solui, & sanguinem mitti. quod A. Gell^b, primū in militibus stupentis animi, atque a naturali habitu declinantis (ut non tam poena, quàm medicina videretur) factū fuisse credit: postea verò etiam ob pleraque alia delicta factitatum esse per consuetu-

^a Alex. sb A. lex. lib. 2. general. dic. c. 13

^b noſt. Attic. lib. 10. cap. 8

suetudinem : quasi minus sani viderētur omnes qui delinquerent. Ceterum, quāvis alioqui Romanis mitiores poenę placuerint : apud quos antiquitus cautum fuit, ne quis multam indicendo, bouem priusquam ouem nominaret, grauiorū enim multarū æstimatio bos erat vnus, vel plures; minorum verò ouis: in militariibus tamen poenis seueriores semper ⁶fuere*; quòd aspero & abscisso castigationis generē disciplina militaris indigeat. Vnde quamuis consulibus prohibitum esset, ne possent animaduvertere in caput ciuis Romani, in castris tamen poterant pro arbitratu suo supplicium sumere: vt alibi diximus^a. Hinc quoque perrarò bis delictum imperatores venia ^{a 5. de iedu milit.} dignum putauere. Nam, vt M. Cato in libro de re militari scripsit, aliis in rebus errata postmodum corrigi possunt; in bello autem delicta emendationem non accipiunt : quippe cū poena ipsa e vestigio errorem sequatur. præsto enim est ignauie, aut imperitiæ ultor, qui nunquā delinquenti hosti indulget. & Lisimachus summus dux dicere solet, non esse in bello bis errare, vbi si quid offenditur perperam temeritate, vel inscitia, emendari

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uari non potest. nam parua in bello of-
fensa, magnarum sæpe rerum momenta
facit. Nihilominus tamē quædam delicta
pagano aut nullam, aut grauiorem pœ-
nam irrogāt : militi verò grauiorem, aut
leuiorem : vt Marcellus respondit ^a. &
quidē constat, non nulla militaria delicta
capite puniri, quæ non nisi culpa contra-
huntur ^b. Capitalis tamen pœna per vi-
num, aut lasciuia lapsis ^{*} remittitur, & 7
militiæ mutationem irrogat ^c. voluntas
enim & iudicium, quod nullum in ebrio
est, distinguit maleficia ^d. Itaq; Pyrrhus
adolescētes, qui inter bibendū regē con-
uiciis & maledictis onerauerāt, ingenuē
id fatentes, & culpam omnem in temu-
lentiam coniicientes, cū dicerent se
longē plura dicturos fuisse, si plus vini
habuissent, imo ipsum regē interfectu-
ros, nisi lagenam defecisset, innoxios dimi-
sit ^e. Carolus tamen V. imperator edictō
cauit, ne cui ebrietas in delictis excusa-
tionem præberet, propter nimia in hisce
regionibus inebriandi frequentiam. &
Pittacus legem tulit, qua ei, qui per e-
brietatem deliquerat, duplam eius, quæ
^{in con.} sobrio infligeretur, pœnam constituit ^f.
Est porrò valde memorabile, quod Ro-
mani,

^a in l. quedā
delicta. D. de
penis.

^b vt in l. om-
ne delictū. §.
1. cum duob.
seqq. d. qui cō-
meatus. §. 1.
D. de remilit.

^c d. l. omne
delictū. §. per
vinum.

^d l. i. D. ad l.
Corn. de sica.

^e Val. Max.
lib. 5. cap. 1.

^f in con.

mani, qui alioqui maximam meritorum
 cuiusque, & virtutis rationem habuerūt,
 8 in iudicando tamen * non solent, etiam si
 maxima rei in remp. exstitissent merita,
 vero crimini indulgere, aut beneficia cū
 delictis compensare. cuius rei fidem facit
 in primis P. Horatius, qui trigemina
 spolia Cuiatiorum victor præ se gerens,
 quique imperium populo Rom. solus
 sua virtute pepererat, perduellionis reus,
 quod sororem ob mortem spōsi Cuiatij
 flentem transfixerat, in maximo disci-
 rmine fuit: plusque ad salutē ipsius pro-
 fecerūt preces, & miseratio patris, quàm
 recens rei beneficium^a. Item M. Manlius
 Capitolinus regni affectati reus, quāvis
 defenso Capitolio Romam seruasset, &
 prope cccc. produxisset, quibus sine fœ-
 nore expensas pecunias tulisset, quorum
 bona venire, quos duci addictos prohi-
 buisset: ad hæc hostium cæsorū spolia,
 dona imperatorū plurima conspicienda
 protulisset, & ea quæ bello gessisset ora-
 tione magnifica facta dictis æquādo me-
 morasset: nihilominus tamen crimē va-
 luit, inquit Liuius^b, & populi iudicio dā-
 9 natus Manlius, de saxo Tarpeio deiectus
 est. Contrà Persę* nunquam quemquam
 condem-

^a Liuius lib. 1^b lib. 6.

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^{a Diod. Sicul. lib. 1.} condemnabant, nisi reus conuinceretur plus mali quàm boni fecisse reipub.^a

DE CONTVMACIBVS ET DV-
CVM DICTO NON PARENTIBVS
eosq; non protegentibus.

- 1 *Qui edicto non paret, capite punitur.*
- 2 *Miles qui tribuno, vel centurioni castigare volenti resistit.*
- 3 *Tribuno non licet modum in castigando excedere.*
- 4 *Qui præpositum defendere noluerunt, vel deseruerunt.*
- 5 *Qui rem a duce prohibitam facit.*
- 6 *Disciplina castrorum Romanis antiquior, quàm charitas liberorum.*

CAPVT X.

AD stabiliendam disciplinam militarē in primis spectat, vt exercitui & militibus præpositi, habeant milites dicto audientes. Itaque qui edicto minus paret*, capite puniri iubetur. ^{b l. 3. §. in bello. D. de re milit.} Augustus verò decimam legionem contumacius parētem, cum ignominia totam dimisit. Porrò vt ordine, ac sine tumultu omnia in agmine, ad nutum imperium-que ducis fierēt, optimè prouidit L. Æmilius Paulus, in Macedoniam missus.

nam

nam cum omnibus simul pronunciaretur, si quid agendum esset, neque omnes exaudirent, & incerto imperio accepto, alij plus eo quod imperatum esset, alij minus facerent, clamores quoque dissoni orirentur omnibus locis, & prius hostes quam ipsi, quid pararetur, scirēt: placuit trib. militum primo pilo legionis secretum edere imperium: illum, & deinde singulos proximo cuique in ordine centurioni dicere quid facto opus esset: siue a primis signis ad nouissimū agmē; siue ab extremis ad primos perferēdum imperium esset^a. At verò tribuno, & centurioni permissam fuisse castigationem

2 in milites alibi diximus^b. Itaque miles^c, qui tribuno vel centurioni castigare volenti restitisset, probro notabatur: qui verò probro notabatur, eū nemini igne, nemini alloquio impartire licebat. qui vero vitem tenuisset, militiam mutabat: si ex industria fregisset, capite plectebatur^c. Tribunis autē vites prælatas fuisse, non virgas alibi ostendimus. Cauēdum

3 tamen tribuno^d, ne modum in castigando excedat^d, & si iniuste militem inuadat, & non castigandi animo ob crimen aliquod metas officij sui excedat, puto

c militi

^a Liv. lib. 34

^b 3. de offic. tribu.

^c l. miles. §. irreuerens. D. de remilit.

^d l. officium. in fin. D. de remilit. l. si queritur. §. item lulianus D. locati.

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a argumento militi defensionem esse licitam ^a: alioqui
l. prohibitum. verò non erit resistendum ^b. nam omnis
C. de iur. fisc. contumacia aduersus ducem vel præsi-
bb. 10. dem, capitalis est ^c. Neque solum capita-
b c. qui resi- lis poena statuta est in eos, qui manus in-
stit. 2. qu. 3. tulerunt præposito ^d: sed etiam in eos,
c l. omne. §. qui eum defendere noluerunt ^e, vel de- 4
contumacia. seruerunt, occidiq̃ue passi sunt ^e. idemq̃;
D. de re milit. regia Hispaniarum lege constitutum est
d l. omne. §. 1 in eos, qui regem suum deseruerunt ^f.
D. de re milit. Senatus autem Romanorum quàm gra-
e l. 2. in fin. uissimè tulit, quòd Q. Petilium consulè
et d. l. omne. fortissimè aduersus Ligures pugnàtem,
in fin. D. de re occidi milites passi essent, & legionem ne-
mo st. que stipendium anni procedere, neque
f Reg. l. 3. tit. æra dari voluit: quia pro salute impera-
19. par. 2. toris hostium telis se non obtulissent ^g.
g Val. Max. Celtiberi verò nefas esse duxerūt prælio
lib. 2. cap. 7. superesse, cùm is occidisset, pro cuius sa-
h Val. Max. lute spiritum deuouissent ^h. Cuius con-
lib. 2. cap. 6. ditionis homines fuisse apud Gallos,
i de bel. gal. quos illi Soldurios appellabant, refert
lib. 3. Cæsari. Porrò vsque adeo seuerè imperio
k l. 3. §. in ducis pareri, eiusq̃ue edicta obseruari
bello. D. de re præcipitur, vt capitis poenam subeat, qui
moist. rem a duce prohibitam fecerit ^k, aut mā- 5
 data eius nō seruauerit, etiam si res bene
 cesserit ^k. Cuius disciplinæ seuerissimi
 custodes

custodes fuere Postumius, Tubertus & Manlius Torquatus: quorum alter filiū, quia non suo iussu, sed sponte, præsidio progressus hostes fuderat, victorē securi feriri iussit. alter verò, cui Imperioso postea cognomen fuit, filium, quòd prouocatus a Geminio Metio duce Tusculanorum, ad dimicandum contra edictum patris descenderat, gloriosam victoriam, & speciosa spolia referentē, in conspectu exercitus virgis cæsum securi percussit. & Manlius filius exercitu pro se aduersus patrem seditionem parante, negauit tātī esse quemquam, vt propter illum disciplina corrūperetur, & obtinuit vt ipsum puniri pateretur^a. Vnde Paulus ait, disciplina⁶ castrorū antiquiorem Romanis^{*} fuisse, quàm charitatem liberorum^b. Nec minori seueritate Papyrius dictator Q. Fabium magistrum equitum, quòd cōtra eius imperium exercitum eduxisset: quāquam fuis Samnitibus in castra redierat, neque virtute eius, neque successu, neque nobilitate motus, nudatum, virgisq; cæsum securi percussurus; apopulo Rom. tribunisq; plebis, qui pro eo intercedebant, constanter poposcit^c. Perinde autē in eum militaris animad-

^a *Linium l. 7.**Or 3. Valer.**Max. l. 2. c. 7.**Gell. l. 9. c. 13.*^b *in l. postli-**minum. §. si-**lus quoque.**D. de capti. et**postli. reuers.*^c *Linium lib. 8.**Val. Max. lib.**2. cap. 7.*

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uersio fuit, qui extra ordinem etiam in prouocantem, cōtra imperium pugnas-
set, aut classico reuocatus, tardius paruif-
set, quàm si ciuem aut socium iniuria af-
fecisset. Itaque Cyrus laudasse dicitur
militem, qui cū hostem interfecturus
gladium eduxisset, classico receptui au-
dito ictus cohibuit, hostemque dimisit.

DE EMANSORIBVS.

- 1 *Sine commeatu miles a signis abesse non
potest.*
- 2 *Qui agmen excessit fustibus ceditur.*
- 3 *Emansor quis, & quomodo puniatur.*
- 4 *Qui vallum transcendit.*
- 5 *Qui ad commeatus diem non redit.*

CAPVT XI.

IVre militari apud Romanos cautum
fuit, ne miles sine commeatu* ab signis
abeat, nèue prælio decedat, nèue locum
relinquat, aut e castris fugiat, nèue de-
cedat longius, sed explorato, & sub signis
atque subsidiis positus, non modo in acie
procedat, sed & lignatum aut populatū
vadat, omnia denique, veluti sic coram
hoste cauta præuisaque essent. qui verò
longius a tubæ auditu, nisi imperatoris
aut tribuni iussu, extra munimenta abiif-
set, in

set, in eum militaris animaduersio erat: ne scilicet vagi milites solutiore cura obambulantes, in hostili loco temerè progressi cædibus essent & periculis obnoxij: tum etiam vt a rapina contineretur:

2 vnde qui agmen excessisset*, ex causa vel fustibus cædebatur, vel mutare militiam solet^a. Lyfander Lacedæmonius egres-
sum via quendam castigabat, cui dicenti
ad nullius rei rapinam se ab agmine excessisse, respondit: Ne speciem quidem rapturi præbeas volo. Alexander Seuerus, si quis de via in alicuius possessione deflexisset, eum fustibus cædi iubebat, & dum castigaretur, per præconem proclamari & edici: Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris. quod a Christianis aliquando audiuerat. Pompeius verò missus in Siciliam legatus, cùm audiret milites in itinere faciundo sæpe euagari, vimque hominibus facere, & prædas auertere, eos qui temerè oberrabant, suppliciiis compescuit: a se autem missorum gladiis sigilla imposuit^b. Porro qui diu vagatus sine cōmeatu ad castra regreditur, eman-
3 for* dicitur: cuius crimē leuius est, quàm desertoris^c: vt erronis leuius est in seruo, quàm fugitiui^d. Examinantur autem

^a l. 3. §. sed
qui. D. de re
milit.

^b Plus. in a-
poph.
^c l. 3. §. emā-
sionis. D. de ra-
milit.
^d l. fugitiuus
D. de verbor.
sign.

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causæ emanationis, & cur, & ubi fuerit, & quid egerit, & datur venia valetudini, affectioni parentum & affinium, & si servum fugientem persecutus est, vel si qua huiusmodi causa sit: sed & ignoranti adhuc disciplinam tyroni ignoscitur^a. Hostibus tamen imminetibus, qui in exploratione emanet, aut a fossato recedit, capite punitur^b. similiter & is qui vallum transcendit*, aut per murum castra ingreditur^c. muri enim sacrosancti semper habiti fuerunt^d. Is quoque qui commeatu* 4 accepto ad diem commeatus non rediit, perinde in eum statuendum Modestinus respondit, ac si emanfisset, vel deseruisset pro numero temporis: facta prius copia dicendi, num fortè casibus quibusdam detentus esset, propter quos venia dignus videatur^e. Vsq; adeo verò odiosum fuit a signis abesse, ut miles qui in commeatu agit, non videatur reipub. causa abesse, ut Vlpianus respondit^f: si puta vagetur, aut domi suæ ocietur, ut Iabolenus sensit^g. nam ut Vlpianus ait^h: Ij tantum reipub. causa abesse intelliguntur, qui non sui commodi causa, sed coacti absunt. at commentum quāparcissimè dari debere militibus, alio loco diximus.ⁱ

a l. qui cum.
in fin. D. de re
milit.

b l. 3. §. in
qui. D. de re
milit.

c l. 3. §. in
bello. D. de re
milit.

d §. sanctè.
inst. de rer. di-
vis.

e l. 3. §. si ad
diem. l. qui
commeatus.

D. de re milit.
f in l. 1. D.
de re milit.

g in l. miles.
D. ex quibus
caus. maio.

h in l. reipub.
D. ex quibus
caus. maio.

i 5. de offic.
tribuni.

DE DE-

- 1 *Desertor quis & quomodo punitur.*
- 2 *Qui desertorem occultant.*
- 3 *Desertor restitutus non accipit stipendia temporis quo in desertione fuit.*
- 4 *Qui filium militia subtrahit.*

CAPVT XII..

1 **D**esertor* in iure dicitur, qui per longum tempus vagatus reducitur a. a l. desertorē. §. desertor. D. de re milit.
Semel autem militiæ ascriptus, nisi debitor missus, eam deserere non poterat: quod grauissimum crimē habitum fuit. non tamen omnes desertores similiter puniendi sunt. nam habetur ordinis, & stipendiorum ratio, & anteastræ vitæ. refert etiam num solus, vel cum pluribus, semel, aut iterū quis deseruerit. aliudue crimen desertioni adiunxerit. item temporis ratio habetur. nam qui in pace deseruit, eques gradu pellendus est, & pedes b l. nō omnes. D. de re milit.
militiam mutat. in bello idē admissum, capitale est^b. Grauius quoque in eo statutum fuit, qui post desertionem in aliā c l. qui cum uno. §. qui post. D. de re milit.
militiam se dedit, legiue passus sit^c. Imperatores verò permiserunt cuilibet desertorem opprimere^d. quod Leo imperator ita restrinxit, si inuentus restiterit^e. d in l. ult. C. quād. lic. vn. sine iud. e l. 2. C. de desert. lib. 12.

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Defunctorum autem in desertione bona publicantur^a. Neque solum ipsi desertores puniendi sunt, sed etiam ij qui eos occultant*. item iudex, qui gratia, 2 vel dissimulatione poenam desertori irrogare neglexit^b. qui vero desertorem prodit, præmio afficitur^c. desertori tamē qui se obrulit, indulgeri solet^d. nisi forte quis post quinquennium se obtulerit, qui deportari iubetur^e. Et quamvis desertor* ex indulgentia fuerit restitutus, 3 non tamen stipendia eius temporis, quo in desertione fuerit, exigere poterit^f. Non minus graviter quàm in desertorē, statutum est in eum, qui filium suum militiæ subtraxisset*. nam si id belli tēpore 4 fecisset, exilio & parte bonorum multabatur: si in pace, fustibus cædi iubebatur, & requisitus iuuenis in deteriores militiam dabatur. & qui filium debilitavit delectu indicto, ut inhabilis militiæ esset, deportari ex rescripto D. Traiani solet^g. Cæsar autem cū conveniret, in ceteris seditiosorū & desertorum acerrimus inquisitor & punitor dicitur fuisse maximus. & Aufidium Cassiū memoriæ proditum est, novo exemplo multis desertoribus manus detruncasse & pedes, asferens

^a l. defunctorum. C. de re milit. lib. 12.

^b l. 1. C. de deserto. lib. 12

^c d. l. 1.

^d l. nō omnes.

^e qui in desertione. l. qui

cum vno. §.

edictum. D.

de re mil.

^f l. milites a-

grum. in fin.

D. de re mil.

^g l. cū allega-

ti. C. de re

milit. lib. 12.

^h l. penu. D. de

re milit.

ⁱ l. qui cum

vno. §. filiū.

D. de re mil.

ferens maiori disciplinæ fore miserabili-
ter criminofum viuere, quàm occidere.

DE TRANSFUGIS ET PRODI-
TORIBVS.

- 1 *In transfugas acerrimè animaduersum.*
- 2 *Qui cùm potest redire, & non redit, pro transfuga habetur.*
- 3 *Exploratores quomodo puniendi.*
- 4 *Arcana consilia non sunt euulganda.*
- 5 *Speculatores hostium.*
- 6 *An sit nobili viro dignum speculatorem esse.*
- 7 *Minimè tutum per fugis credere.*

CAPVT XIII.

IN transfugas*, velut maiore crimine
obnoxios, & patriæ acciuium prodito-
tores, acerrimè semper animaduersum
fuit, & venia indigni fuere. nam vt Pau-
lus ait: Transfuga, qui malo consilio &
proditoris animo patriam reliquit, ho-
stium numero habendus est, & capite
punitur^b. & vbicunque inuentus, quasi
hostis interfici potest^c: ac legis Iuliæ ma-
iestatis reus est^d. torqueri quoque, & ad
bestias, vel in furcam cōdemnari potest,
quamuis milites nihil eorum patiātur^e.

a in l. postli-
mentum. §.
transfuga. D.
de capt. &
postl. reuers.

b l. prodito-
res. D. de ro-
milit.

c l. 3. §. ult.
D. ad l. Corn.
de fica.

d l. 2. D. ad
l. Iul. ma.

e l. 3. §. is qui
D. de remilit.

c 5 Is etiam,

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—Is etiam, qui volens transfugere depre-
a l. defertorē. hensus est, capite punitur^a. Itaque Ful-
§. is qui ad uium senatoris filium ad Catilinam pro-
hostes. D. de ficiscētem retractum ex itinere iussit pa-
re milit. rens necarib. P. autem Scipio Africanus,
b Sallust. in alioquin mitissimi ingenij, in perfugas
conuolat. Ca- & fugitiuos acerbus fuit: si quidē deuicta
til. Carthagine ad firmandam disciplinam
 militarem, ex Romanis, qui rupto impe-
 rio ad hostes transfugerant, in crucem
 efferrī, nominis verò Latini securi per-
 cuti iussit^c. & posterior Africanus transfugas
c Liv. lib. 30. bestiis obiecit^d, Paulus Æmilius
Val. Max. l. 2 elephantis. M. Marcellus Leontinis ca-
cap. 7. ptis, ad duo millia transfugarum securi
d Val. Max. percussit^e. Metium verò Suffetium pro-
lib. 2. cap. 7. ditionis reū, quadrigis in diuersum actis
e Liv. lib. 24 discerptum fuisse legimus^f. Et cccclxx.
f Liv. lib. 2. perfugæ, qui ad Annibalem transfuge-
 rant, recepti a Q. Fabio Romam missi,
 virgis in comitio cæsi omnes, ac de saxo
g Liv. lib. 24 deiectionis sunt^g. Idem tamē Fabius Maxim.
 mitius agens, illorum qui contra reli-
 gionem iurisiurandi transfugerant, de-
 xtras amputari mandauit: vt trunca præ
 se brachia gestantes, defectionis metum
h Val. Max. reliquis inijcerent, & ceteris, ne idem
lib. 2. cap. 7. cōmittere auderent, documēto essent^h.
 Apud

Apud Athenienses verò proditionis reū
sepelire nefas fuit. eumque cum tota po-
steritate inter infames referebant^a: & ca-
dauera eorum extra fines patriæ depor-
tari iusserunt^b. ei tamen, qui transfugit,
& postea multos hostes apprehendit, &
transfugas demonstraerit, posse parci
D. Hadrianus rescripsit^c. Habetur etiam

^a Plut. in vi-
ta dei & Rhod.
^b Plus. de se-
ra iniur. viro.
^c l. nō omnes.
in fin. D. de
re milit.

2 pro transfuga is, qui cū posset * redire,
non rediit^d. Et quidem ab hostibus re-
missi milites, non aliter restituendi sunt,
quā si constiterit eos captos fuisse, nō

^d l. non om-
nes. §. qui ca-
ptus. D. de re
mil.

3 transfugisse^e. Porro exploratores*, qui
secreta hostibus nunciant, proditorum
loco habentur, & capitis pœnas luunt^f:
& viui exuri, aut furca suspendi solent^g.

^e l. nō omnes.
§. a barbaris.
cū §. seq. D.
de re milit.

Apud Carthaginenses verò quodā po-
tentissimo ea tempestate Pœnorū pro-
ditionis damnato, quòd odio Hannonis

^f l. omne. §.
exploratores.
D. de re milit.
reg. Hisp. l. 2.
iii. 28. par. 2.

ducis belli Græcis litteris Dionysio ty-
ranno aduentum exercitus, & segnitiem
ducis prænunciaisset, S. C. factum est, ne

^g l. si quis a-
liquid ex me-
tallo. §. trās-
fuga. l. aut
damnum §.

quis postea Carthaginensis aut Græcis
litteris, aut Græco sermoni studeret: ne
aut loqui cum hoste, aut scribere sine in-

terprete posset^h. Neque solū pœna di-
gni fuerunt, qui hostibus secreta nuncia-
rent: sed etiam ij, qui apud suos ea euul-
garent.

hostes. D. de
pœnis.
h Iustin. l. 20

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garent*. Itaque apud Ægyptios legem- 4
litari cautum fuit, vt qui ducis cōsilium
^{a Diod. Sicul.} palam fecisset, lingua multaretur^a. Perse
^{lib. 2.} verò veteri eorum disciplina arcana regū
^{b Q. Curt.} vitę periculo custodiri sanxerūt^b. Et me-
^{lib. 4.} moriæ proditum est, multis seculis P.
conscriptorum arcana consilia a nemine
senatorum fuisse euulgata. Itaque Q. Fa-
bius Max. quòd de bello Punico indicē-
do, de quo secreto in curia actum erat, P.
Crasso narrauit, quamuis per imprudē-
tiam, memor eum triennio ante quęsto-
rem factum, ignarusque nondum a cen-
soribus in ordinem senatorum allectum,
vehementer a cōsulibus obiurgatus fuit.
^{c lib. 2. c. 2.} Nunquam enim, vt ait Val. Max^c. taci-
turnitatem, optimum ac tutissimum re-
rum administrandarum vinculum, labe-
factari volebant. Sicque cūm Asiæ rex
Eumenes amantissimus Romanorū bel-
lum a Perse aduersus populum Roman.
comparari senatui nunciaffet, non ante
sciri potuit, quid aut ille locutus esset,
aut patres respondissent, quā Perse
^{d Val. Max.} captum cognitum esset^d. Prudēter verò
^{lib. 2. cap. 2.} Cęcilius Metellus tribuno militum per-
cunctanti quid esset factururus: Si eius, in-
quit, rei scirem mihi tunicam consciam,
exutam

exutam in ignem conijcerem. indicans ducū consilia non esse euulganda. Porro proditoribus annumerari possunt, qui ad hostes tela armæue deferunt: quod capitale est, bonis eorum publicatis^a. Et

Paulus respondit, ferrum hostibus vendare sine capitis periculo nō licere^b.

qui verò operam dabant, vt barbari Romanos deprædarentur, & prædam cum

hostibus diuidebant, viui exuri solent^c.

5 Ceterum hostiū speculatores* apud nos forte deprehensos, non tanto odio dignos esse, quanto ij qui ad hostes transfugiunt, & secreta hostibus nunciant, ratio ipsa satis indicat, quippe qui nulla perfidia notantur. Vnde speculator quidam Carthaginiensis, qui per biennium fefellerat, Romæ deprehensus, præcis tantum manibus dimissus est^d. Solet hic

6 quæri, an sit nobili viro dignum* speculatorem esse, & explorare hostium consilia & facta. Et certè ex professo hanc artem exercere mercedis gratia, nō puto viro nobili honori esse, neq; citra ignominia notam licere: vt colligere licet ex iis quæ de nobilibus latè tradit Tiraquelus. Si quis verò amore reipub. & pro salute communi & publica hoc faciat, non solum

^a l. i. C. quæ

res expor. non

deb. l. 4. D. ad

l. iul. ma.

^b l. eodem. D.

de public.

^c l. ii. qui. C.

de re mil. l. 12

^d Liv. lib. 22

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solùm nō indignum viro nobili, sed etiā maximè gloriosum iudico. nam & Dominus pręcepit Moyſi proficiſcenti cum Iſraëlitis in terram promiſſionis, vt pręmitteret ſingulos de ſingulis tribubus ex pręcipuis in terram Chanaā, qui conſiderarent, qualis quantaque eſſet, & vtrum fortis populus, an infirmus, pauci numero, an plures, ipſa terra bona, an mala, vrbes munitæ, nec ne, ceteraque omnia explorarent ^a. Et Iosue duos exploratores miſit in urbem Iericho, antequam eam oppugnaret ^b. Itaq; Sex. Tarquinius, ſimulata patris ſæuitia & odio Gabios profugit: quo aſtu dux ab illis electus, vno aut altero prælio proſperè regeſta, cūm vniuerſa res Gabina illi credita eſſet, ſublatis de medio primoribus ciuitatis, ſine certamine oppidum patri, qui illud oppugnabat, in manus tradidit ^c. Et Zopyrus homo nobilis, Darij Perſarum regis amicus, cūm videret regē longa obſidione Babylonis deſeſſum, & difficilem admodū expugnationem fore, truncatis ſibi ipſi naſo & auribus, lacero corpore ad Babylonios transfugit, ſimulās ſe a Dario tam ſcēdē cæſum. quare credita benignè ab hoſtibus exceptus,

turmis

^a Num. 13.

^b Iosu. cap. 2

^c Liv. lib. 2.

turmisequitum præfectus, vno aut altero prælio re bene gesta, tandè dux totius exercitus constitutus, urbem atque exercitum Dario tradidit a. Araspa quoque ^{a Iustio. lib. 1} nobilissimus Medus, ex Cyri comitibus, iussu eius ad Assirium regem transfugit, & exploratis hostium copiis & consiliis ad Cyrum reuersus, in publica concione ab eo laudatus est ^b. Quibus etiam exemplis docemur, quam minimè tutum sit ^{b Xeno. in ped. Cyni l. 6} perfugis credere*, quibus certè, etiam si sine dolo & fraude ad nos profugiant, & suos prodant, non multum fidei habendum erit. quomodo enim sperari potest in alienos fidũ fore, qui in suos perfidus existit? Itaque Antigonus dicere solet, se proditores amare dũ proderet, vbi verò prodidissent, eos omni odio persequi. quò spectat Augusti dictum: Proditionem amo, proditorem non laudo ^c. Et ^{c Plut. in a. poph.} faceret Philippus Macedo, quãquam decepto hoste semper gauderet, conquærenti cuidam, quòd milites eum proditorem vocarent, eo quòd patriam Philippo prodidisset: Noli mirari, inquit, hebetes enim ingenio sunt Macedones, & agrestes admodum, vtpote qui scaphã scapham vocant: his verbis docens, proditores

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ditores omnibus ludibrio esse debere: Romanis certè veteribus illis, insitum fuit Romanis, vt ipsi dicebant, artibus, id est, virtute, opere, armis potius vincere, quàm aliena iniquitate, vt alio loco ostendimus.^a

^a 7. de infid.
& fraud. ho-
stis.

DE SEDITIOSIS.

- 1 *Intestina seditioes perniciose.*
- 2 *In seditiosos acriter animaduersum.*
- 3 *Non temerè experiendum imperium.*
- 4 *Luxus & licentia maxime fouent seditioes.*
- 5 *Seditio mira dexteritate sedata.*
- 6 *Aliter in bello, aliter in pace agendum.*
- 7 *Prius lenienda seditio, quàm in auctores animaduertatur.*
- 8 *Quomodo compefcatur seditio.*

CAPVT XIII.

QUàm perniciosæ sint* intestinae dissentiones, disertè Menenius Agrippa orator, ad populum, qui in sacrum mōtem secesserat, apologo suo de membrorum humani corporis dissentione, ostendit ^b: & Scylurus fasce suo hastarū, quem filiis suis, quos octoginta habebat, confringendum exhibuit. Etenim haud pauciores exercitus discordia & seditio-
ne, pro-

^b *Limus* l. 2

ne, propriis viribus consumptos, quàm ab hostibus prostratos fuisse satis cōstat.

- 2 Vnde in seditiosos*, & seditionū auctores acriter semper sæuitum est, tanquam in criminis læsæ maiestatis reos^a. itaque capite puniri Modestinus respōdit eum, qui atrocem militum seditionem concitavit: sin verò intra vociferationem & leuem querelam seditio mota esset, gradu militiæ deijsi^b. & Paulus seditiosos, pro qualitate dignitatis, in furcam tolli, aut bestiis subijci, aut in insulam deportari voluit^c. Ex cōstitutionibus quoque regni Hispaniæ, pro qualitate delicti, & personæ, puniri iubetur. & siquidem eo animo seditionem mouerint, vt impeditur occasio rei benegerendæ, erutis oculis in carcerem conijciuntur, donec occasio rei gerendę transferat: & quidem si sint ex dignioribus, captiui constituuntur, & postea in exilium mittuntur^d. Cæsar autem cū in ceteris criminibus commueret, in seditiosos acerrimus vindex fuit, & ex causā seditionis, in tumultu ciuiliū armorum, ac tum maximè tumentibus animis, legionem totam exauctorauit, auctoribus seditionis securi percussis: sed mox eos quos exauctorauit^d uerat,

^a l. 1. D. ad l. l. l. maiest.

^b l. 3. in fin. D. de remilit.

^c in l. si quis aliquid ex metallo. §. auctores. D. de pen l. 1. et 2. C. de seditione.

^d Reg. lib. 4. c. 5. tit. 28. per. 2.

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uerat, ignominiam deprecâtes restituit,
 & optimos milites habuit. Cn. Põpeius
 minitantibus direpturos pecuniam mi-
 litibus, quæ in triumpho ferebatur, Ser-
 uilio & Glaucia hortâtibus, vt diuideret
 eam, ne seditio fieret, affirmavit non
 triumphaturum se, sed potius moriturû,
 quàm licentiæ militum succumberet, ca-
 stigatisq; oratione graui militibus, lau-
 reatos fasces obiecit, vt ab illorum inci-
 perent direptione, eaq; muidia redegit
 eos ad modestiam. Monendi tamen sunt
 duces belli, ne temere experiantur im-
 perium*, cuius vis omnis in consensu o-
 bedientium est, ù forte periculum sit, nõ
 fore dicto audientes milites: vt prudẽter
 legati App. Claudium monuerunt, sæ-
 uire volentem in milites, qui odio eius
 in aciem producti, turpi fuga petierant
 castra^a. Porro Gemitius consul millia
 hominum quattuor exauctorauit, & in
 foro percussit, quòd licentia corrupti
 Rhegium, in cuius præsidio erant, occu-
 pauerant, & eorum corpora sepulturæ
 mandari, mortemque lugere veruit^b.
 Atquẽ in compescendis cohibendisq;ue
 militum seditionibus magna requiritur
 ducis prudẽtia, qui in primis scire debet,
 luxum

^a Liv. lib. 2.

^b Val. Max.
 lib. 2. cap. 7.
 Liv. lib. 28.

4 luxum & licentiam^{*} ex ocio, vt fit, colle-
 ctam maximè fouere istiusmodi militū
 consilia: vt Liuius in sua historia satis o-
 ,, stendit^a, cū ait: Iam tum minimè salu- a lib. 7.
 ,, bris militari disciplinæ Capua, instru-
 ,, mento omnium voluptatum delinitos
 ,, militū animos auertit a memoria patriæ,
 ,, inibanturque consilia in Hibernis, eodē
 ,, scelere adimendę Campanis Capuæ, per
 ,, quod illi eam antiquis cultoribus ade-
 ,, missent. Ceterum in hac coniuratione
 Capuana compescenda, laudanda pru-
 5 dentia C. Martij Rutilij cons.^{*} qui & æ-
 tate, & vsu doctus, optimum ratus diffe-
 rendo spem, quādocunque vellent, cō-
 silium exequendi militarem impetū fru-
 strari, rumorē dissipat in iisdem oppidis
 & anno post præsidia hibernatura, diuisa
 enim erant per Campaniæ vrbes. eoque
 laxamento cogitationibus dato, quieuit
 in præsentia seditio: & consul educto in
 æstiuam militem, dum quietos Samnites ha-
 bebat, exercitū purgare missionibus tur-
 bulētorum hominum, mira dexteritate
 instituit, alios aliis ex causis^b. Neque e- b Liuii l. 7.
 nim semper conuenit imperiū experiri.
 sæpe enim, vt Tacitus ait, quod in pacis
 ocio vindex disciplina persequitur; inter
 d 2 gladios

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gladios & turbas cauta toleratur patien-
tia. & vt Fabius Max. dicebat, aliter in
medio ardore * belli ; aliter in pace tran- 6
quilla arbitradum & agendum esse, vt a-
libi ostendimus^a. Hinc quoque graui a-
liqua seditione exorta, eandem, quacun-
que ratione, leniendam*, & tum demum 7
in auctores animaduertendum censeo,
ne alioqui magis irritetur & accendatur,
quam sedetur aut extinguatur militaris
furor : exemplo Scipionis, qui in castris
ad Sucronē in Hispania seditione orta,
inter suos milites septē tribunos ad eos
misit, qui placido sermone permulcētes
lenirent militum animos, & edicto pro-
posito, vt ad stipendium petendum con-
uenirēt, Carthaginem pertraxit: vbi cir-
cumfuso omni exercitu graui oratione
castigatis militibus, metu torpentibus,
auctores seditionis in mediū protractos,
nudos deligatos ad palum virgis cæsos
securi percussit: cumque certatum fuisset
sententiis, vtrum in auctores tantū se-
ditionis animaduerneretur, an plurium
supplicio vindicanda tam fœdi exempli
defectio magis, quam seditio esset: vicit
sententia lenior, vt vnde orta culpa esset,
ibi poena consisteret^b. his adde quod
Tacitus

^a *Temporis
rationem ha-
bendā, lib. 2.*

^b *Lin. lib. 28.*

Tacitus ait^a, saluberrimum esse ad con-
 tinendam militarem fidem, vbi seditio
 8 timetur*, vt longis spatiis distineatur e-
 exercitus, ne viribus & vitiis milites mis-
 ceantur. sed & cùm ocium militarem se-
 ditionem maximè foueat, illud bello, A-
 lexandri exemplo, interpellare cōuenit.
 Prudenter verò Cæsar bello ciuili, vt sibi
 exercitum deuinciret, a tribunis militū,
 centurionibusq; mutuas pecunias sum-
 psit, quas exercitui distribuit. quo facto
 duas res consecutus est, quia pignore a-
 nimos centurionum deuinxit, & largi-
 tione redemit militum voluntates^b. Est ^b *caesar de*
 autem memorabile, quod de Annibale ^{bel. ciuili. lib. 2}
 tradunt historiæ: quippe qui cùm in ho-
 stiū terra per annos tredecim, tam pro-
 cula domo, varia fortuna bellū gereret,
 exercitu non suo ciuili, sed misto ex col-
 luuione omnium gentium, quibus non
 lex, non mos, non lingua communis; a-
 lius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alij ri-
 tus, alia sacra, alij prope dij essent, ita
 quodam vno vinculo copulauerit eos,
 vt nulla nec inter ipsos, nec aduersus du-
 cem seditio existeret, cùm & pecunia sæ-
 pe, & stipendium, & commeatus in ho-
 stium agro deesset^c. Idem de Viriato le- ^c *lin. lib. 27*
 d 3 gimus,

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gimus, qui per octo perpetuos annos, quibus bellū cum Romanis gessit, exercitum ex omni hominum genere conflatum, sine seditione obsequentissimum habuit^a. quod certē non sine admiranda quadam virtute ducis fieri potuit. Scipio verò alioqui summus imperator, nimia lenitate sua militibus ansam ad seditionē præbuit. quo nomine Q. Fabius Max. eū ad corrumpendam disciplinam militarem natum arguebat, & plus prope in Hispania culpa Scipionis per seditionem militum, quàm bello amissum esse. Adeo natura insitum quibusdam est, vt magis peccari nolint, quàm satis animi ad vindicanda peccata habeant.

^a Appian. de
bel. hisp.

DE IIS QVI IN ACIE LOCO CEDVNT, AVT VICTI SE DEDVNT.

- 1 *Imperator magis quàm hostis timendus.*
- 2 *Qui in acie prior fugit, capite punitur.*
- 3 *Seueritas ad rem bene gerendam prodest.*
- 4 *Qui se hostibus dedunt, carēt postliminio.*
- 5 *Qui metu hostium languorem simulat.*

CAPVT XV.

Clearchus Lacedæmoniorum dux exercitui dicere est solitus, imperatorem

- 1 **to**rem potius * quàm hostem metui debere, significās eos, qui in prælio dubiam mortem timuissent, certum, si deseruissent, manere supplicium: vt scilicet insitum esset militibus, aut vincendum, aut moriendum esse. Quæ certe necessitas in virtutem verti solet. de quo alio loco diximus ^a. Vnde iure militari cautum est,
- 2 vt qui in acie prior fugam fecerit *, capite puuiatur ^b. Idem in nobili fugiēte, regia Hispaniæ lege statutum est ^c: at iure canonico fit infamis ^d. lege verò diuina timidi iubebantur reuerti in domum suā, ne aliis timorem incuterēt ^e. App. Claudius ex his, qui bello Volscō loco cesserant, decimum quemque sorte ductum ad suppliciū legit ^f. idem fecit Antonius bello Parthico. P. Cornelio Nasica, Decimo Iunio consl. qui exercitum deseruerant, damnati virgis cæsi, publicè vānierūt. Attilius regulus cū ex Samnio in lucernam transgrederetur, exercitusque eius obuiis hostibus aduersus effer, opposita cohorte iussit fugiētes pro defectoribus cædi. Camillus dictator Veiēti bello dictus omnium primum, in eos, qui a Veis proximo prælio pauore fugerant, more militari animaduertit, effe-
- d 4 citque

^a 5. necessitatem pugnandi. lib. 2.

^b l. omne. §. qui prior D. de re milit.

^c Reg. l. ult. tit. 21. par. 2.

^d c. infamis. 6. quest. 1.

^e Dent c. 20 & l. dub. c. 7

^f Liuius l. 3.

^g Appian. de bello Part.

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citque ne hostis maximè timèdus militi
^a *Liv. lib. 5.* esset^a. T. Scaurus filium, quòd in saltu
Tridentino hostibus cesserat, in conspe-
ctum suum venire vetuit: quare adoles-
cens verecūdia ignominia pressus, mor-
tem sibi cōsciuit. Marcellus verò mitius
agens, milites a quibus orta fuga esset,
qui que pauore signa reliquissent, sequē-
ti pugna inter primas acies frequentes
induxit, vt quod ignominia acceperant,
^b *Val. Max. lib. 2. cap. 7.* aliis prēliis periculo expiarent^b. Senatus
autem Romanus eos, qui commilitones
suos pugnantes apud Cannas deserue-
rant, graui decreto vltra mortuorum
cōditionem in Siciliam relegauit, & ac-
ceptis a Marcello litteris, vt eorū opera
ad expugnationem Syracusarum vti li-
ceret, rescripsit indignos esse, qui in ca-
stra reciperentur, nec reipubl. iis com-
mittēdam esse: ceterum se ei permittere,
vt faceret quod reipub. expedire iudica-
ret: dum ne quis ex eis munere vacaret,
aut dono militia donaretur, aut in Ita-
liam, donec hostes in ea essent, accede-
ret^c. idem decretum fuit in eos, qui de
^c *Liv. l. 25. Val. Max. l. 2. cap. 7.* exercitu Cn. Fuluij prætoris in Apulia
foede cæsi, fugati que supererant: addi-
tumque ignominie, ne in oppidis hiber-
narent,

narent, néue hiberna propius vllam vr-
 bem decé millibus passuum ædificarent.
 & Cn. Fulvius capitis accusatus, in exi-
 lium abiit^a. Scipio tamen cùm in Africā ^{a Livius l. 26}
 transiret, non est aspernatus milites, qui
 ex Cannensi clade supererant, vt qui ne-
 que ad Cannas ignavia eorum cladē ac-
 ceptam sciret, sed culpa ducis, neq; vllos
 æquè veteres milites in exercitu Roma-
 no esse, expertosque non variis præliis
 modò, sed in vrbibus etiam oppugnan-
 dis^b. Porro quantum huius disciplinæ ^{b Livius l. 29}
 seueritas ad rem bene gerendam profe-
 cerit*, multis exemplis docemur. itaque
 3 Licinius Crassus contra Spartacum gla-
 diatorem (qui cum magna manu fugiti-
 uorum & suæ cōditionis hominum Ro-
 manis bellū inferebat) aliquot victoriis
 ferocē profectus, legionibus decimatis,
 quòd male pugnassent, effecit, vt magis
 ipse, quàm hostis timeretur: & denuò in
 aciem suis productis, quamuis hac deci-
 matione multum imminuto exercitu,
 magna strage hostiū facta, egregiè Spar-
 tacum vicit^c. Similiter L. Apronius, suis <sup>c Appian. de
 bel. civil. l. 1.</sup>
 acie fugatis, a Tacfarinate magis decore ^{in fine.}
 suorum, quàm gloria hostis anxius, raro
 ea tépestate, inquit Tacitus^d. & e vetere ^{d annal. l. 3.}

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memoria, facinore, decimum quemque ignominiosæ cohortis forte ductos fuste necat: tantumque seueritate profectum, vt vexillum veteranorum non amplius quingenti numero, eadem Tacfarinatis copias fuderint. Ceterum non solum loco cedere, & fugere apud Romanos turpe fuit, & animaduersione dignum, sed etiam per deditionem in potestatem hostium venire. itaque eos, qui armis victi* se hostibus dedunt, postluminio ca- 4

a. in l. postli-
minium. D.
de capto. &
postl. reuers.

rere Vlpianus respondit^a. Et quidem T. Vespasianus tam seueræ disciplinæ fuisse traditur, vt militem ab hostibus captum, qui solutis vinculis ad castra refugerat, vltra militare non siuerit, nec illi arma crediderit, quod viuus se ab hostibus capi permisisset. & senatus vel maximè attritis reip. viribus, cum magnum seruorum numerum a Pyrrho rege vltro missum recepissent, decreuit ex sententia App. Claudij, vt ij qui equo meruerant, peditum numero militarent: qui pedites fuerant, in funditorum auxilia transcriberentur, nèue quis eorum intra castra tēderet, nèue locum extra castra assignatum vallo aut fossa cingeret, nèue tentorium ex pellibus haberet: & ita demum
cos in

eos in pristinum militiæ ordinē restitui
 placuit, si bina spolia ex hostibus retulif-
 sent^a. Pari seueritate senatus, cū ei An-
 nibal octo millia Romanorum, qui in ^{a Val. Ma}
 castris relictī post Cannensem cladem, se ^{ub. 2. cap.}
 Annibali dediderant, redimēdorum po-
 testatem faceret, conditionem spreuit, &
 in eorum locum octo millia seruorū pu-
 blicē empta armauit : qui miles magis
 placuit: cū tamen precio minore redi-
 mendi captiuos copia fieret : memor tā-
 tam multitudinem armatorū iuuenum,
 si honestē mori voluissent, turpiter capi
 non potuisse : vt insitum esset Romanis,
 aut vincere, aut emori. qua quidē audita
 re fractum animum Annibalis ferunt :
 quod senatus populusque Rom. rebus
 afflictis tam excelsō animo esset^b. Deni-
 que ij quoque, qui metu hostium lan- ^{b Liu. l. 22.}
 5 guorem^c simulant, capite puniri iuben- ^{Val Max l. 2}
 tur^c. Est verò notatu dignum, quod Sal- <sup>c 7 Cicer. of-
fic. lib. 3.</sup>
 lustius de veteribus illis Romanis refert, ^{c l. omne. §.}
 quod in bello sæpius vindicatum fuerit, <sup>solet. De de re
milit.</sup>
 in eos, qui contra imperium in hostem
 pugnaverant, quia tardius reuocati præ-
 lio excesserāt, quàm qui signa relinque-
 re, aut pulsi loco cedere ausi erant.

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DE IIS QVI ARMA ALIENANT
VEL AMITTUNT.

- 1 *Arma in bello amittere vel alienare graue crimen.*
- 2 *Arma postliminio non redeunt.*
- 3 *Qui scutum vel gladium in acie amittit.*

CAPVT XVI.

Arma veteres membra militum esse voluerunt : itaque graue crimē habitum fuit in bello arma amittere, vel alienare *, & capite punitum ^a. & crimen ¹ istud desertioni æquiparatur, si quidem tota quis alienasset, vel etiam si partem tantum: nisi quod interest. nam si tibiale vel humerale amisit, vel alienauit, verberibus castigari solet: si verò loricam, gladium, scutum, desertori similis est: nisi quod tyroni facilius parcitur ^b. Hinc est quòd arma non redire postliminio * respondit Marcellus, quòd turpiter amittantur ^c. quare mirum quòd constitutio regni Hispaniæ arma in bello amissa ex præda forte facta refarciri iubeat ^d. Eadem tamen constitutio nobilibus ex hac causa infamiæ notam inurit, & nobilitatis prærogatiuam adimit ^e. Et certè arma in bello amittere, ignominiosissimum
semper

^a l. 3. §. miles. D. de re milit.

^b l. qui committitur. §. arma. D. de re milit.
^c l. 2. in fin. D. de capt. et postl. reuerf.
^d Reg. l. 4. et §. 25. p. 2.

^e Reg. l. ult. ibi, 21. par. 2.

semper fuit. itaque M. Cato Censorij filius, in acie cadente equo prolapsus, cum se recolligeret, animaduerneretque gladium excidisse vagina, veritus ignominiam, in confertissimos hostes se immit- tens, aliquot vulneribus acceptis, recuperato gladio rediit ad suos. quo spectaculo attoniti hostes, postero die ad eos supplices pacem petentes venerunt^a. L. autem Calpurnius Piso cons. C. Titium præfectum equitum, quòd fugitiuorum multitudine circumuentus, arma hosti cum suis tradidisset, toga laciniis abs- cis amictum, distincta tunica & nudis pedibus ad principia per omne tempus militiæ adesse iussit^b. App. Claudius a Vol- scis exercitu eius fugato, inuectus in proditorẽ exercitum militaris disciplinæ, desertorem signorũ, vbi signa, vbi arma essent, singulos rogitãs, inermes milites, signo amisso signiferos, virgis cæ- sos, securi percussit^c. Lacedæmonij ve- rò Archilochum poëtam vrbe exegere, quòd carmẽ scripserat, in quo suadere vi- fus fuit, satius esse arma amittere, quàm vitam. At Spartanę mulieres exituros in militiam filios monebant, vt aut viui cum armis in conspectum suum redirẽt, aut

^a Val. Max.
lib. 3. c. 2. l. m.
sim. lib. 33.

^b Val. Max.
lib. 2. cap. 7.

^c Liniu 1, 2
Dion. Hal.
lib. 9.

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aut mortui cum armis referrentur. Ceterum apud Græcos militari lege cautum erat, ut miles, qui scutum in acie amisisset*, capite lueret; qui verò gladium, leuiori poena plecteretur: quia maioris disciplinæ se ab hostibus tueri & præstare incolumem, quàm cum sua pernicie hostem perdere summi duces existimauere. Quo spectat Scipionis Æmiliani dictum, Malle se ciuem seruare, quàm multos hostes perdere. Itaque Epaminondas traiectus hasta, moribundus, primum an clipeus suus saluus esset, deinde an penitus fusi hostes foret, interrogauit, quæ postquam ex animi sententia comperit, lætus obiit, inquit: Nunc vester Epaminondas nascitur, quia sic moritur^a.

a Val. Max.
lib. 3. cap. 2.

DE IIS QUI EXCVBIAS DESE-
RVNT, VEL MINVS RECTE AGVNT.

- 1 *Excubia diligenter agenda.*
- 2 *Qui excubias palacij deseruit, capite puni-
tur.*
- 3 *Dormientes in statione quo modo puniendi.*
- 4 *Captiuicustodia militum commissi si eua-
serint.*

CAPVT XVII.

NON minima disciplinæ militaris pars est vigilias bene disponere, & excu-
bias

bias maxima cura agere : quarum negli-
 gentia plurimosexercitus cēfos, prostra-
 tosque, & multa castra capta, ac oppida
 occupata legimus. Itaque Thomyris re-
 ginæ filius somno vinoque sepultus, cū
 toto exercitu a Cyro oppressus interiit^a, a *lustin. lib. 1*
 & L. Marcius, cum reliquiis exercituum,
 extinctis Scipionibus, in Hispania bina
 castra Pœnorum, vbi omnia victoria ne-
 glecta solutaque inuenit, vna nōcte cæsis
 1 hostibus cepit^b. In vigiles^c igitur, quorū b *L. lib. 23*
 diligentia freti reliqui dormiūt, qui mi-
 nus officio functi essent, meritō animad-
 uersum fuit. Itaque Paulus eum, qui ex-
 2 cubias palacij deseruit^d, capite puniri re-
 spondit^e, & Modestinus eum, qui statio- c in l. qui eu-
cubias. D. de
re milit.
 nis munus reliquit, plusquam emanforē
 esse, atque pro modo delicti aut castigari,
 aut gradu deiici : qui verò ab excubatio-
 ne præsidis, aut cuiusuis præpositi deces-
 sit, peccatum desertoris subire dixit^d. d in l. deser-
torem. §. qui
stationis. cum
§. seq. D. de
re mil.
 Cū Galli in summum capitolij euasis-
 sent, incuria vigilum, qui tandem benefi-
 cio anserum excitati sunt, P. Sulpitius
 tribunus militū, in vigiles eius loci, quos
 fefellerat ascendens hostis, more militari
 se animaduersurum pronunciauit : sed
 consentiente clamore militum, in vnum
 vigilem

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vigilem coniicientium culpam, deterri-
tus, a ceteris abstinuit, & reum haud du-
bium eius noxæ approbantibus cunctis,
a *Liub. 5.* de saxo deiecit^a. Epaminondas verò cum
custodias stationesque circumiret, ut di-
sciplinam exēplis stabiliret, sopitum mi-
litem gladio transfixit^{*}, asserens, quod 3
b *Plut. in a-* qualem inuenerat, talem reliquerat^b. &
pop. Augustus manipulares milites statione
deserta, & centuriones morte multauit.
Porro ex constitutionibus regni Hispa-
niæ, solent dormientes in statione, tertio
demum admoniti præcipitari de saxo, vel
c *Reg. lib. 9.* muris arcis, in quo fortè excubabant^c.
tit. 18. par. 2. Qua autem ratione castrenses excubiæ
constituerentur apud Romanos, quod
officium circuitorum, qui vigilias circū-
ibant, quæue poena in eos, qui negligen-
tiores essent, tradit Polybius^d. Ceterum
d *de Rom.* Paulus Æmilius, ut attentius custodiæ
Castram. contra somnum pugnarēt, vigiles nouo
more scutum in vigiliam ferre vetuit: nō
enim in pūgnam vigilem ire, ut armis v-
tatur, sed ad vigilandum, ut cum senserit
hostium aduentum, recipiat se, excitetq;
e *Lin. 1. 44.* ad arma alios^e. Epaminondas Thebanis
diem festum agentibus, omnibusq; vino
& conuiuio deditis, solus squalidus &
cogi-

cogitabundus ciuitatem obambulauit,
 & familiari suo miranti, querētiq̃ue cau-
 sam: Vt vobis omnibus liceat potare, &
 animo esse ocioso, respōdit^a. Prudenter
 quoque Cambyfes Cyri pater, interro-<sup>a Plut. in a-
poph.</sup>
 gatus quonam pacto vrbes optimè cu-
 stodirentur, respondit: Si custodes nun-
 quam sibi satis cautum ab hoste esse ar-
 bitrarentur. Solent etiam militum cu-
 4 stodiæ committi captiui*, qui si custodiā
 eorum euaserint, pro modo culpæ casti-
 gantur, aut militiam mutant^b. exquirē-<sup>b l. milites, l.
ult. D. de cu-
stod. reo.</sup>
 dum tamen esse, an nimia negligentia
 militum euaserint, an casu D. Hadrianus
 rescripsit.^c

^c d. l. miles.

DE EO QVI ARCEM, VEL OP-
 PIDVM, CVIVS PRÆSIDIO IMPO-
 situs est, amittit, vel hostibus dedit.

- 1 *Qui arcē nō tenuit, laesa maiestatis reus.*
- 2 *Pro arcis defensione mors recusanda non est.*
- 3 *Si prefecto arcis ab hoste capta nulla culpa imputari possit, an puniri debeat.*
- 4 *Prefectus quando non teneatur arcem defendere.*
- 5 *Arci male munita prefectus.*
- 6 *Vix est ut citra ignominiam arx hosti tra-*
datur.

^c

7 Boni

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- 7 *Boni ne an mali plus adferat reip. arcis
exstructio.*
8 *Extraneis non facile accessus ad arcem cō-
cedi debet.*

CAPVT XVIII.

SI serui dominis periculo capitis cu-
stodiam domus, tam a domesticis,
quàm ab extraneis præstare coguntur:
quantomagis illi, quibus custodia arcis
vel oppidi, & publica salus commissæ est:
pro qua tuenda nullum periculum, nul-
los cruciatus, nec mortē denique ipsam
quisquam recusare debet: quare exactis-
sima diligētia præstari debet in arcis cu-
stodia^b. Itaque lege Iulia maiestatis tene-
tur*, qui arcem non tenuit, aut castra ho-
stibus concessit^c. Itaque L. Rupilius cō-
sul eo bello, quod cum fugitiuis gessit in
Sicilia, Q. Fabium generum suum, quia
negligentia Tauritanam arcem amiserat,
prouincia iussit excedere^d. C. Corta P.
Aurelium Pecuniolā sanguine sibi iun-
ctum, quem Liparitanæ obsidioni, ipse
ad auspicia repetenda Messanam transi-
turus, præfecerat, virgis cæsum gregalis
militiæ munere inter pedites fungi coë-
git, quòd eius culpa agger incensus, &
pæne

a l. 1. in pris.
D. ad S. C.
Syllan.

b argumento
l. 1. §. quia
sciendū. D. de
præfec. vigil.
c l. 3. D. ad l.
Iul. maiest.

d Val. Max.
lib. 2. cap. 7.

pæne castra fuerant capta^a. M. Antonius, ^{a Val. Max. lib. 2. cap. 7.} cum agger ab hostibus incensus esset, ex his qui in opere fuerant, duarum cohortium legiones decimavit, & in singulos decuriones animaduertit, legatum cum ignominia dimisit, reliquis ex legione hordeum dari iussit^b. T. Turpilius Syllanus Vaccæ oppidi præfectus, quod vnus ex omnibus profugisset, omnibus suis militibus, qui in præsidio erant, per fraudem obtruncatis, iussus a Metello causam dicere, postquam se parum expurgat, cõdemnatus, verberatusque pœnas capite soluit^c. Q. Cincinnatus dictator, eo tempore, quo deuicti Æqui, & subiugum missi, L. Munitium, quem ab obsidione hostium liberauerat, cõsulum deponere coëgit, & omnium rerû prædâ suo tantum militi dedit, indignum enim maximo imperio credidit, quem nō sua virtus, sed fossa vallumque tutum præstiterat, cuique verecundia non fuerat, arma Romana metu trepida clausis portis contineri^d. Porro Alexander Macedo ^{d Liv. lib. 3.} quendam castelli custodiæ præpositum ob desertam stationem nece multauit. & Carthaginenses, cum Mainertini a Romanis præsidium accepissent, Carthagi-

e 2 nienſium

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nienſium præſidio expulſo , præfectum præſidij , quòd formidine atque ignavia arcem amiſiſſet, cruci affixerunt^a. Veriſſimè certè Alexander audiens Aornum, ſaxum in India , natura loci inexpugnabilem eſſe, ſed a formiduloſo homine teneri : Hoc facit, inquit, vt locus iſte iam facilis captu ſit^b. Et præclare Lacedæmonius quidam nobilis, Philippo minitâti multis ſe prohibiturum, niſi ciuitas ſibi traderetur : Num, inquit, & pro patria mori prohibebis ? Fortiter quoque & prudenter L. Pinarius Ænnæ in Sicilia præfectus præſidij, quod in arce erat. nam Ænneſium principibus, qui de proditi-
one præſidij pacti erant cū Himilcone, cū nulla occaſio fraudis pateret, propalam agentibus urbem, arcemque ſuæ poteſtatis eſſe debere, & claues portarū ſibi reddi cōtendentibus, eo quòd liberi in ſocietatem, nō ſerui in cuſtodiam traditi eſſent Romanis: ita Pinarius reſpondit: Se in præſidio impoſitum eſſe ab imperatore ſuo, clauesque portarum & cuſtodiam arcis ab eo accepiffe, quam nec ſuo, nec Ænneſium arbitrio haberet, ſed eius qui commiſiſſet, præſidio excedere apud Romanos capitale eſſe, & ne libero-

^a Polyb. l. i.
hiſt.

^b Plut. in æ.
poph.

liberorum etiam suorum causa parentes
 sanxisse. consulem Marcellū haud procul
 esse: ad eum mitterēt legatos, cuius iuris
 atque arbitrij esset. Ænnensibus verò
 negantibus se missuros, testātibus si ver-
 bis nihil agerent, vindictam aliquam li-
 bertatis suę quęsituros: Pinnarius saltem
 populi consilium sibi dari postulavit, vt
 sciret vtrum paucorum ea denunciata,
 an vniuersę ciuitatis essent, & consensu
 eorum concione in posterum diem indi-
 cta, & vna omnibus clauēs reddi iubenti-
 bus, cunctantiq̃ue & differenti ferociter
 minitantibus: tum præfectus, cū nihil
 proficeret toga, signum, vt conuenerat,
 militibus dedit, a quibus Ænnenses im-
 petu factō miserē trucidati sunt: & Ænna
 hoc facinore retēta est. Marcellus factum
 non improbavit, & prædam Ænnēsium
 militibus concessit: ratus timore deterri-
 tos temperaturos a proditione præsidio-
 rum Siculos^a. Et hæc certē, quæ hæte-
 nus dicta sunt, conueniunt iis, quæ cōsti-
 tutionibus regni Hispaniæ statuta sunt,
 quibus cautum est, non debere quem
² mortem recusare^{*} pro arcis defensione,
 pro qua tuēda fortiter se quilibet gerere
 debet, etiam contra patrem, filium vel
 c 3 quondam

^a Liv. l. 24.

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quondam dominum : neque tanti quis
facere debet mortem vel quodcunque
periculum, quæ sunt transitoria, quàm
infamiam, quæ illi, posterisque suis in
perpetuum inuritur, si honori suo non
satisfecerit^a. & quidem necessitate famis
cogente, potius filium comedere debet,
quàm hosti arcẽ dedat iniussu Domini^b.
neque excusabitur si dedat arcem, ex eo
fortè quòd hostes minitentur mortem
uxori, aut liberis, aut quibusvis aliis^c. fa-
lus enim reip. charitati liberorum præ-
ferri debet^d. Itaque Alphonsus Perez
Gulmannus, post semestrem Tarifæ ob-
sidionem, hostibus, nequicquam omni-
bus tentatis, minitantibus, nisi oppidum
dederetur, filium se illius, quem apud se
habebāt interfecturum: respōdit, filium
patriæ, neque cum immortalẽ genuisse,
quo se orbari, si fors ita ferret, quàm præ-
sidio decedere, & fidem frangere sibi po-
tius esse. illud enim fieri vel cum sua glo-
ria posse, hoc sine suo dedecore ac scele-
re non posse, atque ita filium in cōspectu
suo ab hoste nefario scelere necari passus
est. Et quidem huius disciplinæ tam se-
ueri censores fuere Hispani: vt ex eorum
constitutionibus præfectus arcis, etiam
alio

^a Reg. lib. 12
tit. 18. par. 2.

^b Reg. lib. 7.
tit. 17. par. 2.
facit l. 1. et 2

C. de patr.
qui filios dist.

^c Reg. l. 6
12. tit. 18.

par. 2. l. ult.
tit. 21. par. 2.

l. 2. tit. 2. par.
7.

^d l. postlimi-
nium § filius

quoque. D. de
capt. & post.

reuer.

alio ex iusta causa substituto, qui arcem hostibus tradidit, nihilominus sit reus criminis læsæ maiestatis^a. Porro cum a iusticia alienum sit quem sine culpa puniri, & qui culpa vacat, etiam a pœna liber esse debeat^b: si præfecto arcis fortè ab hostibus captæ, vel iis deditæ nulla omnino culpa aut negligētia imputari possit^{*}, eum etiam a pœna securum esse debere æquitas suadet^c. cuius rei etiam a veteribus rationem habitā fuisse indicat certamen de M. Liuo præfecto arcis Tarentinæ, aliis sententiis suis notantibus præfectum, quòd eius socordia Tarētum proditum hosti esset, aliis præmia decernentibus, quòd per quinquennium arcē tutatus esset, maximeque vnus eius opera receptum Tarentum esset: mediis ad censores, non ad senatum notionem de eo pertinere dicētibus^d. Et L. Attilio præfecto præsidij Locrensis, cum videret deditiōem a ciuibus ad Pœnos factam impedire non posse, vitio datum nō fuit, quod secum militibus Romanis, qui cū eo erant, vt eos crudelitati hostiū eriperet, & reipubl. incolumes seruaret, Rhegium deuchi passus est^e. Itaque qui ne-

e 4 quodam

^a Reg. l. i. c.
6. tit. 28. p. 2.

^b I. sancimus.
C. de panis. c.
sine culpa de
reg. iur.

^c facit I. mi-
lites. l. vlt. D.
de cust. roor.

^d Liu. l. 27.

^e Liu. l. 24.

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quodam loco ait Liuius, superare possunt, omni humana ope destitutus, arcē hosti tradit, cum nullo supplicio dignū esse existimo. nam qui facit quod potuit, legem impleuit. & vasallus non tenetur: fidelitatem præstare domino, nisi quatenus facere potest^a. impossibile enim nulla est obligatio. Vnde eos qui necessitate coacti Schorā arcem a Turcis obsessam iisdem dediderant, Venetias reuerfos in nullam reprehensionem venisse refert Egnatius^b. intelligebat enim senatus, quanta vis esset necessitatis, cui nulla virtus potest resistere. hinc plerique existimant ciuitatem, quæ iusto præsidio caret, excusari a crimine læsæ maiestatis, si hosti dedatur^c: præsertim si non mittatur subsidium^d: & præfectum arcis non teneri arcem defendere^e, si rex ea quæ ad defensionem sunt necessaria, non suppeditet^e. Quò facit quod vasallus non tenetur domino seruitia præstare, nec eum recognoscere, quoties derelinquit vasallum in necessitate^f. & Carolus Molineus^g tradit, quod antiqui reges Galliæ, vrbibus, quas defendere non poterant, permittebant se hostibus dedere. Itaque existimo præfectum arcis fortè male munitæ,

a c. ult. de
feu. sin. cul.
non amit. &
ibi. Aluaro et
alij Gloss. &
Bald. in c. 1.
in prin. dist.
ut.

b de exemp.
illust. viro.
lib. 7. cap. 6.

c Matth. de
Afflic. ad cō-
stit. reg. quæ
incipit dubi-
tationem.

d Ioan. Imol.
concl. 34.

Decius con.
600. nu. 13.

Panor. conc. 3
nu. 5. lib. 1.

e Hieron.

Grat. conc. 5.
& concil. 51.

lib. 1.

f c. 1. qual.
dom. et propr.

& ibi Alua-
ro, & alij in

c. 1. §. Domi-
no cōtinente,

et ibi Bald. et
alij tit. si de

feu. sue. cōtr.
int. dom. &

agn.

g in addit. ad
cor. dec. 604.

5 nitæ*, omni ope humana & spe subsidij
 destitutum, quique vim hostium ferre
 non possit, pacto vel quocunque modo
 sibi, & præsidio posse consulere, & arcem
 relinquere, præsertim cum omnibus ne-
 quicquam tentatis, arcem æquè in pote-
 statem hostium venturam fuisse constet.
 non enim expectandum est id, cuiuse-
 uentus nihil operari potest². Quò facit
 quod debitor speciei etiam in mora cõ-
 stitutus, non tenetur de interitu rei, quæ
 æquè apud creditorem erat peritura^b.
 non tenebitur ergo arcis præfectus se
 præsidiumq; indubitatè morti obijcere,
 qua non tam rempub. seruat, quàm pro-
 dit. Vnde Callicratidas Lacedæmoniorũ
 dux meritò culpatus fuit, qui classis;
 quàm priuatæ gloriæ iacturã facere ma-
 luit: & Cleombrotus, qui inuidiam ti-
 mens, temerè cum Epaminonda cõllixit,
 & Lacedæmoniorũ opes euertit^c. magni
 enim viri, vt inquit Q. Curtius, magis
 est contemnere mortem, quàm odisse vi-
 tam. & ita quidem moriendum esse pro
 patria docet Cicero^d, si morte nostra pa-
 triæ profuturi sumus. Quacunque itaq;
 ratione omnino salutis reipubl. & patriæ
 consulendum erit, siue deditiõne, siue

a l. stipulatio.
 §. diues. D.
 de leg. nom.
 caus.

b l. si plures.
 D. de pos. l. il-
 li. D. de petit.
 hered. l. quod
 te, & ibi in-
 terpp. D. si
 cert. petat.

c Cicer. off.
 lib. 1.

d offic. lib. 1.

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morte, si opus sit. vir enim fortis nihil sua, omnia pro communi utilitate facere debet, ut alio loco ostendimus^a. His adde quod ex constitutionibus regni Hispaniæ, quæ alioqui satis severe sunt, is qui mandato regis arci male constructæ, & immunitæ, ita ut defendi non possit, præfectus fuerit, idque regi indicauerit, non incidit in crimen læsæ maiestatis, si hostis vi, & sine culpa præfecti arce potiatur^b. Potest quoque præfectus arcis ex hac causa, reddita ratione, cur defendi non possit, etiã non expectato hostium impetu, si forte rex non miserit successorem, arcem deferere, secundum normam iisdem constitutionibus præscriptam: si puta ipse præfectus noluerit suscipere defensionem arcis^c. Ceterum ut ut sit, non nisi magno iudicio ad arcis, vel oppidi custodiam quis accedere debet, & ita se gerere, ut si fortè quid aduersi contingat, & necessitate ad deditiorem compellatur: ut non tam videatur id metu mortis fecisse, quam ut se suosque reipubl. conseruaret, & ex arce mox omnino futura hostium, saltè præsidium reipubl. eriperet. & certè ut maximè viri fortis officio functus sit, tamen vix est, ut citra ignominie notam arcem

^a 7. de officiis
bellicis lib. 2.

^b Reg. lib. 4.
& 6. tit. 18.
par. 2.

^c Reg. l. 20.
tit. 18. par. 2.

6 arcem tradat*. nam si turpe apud veteres habitum fuit, militem vnum in potestatem hostium venire, vt superius ostendimus^a: quid de præfecto dicemus, qui præsidio impositus & iureiurando ad defensionem arcis se astrinxit. Nihilominus subeunda erit potius hæc ignominia, si ita reipub. expediat, quàm nequicquam defendendo, & se suosque dedêdo ad necem, patriam deserere, ac prodere: vt alio loco diximus^b. Sed & aliæ sunt partes præfecti, aliæ militis: hic fortiter pugnare, ille quod reipub. expedit curare debet. Porro non mediocris disceptationis fuit inter eos, qui de republ. scripserunt, boni ne an mali plus adferat reipub. arcis exstructio*. & quamuis pleriq; inutilem & periculosam esse arcem in optima rep. existiment, Roma tamê a Gallis capta præsidio Capitoliij recuperata fuit: & Ænna oppidum, de qua superius diximus, arcis & præsidij beneficio seruata fuit. Multas itaque puto posse existere causas, ex quibus utilis, imo necessaria sit arcis cōstructio: tam ad hostium impetum excipiendum, quàm ad ciues in pace conseruandos. Quod reliquū est, arcis præfectos monitos velim, ne facile

extra-

^a c. de iis qui in acie loco cedunt. f.

^b supra. de off. bel. lib. 2.

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extraneis*, præsertim fortibus viris, & 8 principibus, aditum in arcem præbeant, memores cōsiliij Pyrrhi Epirotarum regis : qui cū Athenas venisset, & in arcē Palladis deductus esset, natura & arte munitissimā, quā magna admiratione contemplatus erat, monuit principes ciuitatis, qui eum comitabantur, ne in posterum vlli regum potestatem facerent amplius arcem ingrediendi, ne opportunitatem præsidij nactus quispiam eam inuaderet : quod consilium gratum fuit Atheniensibus.

DE FVRTIS ET ALIIS QVIBVS-
DAM DELICTIS MILITARIBVS.

- 1 *Milites in furto deprehensi quomodo puniendi.*
- 2 *Tribuni quale iusiurandum exigere solēt.*
- 3 *Non licuit longius a tuba audire discedere.*
- 4 *Commilitonem gladio ferire capitale.*
- 5 *Dare se militem, cui nō licet graue crimē.*
- 6 *Qui se pro milite gerit punitur.*
- 7 *Qui se pro cine gerit punitur.*

CAPVT XIX.

NON aliā ob causam, vt est apud Platonem de rep. homo in lupum conuersus

uerfus fuisse a poetis fingitur, quàm quòd rapinis & furtis dediti, hominem & humanitatem prorsus exuisse videantur, sintq; iam non tam reipsa homines, quàm nomine. ideoque grauib; pœnis coërcendi sunt: & quamuis nulla pœna corporalis ob furtum, iure ciuili inter ciues statuta sit: solent tamē imperatores, ad firmandam disciplinam militarem, a militibus in furto deprehensis seueriores pœnas exigere*. Itaque Tiberius militem prætorianum, ob surreptum e viridario pavonem, capite puniuit ^a. Aufidius Cassius milites, qui prouincialibus vim aut damnum inferrent, in crucem sustulit: exstantque in hanc rem innumera veterum imperatorum exempla. Paulus verò I. C. militem in furto balneario deprehensum, ignominia mittendum respondit ^b. Solent autem tribuni, ^{b in l. ult. D. de furt. bal.} vbi castra metata essent*, ab omnibus liberis & seruis, qui in castris erant, iusiurandum exigere, se nihil e castris furto ablaturos; & si quis quid inuenisset, id ad tribunos allaturum^c. eiusque iurisiuradi formulam refert Gell^d. & vt a rapina cōtinerentur milites, non licuit longius a ^{c Polybius de Rom. castr. d lib. 16. c. 4} 3 tubæ auditu*, nisi imperatoris aut tribuni iussu,

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ni iussu, extra munimenta abire, neque

a *supra. de e-*
manforib.

agmē excedere: qua de re alibi diximus^a.

M. Cato in furto comprehensis inter cō-
militiones dextras debere præcidi cœsuit.

b *in l. 3. §.*
quis aliena. D.
de re milit.

Modestinus eum, qui arma aliena surri-
puit, gradu militiæ pellendum respōdit^b.

Et sedulò olim cauebatur, vt maximum
militum vinculum putarēt singulorum
amorem, velut inexplicabilem nexum:

vnde etiam commilitonem gladio ferire

* capitale fuit: qui autem lapide vulne- 4

c *l. unus. §.*
si quis. D. de
re milit.

rasset, militia reiiciebatur^c. Præterea mi-
les honoris sui prodigus, qui pecunia

transigit cum mœcho vxoris suæ, sacra-
mento soluitur, & deportatur^d.

d *l. miles D.*
ad l. l. de a-
riult.

Graue quoque crimen habetur, dare se militē^e 5

cui non licet: & augetur, vt in ceteris de-
lictis, dignitate, gradu, specie militiæ^e.

e *l. 2. D. de re*
milit.

Qui autem pro milite se gerit^f, cū mi- 6

f *l. eos in fine.*
D. ad l. Cor.
de falsis.

les non sit, punitur poena falsi^f. Quò spe-
ctat lex a Crasso & Scævola consl. lata:

g *Cicero off.*
lib. 3.

ne scilicet quis, qui ciuis^g non est, pro 7

h *Tranquil*
in Claud.

ciue se gerat g: isque peregrinitatis reus
dicebatur^h. Est autem poena falsi depor-

i *l. 1. D. ad l.*
Com. de fals.

tatio, cum publicatione bonorum i.

DE PRAEMIIS MILITVM.

- 1 *Respubl. optimè gubernatur pœna & pra-*
mio.

2 *Mili-*

- 2 *Milites præmiis excitandi.*
- 3 *Multa præmia militibus proposita.*
- 4 *Optima spolia quæ.*
- 5 *Triumphus quando decerni solitus.*
- 6 *Mos triumphandi quamdiu manserit apud Rom.*
- 7 *Romani ex prouinciis & oppidis subactis nomina sumebant.*
- 8 *Militaria dona varia fuere.*
- 9 *Militares corona quæ.*
- 10 *Proposito præmio primùm muros ascendenti, si plures simul conscendant.*
- 11 *Præmia parentibus mortuis debita conceduntur filiis.*

CAPVT XX.

1 **N**VLLA re melius remp. gubernari, quàm pœna & præmio*, multis philosophorum sententiis comprobatū est. ex quibus Solon, qui sapiens vnus ex septem, & legum scriptor solus fuit, remp. constare dixit. & Democritus duos omnino deos esse cēsuit, Pœnam & Beneficium. Lyfander rogatus, quam reip. formam maximè probaret: in qua, inquit, fortibus & ignauis suū tribuitur^a. Theophrastus interrogatus, quidnam vitam humanam maximè conseruaret, respondit, be-

^a Plut. in apoph,

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dit, beneficium & poena. Cicero neque domum, neque rempub. stare posse, si in ea nec rectè factis præmia exstent vlla, ^{a denat. dec. lib. 3.} nec supplicia peccatis asserit^a. Et nemo in reip. periculis cū laude ac virtute versatur, vt idem ait, quin spe posteritatis fructuque ducatur^b. Apud quos autem maxima virtutis præmia proponuntur, apud illos etiam optimos viros gubernare dixit Thucydides. vbi enim vberissima virtutis præmia proposita essent, ad ea optimo quosque in rempubl. animo contendere. & vt Plinius ad Traianum ^{c in Panegy.} scripsit^c: Præmia bonorū malorumque, bonos ac malos faciunt: omniumq; beneficiorum, quæ merentibus tribuuntur, non ad ipsos gaudium magis, quàm ad similes redundat. atque eò impendi laborem ac periculum dicit Liuius^d, vnde emolumētum atque honos speretur, nihilque non aggressuros homines, si magnis conatibus magna præmia proponantur, magnosque animos magnis honoribus fieri. Itaque Socrates ciuitatem optimā esse dixit, in qua plurima virtuti præmia essent proposita. Vnde Demosthenes^e: Studio, inquit, & magnæ curæ vobis esse debet, Athenienses, cū vt omnes

^e aduersus Lept.

omnes leges vestræ præclarissimæ sint, tum verò hæ imprimis, quæ ciuitatē aut magnam aut parvam efficere possunt. eæ verò quæ sunt hæ nimirum, quæ & bene meritis honorem habent, & improbos suppliciis coërcent. nam si omnes pœnarum metu, quæ legibus sancitæ sunt, maleficiis omnibus abstineāt, & omnes præmiis beneficiorum inuitati officium facere studeant: quid obstat, quo minus ciuitas florentissima efficiatur? Quare quemadmodum aspero castigationis genere militaris disciplina indiget: ita quo-
2 que præmiis ad virtutem* excitandi sunt milites. in quo a plerisque peccatur, eo quòd, vt Tacitus ait, procliui⁹ sit iniuriæ, quàm beneficio vicē exsoluere: quia gratia oneri, vltio in quæstu habetur: cū tamen ideo multæ pereant resp. vt ait Euripides in Hecuba, quòd qui bonus & strenuus est vir, nihil plus quàm ignauus fert præmij. Cyrus autē militari virtute præstantibus viris maximum honorem habuit, & multis eos præmiis affecit. Apud Romanos quoque plurima virtutis præmia * militibus proposita fuere,
3 quæ hic obiter recensebimus. Itaque imprimis ducibus, regibusque, quorum au-
f spicio

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spicio res gerebantur, quique fuisset
corporibus dimicantes, spolia hostium
ducibus detraxissent, quæ opima* voca- 4
bant, præmij causa tributum est, ut opi-
ma illa spolia Ioui Feretrio in capitolium
ferrent: quæ ter solum a Romanis duci-
bus, qui fortem strenuamque operam
reip. navarunt, delata fuisse comperimus.
Prima Romulus urbis auctor & parens,
de Acrone Cæninensium duce, post raptas
Sabinas detulisse fertur: quo tempore
a *Liv. lib. 1.* Iouis Feretrij templum dicavit^a. neque
magno post intervallo, Cornelius Cos-
sus, dux ea tempestate inclytus, secunda
detulit opima spolia de Larte Tolunio,
rege Veientium, quem acie vicit & con-
fecit^b. *b Liv. lib. 4.* tertia Claudius Marcellus manu
strenuus, & bonus imperator, de Virido-
maro Gallorum duce, apud Padum victo,
c *Val. Max. lib. 3. cap. 2.* opima spolia deportavit^c. Fuerunt præ-
terea summis ducibus ob rem bello bene
gestam triumphi decreti*: quæ maxima 5
merces victoriæ fuit. sed non ex quibus-
cunque victoriis triumphare licitum fuit:
sed cum bellorum & victoriarum causæ
eo munere dignæ viderentur. fuit enim
lege cautum, ne quis triumpharet, nisi
qui quinque millia hostium una acie cæ-
cidisset.

cidisset, & magnas copias iusta acie fudisset. poena imperatoribus inflicta, qui aut hostium occisorum in prælio, aut amissorum ciuium falsum numerum senatui referrent. nam nec eum qui magnis acceptis cladibus, & nimium cruēta victoria esset potitus, tanquam lugubri & parui compendij, quod multis funeribus, non multis commodis remp. affecisset, triumphare passi sunt. Fuit quoque lege cautum, vt non nisi pro aucto imperio, non pro recuperatis his quę bello amissa erant, triumphus cuiquam decerneretur: & quidē ita demum, si suo ductu & auspicio, & in sua, non in aliena provincia, eaquę pacata, & nullo manente bello hostes profligasset & vicisset. Præterea si contra piratas, seruos, aut fugitiuos, vel aliud genus hominū Romano nomine indignum bellatum foret, tanquam belli causa erubescenda, quamuis parta victoria, aut hostibus fuis, euerfisquę, nemini triumphare licuit. Fuit quoque animaduersum, tametsi fuis fugatisquę hostibus res triumpho dignas imperatores gessissent, si tamen neque consul, neque prætor exercitui præfuisset: & nisi legitimum haberet magistratum, cu-

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ius ductu & imperio victi essent, & profligati hostes, triūphare nemini fas fuit. Sed & ex duobus imperatoribus in magistratu positis, illi qui supremo gradu erat, soli triumphare permissum fuit: ne scilicet in honore triumphi minor potestas maiori equaretur: neue auspicia, quę maioris magistratus erant, cum minoribus confunderentur. ideoque consul cū dictatore aut prætore non triumphabat. ex his autem causis, ex quibus Romani duces triumphare non potuerunt, minoribus triūphis & ouatione honestati sunt. Porro quantumuis quis præclaras res maximeque vtilis reipubl. civili bello gessisset, imperator tamē eo nomine appellatus non est, neque ullę supplicationes decretę sunt, neque aut ouans, aut triumphans urbem intrauit: quia ut necessariae istę; ita lugubres semper existimatę victorię sunt: utpote non externo, sed domestico partē cruore. Constat quoque ciuem Romanum, quamuis reipubl. perniciosum & infestum, bello victum in triūpho duci nō potuisse. Mansit autē mos Romę de domitis nationibus bello victis triumphandi*, ad Probū 6 vsque imperatorem, qui vltimus Cęsarum triumph-

triumphasse dicitur. Plura de iure triū-
 phandi, & quo apparatu & pōpa Roma-
 ni triumphos agerent: videre licet apud
 Val. Max^a. & Alexand. ab Alex^b. Solent
 quoq; Romani duces honoris causa, ex
 oppidis & prouinciis vi subactis cogno-
 7 menta delumere*, vt tres Metelli: vnus
 ex deuicta Numidia, Numidici: alter ex
 Macedonia, Macedonici: tertius ex Cre-
 ta, Cretici cognomenta sumpserunt. Fuit
 quoque Metellus Balearicus, ex deuictis
 Balearibus denominatus: Marius Co-
 riolanus, ex Coriolis oppido Volscorū:
 duo Scipiones Africani, maior & minor,
 ex Africa: & Scipio quoque Asiaticus, ex
 Asia cognomina tulere. similiter & alij
 quamplurimi, quorum exempla secuti
 postea Cæsares, ex bello domitis genti-
 bus nationibusque illustra cognomēta
 ad immortalem gloriā tulere. Sæpe po-
 puli decreto, nonnunquā acclamatione
 senatus. vnde Arabici, Adiabenici, Par-
 thici, Armenici, Germanici, Sarmatici,
 Africi diuersis titulis cognomina cepe-
 re. Porro militaria dona, quæ priscis tē-
 8 poribus militibus fortem in bello operā
 nauantibus, a ducibus dabātur, fuere va-
 ria*: & quidē precia militiæ inter alia hæc
 f 3 habita

a lib. 2. cap. 8

b genial. dier.

lib. 1. cap. 22.

c lib. 6. c. 6.

¶ 17.

c Alexand.

ab Alexand.

genial. dier.

lib. 2. cap. 11.

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habita sunt maxima : vt post exhaustos labores, milites emeritis stipendiis, sanguine & sudore partis agris donarentur. hos enim lætissimos fructus, velut optimam prædam laborum periculorumque accipiebant^a. Præter hæc, vt ad decora militiæ magis accenderent animos, quoque honoratior testatiorque eorum virtus foret, præmio proposito militares coronas, ampliissimaque alia honoris munera inuenere : vtpote aureos torques, duplicem annonam, interdum militiæ vacationem, nonnunquam duplex stipendium ob virtutis præmium imperatores largiti sunt : fuereque illi, quorū opera in bello insignis exstitisset, perditæque & afflictæ res restitutæ essent, pluries donis muneribusque affecti. Itaque legimus L. Sicinium Dentatum, virum clarum ingenio factisque, ob egregia facinora militaria, præter octo aureas coronas, ciuicas quatuordecim, murales tres, obsidionalē vnā, torquibus clxxxiiij. armillis clx. hastis puris duodeuiginti, phaleris viginti quinq; donatum fuisse^b. huic proximus fuit Mālius Capitolinus, qui spolia hostiū cæsorū ad xxx. retulit, & dona imperatorum ad xl. accepit : in quibus

^a patet ex l. item si verberatum. §. itē ff. D. de res vendic ex l. in agris D. de acq. rer. dom.

^b Vol. Max. lib. 3. cap. 2.

quibus duas insignes murales coronas,
ciuicas octo^a. Nemo autem, qui præclarū ^a *Liv. l. 6.*

facinus gesserat, prout cuiusq; meritum
virtusq; fuisset, militaribus donis indo-

9 natus abiit. Militares verò coronæ* fue-
runt multifariæ: triūphales, ouales, obsi-
dionales, ciuicæ, murales, nauales, castré-
ses, quibus donabātur imperatores, & a-
lij, qui vrbes, castra, aut exercitus obsi-
dione liberassent, ciuemque seruassent,
primūmue muros hostium ascendisset ^b.

^b *Cell. nott.
Ant. lib. 3. c. 6*

10 Porro proposito præmio*, primū muros
hostium ascēdenti, si duo vel plures vna
conscēdant eodē momēto, an præmium
omnibus debeat, quæri solet; an verò
nemini. & videtur nemini deberi^c: quòd
inuicē sibi obstat, & alter alteri sit impe-
dimēto^d, & inter partes nulla possit esse
victoria^e. idq; verū est, si constet impera-
torem vni tantū dari voluisse^f: utpote si

^c *l. si fuerit.
D. de rebus
dubis.*

^d *l. inuicem.
D. de here. im-
stit.*

^e *l. si rem. D.
de duob. reis.
f argumento
d. l. inuicem.*

pro præmio assignet talē equū: nec enim
huiusmodi species multiplicationē reci-
pit. alioqui verò omnibus præmium de-
beri existimo. Nam, ut Africanus respō-
dit, primus nō solū is dicitur, qui ante
aliquē est; sed etiā is, ante quē nemo est.
& Paulus^h: Proximus est, inquit, quem
nemo antecedit. Idē dicendū erit, etiam si

^g *in l. ex duob.
bus. D. de
vul. & pupil.
h in l. proxi-
mus. D. de
verb. signif.*

dubium

DE IVRE ET OFF. BELL.

^a *argumento* ^{l. qui duos.} ^{b. si fuerit. §.} ^{vlt. D. de reb.} ^{dub.} ^c *idq;* ^d *etiam* ^e *Scipio* ^f *secutus est.* ^g *nam cum* ^h *capta* ⁱ *Carthagine noua,* ^j *inter Q. Tyberiliū cē-* ^k *turionem legionis quartæ,* ^l *& Sex. Digi-* ^m *tium sociū naualē,* ⁿ *magna contētio,* ^o *quæ* ^p *prope seditionem esset,* ^q *oriretur,* ^r *& quili-* ^s *bet profiteretur se primū murum ascē-* ^t *disse: ideoq;* ^u *muralis coronæ decus ad se* ^v *pertinere: Scipio cōcione aduocata pro-* ^w *nūciauit, se satis compertum habere, Q.* ^x *Tyberiliū & Sex. Digiitiū pariter in mu-* ^y *rum ascendisse, seque eos ambos virtutis* ^z *causa coronis muralibus donare^b.* ^{aa} *Aug-* ^{bb} *ustus autem facilius phaleras, torques,* ^{cc} *& quicquid auro constaret, quàm mura-* ^{dd} *les, castrēses, aut ciuicas coronas munera* ^{ee} *dedit. Ceterum constitutiones quoque* ^{ff} *Hispaniæ multa præmia iis, qui fortem in* ^{gg} *bello operam nauarunt, tribuit^c: quæ &* ^{hh} *filiis dona parētibus mortuis debita^c cō-* ⁱⁱ *cedit^d. quod Pisistratus olim cauisse fer-* ^{jj} *tur. Lege verò Solonis apud Atheniēses* ^{kk} *cautum fuit, vt præter ea dona, quæ mili-* ^{ll} *tibus duces impartiti fuerant, filij qui in* ^{mm} *bello occubuissent, publicè alerentur, &* ⁿⁿ *bonis disciplinis instruerentur. & Con-* ^{oo} *stātinus filios in paternam militiam vo-* ^{pp} *cari voluit.^e*

F I N I S.

NOTE AS TO ERRATA IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT.

[Extracted from Translator's Note in second volume of this work.]

CORRECTIONS OF THE TEXT.


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
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
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THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

EDITED BY

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

*Member of the Institute of International Law
Secretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari Libri III

BY BALTHAZAR AYALA

Jurisconsult and Judge Advocate General of the Royal Army in the Low Countries

EDITED BY JOHN WESTLAKE, LL. D., D. C. L., K. C.

*Late Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge
Honorary President of the Institute of International Law*

- VOL. I. Reproduction of the First Edition, with Introduction
by John Westlake.
- VOL. II. Translation of the Text, by John Pawley Bate, with
Translator's Note and Index of Citations.

THE LORD BALTIMORE PRESS
BALTIMORE

BALTHAZA-
RIS AYALÆ, I. C. ET
EXERCITVS REGII APVD
BELGAS SVPREMI IVRIDICI,
DE IVRE ET OFFICIIS BEL-
LICIS ET DISCIPLINA MILITARI,
LIBRI III.

*Non in multitudine exercitus victoria belli;
sed de calo fortitudo est. 1. Mach. 3.*



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Three Books

On the Law of War And on the Duties Connected with War And on Military Discipline

BY

BALTHAZAR AYALA

Jurisconsult and Judge Advocate General of the Royal Army in the Low Countries

“For the victory of battle standeth not in
the multitude of an host; but strength
cometh from heaven.” I. Mach. 3


Douay, from the business-house of John Bogardus, licensed printer,
at the Sign of the Golden Books, in the year 1582

VOLUME TWO

THE TRANSLATION

BY JOHN PAWLEY BATE, LL. D.

Reader of Roman and International Law in the Inns of Court, London



WASHINGTON, D. C.

PUBLISHED BY THE CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON

1912

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The text here reproduced was photographed from a copy of the original edition of 1582, belonging to the library at All Souls College, Oxford, and loaned to the University Press for the purpose of photographing.

The portrait of Ayala given in this volume has been reproduced by photography from one found in a volume of portraits of Belgian authors, published at Antwerp in 1608, with the title *Illustrium Galliae Belgicae Scriptorum Icones et Elogia: ex Musaeo Auberti Mirae Canonici Antwerp.*

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MODE OF CITATION OF BIBLE, AND OF THE BOOKS OF THE CIVIL, CANON, FEUDAL, AND IMPERIAL LAWS.

(1) The names of books in the Bible are given as in the English "Authorised Version": thus, where Ayala cites 1 or 3 Kings (*Regum*), the translation cites 1 Sam. and 1 Kings respectively.

Translator's Note.

(2) Passages in the law-books of Justinian, or the Canon Law, or the Feudal or Imperial Law, are cited (wherever possible) by *number* of Book, Title and Section, and not (as in Ayala) by the name or opening words thereof: the former method is not only the method employed in the United States and Great Britain, but is also shorter than the latter method.*

The references which Ayala makes to the *Authenticæ* are of two kinds. In the one case they are to passages in the *Novels*: these are given in the margin of the translation by the number of the *Novel*. In the other case the reference is to one of those summaries of an Imperial Constitution, or *Novel*, which used to be appended, in manuscript and early printed editions, to the part of the Code affected by the *Novel* in question, but which are omitted, as being unofficial, in modern editions. In the margin of the translation the reference to the Code is given, for use with one of the earlier editions mentioned, and the number of the passage in the *Novel* which is summarised is added, for use with a more modern edition. [In note *a*, p. 31*a*, vol. 1, is an instance of each of these kinds of reference.]

(3) More particularly, as to the citations from the Canon and the later Imperial Law:

A reference made by *Distinctio* and *Caput* (thus, c. 8, Dist. 35) is to the first part of the *Decretum*: references to the second part of the *Decretum* give, first, the *Caput* (c.), then the *Causa* (C.) and lastly the *quæstio* (thus, c. 29, C. 17, qu. 4): the third part of the *Decretum* is indicated by the words *De Consecratione* (thus, the only reference to this part—see p. 131—is as follows, c. 26, Dist. 5, *de consecr.*).

The *Decretals* of Pope Gregory IX are indicated by the letter X (for *Extra Decretum*): thus, c. 7, X. 5. 27 means caput 7 in Bk. 5, Tit. 27 of the *Decretals* of Pope Gregory IX. In order to distinguish the references to the *Liber Sextus* of the *Decretals*, “in vi” (that is, *in sexto*) is used: thus, c. 1, Bk. 5, Tit. 1 in vi means caput 1 of Bk. 5, Tit. 1 in “*Liber Sextus*.” References to that subdivision of the second part of the Canon Law which is called *Liber Clementinarum* are given in the following form: c. 2, in Clem. ii. 11. This stands for caput 2 of Book ii, Tit. 11, in *Clementinis*.

Ayala uses the abbreviation \overline{x} in three distinct senses, first, to indicate any part of the Canon Law outside the *Decretum*, i. e., *extra Decretum* (see p. 61, vol. 1, note *e*, where the reference is to the *Decretals*)—these cases are among those dealt with in the preceding paragraph; sec-

* The following illustrations (from vol. ii, p. 12) will show how subdivisions of a Title are cited. “Dig. 49, 15, 19, 2” means Digest, Bk. 49, Tit. 15, Lex 19, section 2. “Dig. 39, 5:2 (7) and 3” means Digest, Bk. 39, Tit. 5, Lex 2, section 7, and Lex 3. Citations in the same note from different Books of the Digest are separated by a semi-colon. “pr.”—see *e. g.* p. 22—stands for *principium* and indicates the opening section of a Lex.

The references to the *Institutes*, *Digest*, and *Code* are given as in Mommsen's edition; he references to the *Novels* as in the edition of Schoell and Kroll.

In the case of the Feudal Law the references are to the edition of Gothofredus.

Translator's Note.

ond, to indicate Papal Extravagantes (see p. 18a, note *c*, where the reference is to the Extravagantes communes); and third, to indicate Imperial Extravagantes (see p. 8, note *g*, where the reference is to a constitution of the Emperor Hen. VII). In the latter two of these cases, that is, where the reference is to the Extravagantes, Papal or Imperial, the abbreviation Extrav. is used in the margin of the translation.

CLASSIFIED LIST OF AUTHORITIES CITED.

In addition to the works just named Ayala cites the poets Ovid, Vergil, Horace, Propertius, Lucan and Ennius.

Also the following historians, philosophers or grammarians: Aristotle, Plato, Æschines, Euripides, Demosthenes, Cæsar, Livy, Cato, Cicero, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cinna, Sallust, Tacitus, Xenophon, Plutarch, Suetonius, Cornificius, Appian, Valerius Maximus, Florus, Quintilian, Quintus Curtius, Aulus Gellius, Pliny the elder, Pliny the younger, Ælius Lampridius, Polybius, Dio Cassius, Diodorus Siculus and Nonius Marcellus.

Also, Christian Fathers and later historians: St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, Lactantius, Sozomen, Cassiodorus, Orosius, Eusebius and Procopius.

Of writers nearer his own time Ayala cites: Thomas Aquinas, Ferrandus Diaconus, Nicephorus, Froissart, Alexander ab Alexandro, Ant. de Herrera y Tordesillas, Petr. Crinitus, Ludov. Coelius Rhodiginus, Alfonso of Castile, Hotman, Bernard de Girard, Bodin, Egnatius (Egnazio), Hieron. Gratianus (Grazio) and Petrinus Bellus. Also from books on Numismatics by Covarruvias and Hadr. Jun. Hornanus. And from the Royal Ordinances of Spain and from Decisions of Church Councils. And also the jurists or canonists in the following list *:

Abbas, see Panormitanus.
Accurtius, 13th Cent., of Florence.
de Adflictis, Matth., 15th-16th Cent.,
Naples
Albertus Brixensis (of Brescia), 14th
Cent.
Alciatus, 16th Cent., Milan.
Alexander, see Tartagnus.
Alvarus: Pelagius, 14th Cent., Span.
de Anania, Joh., 15th Cent., Bologna.
de Ancharano, Petr., 14th-15th Cent.,
Bologna.
Andreae, Joh., 14th Cent., Florence.
Angelus, or Aretinus (of Arezzo),
15th Cent.
Baldus de Ubaldis, Perusia, 14th Cent.

Bartolus of Sasso Ferrato, 14th Cent.
de Bellapertica or Belleperche, Petr.,
13th-14th Cent., Burgundy.
Bellovensis (of Beauvais), Vincent,
13th Cent. (cited as Vinc.).
Boerius (Boyer), 16th Cent., France.
† Bonaud de Sauzet, Jac., 15th-16th
Cent., France.
Brixensis, see Albertus.
Budæus (Budé), Gul., 15th-16th Cent.,
France.
de Butrio, Ant., 14th Cent., Bologna.
Cagnolus, Hieron., 16th Cent., Padua.
‡ de Canibus, Joh. Jac., 15th Cent.,
Padua.

* In several of these cases Ayala does not directly cite the writer, but merely names him, on the authority of some other named writer, as holding the opinion in question.

† "Borrandus" in margin p. 100a is a misprint: Bonaud is meant.

‡ "Camb." in margin p. 31a is a misprint for Canib.

Translator's Note.

- Cantiuncula, Claude, 16th Cent., Alsace.
 Card. is abbreviation for Cardinal a Turre Cremata (i. e., Torquemada), 15th Cent., Span.
 de Castro, Paulus, 15th Cent., Naples.
 Chassaneo, Bartol., 16th Cent., France, cited as Chas. (?) and as Cas.
 Cinus, or Cynus, 14th Cent., Pistoia.
 Clarus, Julius, 16th Cent., Milan.
 Connanus,* Francisc., 16th Cent., France.
 Corasius (de Coras), 16th Cent., Toulouse.
 Corneus, Pet. Phil., 15th Cent., Perugia.
 Corsetti (or Corsecti), Ant., 15th-16th Cent., Sicily, etc.
 de Covarruvias, 16th Cent., Span.
 de Crema, Francisc., 15th Cent.
 de Cuneo, or de Cugno, Gul., 16th Cent.
 Curtius or Corte (Senior †), 15th Cent., Pavia.
 Curtius or Corte (Junior †), Francisc., 15th-16th Cent., Pavia.
 Curtius or Corte, Rochus, 15th-16th Cent., Pavia.
 Decius, Philip, 15th-16th Cent., Pavia.
 Domin., see de Soto.
 Duarenus (François le Douaren), 16th Cent., France.
 Durandus, Gul., 13th Cent., France: cited by nickname of Speculator.
 Faber, Joannes, 16th Cent., Mechlin.
 Felinus, or Sandei of Felino near Reggio, 15th Cent.
 Fortunatus, Marcel, 16th Cent., Ital. Franc., see Victoria.
 Fulgosius (Fregoso), 15th Cent., Piacenza.
 de Imola, Joh., 15th Cent., Bologna.
 Jason, Mainus., 15th Cent., Ital.
 Laudensis (of Lodi), Mart., 14th Cent., Ital.
 Molinæus (Dumoulin), Chas., 16th Cent., Paris.
 Mynsinger a Frundeck, Joach., 16th Cent., Stuttgart.
 Natta, of Asti, 15th Cent., Ital.
 Oldradus de Ponte, 14th Cent., Ital.
 Omphalius, Jacob, 16th Cent., Cologne.
 Panormitanus (of Palermo), Nich. de Tedeschis, 16th Cent. Also cited as Abbas.
 Papae, or de la Pape, Guido, 15th Cent., France.
 Paponius, Joh. (or Papon), 16th Cent., France.
 Præpositi (or Desparborde), Gul., 14th Cent., Span.
 Pyrrhus Englebermæus, 16th Cent., Orleans.
 de Rauen (Ravanus), 13th Cent., Lorraine.
 Ripa, Joh. Francesc., 16th Cent., Pavia.
 Romanus, Ludovic., 15th Cent., Ital.
 de Rosate (of Roxiati, near Bergamo), Albericus, 14th Cent.
 Salicetus, either Rich., 14th Cent., or Bartol., 14th-15th Cent., both of Bologna.
 de Silvestris, Vergilius, 16th Cent., Ital.
 Socinus, Bartol., 15th Cent., Siena, son of the elder Marian. Soc.
 Socinus, Laelius Francisc. Maria, 16th Cent., Siena, nephew of preceding.
 de Soto, Dominicus, 16th Cent., Spain: sometimes cited as Domin.
 Speculator, see Durandus.
 Tartagnus (de Tartagnis), Alexander, 15th Cent., Ital.
 Tiraquellus (Tiraqueau), 16th Cent., France.
 de Valle (or a Val.), Roland, 16th Cent., Ital.
 Vasquius (Vasquez), Fernandus, 16th Cent., Span.
 Verrutius, Hieron., 16th Cent., Groningen.
 de Victoria, Francisc., 16th Cent., Span. Vinc., see Bellovensis.
 Zasius, 16th Cent., Freiburg in Breisgau.
 Zoannettus, Francisc., 16th Cent., Bologna.

* Cited in original, p. 75a, as Conan.

† Curt. Inn. is sometimes misprinted for Curt. jun. and Curt. Sent. for Curt. sen.

To the most serene Prince of Parma and Piacenza,

Alexander Farnese,

*Lieutenant-Governor and most successful Captain-general
for the King in the Low Countries,*

Balthazar Ayala, jurisconsult, greeting:

Publicists maintain, Most Serene Prince, that the habit of referring our actions and laws and legislation to the standards of our forefathers and of their institutions conduces very materially to the welfare and preservation of the State; for it is with the State as it is with some celebrated picture which is fading with age, if we omit to renew its original coloring it will keep neither beauty nor outline; and just as in the human body so, too, in the State, every day there is something developed which calls for treatment; and outworn laws breed vices such as the State can not tolerate for any length of time. Hence Ennius' line:

Moribus antiquis res stat Romana, virisque.

(On old custom the fortunes of Rome are based and on her manhood.)

a line which in its terseness and truth Cicero thought worthy of the oracle. For (says he) had not the State been stayed as it was by customary rules, its men would not have availed to found or perpetuate so vast and beneficent an empire, nor would these customary rules have sufficed had not men of such a type been at the head of the State.

In his book on
The Republic.

Ancestral observance of custom, then, begat fine men and they in their turn were tenacious of the customs and customary institutions which had descended to them from their fathers. This is the reason why the Roman State grew and endured. For (as Sallust says) empire is easily preserved by the same means by which it was at the outset gained, but, if sloth usurp the place of industry, if lust and pride usurp the place of self-restraint and fair-dealing, then a change of fortune at once accompanies this change of character.

It was this that Apollo is taken to have meant by his reply on the occasion of his being asked to say when, at last, the end would come of the ills and dissensions by which Greece was so sorely troubled. The oracle's reply was that the troubles of Greece would end when the Greeks had doubled the god's altar at Delos. Now this altar was cubical in form; so the Greeks thought they could easily fulfil the condition, by adding a second mass equal in bulk to the existing one. They did not, however, obtain thereby any diminution of their ills and the same god gave them to understand that the condition imposed by the oracle had not been duly satisfied.

At last, under the teaching of Plato and other philosophers, they came to understand that what the oracle of Apollo had required was not the matching of a new bulk with an old one, but the adoption of such new measures and principles as were conformable to the old ones (*analogiam cum analogia et rationem cum ratione componendam*); and thus when, owing to the far-seeing counsel of men of wisdom, matters had been adjusted to the standards of olden times and harmonized with the institutions of their forebears, and everything was put back into its proper place, the evil began to abate and the well-being of days of yore began to return.

Odes, bk. 3, ode 6.

The same sentiment inspired Horace, when he perceived what disasters the neglect of religious observance had brought in its train, to address to the Romans the lines,

Delicta maiorum immeritus lues,
Romane, donec templa refeceris,
Aedeisque labenteis deorum et
Fœda nigro simulacra fumo.

(O Roman, you, though guiltless, will expiate the offenses of your forefathers, until you have repaired the temples and falling shrines of the gods and the statues sullied with blackening smoke.)

In these lines Horace shows how far the Romans had fallen below their ancestors through violating religious duty and neglecting the ancient rule. And we have a notable instance of this in Roman history, clearly set out by Livy, where he tells us how corruption of Roman morals, neglect of divine worship, and violation of the law of nations were followed by the capture and

almost total destruction of the city by the Gauls. The valor of Camillus, however, restored to the city its liberty, and this was followed by the restoration of divine worship, by the revival of ancestral laws and institutions, and by the punishment of those who had violated the law of nations; the result was that the city thrived wondrously, gaining in time the empire of the whole earth, and there was truth in the epigram that the city of Rome would long ago have been on the edge of ruin if it had not been ruined; at any rate it would never have reached such an eminence.

It is our hope, Most Serene Prince, that in similar fashion your surpassing valor and wonderful skill and foresight in affairs may lead to the restoration of the worship of the true God and to the reestablishment of the sovereign authority of the king (due to him both by divine and human law), and that so the subversion of all things human and divine which has been brought into the Low Countries may by God's aid be checked and at last ended, and that the whole of the Low Countries may be restored to their former happy state. Of which country may be said what our sacred books say of the Israelites:

Judith, ch. 5.

"Whatsoever place they went up against, their God fought for them, without their bow and arrow and without their shield and sword, and he conquered: nor was there any to mock at that people save when they forsook the worship of the Lord their God. But as often as they worshipped any other god than Him, they were given for a spoil and to the sword and to reproach."

Further, the expediency of frequently revising the laws and enactments of ordinary civil society and of shaping them to the model of old institutions is admitted; and this led the early Romans to appoint censors whose duty was to scrutinize the morals of the citizens (liable, as they are, so easily to become corrupt if neglected) and in that way to preserve the old-time seemliness and uprightness of behavior. But in war, assuredly, this process is especially fitting, seeing that military discipline requires a rough and sharp kind of punishment. For, as Valerius Maximus observes, armed forces are the repository of strength and if these be once put on the wrong path, they will crush unless they are

crushed. So much, indeed, depends on military discipline that merely according as it is maintained or neglected, so have decisive defeats been inflicted or sustained, many armies been overwhelmed or preserved, vast empires (in a word) been gained or ruined, as we shall show at greater length in the course of this book.

Now the Romans (who claimed Mars as ancestor both for themselves and for their founder) reached the height of their military glory entirely by dint of military discipline—which Valerius Maximus calls the especial adornment and buttress of the Roman Empire; but when this discipline slackened they were gradually involved in more and more disasters until the day came when they had lost, together with the valor of their ancestors, both empire and glory. Accordingly I have thought it a work worth doing, so far as my legal studies and historical reading enabled me, to describe how so great military glory was earned, as regards the men and methods employed and the kind of discipline resorted to. The result will show that men's qualities are the same now as formerly and that the chances and occurrences which befall us from day to day are the same as befell men formerly; so that it will not be difficult for one who ponders with diligence on things of old and examines them with judicial deliberation to employ the past—appropriate task for a wise man—in judging the present, in foretelling the future, and in educing from old examples remedies fit (because of the similarity of the circumstances) for modern ills.

These are matters the neglect of which more often than not may cause us to stumble over the same stone. For (as Aristides used to say) big things are achieved in war not so much by arms as by prudence and planning. Accordingly, Xerxes, whose forces earth and sea could scarce contain, was beaten by the assiduity of a single individual, Themistocles. The Romans, too, did not possess greater or stronger forces than did the vast kingdoms and savage barbarians encountered by them, but the sternness of their moral usages and their military system gave them the upper hand. It was for this reason that Agamemnon did not desire to have ten men like Ajax, but like Nestor and Ulysses,

never doubting that their counsel and prudence would bring about the speedy overthrow of Troy. And Sallust tells us how there was a long-standing controversy as to whether bodily strength or mental qualities contributed the more to military success, but later, in times of danger and difficulty, it was realized that powers of mind were the most effective in war. In Cicero, Acad. quest., bk. 2. indeed, we read that when Lucullus started from Rome for the Mithridatic war he was admittedly ignorant of military matters, but by reading about campaigns, and by his industry and native wit, he became so proficient a commander, in every species of warfare, that Mithridates, the greatest king after Alexander, declared that in his judgment Lucullus was to be ranked above all the generals whom he had read about.

It was, therefore, a sage reply that Alfonso, King of Aragon, made to the question whether he owed more to arms or to books: he said that he had learned from books both arms and the laws of arms, thus proclaiming to the world that he owed everything to learning. And the remark of the Emperor Justinian tends in the same direction, namely, that on the one hand military affairs have been carried through in safety by means of law and that on the other hand law has been preserved under the protection of arms, each always requiring the help of the other. In short, it is incontrovertible that no State, however flourishing, can find any degree of safety in arms without law and discipline any more than in law without arms. Constit. confirming the Code, Sec. 1.

And so, Most Serene Prince, I feel assured that this work of mine, such as it is, will not be displeasing to your Highness. The offering is, of a truth, a poor one and unworthy of your splendor, but (unless I err) it is opportune to the present crisis; and I would that, in appraising my work, my perhaps overexacting and severe critics may bear in mind what Quintus Fabius Maximus said to his son, Quintus Fabius Maximus the consul, namely, that the same standard ought not to be applied in the midst of the heat of war as in the tranquillity of peace, for much that in quiet times is visited with correction and punishment is pardonable in times of mobs and the sword.

Most Serene Prince, I have dedicated to your Highness whatever study and toil there is here, both because I desired, in

my own interests, that your Highness should have the means of knowing how and with what studies I have occupied the leisure left me by my public duties, and also because I thought that no one would be more interested in these military topics than a general so great and an enthusiast for military discipline so keen as yourself.

May God, most good and most mighty, guide your movements and preserve you to us to the most distant day.

From the camp before Tournai, 31 Oct. 1581.

A PREFACE CONCERNING THE LAW OF WAR.

It is commonly thought a fine saying of Pindar that war is a tyrant and a mistress, lording it over all law, there being nothing so opposed to God's gift of law as force, which is a characteristic of the beasts. Just as the eagle is endowed with sharpness of talon and the lion with savagery of tooth, so man with reason (which jurists correctly style the soul of law) ; and this should be his only weapon and defense. Now, although a State can not be carried on without justice and although nothing is so subversive of the State as injustice (as was decisively shown by Lælius in the dialogue which Cicero, in his *Republic*, represents him as holding with Philo), yet it is to-day a fixed idea with many that war can not be waged without violation of right, for the ills that inevitably spring from wars, even from those that are classed as just, are so many and great and fearful and cruel that any one who would propose to apply to all of them the test of justice is simply blending reason with raving. For, it was on the propositions that in war there is no scope at all for justice and that that is right in war which is expedient to the stronger (might supplanting right), that men of old used especially to rely in order to prove that it was unjust and contrary to nature for men to be enslaved by their conquerors, this being an institution derived from the law of war—while they admitted, however, that this was a kind of injustice which every far-spreading empire must adopt as essential to the administration of its provinces.

The opinion in question must, however, be unhesitatingly repudiated. There are laws of war just as much as of peace. The use of force against those who will not submit to fair demands or will not be restrained by reason is not an injustice. For (as St. Augustine says) the wickedness of the enemy convinces the wise man that the prosecution of "just" wars is not only right but also a necessity. Accordingly, David, a man after God's own heart, and other very holy men have made war; and God himself or-
On the Kingdom of God, bk. 19, ch. 7.
c. 3, C. 23, qu. 1.
dered the Jews to make war on the Amorites and other peoples.

A wise man, therefore, will grieve to have to admit that the
Deut. 2.
necessity for a just war has arisen, but he will embark on it, plac-

ing the common weal before the interests of individuals lest, unmindful of the well-known dictum of Plato, he should abandon the body of the State as a whole through his wish to protect some given part thereof. Nor is it without more to be assumed unjust that the conquered in a just war should formerly have been taken into slavery. Nay, the justice of this can be defended on the ground of the expediency to the State of punishing those who wage unjust war; and it may also be urged that slavery is a blessing to such wrong-doers, for the opportunity of further wrongdoing is taken away from them and they will behave better under restraint than as their own masters. Agesilaus was wont to characterize the Asiatics as follows: "Good in slavery, bad in freedom."

Plutarch's
Apophthegms.

Kingdom of God,
bk. 19, ch. 7.

Numb. 31.

Ephes., ch. 6.

And as a support to this reasoning, Lælius, in the course of the argument in Cicero's *Republic*, furnished the following noble analogy, taken as it were from nature: "Why, then, does God govern man, the soul govern the body, reason govern the passions and the other vicious parts of the soul?" St. Augustine was particularly struck with this. Moses, too, in obedience to the command of God, after the defeat of the Midianites, divided all the spoil, both man and beast, among his own men. And the Apostle admonishes slaves to be obedient to their masters and to serve them in singleness of heart. Right reason, therefore, implanted by nature in wise men, has inculcated this, that human depravity may be restrained by war, by captivity, and by slavery—on which topic we shall enlarge elsewhere.

✓ Further, the same principle of justice which lays down rules of war, imposes its laws on soldiers and armies, whereby military discipline is secured: * "If this be once impaired" [I borrow the words of the dictator Papirius as recorded by Livy] "neither the soldier would obey the centurion's commandment nor the centurion the tribune's, nor the tribune the legate's, nor the legate the consul's, nor the master of the horse the dictator's, while no edicts of the commander would be observed; but without leave the soldiers would wander and rogue, either in their own or on enemy's land, unmindful of their oath, and discharge themselves from soldiery through a licentious liberty of their own, whenso-

* Here and in other speeches taken from Livy, the translation by Philemon Holland (London A. D. 1600) has been followed, with some modifications. [Tr.]

ever they listed, leaving their ensigns and colors not attended, not meeting at summons; nor making any difference whether they skirmish by day or night, on even ground or uneven, with vantage or disadvantage, with direction of captain or without; observing no signals or watchword, no array. In sum, the whole course of military service would henceforth be blind, rash, and inconsiderate, after the guise of robbing, to stand and go current for solemn and sacred warfare."

For just as in string-music and in part-singing different sounds and unlike notes are blended into an accordant harmony, so it may be said of an army (as Scipio in the discussion in Cicero's *Republic* was made to say of the State) that its concerted activities are produced by the coöperation of the most unlike individuals, it being compacted into one by means of reason and discipline out of the intermingled ranks of upper, middle, and lower. And what musicians style harmony in the case of song is in the case of an army concord, that closest and most efficient bond of military discipline. Now this can not exist apart from justice, which is needed for every undertaking and which possesses such power that (in Cicero's words) not even those who batten on wrongdoing and crime can live without some spark of it.

Let this suffice to explain the motive of this work and to placate those who have ventured to condemn the laws of war (with which the safety of the State is implicated) as being contrary to nature and the peace of the Gospel.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses. The names are listed in the first column, and the addresses are listed in the second column. The names are: John Doe, Jane Smith, and Bob Johnson. The addresses are: 123 Main St, 456 Elm St, and 789 Oak St.

2. The second part of the document is a table with two columns. The first column is labeled "Name" and the second column is labeled "Address". The table contains the following data:

Name	Address
John Doe	123 Main St
Jane Smith	456 Elm St
Bob Johnson	789 Oak St

3. The third part of the document is a list of names and their corresponding addresses. The names are listed in the first column, and the addresses are listed in the second column. The names are: John Doe, Jane Smith, and Bob Johnson. The addresses are: 123 Main St, 456 Elm St, and 789 Oak St.

TITLES OF CHAPTERS.

	Pages of original.	Pages of translation.
<i>The chapters of the First Book:</i>		
1. Of the method of declaring war and of other ceremonies relating to war which anciently were regulated by feacial law.....	1-4b	3-6
2. Of just war and just causes of war.....	4b-24 bis.	7-25
3. Of the duel or single combat.....	24 bis.-29	26-30
4. Of hostage-seizing, commonly called reprisals.....	29-32a	31-33
5. Of capture in war and the law of postliminy.....	32a-54a	34-54
6. Of keeping faith with an enemy.....	54a-73a	55-72
7. Of treaties and truces.....	73a-84	73-83
8. Of trickeries and deceit in war.....	84-87	84-87
9. Of the law of ambassadors.....	87a-91	88-92
<i>The chapters of the Second Book:</i>		
1. Of the duties relating to war.....	92-105a	95-108
2. Of the commander or general of an army.....	105a-121a	109-124
3. There should be one head of an army and not more; with full power; and permanently appointed; and not a man who has previously been reprimanded or disgraced.....	122-125	125-128
4. Whether gentleness and kindness or sternness and cruelty are the more advantageous in a general.....	125-129	129-132
5. Times and seasons to be taken into account above all in war....	129-132a	133-136
6. Factions and prolonged deliberations on matters of war are very harmful, especially when what is wanted is action rather than counsel	133-135a	137-139
7. So long as their strength remains unbroken, the King and State should not admit the slightest derogation from their sovereignty: and those err who think that the pride of an enemy can be tamed by moderation and patience.....	135a-139	140-143
8. Whether it is better to await war at home or to carry it into the enemy's territory	139-144a	144-149
9. Whether it is better at the beginning of a battle to make for the enemy with much din and vehement charge or on the other hand to hold one's ground and await the enemy's attack.....	144a-147a	150-152
10. It is not prudent to attack a state which is torn by civil dissension, merely in reliance on that fact.....	147a-149a	153-155
11. Troops to be so placed, by all possible endeavors, as that fighting is an absolute necessity for them, but the enemy should be afforded means of escaping that necessity.....	149a-154	156-160
12. In time of victory the first and chief thought must be about peace..	154-156	161-162
13. After enemies have been crushed, what is the best method for keeping them quiet in a lasting peace.....	156-160	163-167
<i>The chapters of the Third Book:</i>		
1. Of military discipline.....	161-167	171-176
2. Of the duties of tribune and legate and other officers.....	167-172	177-181
3. Of quarter-masters	172-173	182-183
4. Of soldiers and who can serve as such.....	173-180	184-190
5. Of the military oath.....	180-183	191-193
6. Of discharge	183-185a	194-196
7. Of the privileges of soldiers.....	185a-193	197-204
8. Of military courts.....	193a-194a	205-206
9. Of the punishments of soldiers.....	194-198a	207-210

	Pages of original.	Pages of translation.
10. Of the contumacious and those who disobey the orders of their officers and do not defend them.....	198a-200a	211-213
11. Of truants	200a-201a	214-215
12. Of deserters	202-203	216-217
13. Of deserters to the enemy and traitors.....	203-206a	218-221
14. Of the seditious.....	206a-209a	222-225
15. Of those who yield ground in battle or surrender when beaten...	209a-212	226-228
16. Of those who part with their arms or lose them.....	212-213a	229-230
17. Of those who desert, or neglect, their watch.....	213a-215a	231-232
18. Of him who loses, or surrenders to the enemy, a fortress or town which he has been appointed to defend.....	215-220a	233-238
19. Of theft and certain other military offenses.....	220a-221a	239-240
20. Of soldiers' rewards.....	221a-226a	241-245

These three books are of use in the preservation of military discipline in these troublous times, and contain nothing contrary to the Catholic Faith. So I adjudge 16th Nov. 1581.

MATHIAS LAMBRECHT,
Licentiate in Sacred Theol-
ogy and Regius Professor
of Divinity in the good
University of Douai.

THE FIRST BOOK

Of the Law and the Duties connected with War and
on Military Discipline

CHAPTER I.

Of the method of declaring war and of other ceremonies relating to war, which anciently were regulated by fecial law.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Fecial law.2. The college of fecials.3. The duty of fecials.4. Clarigatio (solemn demand of redress).5. Pater patratus (the chief of the fecials).6. The good-faith of the Tibarenians.7. The words of the feacial law. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">8. A treaty can not be made without ordinance by the people.9. The surrender of Spurius Postumius to the enemy.10. The formula of surrender.11. The surrender of Mancinus to the Numantines. |
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How scrupulously the Romans considered what legal principles were applicable to each occasion, whether of peace or of war, may be learned from their historians; and it ought not to excite surprise that they were uniformly so successful in their wars, seeing that they never took up arms save on just grounds. Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us US Rom. Antiq., bk. 2. the following illustration of the extent to which they carried this principle.

The Campanians, in consequence of an utter defeat by the Samnites, had been compelled to beg help from Rome, and their envoys were introduced into the Senate and made long speeches, setting out the utility to the Romans of an alliance with the Campanians and craving a lasting friendship and present assistance. They did not, however, obtain more by this (owing to the Senate's unwillingness to be involved in the wars of other States) than an offer to despatch a Roman mission to the Samnites to beg that no violence should be done to the Campanians. To this offer the head of the Campanian delegation replied, in accordance with his instructions:

“ Even if you decline to intervene with lawful force for our protection against force and outrage, you will certainly defend what is your own. Accordingly, we hereby surrender into your sovereignty, O Conscript Fathers, and into that of the Roman people, the Campanian people, the town of Capua, our territory, and all our interests, both divine and human; so, whatever sufferings are inflicted upon us in the future will be inflicted on your subjects.”

Thereupon, so Livy narrates, the Senate, deeming it a matter of Bk. 7. honor not to abandon vassals, entered on a war with the Samnites and drew hostilities away from the Campanians and upon themselves—which they would never have done without good cause.

In like manner, before the third and last Punic War, that great undertaking was the subject of a long and detailed discussion, in the course of which widely different opinions were expressed by Marcus Porcius Cato and Scipio Nasica, leading men in the Senate, the former being reckoned the shrewdest man in the State and the latter having been adjudged, even by the Senate, the best of men. Cato urged a declaration of war against Carthage on the ground that she was keeping an army in readiness on her territory, ostensibly against King Massanissa, but in reality against Rome; Nasica took the opposite view and favored the despatch of a mission to Carthage which, while rebuking the Senate there for keeping on foot an army and naval stores in defiance of the treaty, might spy out what was being done. But Gisco, the son of Hamilcar and an obstreperous person, so worked on the Carthaginian Senate, by his advocacy of a war against Rome, that the envoys were fain to seek safety in flight. And, although Cato then protested against any further postponement of war, Nasica repeated that he could not yet find a just cause of war and that no rash steps should be taken. Cato's view, however, prevailed and war was begun with the Carthaginians on the ground of their maintaining a fleet in defiance of the treaty and of their having marched an army beyond their frontiers, and of their attack on Massanissa, an ally of Rome.

Flor., bk. 49.

[1] Now the preconditions of a just war were most scrupulously laid down by the fecial law of Rome, as Cicero tells; and, in accordance therewith, no war can be just unless preceded by a demand of satisfaction, and by due announcement and declaration.

Offic., bk. 1.

[2] And Ancus Martius, a king of the old stock, appointed this to the Æquians for a law, and it was from him (according to the testimony of Livy) that the Romans derived their ceremonial of war, pursuant to which it was not enough merely to wage war, but there must also be a formal declaration of war. Others, however, attribute this to Numa Pompilius, by whom, in the seventh part of his sacred laws, the fecial college (so they say) was founded.

Bk. 1.

Dion. Hal., Rom. Antiq., bk. 2.

[3, 4] The duty of the feccials, to whom the Romans conceded at all times the highest degree of authority, may be summed up as follows: To see to it that the Romans did not make an unjust war on any confederate State, and to take cognizance of wars, alliances, and treaties, and of wrongs done to allies and other confederate States, and, if any of these States was the first to infringe any condition of a treaty, to send envoys who should orally put forth their claim and demand redress with a loud [*clara*] voice (which is called *clarigatio*) in the following terms: "I call Jupiter to witness: if against duty and justice I demand this reparation for the Roman people and myself, mayest thou never allow

NOTE: The bracketed numbers at the beginning of paragraphs refer to the topical summary found at the commencement of each chapter.

me to return safely to my fatherland." Then, if this demand was refused, the bond of alliance and friendship (if any such existed) was first denounced and then, after a fixed lapse of thirty days, war was declared and redress obtained, under the laws of war, by means of captures and hostile ravage. In any case, should the *fecials* forbid or disapprove, neither Senate nor consul nor popular vote might decree arms against an enemy.

[5] Now the chief of the *fecials* was the one called *pater patratus* (he being a person who had children of his own, while his father was still living). A *fecial* crowned his head and brow with myrtle, and thus made him their chief for all purposes of declaring war and making treaties. Plut., Rom. Quest.

It must, further, be noticed that there was no need that the declaration of war should be made in person to the king against whom the war was to be waged, but it was enough to make it to any armed body of troops. This was laid down by the *fecials*, first on the occasion of declaring war against Philip, and a second time against Antiochus. After a correct declaration of war all peaceable intercourse was prohibited and the soldiery were free to take up arms, collect forces, lead them against the foe, make raids, drive booty, lay districts waste and ravage them with fire and sword, cutting down crops and burning buildings, and generally might act as an enemy does.

[6] It is indeed recorded that the Tibarenians carried punctiliousness to such a pitch that they would not engage in conflict with an enemy before sending to him by *fecials* an honorable declaration as to the day, place, and hour, which we read was also sometimes done by the old Romans. Livy, too, gives us the formula and most ancient ritual of declaring war. Bk. 1. And Gell., bk. 10, ch. 4. And Dion. Halic., Rom. Antiq., bk. 2.

The *fecials* also investigated any complaints that might be made of wrongful breach of treaty; and, if the charge was sustained, they had the offenders seized and delivered to the injured parties. They took cognizance also of all wrongs done to ambassadors, for these are inviolable by the law of nations (*jus gentium*); and, if violence were done to them by any people or nation, it was the *fecials'* duty to insist on the surrender of those wanton offenders against that law; and our law is the same. Dig. 50, 7, 18.

The *fecials*, too, saw to it that the terms of treaties were carried out. They made treaties of peace and, if one had been made without due regard to law, they declared it void. They had no power, however, to give sanction to a treaty made with an ally or with an enemy or to frame a compact save where either consul or *prætor* had given his authorization and after due approval by Senate and people. And, lastly, if generals or captains sinned in aught against the sanctity of an oath, the *fecials* took the matter up and made atonement.

[7, 8] Now these were the words of the fecial law: "Of war, peace, treaties, truces, envoys [*oratorum* *] let the fecials be the judges." And indeed if any one entered into a treaty without the due forms, the fecials themselves would deliver him to the enemy, in order that the people might so be released from all obligation. Without a popular vote and the authorization of the Senate, nothing could be so ratified as to bind the commonwealth, and no treaty could be made without the fecials and the other solemn rites.

[9] Accordingly, when the consuls Titus Veturius and Spurius Postumius, after the defeat at Caudium, made peace with the Samnites without being empowered so to do by the people and Senate, on the terms of the Roman legions passing under the yoke, they were surrendered to the enemy in order that the peace might be repudiated, and Titus Numicius and Quintus Æmilius, tribunes of the people, were surrendered with them because they too had given their authorization to the treaty. It was indeed Postumius himself who initiated and counselled the surrender, using these words, as preserved by Livy: "Let us be surrendered by the fecials, naked and bound; let us free the people from any obligation wherewith we may have bound them; so that no obstacle may remain, either under divine or human law, to a just and pious war being entered on afresh."

[10] And this is the formula used by the fecials in making the surrender:

"Whereas these men, without warrant from the Roman commonwealth of Quirites, have pledged themselves that a treaty should be concluded and thereby have done a wrong, for that cause, with the intent that the Roman people may be quit of impious guilt, I surrender these men to you."

Cic., *Offic.*, bk. 3.
Flor., bk. 2, ch. 18.

[11] In the same way, many years later, Caius Mancinus was surrendered to the Numantines for making a treaty with them without warrant from the people or authorization from the Senate.

* If this be changed to *oratores* (the usual reading), the translation will be, "Of war, . . . truces, let the fecials be the spokesmen and judges."

CHAPTER II.

Of just war and just causes of war.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The laws of war must be observed. 2. Two kinds of conflict. 3. The object of wars is to secure peaceful life. 4. Many ills arise even out of just wars. 5. An honorable war to be preferred to a disgraceful peace. 6. Just wars permitted alike by the Law of Nations [<i>jus gentium</i>], the Canon Law and the Divine Law. 7. The authorization of a sovereign required for a just war. 8. Among the Romans the determination of questions of peace and war was in the hands of the people. 9. War may sometimes be waged without the authorization of the prince. 10. The penalties of rebellion are incurred by the fact itself [<i>ipso jure</i>]. 11. Just causes of war. 12. Rebellion. 13. An outrage on the prince is deemed an outrage offered to God. 14. A rebel and an enemy quite different persons. 15. Whether the laws of war apply to rebels. 16. Civil discord. 17. The law of Solon. 18. In war not always safe to keep aloof from both sides. 19. The middle course hazardous. 20. The authority of the prince must always be supported against rebels. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 21. There can not be a just cause for rebellion. 22. The fatherland or State, what it is. 23. Rebellion a most heinous offense. 24. A tyrant may be killed. 25. A lawful sovereign can not be dubbed tyrant. 26. The <i>lex regia</i>. 27. The Pope may deprive a king of his crown for cause. 28. Whether a war against infidels is just, and how far. 29. The emperor is not lord of the whole world. 30. Just war waged on heretics. 31. The soldier incurs no guilt even if the cause of war be unjust. 32. A Christian soldier may take service under a pagan ruler. 33. How far obedience is due to a pagan king. 34. A war may be "just," even though the cause thereof be unjust. 35. Whether a war can be "just" on both sides. 36. Money the sinews of war. 37. Who ought to bear the expenses of a war. 38. Trajan compared the <i>fiscus</i> to the spleen. 39. The custom of the Gauls. 40. Whether private losses sustained in war ought to be made good. |
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[1, 2] Cicero lays it down that in a well-ordered State the laws of war should be scrupulously observed. Alike in beginning a war and in carrying it on and in ending it, law has a most important position and so has good-faith. The rules of fecial law, to which we have just alluded, aim at securing this. For, as Cicero also says, there are two kinds of strife—one conducted by discussion and the other by force: the one appropriate to men and the other to beasts; and recourse must be had to the latter when the former can not be used. And this is taken to have been the meaning of the poetical conceit that Chiron, the centaur—whose upper part (so the fiction ran) was that of a man and his lower that of a horse—was the preceptor of Achilles, as if to show that a good prince ought not only to be endowed with wisdom and judgment and other mental gifts, but also to be trained to feats of strength and arms; for the

Offic., bk. 1.

Laws, bk. 2.

use of force against those who will not submit to what is fair nor be restrained by reason is not unjust. Nevertheless, a general, like a surgeon (it was a saying of Scipio's) ought to use steel only in the last resort for effecting his cures.

Plut., Apoph.

[3, 4] War, therefore, is justifiable when its object is to procure peaceful existence and freedom from outrage, and when begun in such a way as that peace may appear to be its sole object. That is what Martianus Cæsar was aiming at in his memorable saying: "So long as a prince can live in peace he ought not to take up arms—so many and so great are the ills which spring even from what may be styled a just war."

On the Kingdom of God, bk. 19, ch. 7.

And these ills drew from St. Augustine the following outburst: *

"If I should stop to recite the massacres and the extreme effects hereof, as I might (though I can not do it as I should), the discourse would be infinite. Yea, but a wise man, say they, will wage none but just war. He will not! As if the very remembrance that himself is man ought not to procure his greater sorrow in that he has cause of just wars, and must needs wage them, which if they were not just were not for him to deal in, so that a wise man should never have war; for it is the other men's wickedness that works his cause just, that he ought to deplore whether ever it produce wars or not. Wherefore he that does but consider with compassion all those extremes of sorrow and bloodshed must needs say that this is a mystery, but he that endures them without a sorrowful emotion, or thought thereof, is far more wretched to imagine he has the bliss of a god when he has lost the natural feeling of a man."

So far St. Augustine. For there are certain lawful incidents of war (as Livy says) which each side must be ready to endure, just as it may also produce them—e. g. burning of crops, destruction of buildings, loss of men and horses as booty. These are of course a hardship to him who has to endure them, although not in every case dishonoring. Our first care, then, must be for peace, which, as Cicero says, refuses to have any truck with treachery and baseness.

Offic., bk. 1.

Philipp. 13.

[5] Further, as the same writer says, although the name of peace is musical and the thing itself both pleasant and profitable (for he can not hold dear either private hearths or public ordinances or the laws of liberty who delights in dissension and slaughter of his fellow-citizens and in public war) yet an honorable war, according to the saying of Demosthenes, is ever to be preferred to a disgraceful peace.

Dig. 1, 1, 5.

c. 1 and 2, C. 23, qu. 1 and c. 12, X. 2, 12.

[6] Just wars are, indeed, enjoined by the Law of Nations (*jus gentium*), and are permitted both by the canon law and by the law of God, for God himself ordered the Jews to make war on the Amorites

c. 1, 3, and 5, C. 23, qu. 1. Deut. 2.

Letter 1, to Boniface.

and other peoples. St. Augustine, accordingly, wrote: "Beware of thinking that no one who follows arms pleases God, for David, a man after God's own heart, was of the military profession and so was that

* Transl. of *de Civit. Dei* by J. H., A. D. 1610.

centurion whose faith is commended by divine attestation, and other holy men also."

[7] Now in order that a war may be styled just, it ought in the first place to be declared and undertaken under the authority and warrant of a sovereign prince, in whose hands is the arbitrament of peace and war. c. 4, C. 23, qu. 1. St. Aug., bk. 22 against Faust., ch. 74.

For a private person has no business to begin a war, seeing that he can, and ought to, assert his right in the courts; and it is a breach of the prince's prerogative for a private person, unwarranted by law, to assert his right himself with royal hand. Nor is any one competent to initiate any variety of hostile activity without the knowledge and counsel of the prince. And he is liable under the Julian law against treason who, without the warrant of the prince, has either made war or summoned a levy or gathered an army together. And so Cato urged the recall of the army and the surrender of Cæsar to the enemy on the ground that Cæsar was campaigning in Gaul without having been authorized by the people. Dig. 4, 2, 13. Cod. 11, 47. Dig. 48, 4, 3. Plut., on Cato of Utica and Jul. Caes.

[8] For, among the Romans the arbitrament of peace and war was in the hands of the people in whom sovereignty was vested, as appears from many passages of Livy. The Senate, accordingly, ordered the military tribunes (says Livy) to propose to the people on the earliest possible date a declaration of war against Veii; and the war with Præneste, too, was entered on by an ordinance of the people after a senatus consult. And, after authorization by the Senate, the people bade the making of war on the Palæopolitani and on the Vestini and on the Æqui. Since, therefore, the people has conferred on the prince by the *Lex Regia* all its sovereignty and power, this arbitrament of peace and war is his alone and resides in him and inheres in his princely dignity in such sort that it can not be severed from him. And Holy Scripture shows that this right has always belonged to kings. Bk. 4. Livy, bk. 16. Livy, bk. 18, 19. Dig. 1, 4, 1. 1 Sam., ch. 8.

[9] There are occasions, however, when, e. g., pressing necessity or the absence of the prince, coupled with the hazards of delay, may justify a commencement of war even without his sanction, and this is especially so for purposes of defense, which is open to any one by the law of nature. On such occasions it will be lawful not only to ward off the wrong, but also to take vengeance for it and to drive the enemy out of his own land if we can not otherwise obtain safety from him, for one can not be said to overstep permissible precaution who does what it would be dangerous to omit. And this is shown at length by Marianus Socinus (the grandson), who holds that such a war ranks as a just war even as regards the consequences, and that the rules of war apply (consequences being deduced from their causes) and therefore that anything captured during that war belongs to the captor. By inference, Dig. 43, 24, 7, 3, at end. Cod. 10, 32, 54. Dig. 42, 8, 10, 16. c. 2, C. 23, qu. 1. Consult. 68, vol. 3. Dig. 39, 5; 2, 7, and 3.

[10] And this, he says, is especially so in dealing with rebels, for every one not only may, but must, foil their attempts without waiting for the prince's command, should delay be perilous. For, one who has it in

Generally in Bodin
on The Republic,
bk. 1, last ch.

Dig. 1, 1, 3.
Cod. 3, 27, 1.
c. 2, in Clem. ii,
11, at end.

his power to ward off a wrong from a comrade, yet forbears to do so, is as much in fault as the actual perpetrator. This being so in ordinary cases, what are we to say when it is the prince who is threatened, especially seeing that these machinations against the sovereignty of the prince and the peace of the State render their authors liable, by the very fact, to the penalty of treason and to death or captivity as enemies and, much more, to forfeiture of their property to the captor.

Dig. 48, 8, 3, 5;
and 49, 16, 7.
Dig. 41, 1, 51.

Extrav. Hen. vii.
Qui sint rebelli.
Gloss on Extrav. Hen.
vii, qui sint rebelli and
thereon Bart. and Curt.
jun., Consult. 137.

Among the examples of this which Roman history furnishes, a notable one is that of Lucius Pinarius, commander of the guard at Ænna in Sicily. He detected the plot of the citizens to revolt to the Carthaginians, but had no opportunity to send messengers to inform the consul Marcellus, though he was not far away; so he suddenly made a great slaughter, and thus kept the citizens under. This measure saved Ænna and received the approval of Marcellus, and the soldiery were allowed to keep the booty which they had taken.

Livy, bk. 34.

Cicero similarly praises the conduct of Octavius Cæsar, who, without waiting for a decree of the Senate, began hostilities against Antony of his own motion; for (as Cicero says) the season for issuing decrees was not yet and Cæsar saw that if he did not seize the moment for making war the city would be overwhelmed, and so no decree would ever issue again. And the Senate ratified and approved on behalf of the public the war which Cæsar had begun on his private initiative. In the same way Scipio Nasica earned much praise by offering himself as the leader of all good citizens and thus crushing, by private initiative, Tiberius Gracchus and his nefarious faction. For, in such disturbed times we must do what is required by the crisis rather than by custom. Custom is ever to be followed in time of peace, says Cicero, but in time of war expediency—a doctrine on which we shall have more to say elsewhere.

Cic., Philipp. 8.

Cic., Philipp. 5.

Val. Max., bk. 3, ch. 2.
Appian, Civ. War, bk. 1.

See bk. 2, ch. 5.

c. 3, C. 23, qu. 1.

c. 4, C. 23, qu. 1.

Beside this, war may not be made save for just and necessary cause, and there should be an entire absence of the passion to do hurt and of vengeful savagery and of the lust of conquest. It was the securing of this that was the object of the rules prevailing among the Romans under their feacial law. Now he who makes war for an unjust cause not only sins, but the opinion is widely spread among men that he is nearly always beaten. For, as Propertius puts it,

Frangit et attollit vires in milite causa.

Quae nisi justa subest, excutit arma pudor.

(’Tis his cause which breaks or sustains the strength of a soldier; if no just cause underlie, disgrace smites on his arms.)

[11] Now the principal just causes of war are: the defense of our own empire, of our persons, of our friends, of our allies, and of our property; for no other warrant than the law of nature is needed to justify even private persons in defending themselves. A war, therefore, as

c. 1, C. 23, qu. 1 and
c. 5, 6 and 7, C. 23,
qu. 3. And c. 12, X.
2, 12.

Dig. 1, 1, 3;
and 48, 8, 9;
and 9, 2, 4.

Caius Pontius, the Samnite general, used to say, is a just one for those to

whom it is necessary, and recourse to arms is a duty for those who have no hope left save in arms. A war is based on a just cause, again, when it is waged in order to regain from the enemy something which he is forcibly and unjustly detaining, in the same way as the authors of a wrong or harm done with private and not public intent are handed over to punishment: we have shown above that this is provided for by the feacial law.

And so, after the death of Saul, David made war on Ishbosheth, Saul's son, who was trying to obtain the kingship in Israel which God had given to David by the mouth of the prophet Samuel. And Romulus made war on the Albans because their dictator, Cluilius, would neither restore certain captured property nor surrender the captors.

Another just cause of war is to take vengeance for some wrong which has been unjustifiably inflicted. Thus we read that King David made war on the king of the children of Ammon for his contemptuous treatment of David's messengers. And on the same ground of a wrong done, a war will be ranked as just which arises on a State's refusal to allow passage over its territory, provided such passage is innocent; by the law of human society such passage ought to be open. Accordingly, the Jews made war on the kings of the Amorites for refusing them innocent passage into the land which God had allotted to them.

[12, 13] And then a prince has a most just cause of war when he is directing his arms against rebels and subjects who abjure his sovereignty; for it is a heinous offense, against both God and the prince, for subjects to resist his authority, all power being from God alone; and St. Paul tells us "whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." And a wrong offered to the prince is reckoned to be offered to God, who said to Samuel, when the people were demanding of Samuel another as king: "They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them." David also fought with Sheba the son of Bochrì, who had stirred up the people to transfer their allegiance from David to himself.

[14] Now rebels ought not to be classed as enemies, the two being quite distinct, and so it is more correct to term the armed contention with rebel subjects execution of legal process, or prosecution, and not war. There is, therefore, no need of the authority of the prince; the authority of a local magistrate will suffice.

[15] For the same reason, the laws of war and of captivity and of postliminy, which apply to enemies, do not apply to rebels, any more than they apply to pirates and robbers (these not being included in the term "enemy" [*hostes*]). Our meaning is that these persons themselves can not proceed under the laws of war and so, e. g., they do not acquire the ownership of what they capture, this only being admitted in the case of enemies [*hostes*]; but all the modes of stress known to the laws of war

c. 1, bk. 5, Tit. 1, in vi and c. 2, C. 23, qu. 2. c. 1, C. 23, qu. 2. St. Aug. quest. 10, on Joshua, bk. 2.

2 Sam., ch. 2.

Dion. Halic., bk. 3.

c. 2, C. 23, qu. 2 and c. 11, C. 23, qu. 8.

2 Sam., ch. 10-12.

c. 3, C. 23, qu. 2.

Deut. 2.

c. 2, C. 15, qu. 6 and c. 8, C. 23, qu. 8.

Dig. 4, 5, 5, 1. Rom., ch. 13.

1 Sam., ch. 8.

2 Sam., ch. 20.

c. 12, X. 2, 12. Dig. 6, 1, 6S.

Extrav. Hen. vii. Qui sint rebelli. Dig. 49, 15, 24; and 50, 16, 118.

Ibid.

Dig. 49, 15, 5 and the whole title. Dig. 49, 15, 24.

Dig. 49, 15, 19, 2; and 28, 1, 13; and 49, 15, 24. Dig. 49, 15, 5.

may be employed against them, even more than in the case of enemies, for the rebel and the robber merit severer reprobation than an enemy who is carrying on a regular and just war and their condition ought not to be better than his.

By inference, Dig.
24, 1, 3, 1.
Philipp. 5.

And this seems to be what Cicero was aiming at when he deprecated the despatch of envoys to Antony and insisted that he should not be begged by words, but compelled by arms, to raise the siege of Mutina, a colony of the Roman people, and to break up the lines of investment which he had drawn round Brutus, a general, a consul-designate, and irreproachable citizen; for this (said Cicero) was not a case such as when Hannibal, an enemy of the State, was in days gone by desired by the Senate, through its envoys, to withdraw from Saguntum, but it was a case of a citizen; nor did it matter a whit (he continued) whether Antony was besieging Rome or a colony of the Roman people, founded for purposes of protection. And elsewhere the same writer says, in a letter to Plancus, that no peace ought to be concluded with Antony's faction by whom Brutus was besieged at Mutina, and he calls them loathsome robbers who ought to lay down their weapons and sue for peace, or, if they demanded it while keeping the field, ought only to get it by victory and not by bargaining.

Epist. 6, bk. 10.

Further, since there are on the prince's side all the essential elements of a just war, i. e., the right of making war and a just cause, but on the side of the rebels neither the right of making war (which we have shown above to belong to the prince alone) nor a just cause of war (the cause of a rebellion being no cause at all, as we shall shortly prove), it follows that a war waged by a prince with rebels is a most just one and that all measures allowed in war are available against them, such as killing them as enemies, enslaving them as prisoners, and, much more, confiscating their property as booty: for consequences are deduced from their causes.

Dig. 48, 8, 3, 5;
and 49, 16, 7.

Dig. 39, 5: 2(7), and 3.

Dig. 41, 1, 51.

Gloss and Bart. on
Extrav. Hen. vii. *Qui
sint rebelli. Curt. jun.,
Consult. 137.*

Bartolus on Dig. 49,
15, 24. And c. 12.
X. 2, 12 and c. 27,
X. 2, 24.

Dig. 49, 15, 19, 2;
and 28, 1, 13.
Dig. 27, 14, 6.

Cod. 4, 48, 3.

Dig. 49, 15, 21.

And this I think a correct statement where the war is carried on under the direct sanction of the prince; but in other cases, although any one is allowed to defend himself and every one may act within the limits of his jurisdiction, yet the laws of war will only apply in a war waged by the authority and in the name of the prince; for it can not otherwise be called war. But the hostilities in which rebels engage are admittedly the very opposite of just war and so rebels can not proceed under the law of war and their captives do not become slaves. For where the cause is absent the consequence is absent likewise, and no one ought to be allowed to profit or injure others by his own wrongdoing.

[16] No obstacle hereto is created by Ulpian's response that those who in civil dissensions find themselves of the one party [*pars*] or of the other are not in the position of enemies, i. e., of persons between whom the laws of captivity and of postliminy prevail, and that therefore those

who are captured on the one side or the other do not become slaves; nor is any obstacle created by the fact that by the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain, captures made in times of civil dissension are to be restored sevenfold. For these rules are meant to apply in times when citizens are at variance and strife with one another, and not in times when they are contriving against the sovereign power and fighting for the overthrow of the State; for at such times they must be classed as enemies. Ulpian accordingly used the word party [*pars*]; and "party" involves, says Cicero, a division of the State into two and a strife of citizen with citizen. "Faction" [*factio*] is Cæsar's term for this.

Dig. 49, 15, 21.

Span. Ordin., bk. 16.
tit. 26, para. 2.Dig. 4, 5, 5, 1; and
49, 15: 26 and 19(4);
and 48, 4, 11.

Philipp. 13.

Gallic War, bk. 6.

Now it would be improper to call the war waged by Antony against the State a strife of parties; it was a secession from the Roman people. This was the ground of Cicero's dissent from Cæsar when the latter gave his opinion that the death penalty could not be inflicted on Cethegus and Lentulus, parties to Catiline's conspiracy, owing to the prohibition contained in the Sempronian law of a capital judgment against a Roman citizen without an ordinance of the people. Cicero pointed out that the Sempronian law, being framed in view of Roman citizens, did not apply to enemies of the State, who could by no means be citizens.

Against Catiline, 4.

And of course in the war between Rome and her seceding and rebellious allies (Latins, Campanians, Fidenates, Hernicians, Æquians, Etruscans, and others, who were subjects of Rome and not sharers in her sovereignty, according to the sufficient evidence of Livy and Appian and Dionysius of Halicarnassus), we read that the conquered were made to endure the utmost severities of war, and that captured property changed hands as booty. And captured persons were reduced into slavery; and of a truth they were much more harshly treated than ordinary enemies, the motive being that the best way to keep rebels in their duty was to deal with them in such a way that they could not rebel again, for so long as wrong-minded persons have the opportunity of doing wrong they will want to do it.

Bks. 2 and 8.

Civil War, bk. 1.

Bks. 3 and 4.

Accordingly when the Romans stormed Capua, which, after falling under Roman sway by surrender, had defected to the Carthaginians, the quæstors took as spoil 70 pounds weight of gold and 3,000 pounds weight of silver, and seventy prominent Senators were executed, and about three hundred Campanian nobles were thrown into prison and died there of varying mischances; and another great horde of Campanians was sold, and all the territory and public buildings fell to the Roman people. The same treatment befell the men of Fidenæ, a Roman colony, when they rebelled. Ænna in Sicily, too, the quarters of a Roman garrison, was crushed by a terrible slaughter of its citizens (as already described) when it contemplated defection. And mention may be found here and there in Cæsar of similar treatment being meted out to the Gauls when they revolted, after the reduction of Gaul to a province.

Livy, bk. 7.

Livy, bk. 36.

a Livy, bk. 4.

Livy, bk. 34.

[17] Further, I think that in times of civil dissension the law of Solon will not be found inexpedient. This law—which, like many other very ancient laws, was at Athens carved on wooden boards—provided that whenever a sedition occurred and the people were split into two opposed factions any one who stood neutral should be deprived of home and fatherland and fortune and be banished from the country, an exile. The philosopher Favorinus thought this was a good rule to apply also when brothers and friends fell out; for (said he), if the friends of both sides have not sufficient influence to bring about the restoration of peace, then let some join one side and some the other, and in this manner prepare a way for an arrangement between the two. And I hold that in our own days such a law would be very useful in compelling all good citizens, directly a faction is formed by bad citizens, to join their forces in order to put it down and so to save both themselves and the State from such a ruin as, alas, we now see in process in different places, to the great hurt of the Christian commonwealth and to the subversion of these Low Countries; for while good citizens trust to get peace by submitting with excessive moderation and forbearance to the evil attempts of the seditious, they are fastening on themselves a terribly severe yoke of slavery which it will be vain for them to attempt to shake off hereafter; and so, maybe, their unwillingness to imperil either fortune or life on behalf of the State will lead them and the State to an inevitable ruin. For (as Cicero says) all evil may easily be checked in its beginnings, but as it gets older it commonly gets stronger.

Gell., bk. 2, ch. 2.

[18] Nor is it, as many seem to think, always the safest course to abstain from intermeddling in a war and to await as a mere spectator the issue of the war and the result to other persons' fortunes without hazarding one's own. That was the course which, when Antiochus and the Ætolians were attempting the expulsion of the Romans from Greece, their envoys tried to induce the Achæans (who were friendly to Rome) to adopt, begging them at least to remain neutral. The proconsul, Titus Quintius, showed in reply that nothing could be so ill-advised for the Achæans, seeing that, without gaining either thanks or esteem, they would be the prize of the conqueror.

Livy, bk. 35.

[19] And when first the Romans were seeking the friendship of the Achæans and Philip was claiming that they should at least abstain from armed intervention, the Achæan prætor, Aristenus, in a speech to his folk, showed that they must treat the Romans either as allies or as enemies and that there could not be a middle path,—which (as Pontius of Samos used to put it) neither secures friends nor removes enemies. And so, at the time of the quarrel between Cæsar and Pompey, although the excellent Porcius Cato in his zeal for the commonwealth differed in many respects from the leaders of the two factions, clearly approving the attitude of neither, yet, when war broke out, he felt that he ought not

Livy, bk. 32.

to remain in repose and so he joined that side which seemed on the whole juster; and when Brutus would have dissuaded him he wisely replied:

Summum, Brute, nefas civilia bella fatemur:
Sed quo fata vocant, virtus secura sequetur.

(I admit, Brutus, the monstrous iniquity of civil war; but virtue will follow in security the summons of the Fates.)

and so on, as Lucan's poem continues.

Bk. 2.

[20] Now, this scrutiny, which of two factions has the better cause, is admissible in a democratic or an aristocratic State, where sovereignty is divided up among rivals; but in a monarchical State all that is best and wisest will follow the authority of the prince, in whom is the sole sovereignty, against his seditious and turbulent citizens and subjects. For after the republic has decided to commit its interests to the care of one man and the people has conferred on him by the *Lex Regia* all its sovereignty and power, that one man is the common parent of all and obedience to him is enjoined by the divine law, and everybody ought to defend and protect him as sedulously as the fatherland.

Dig. 1, 2, 2, 11.

Dig. 1, 4, 1.

Nov. 98, at end.

Paul, Ep. Rom., 12.

[21] Now no just cause can be admitted (says Cicero) for taking up arms against one's fatherland: Plato declared it monstrous to employ force against one's father or mother, but worst of all against one's fatherland, for there is no breach of natural ties, no crime, which it is justifiable to avenge by parricide. Cicero calls Antony the parricide of his fatherland, for making war on his State, whose safety one ought to place before the safety of one's father.

Quintilian, Declam., 286.

Dig. 11, 7, 35; and 1. 1, 2.

[22] I use the word 'State' [*republicam*] (which connotes, said Cornificius, that most sacred concept, fatherland [*patria*]) to mean not the soil itself (which would be absurd, for all soil is a brave man's fatherland), but in Cicero's sense as an assemblage of individuals compacted into a society by identity of law and community of interest. And that was the drift of Censorinus's reply to the Carthaginian envoys, as given in Appian, i. e., that the city of Carthage, whose freedom the Romans had guaranteed, did not consist of walls and buildings, and that it was these latter which it was proposed to destroy.

To Herenn., bk. 4.

In his Punic War.

Nor can a faction of aristocrats [*optimates*] be called a State (says Cicero), nor a seditious and conspiring populace, for an unjust populace (which he dubs a usurper) can not found a State. For although (as just said) one who is animated with hostility towards State or prince may be by birth a citizen he has voluntarily become an enemy and is called *perduellis*, a term ordinarily applied to public enemies. And indeed there is such an intimate connection between these two, prince and State, that no one can be an enemy of the former without being also an enemy of the latter, and conversely.

Dig. 48, 4, 11. Dig. 50, 16, 234.

Ibid.

We ought to die for our country (says Cicero), to give up ourselves entirely for it, to place all we have at its disposal, and, as it were, to con-

Laws, bk. 2.

secrete ourselves to its service. And the same writer says that a man deserves encomium who goes out to death on behalf of his State and who shows that our fatherland is dearer to us than ourselves. We ought to adapt all our actions not to our own expediency and advantage, but to the well-being of State and prince. On which count Demaratus of Sparta won a large meed of praise and so did Aristides, Phocion, and Themistocles, all Athenians, and the Romans, Tarquinius Collatinus, Camillus, and Rutilius. These all bore with complete serenity wrongs done to them by their country and contrived no vengeance, though they had the opportunity of doing so. Nay, Themistocles preferred to die by poison rather than help the Persian king, to whom he was bound by many honors and acts of bounty, to make war on his fatherland, albeit an ungrateful one. And Camillus, a man of the best character, who had deserved most highly of his country, yet had been exiled, forgot the wrong and ran extreme danger in order to render help to his country, which he restored by driving away its enemies.

[23] Again, disobedience on the part of subjects and rebellion, against the prince is treated as a heinous offense and put on a par with heresy, and the disobedient offender is called an infidel. For how, asks c. 16, Dist. 38. St. Jerome, can he be faithful in the matter of God [*in substantia Dei*], who can not keep faith with his earthly lord? And so, no matter how grievous are the burdens which a king imposes on his subjects, they may not rebel, for it is better to bear all ills than to connive at one; and hard as the burden may be which the superior has imposed, borne it must none c. 3, Dist. 19. the less be, and suffered with duteous self-surrender, obedience being a good thing in itself; for it is the general pact of human society that men must obey their kings. Wherefore, when Rehoboam, Solomon's son and successor, refused to lighten the least whit the very heavy yoke placed on the Jews by Solomon, saying that he would instead make his father's heavy yoke heavier, although it was in consequence hereof that the ten tribes of Israel, cutting themselves loose from the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, abandoned their king and chose another, Jeroboam, yet they did not go quit of blame; for the Lord was wroth with the whole seed of Israel and destroyed them and caused them to be scattered for as long as He should drive them away from His face, because they had renounced their union and had chosen another king for themselves.

Likewise, although King Nebuchadnezzar was an unbeliever and did much wickedness and ordered that his golden image should be worshipped and that those who refused should be cast into the burning fiery furnace, yet Daniel said to him, "Thou art a king of kings, for the Lord of heaven hath given thee a kingdom and power and sovereignty"; and the Lord said through the prophet Jeremiah, "Now have I given all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylon, my servant; and the beasts of the field have I given him also, and all nations

shall serve him and his son and his son's son, until the very time of his land and of himself shall come; and many nations and great kings shall serve him." And the prophet Baruch said, "Pray for the life of King Nebuchadnezzar and for the life of Balthazar his son, that their days may be like the days of heaven upon earth." And the prophet Ezekiel inveighs bitterly against Zedekiah, King of Judah, reproaching him for his perfidy and rebellion against his King Nebuchadnezzar. David, also, though designated king of the Jews by divine authority, yet always rendered royal honors to Saul while he was still reigning, even though Saul had been reduced by divine law to the position of a private person in the kingdom and was hostile to himself: and when Saul entered into the same cave in which David was hiding and David could have cut him off alone with little trouble, he refused to do so, saying that he would not stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed. And David, too, ordered the execution of the man who brought the news that he himself had killed Saul, saying, "How wast thou not afraid to stretch forth thine hand against the Lord's anointed?"

Jerem. 27.

Baruch, ch. 1.

2 Chron. 36.

1 Sam., ch. 24, 26.

2 Sam., ch. 1.

Kings, therefore, and princes we ought to revere with extreme dutifulness, if they be good, as being sent by God (in the words of St. Peter) for the punishment of evil-doers and for the praise of them that do well; but if they be bad we must endure them with patience, for the sins of princes and kings must be borne with and left to the judgment of God, who is pleased at times to visit nations for their sins with iniquitous princes. For, as Holy Writ has it, "God makes a man to reign who is a hypocrite because of the offenses of the people." "For there is no power but of God," St. Paul testifies, who also bids us to obey princes.

Alfons. of Castile
Against heres., on the
word Potestas.

1 Epist., ch. 2.

And St. Peter would have us be subject to our masters, even the froward; and he also teaches that kings are to be honored, although in those days no king had as yet accepted Christianity, but all were unbelievers and extremely cruel persecutors of the Christians; for every one knows about the cruelty of Nero and Domitian and others, which is commemorated in the writings of so many authors, yet the Christians rendered obedience to these same, in accordance with God's command, so far as nothing was required which was offensive to God, to whom they knew that obedience was due rather than to man.

Acts, ch. 5, v. 29.

[24] Whence it is clear that, although a tyrant who forcibly and illegally usurps the throne may be killed by any one if there is no other way of getting rid of his tyranny, and although under the Valerian law, his head and goods were forfeit who had formed the plan of usurping the throne, yet he who is prince by right of succession and election may not be killed by a private individual, however unjust and cruel his conduct may be, nor may his people put him off the throne or defect from him. And this was declared by the council of Constance, as also that all who assert the contrary opinion are heretics.

Plut., Life of
P. Valerius,
Dion. Halic., bk. 5.Felinus on. c. 14
(?) X. 2, 26.
Brivensis, Repertory,
on word Tyrannus.
Dom. a Soto, on Justice
and Law, 5, 1, 8.Sess. 15.
Alfons. of Castile
against heres., on the
word Tyrannus.

[25, 26] For a lawful prince, however cruel and unjust, can not be called a usurper; and since, by the *Lex Regia*, nay, by the ordinance of God, all sovereignty and power has been conferred on the prince as against the people, the people can not pass in judgment on him, for the inferior can not bind the superior by a judgment. And this is the meaning of the prophet when he says, "Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith? or shall the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it?"

Whence Pope Nicolas in a rescript declared it as clear as day that no one of lesser authority can bind one of greater power by his findings or impose limitations on him of his creating. Accordingly, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius's saying is correct, namely, that the magistrate is the people's appointed judge, the king the magistrate's, and God the king's. And indeed if a prince, albeit deriving his power from God, can not punish or condemn any one without a hearing, by what authority can subjects, the recipients of no such power, expel of their own motion or put off the throne the prince in whose sovereign power they are and whom they are commanded to obey, seeing that, by the law of Solon, not even a usurper may be killed without a hearing of his case and that it is repugnant to natural law that an inferior should exercise jurisdiction over a superior and the same person be both accuser and judge. And so, the *Lex Julia* (Chap. I) ordains very heavy penalties not only against those who actually kill the prince, but also against those who with wrongful intent further the inception of a plot to kill him or to effect anything adverse to the sovereign power.

Seeing, then, that we are bound both by divine and by human law to undergo all infamy and danger and even death itself, should occasion arise, in order to save either prince or fatherland, how can there be a just cause of rebellion? What we observe in the human body applies here: All the limbs yield obedience to the head, as being the nobler part, no matter what it orders, and they refuse no risk in order to preserve it; so also subjects, the limbs of the civic body, should put the safety of the prince, who is its head, above all private advantage. Now there was among the Jews a sect of men, held in high esteem and called Essenes, i. e., executors of the divine law, who championed this doctrine, maintaining that kings and princes, irrespective of their character, ought to be inviolable by their subjects, as being sent by God.

Nor will any one attach importance to the case of Tarquinius Superbus, whose wickedness led to his expulsion from his kingdom, for, in the first place, he was not a king but an unmistakable usurper (having obtained the throne not in lawful manner, but by force, after having most basely slain his father-in-law Tullius); and in the second place, as the jurisconsult Proculus says, the question to be asked is, What does the law say that we ought to do? and not, What is done at Rome? For it is

a mistake (pointed out by Cicero) to imagine that everything for which a precedent can be found is lawful. What has been said applies where the supreme sovereignty is in the hands of a single person; but in cases when it is lodged in the people or in an aristocracy [*optimates*] it is undoubtedly lawful to deal with a tyrant by legal process, if time allows; and, if not, he may be got rid of out of our midst by any means whatsoever. It was the former course which the Senate adopted in order to get rid of Nero, and the latter in the case of Maximinus. For it is noteworthy that Roman emperors were not vested with full sovereignty, although several of them tyrannically usurped it; and this is shown by the expression which Suetonius employed about Caligula: "He almost changed the character of the chief magistracy into a monarchy," the Roman Emperor being nothing else than chief magistrate and the ultimate sovereignty being with the people.

Appian, *Proëm.*, l. 1.
Bodin, on *The Repub.*, bk. 1, ch. 8.

[27] For kings who abuse their position the Pope has various modes of restraint and of compelling them to deal justly, for he is God's regent on earth and has received from Him both swords, the spiritual and the temporal, for the peace and preservation of the Christian commonwealth. Pope Nicolas, accordingly, reproved Lothair for his sins, and Gelasius used threats to Anastasius. Innocent I excommunicated

c. 13 X. 2, 1 and c. 1.
Extrav. comm. 1, 8.
In c. 3, C. 15, qu. 6.

c. 26, C. 23, qu. 5.

c. 21, C. 2, qu. 1.

c. 10, Dist. 96.

the Emperor Arcadius for countenancing the expulsion of St. John Chrysostom from his see. Nay, where the interests of the Christian commonwealth require it, the Pope can not only restrain, he can also depose, just as God (whose vicar the Pope is) deprived Saul of his kingdom and raised up David in his stead. Accordingly, Pope Zacharias deprived Childeric III, King of the Franks, and absolved the Franks from the obligation of their oath. Innocent IV in the first instance excommunicated the Emperor Frederic II for his crimes: and, when this measure proved ineffective, he adjudged him unworthy of the empire and freed his subjects from the tie of their sworn allegiance. And the same Pope gave to the King of Lusitania his brother, the count of Bologna, as a colleague, because of his neglect of duty.

1 Sam., ch. 6.

c. 3, C. 15, qu. 6.

c. 2, bk. 2, Tit. 14, in vi.

c. 2, bk. 1, Tit. 8, in vi.

Now, to attribute to the people the power to do this (as some would like to do) is not only absurd and improper, but also subversive of the State; a king is not to be forthwith branded tyrant and unjust, because in some little detail of his rule he does not please the people, for on that showing kings would be nobodies. Why, even Moses, the justest and sagest of magistrates, would be pronounced a tyrant, for almost all his injunctions and prohibitions were displeasing to the people. Moreover, we ought not to talk about "monarchy" and "royal power" in cases where a State is governed by a king subject to the approval of the people, since the prosperity of the State is then dependent on the people—than whom nothing could be more foolish and extravagant and, when it blazes out against the good, more insane. For, as Livy says, it is characteristic

Fern. Vasquez, *Illustr. Quest.* 1, 5, 10.
Hotman, *Franco Gallia*, Girard de Bernard, *Hist. France*, bk. 3.

of the mob to be either humble servants or haughty masters. And Xenophon, who was at once an able commander and a philosopher, testifies that popular power is fatal to virtue and can not be established save by the removal of all good men—a thesis adopted by Seneca in his terse question, “Who that is pleased by virtue, can please the people?” Consistently therewith we read how, among both Athenians and Romans, citizens of outstanding distinction, who had rendered excellent service to the State, were unjustly made to suffer ostracism, exile, and death through the malevolence of a stupid and ungrateful rabble.

Now, that was a brilliant prophecy that Anacharsis, the Scythian, made of the speedy downfall of Athens, based upon the fact that, though her wise men might give advice, yet it was her fools who gave the decision; for he observed how her Senate looked to the people to take measures for the well-being of the State (a matter of quite sacred importance)—which is as much as to look for wisdom in fools and madmen. Of a truth, highly ridiculous as it would be to divide the whole of every one’s wealth equally among the citizens, it would not be so ridiculous as to do the same thing with the ultimate sovereignty, because (as Bodin neatly puts it) any one can enjoy wealth, while governing wisdom is the rarest endowment of nature; and, much as an individual tyrant is to be dreaded, a mob of tyrants is more to be dreaded still. And those who laud the popular sovereignty of the Romans seem not to have read their history aright and not to have given adequate consideration to the miseries which so many and frequent seditions, secessions, struggles, and civil wars brought upon the State, all of which were entirely due to the holding of sovereignty in common, with the attendant difficulties of equal distribution thereof. But these numerous matters the plan of my treatise does not allow me to discuss.

[28] To continue the consideration of the just causes of war: War may not be declared against infidels merely because they are infidels, not even on the authority of emperor or Pope, for their infidel character does not divest them of those rights of ownership which they have under the law universal [*jus gentium*], and which are given not to the faithful alone but to every reasonable creature. For the earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof, the world and all they who dwell therein, and the Lord makes his sun to rise on the just and the unjust. Accordingly, although Nebuchadnezzar was an unbeliever, yet God gave him kingdom and power, as just said. This opinion is widely received, as Covarruvias shows.

[29] Nor is a war with infidels to be called just on the ground that (say) they refuse to acknowledge and obey the emperor as the lord of the whole earth, in accordance with the doctrine which has very many authorities in its favor. For men of the profoundest learning have clearly demonstrated that this widespread opinion is false and that the

In Method. hist., ch. 6.

Genes., ch. 1.

Matth., ch. 5, end,
and ch. 6, begin.

On c. 4, Reg. jur.
in vi, in 2nd part,
Relect. §9.

Cod. 7, 37, 3.
Dig. 14, 2, 9.
Cod. 1, 1, 1.
Dig. 49, 15, 24.

Card., Alb., Fulg.,
Alc., Chas., Domin.
de Soto and others.

emperor is not the lord of the whole earth. These are enumerated and followed by Covarruvias and Fernando Vasquez.

On c. 4, Reg. jur., in vi, in § 9 aforesaid.

Illustr. Quaest., 1, 20 and following ch.

This, then, is no ground on which the emperor can make a just war on unbelievers who are not under his sway: for no one can punish a person who is not in his power. More than that, such a war could not be rendered just by the authority of the Pope, for he has no jurisdiction, whether temporal or spiritual, over unbelievers, except as far as it is needed for the peace and prosperity of the Christian commonwealth; and it is not a function of the church to punish unbelievers who have never received the Christian faith, according to St. Paul in his Epistle to the Corinthians: "For what have I to do to judge them that are without?"

Dig. 2, 1, 20. And c. 2, bk. 1, Tit. 2 in vi. And Cod. 3, 15.

Ch. 5.

[30] On this, Thomas says that the prelates of the Church have received power over those only who have once subjected themselves to the Christian faith: and so a just war may be made on heretics who have abandoned the Christian faith. And Alfonso of Castile has on this topic a fine passage. The grounds on which a just war may be waged with infidels are, then, those on which one may be waged with any other people, and also that they are found hindering by their blasphemies and false arguments the Christian faith and also the free preaching of the Gospel rule, this being a wrong to Christians, who are entitled to preach the Gospel over the whole world.

Lawful punish^t of heret., bk. 2.

c. 11, C. 23, qu. 8. Innoc. and doctors in c. 8, X., bk. 3, Tit. 34. Thos. Aquin. 22, 10, 8.

[31] Now these just causes of making war ought to be weighed with deliberate judgment by the princes and kings, in whose hands is the authorizing and the planning of war; but if it chance that their motive for making war is human greed, that will not be imputed to the soldiery as a sin, seeing that they owe obedience to their prince. Accordingly, St. Augustine writes: "Should a just man happen to be serving as a soldier under a king who is even a sacrilegious person, he may rightly fight under his command, observing the ordered conditions of citizenship; for what he is commanded is either certainly not against God's precepts or it is not certain whether it be; so that, maybe, the iniquity of the command may involve the king in guilt, while the conditions of his service establish the innocence of the soldier."

c. 4, C. 23, qu. 1.

Bk. 22 against Faust. Manich., ch. 75, and c. 4, C. 23, qu. 1.

[32] It is, therefore, permissible for a Christian soldier to campaign under a pagan commander, for even Julian the Apostate had Christian soldiers and they obeyed him when he said, "Engage in battle for the defense of the State." But when he said, "Engage in battle against the Christians," they recognized their heavenly commander. And we are told that when the same emperor tried by the gift of largess to lure them to the sacrifices of the gentile gods, they returned him his largess and professed their Christianity with the utmost willingness in their longing for martyrdom and were dismissed the service. We read too how Marcus Aurelius Antoninus brought to a conclusion the war

c. 94, C. 11, qu. 3.

Sozomen, bk. 5, ch 17. Cassiodorus, bk. 6. Tripart. hist., c. 30. Nicephorus, bk. 10, ch. 23.

against the Marcomanni, overcoming the Sarmatians, the Vandals, and the Quadi, by the aid of the prayers of his Christian stipendiaries in which they besought God to rain on themselves and to thunder on the enemy. This demonstrates that subjects may campaign under a pagan and even heretic commander, unless it be transparently clear that the war is unjust; for service is due to God rather than to man.

[33] Now, although we are taught that we must obey even an infidel and unjust king, yet there are limits to this obedience; whence, although the Children of Israel were ordered by God to obey King Nebuchadnezzar, yet when that king issued his decree that they should worship his golden image (a decree which overstepped the bounds of royal power) the best of the Children of Israel preferred to be cast into the burning furnace rather than to obey the king's decree; and God so approved their choice that he saved them harmless from the fire. And what Christ says in the Gospel is of the same import: "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's": a teaching which the Apostle Paul most plainly set forth, saying, "Render therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor."

From the foregoing it may be gathered that our remarks so far about just causes of war deal rather with considerations of fairness and goodness and propriety, and not with the character of the legal result which is produced. Now, seeing that the right to make war is a prerogative of princes who have no superiors, discussion of the equity of the cause is inappropriate.

[34] A war may in one sense be styled just and yet not be waged for just cause; for the word "just" has varying meanings (as Budæus has remarked) and does not always indicate justice and equity but sometimes signifies a certain legal completeness. It is in this latter sense that we use the word "just" in connection with marriage and matrimony, and the age of attaining majority, and competence to bring suit, and sonship and liberty [*justæ nuptiæ, justum matrimonium, justa ætas, justa persona litem instituendi, justus filius, justa libertas*]. And Livy speaks of a just battle, using the word in the same sense: and it is in a like manner that the phrase "just war" is employed, meaning thereby a war publicly and lawfully waged by those who have the right of waging war.

We accordingly read in Ulpian: "Enemies [*hostes*] are those on whom the Roman people has publicly declared war or who have publicly declared war on the Roman people, but others are termed brigands or robbers" [*latrunculi vel prædones*]. And Pomponius says, "The term 'enemies' [*hostes*] implies that they have publicly declared war on us or we on them; all others are thieves or robbers." In such a war, even though it be not begun with just cause, the laws of war and captivity and postliminy, such as are appropriate in the case of enemies, are called into

Paul Orosius, bk. 7, ch. 15. Eusebius, bk. 5. Eccles. hist., ch. 5. Niceph., bk. 4, ch. 12.

Acts, ch. 1. c. 5, C. 15, qu. 6 and c. 94, C. 11, qu. 3.

1 Pet., ch. 2.

Dan. 2.

Matth. 22.

Rom. 13.

Dig. 17, 2, 3.

Bk. 49.

Dig. 49, 15, 24.

Dig. 50, 16, 118.

Institutes, 1, 10, pr. Dig. 23, 2: 1 and 54. Dig. 34, 9, 13; and 38, 11, 1. Quintil., bk. 5, ch. 10. and 49, 14, 16. Cod. 5, 34, 11. Dig. 1, 7, 2. Cicero, Topic. Dig. 28: 1, 1; and 50 generally; and 40, 8.

operation. This is abundantly evidenced by the fact that, though the Romans never began war save on just causes (their feacial law requiring close heed to that), yet their enemies, who could not have just cause (for both sides could not have it), became owners, even by Roman law, of the property which they captured in such a war and reduced captured persons into slavery; and that held good even where the enemy's case was palpably unjust.

The jurisconsult Paulus is conclusive on this point in the passage where he declares it a dictate of natural equity that a man who has been wrongfully captured by foreigners and then has returned to his country reacquires his former legal position, to wit, by the law of postliminy. It is implied herein that a man becomes a slave if taken prisoner even by an enemy who is waging an unjust war, for there would not otherwise be any need of the fiction of postliminy any more than there is when a man is captured by brigands, in which case he does not become a slave.

Dig. 28, 1, 13; and 49, 15: 19(2) and 24.

Nothing more is needed, then, so far as concerns the legal effects which are produced and the bringing into operation of the laws of war, than that the war should be waged by parties who are within the definition of "enemies" and who have the right to wage war. And, on this way of looking at the matter, it seems possible to defend the opinion of Alc. Emblems, 2, last ch. Fulg., on Dig. 1, 1, 5. Alc. and of Fulgositius, namely, that there can be a just war on both sides. This is contrary to the opinion which is accepted by experts and which, if it be just cause of war that is adverted to, is highly reasonable, seeing that, enemies being in conflict with each other, their rights must be in conflict too, and one and the same cause of war can not be just both for this side and for that.

Fulgositius and Jason on Dig. 1, 1, 5: Petr. de Ancharan. on the rule 'Peccatum' col. 13, verse Tertio quaero: Aretinus on Dig. 28, 1, 13: Alberic. de Rosa. on Cod. 1, 1, 4, col. 6: Abb. on c. 13, X. 24, 2—all of whom Natta quotes and follows, Consult. 284.

[36] Further, money is often declared the sinews of war; and that was the bearing of the jest of Titus Quinctius Flamininus, at the expense of Philopœmen, the Achæan prætor, who was furnished with much cavalry and heavy-armed soldiers, but little money, namely, that he had hands and legs, but lacked belly, which was also a description of the prætor's habit of body.

Plutarch, Apophth.

[37] The question has, accordingly, often been raised, who ought to bear the expense of war: prince or people? The general view is that if the prince has royal revenues assigned him by the citizens it should be at his expense that the war is conducted. And this is a very reasonable view, too, for it is a common and oft-recurring principle with philosophers and legislators that all principalities and kingdoms and empires exist wholly for the public benefit of the citizens and not for the benefit of the heads of the State. Cicero, accordingly, writes: * "There are two precepts of Plato to be observed by all men of authority in the government. The one is, in such sort to assert and defend the public interest that all their actions should refer to that, without any regard to their

Angel. on Cod. 8, 11, 18. Jason and Zasius on Dig. 23, 3, 12. Gul. de Cuneo, Baldus and Cyn. on Cod. 1, 2, 11.

Offc., bk. 1.

own advantage. The other is, to attend the service of the whole in such sort that while they are serving one part they do not abandon another. It is in the administration of a government as in the case of a ward: the commission has a regard to the benefit of those that are delivered up in charge and not those to whom such a charge or care is committed."

Quest. illustr., ch. 1
and following.

Baldus on Dig. 1, 16, 5.
Boerius in treatise on
Custody of the Keys.

Plut., Life of Demosth.

Kingdom of God,
bk. 5, ch. 12.

Sex. Aurel. Vict.
in Jul. (?).

Arctinus on Instit., 4,
6, 13. Bartolus on Dig.
33, 1, 13, 1. Oldra.
Consult., 234. Cas. on
Customs of Burgundy,
title de just. § 4.
Boerius, decis. 303.

Span. Ordin., l. 3 and
5, tit 19, pt. 2.

Cæsar, Gallic
War, bk. 5.

By inference from
Dig. 38, 1, 18.
Specul. on Tit. de
feu § quoniam ver. 12.
Baldus on Feud. Law,
bk. 1, tit. 17.
Ludov. Rom. on
Dig. 36, 1, 6, 6.

Fernando Vasquez discusses this doctrine at length. If, however, the prince has no sufficient revenues, the whole realm ought to bear the expenses of war; and no definite limit to the contribution for this purpose can be assigned. For, in the words of the general Cleobulus' answer to the allies of the Athenians in the war against Philip, when they clamored for the fixing of a definite contribution, "War admits of no fixed ending." And it points in the same direction, that, in Cato's words, every well-ordered State should display domestic industry and a well-filled treasury and smallness of private fortunes; and Cato has posited the contrary as the vice of times of moral corruption, namely, public penury and private wealth, seeing that luxury and sloth soon corrupt a State (as Sallust narrates and St. Augustine proves).

Princes ought, nevertheless, to keep in mind that very moderate reply made by Tiberius Cæsar to the treasury officials who wanted the provinces to be burdened with tribute: "A good shepherd shears his sheep, but does not flay them." And another memorable saying is that of Trajan, when his wife, Poppæa Plotina, chid him for the chicaneries with which his procurators were vexing the provinces so sorely: he said that he was beginning to loathe such vile extortions, and he drew a remarkable parallel between the fiscus and the spleen, saying that just as in our bodies, when there is an enlargement of the spleen, the rest of the organism wastes away, so in a State, when the treasury of the prince is overswollen, the other members grow feeble and diseased.

It is deducible from what has been said that a citizen is not bound to follow the prince to the wars at his own expense, but that he ought to receive pay either from the prince or from the State. Should, however, very pressing necessity arise, e. g., in defense of prince or State, every one, regardless of sex or rank, is bound to join in the operations of the war; and the laws of the Kingdom of Spain visit with very heavy penalties those who shirk this duty.

[39] And this explains the custom of the Gauls to summon at the beginning of their wars the council of warriors, which by their common law was attended by all men over puberty, in full armor, and the last to arrive was put to death with all manner of torture in the sight of the assembly. So also a feudal vassal is under an obligation to assist his lord in a just war, even at his own expense.

[40] The question may be raised whether any loss which may be incurred by reason of the war ought to be made good. Well, where a man goes to the war for the defense of the State without pay, he deserves

to be reimbursed any loss which he may suffer on that account, but loss sustained in war by a soldier who is serving for pay will not be made up to him—save that by the laws of the Kingdom of Spain loss of this kind is ordinarily to be made good out of any booty that may be taken. On the other hand, one who has been summoned to an unjust war has no action at law either for the recovery of pay or for reimbursement of loss, for no right of action is allowed to rise out of circumstances of disgrace [*ex turpi causa nulla datur actio*].

By inference from
Dig. 14, 2, 2, 1.

By inference from,
and Angel. on,
Dig. 14, 2, 1.

Span. Ordln., l. 4, tit.
25, par. 3.

Dig. 45, 1, 26 and 27;
and 17, 1, 6, 3. Innoc.
in c. 13, X. 2, 24.

CHAPTER III.

About the duel or single combat.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Why duelling is forbidden. 2. Duelling forbidden when arising out of defamation. 3. The usage of the duel very old in Spain. 4. The duel was a usage of several peoples. 5. Custom does not render duelling lawful. 6. The custom of duelling alien to Greek and Roman institutions. 7. Lawfulness of duelling with an enemy. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. David slew Goliath in single combat. 9. Single combat very important in war. 10. The end of a war sometimes issues out of a duel. 11. The combat between the Horatii and the Curiatii. 12. Not always safe to obtain the result of a war by a duel. 13. Of Metius Suffetius. |
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The practice of duelling has, with complete justification, been forbidden by the Canon Law, as a detestable invention of the devil; and, with a view to its utter abolition, various censures and penalties have been ordained, not only against the combatants themselves but also against those who initiate or counsel, or are even present at, the combat.

[1] The reason is that this mode of settling differences subverts the judicial system and all the legal authority, with its provision of actions-at-law whereby every one may assert his right in court. There is, too, the impropriety of a man setting himself up as his own law-giver and judge, the very reason for the existence of laws and magistrates being that they may discriminate lawful from unlawful and award to every man his right. Moreover this mode of settling disputes may do violence to justice, for numbers of persons who have stupidly and foolishly submitted to the arbitrament of the gods of war a case which, both in law and in equity, was an excellent one, have died in the fight. Besides, it is wrong to tempt God, and this is what it amounts to when a duel is fought (as often happens) in order to clear up the truth. Lastly, both divine and human law forbid homicide; now a duel very often results in homicide; so the duel may be said to be prohibited, since the prohibition of anything is deemed to involve the prohibition of everything by which that thing is brought about.

[2] There are, however, some who hold that this kind of battle is permissible when one's reputation has been assailed, for (say they) he who does not trouble about his reputation is a savage, reputation being above profit and in the same rank as life. I do not, however, accept this view. For (in the emperor's words) courts are provided in active operation and the protection of the public law made accessible to all precisely in order that no one may arrogate to himself a right of private vengeance; nor can he who seeks from the judicial authorities redress for an

c. 22, C. 2, qu. 5.
And c. 1 and the
whole title, X, 5, 35.
And whole title, X,
5, 14. And Council
of Trent, sess. 19.

Dig. 4, 2, 13.

Dig. 1, 1, 1.

c. 2, X, 5, 35.

c. 22, C. 2, qu. 5
and c. 1, X, 5, 14.

By inference from
Dig. 23, 1, 16.

Baldus on Feudal Law,
bk. 2, tit. 53, c. 1, Coll.
5. Cagn., Decius,
Curt. Sen., Curt.
Jun., and others whom
Fern. Vasquez men-
tions in Quest.
illustr. 1, c. 47.

Dig. 29, 4, 26.
Dig. 40, 2, 9.
In Cod. 1, 9, 14.

injury offered to himself or his family be considered reckless and careless of his honor.

[3] Further it is notorious that this kind of combat was in vogue in very ancient times, especially in Spain, as much for the display of valor as for the discovery of truth; for when Scipio returned to Nova Carthago for the performance of his vows and for the gladiatorial show which he had arranged in honor of his late father and uncle, the spectacle was such as Livy describes in the following passage:

"The show was not of that class of men whom the trainers [*lanistæ*] usually procure, slaves, to wit, and freedman and such as sell their blood; but all the service of the combatants was voluntary and unpaid. For some were sent by the petty princes to show an example of the natural courage of their people; others came forward to fight in compliment to their general; others were led to give and accept challenges by a spirit of emulation. Some decided by their swords disputes which they had not been able or willing to settle by argument, with an agreement that the decision was to be in favor of the victor. Nor was this confined to men of obscure rank, but it included such distinguished and well-known men as Corbis and Orsua; these latter were cousins who had a dispute about the chieftainship of a city called Ibis, and they arranged that they would adjust it by the sword. Corbis was the elder. The father of Orsua was the last chieftain, having succeeded to that post on the death of his elder brother. Now Scipio was anxious to settle the dispute by argument and thus allay their jealousies, but they both asserted that they had refused that to their common kindred and that they would have no other judge, divine or human, than Mars. The elder's pride was in his strength, the younger's in his youth, and each preferred death to becoming the subject of the other. And as every effort to divert them from their madness failed, they gave the army a glorious show, and at the same time an illustration of the mischiefs that are wrought among men by the thirst for power. The elder, by reason of his experience in arms, and his address, easily mastered the unscientific exertions of the younger."

Bk. 8.

So Livy.

[4] In later days, this mode of settling disputes was allowed among the Spaniards (although its inequitable character was admitted) for the purpose of avoiding lawsuits, in certain cases and subject to certain conditions. And the Lombards, too, had the custom of referring a controversy to the duel in certain cases, if there had been some default in the judicial proceeding and the judge's decision was impugnable. And the Emperor Frederic Ahenobarbus decreed that on certain occasions matters should be left to the arbitrament of a duel: and a glance at the Salic law shows that the custom of the Gauls and such differs much from that of the Lombards, one of their extant constitutions being the follow-

Span. Ordin., bk. 8, tit. 14, par. 3.
Tit. 4, On lawsuits, part 7.

Lombard Laws, tit. qual. quis se defen. deb. and tit. de purg. rei and tit. de hom. lib. hom.

Feudal Law, bk. II. tit. 53, c. 1, §§ 1 and 10.

ing (of Philip): "When a man is charged with some secret crime of a capital character, and he is admittedly a person who could be subjected to torture, but could not otherwise be condemned, let him, on the demand of the accuser, undergo wager of battle."

On Instit. 3, 1, 5.

Joannes Faber deals with this constitution: and Guido Papæ refers Decis. 617. to it, adducing and explaining a certain other imperial constitution about the procedure in the duel and the grounds upon which it can be ordered. Decis. 191.

Decius, consult. 97.
Curt., Jun., consult.
173. Curt., Sen., on
Dig. 12, 2, 31.
Cagnol. and others
mentioned by Fern.
Vasq. in Quest.
illustr., bk. 1,
ch. 40.

The duel is customary and very frequent in Italy, especially in defense of a man's honor. Hence there has been a considerable amount of careful discussion, on such points as, What matters may be settled by the duel? Which of the two adversaries is the challenger, which the challenged? Who are allowed the duel? When may the duel be declined? When may an auxiliary, ordinarily called a champion, be allowed? What about choice of weapons and ground? Must the opponents take the *jusjurandum calumniæ* (i. e., the oath that they are not wantonly making or denying the charge)?—and many other questions which frequently crop up in connection with this kind of battle.

Cod. 8, 52, 2
and 1, 14, 5.

c. 13, X, 2, 1 and
c. 1 and 2, X, 5, 32.

[5] Numerous men of great learning, although well aware that this custom is invalid as being contrary to law—especially in view of the canon law's express prohibition of it to persons with a *locus standi* in either forum, when the question raised is one of sin—have, however, discussed the perversion just as if it were valid, seeing that the custom has held its ground in point of fact and that what obtains in fact is at times assimilated to law.

Dig. 28, 7, 20; and
40, 4, 54.
Alexand., consult.
107, col. 6.

[6] Indeed, that custom of referring disputes between citizens and allies and comrades to single combat is not only repugnant to Christian institutions, but also far removed from the ancient discipline both of the Greeks and the Romans; for they reckoned it highly disgraceful that allies in war, who ought to reserve their joint strength for the upholding of their common cause, should be led to fight with one another, as often was the case, by foolish and dangerous vanity, and, rather than have their differences adjudicated on by laws that were common to both parties, should wish them to be adjusted by the sword: which is indeed a very unreasonable method and is just as if two philosophers or jurisconsults should decide with swords the question which of them is the wiser.

Method. hist., c. 5.

And of all the varieties of injustice there can be none baser or madder than that whereby a frail and slight person, to whom offense has been given, is branded with infamy unless he meets his opponent, no matter how much stronger than himself, in armed encounter and hazards his life: especially having regard to the provision of nature (pointed out by Bodin in connection with the Scythians) whereby those with the minimum of intelligence possess the maximum of bodily strength. And, in truth, on this reasoning even the strongest men if compared with beasts which surpass them in strength might deserve to incur infamy.

[7] A wise man ought, then, to exhaust all other expedients before having recourse to arms. But of course no blame attaches to those who resort to this kind of conflict for the public good and not for vengeance or private hate, for their conduct is even laudable. Accordingly a man who engages a public enemy in single battle pursuant to the orders of his general or with his consent (apart from which such irregular fighting is not permissible) not only does not sin against the laws and statutes of the Popes, but ought also to derive great glory from his act, as in the case of Torquatus, Corvinus, Marcellus, Scipio, Æmilianus, and others. For such combats are demonstrably lawful, upon the same principle as that upon which a war is just in which the combatants meet a glorious death on behalf of fatherland or Church. For there is no kind of fighting with an enemy in the course of a war which amounts to tempting God, within the meaning of the divine prohibition; to destroy an enemy is not an act of homicide, nor such as natural law forbids, but is part of the duty of a good soldier.

Dig. 3, 1, 1, 6.
Hiero. Cagnol., on
Dig. 50, 17, 125.

c. 9, C. 23, qu. 8 and
c. 46, C. 23, qu. 5.
Span. Ordin., bk. 3,
tit. 25.

c. 13 and c. 41 (?)
C. 23, qu. 5.

[8, 9] Accordingly it was just as proper for David to lay Goliath low in single fight as in the course of a general engagement. Indeed these encounters not infrequently determine the issue of the whole war. Livy, accordingly, when dealing with the fight between Torquatus and Gallus, says: "This combat was so decisive of the whole war that the Gallic army fled from their camps in a panic and crossed into Tibur and, shortly afterwards, into Campania." The same thing happened in the Social War: an enormous man, one of the Gallic auxiliaries whom Lucius Cluentius had raised for his struggle with Sulla, rushed forward and challenged any one on the Roman side and a Numidian of small stature slew him: the Gauls were thunderstruck and fled pell-mell: and after their line of battle had been thus broken, the rest of Cluentius' men refused to stand and fled in a panic to Nola.

1 Sam., c. 17.

Bk. 5.

Appian, Civil war,
bk. 1.

[10, 11] Sometimes the commanders-in-chief arrange such encounters, both sides being represented either by individuals or by bands of equal size chosen by the chiefs, and the issue of the encounter is to determine the war. We read that this was done in days of old by Tullus Hostilius, King of the Romans, and by Metius Suffetius, King of the Albans. For each side was suffering loss through the frequency of battles fought with equal strength and so an abridged form of the war was arranged (in the language of Lucius Florus) and the fate of each side was left in the hands of the Horatii and Curiatii respectively, two sets of triplets; and a solemn treaty was first struck between the two kings and peoples and conditions agreed to whereby the conquered side was to be surrendered to the conquering.

Bk. 1, ch. 3.

Livy, bk. 1.

I do not think this kind of combat is improper, for even Thomas Aquinas (who compares the duel to trial by lot and who disapproves of it if the object is to prove or discover some secret matter) does not

2, 2, quest. 95, art. 8.

disapprove where the combat is for purposes of discrimination and the settlement of a controversy—such as certainly was the case in David's encounter with the Philistine, which met with God's approval. And I think this sound when the combat is arranged between the commanders-in-chief or by the authority of those who have the right to make war, with a view to avoid its evils. And we read that, when this is so, permission for the combat has occasionally been granted by the Roman Pontiffs. And so, after Charles of Anjou and Pedro of Tarragona had been warring for a long time about Sicily, they agreed, with the approval

Froissart, bk. 1. of Pope Martin, to decide the dispute by single combat.

[12, 13] I can not think that this manner of settling disputes is altogether safe, seeing that it is foolhardy to stake the sum of one's fortunes upon the hazard of the one or the other individual, or that it will in every case put an end to the war. What happened in the case of the fight between the sets of triplets shows this; for Metius Suffetius, through staking his fortunes and the whole result of the war and the valor of his army on the fortune and valor of the Curiatii, lost in a moment his kingdom and the liberty alike of himself and his men, in the defense of which they had been fighting for many years; and though the Romans were victorious by the award of fortune, to which they rashly had submitted themselves, still they did not find their victory altogether secure; for though Metius Suffetius did indeed, forthwith upon his defeat, surrender himself and all he had to the Romans, yet, when subsequently the expedition to Veii furnished the occasion, he repented of his rashness and tried

Livy, bk. 1 to betray the Roman army.

Wherefore, when the safety and liberty of us all, or the whole of our possessions, is in the balance we ought to fight with all our available strength; for otherwise not only will the conquered blame his rashness, but the victor will also not gain complete safety. For (as Livy says) a man's spirit is finally conquered when the confession has been extorted from him that he has been beaten in a just and solemn war, not by stratagem nor by chance, but after a hand-to-hand engagement of all his forces. Nor, in a word, is it credible that any nation or any individual—as the Roman Senate found out in the case of the Privernians—will consent

Livy, bk. 8. to stay in an irksome condition, longer than is unavoidable.

CHAPTER IV.

About Hostage-seizing [Pigneratio], which is called Reprisals.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Hostage-seizing permitted by very ancient custom.2. In what circumstances permissible to-day.3. Whether the custom is approved by law.4. Sometimes an innocent man is punished, for sufficient cause.5. A man, even though innocent, may thus be punished through his property but not corporally. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">6. Hostage-seizing to the hurt of innocent persons illegal.7. St. Ambrose reproved the Emperor Theodosius.8. The principle underlying <i>l. vindicari C. de pæn.</i> (Cod. 9, 47, 20.)9. In hostage-seizing it may happen that innocent persons are killed.10. Hostage-seizing only permissible subject to the same conditions as war. |
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[1] It is clear that the forcible seizure of hostages (Greek *androlepsia*) was permitted by the customary law of most ancient times: for it was a very old usage that if a homicide fled into a foreign town and the townsmen would not surrender him on the demand of those who were entitled to deal with the crime, these latter were allowed forcibly to take hostages. For we read of the following ordinance: "If any one has met with a violent death, his clansmen and blood relatives have the right of androlepsy until there has been a judicial inquiry and those guilty of the homicide have been either punished or surrendered: up to three persons may be seized, but no more."

These words are used by Demosthenes in his speech against Aristogiton and the orator asserts in that context, but perhaps only out of devotion to his case, that hostage-seizing is lawful, not against those who shelter a fugitive homicide, but against those only among whom the killing took place. In Julius Pollux we read, however, that it was lawful also against those who had sheltered a fugitive homicide and who had not given him up, on demand, either to punishment or to vengeance and had not themselves fitly punished him: Budæus has commented on On Dig. 48, 19, 16, a. this.

[2] The conditions in which alone that kind of hostage-seizing which we call reprisals is lawful at the present day, are these: Brigands or pirates or others belonging to some country or other have committed homicide or other crime or have done some unjustifiable damage and the victims have not succeeded in obtaining from the government of that country or from those who have given asylum to the wrong-doers either their surrender or punishment: in such circumstances hostage-seizing is legitimate.

[3] Whether this is a lawful custom is, however, a subject of controversy. An especial point is made of the iniquity and injustice of inflicting punishment on an innocent person for the fault and offense of another, for liability to punishment attaches to the doer of the wrongful act. It is written: "The innocent and the guiltless thou shalt not slay" Exod. 23. and "The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." And "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin."

[4] Nevertheless there are admitted to be occasions on which punishment may, advisedly, be inflicted even though there is no fault. This underlies the rule given in Exodus: "If an animal kills a man, let it be stoned," and the laws of Draco, the Athenian law-giver, contained a similar provision. On the same principle, "if a woman approach unto any beast and lie down thereto" the beast, though void of reason and therefore incapable of guilt, is ordered to be killed with her, lest the beast so grossly contaminated cause the vile deed to be remembered. Moreover God took away the life of the son born to David out of illicit intercourse on account of the father's sin, and the young people of Sodom were consumed by fire together with their elders, without having themselves committed any sin. Hence God himself says, "I am a jealous God, visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation."

[5] Now, although man ought not to imitate these divine judgments save so far as they go on unmistakable grounds, and although, accordingly, no law on any ground whatever ought to inflict bodily punishment for another person's offense (and that is why Covarruvias reprobated the pronouncement made by the emperors Arcadius and Honorius to the effect that, in their imperial leniency and indulgence, they had spared the lives of the children of those guilty of treason; for they had no right to kill them), yet there are circumstances in which human law may inflict even on the innocent such punishments as fine, public sale of property, and so forth, on general grounds of public expediency and in order the more effectually to deter people from wrongdoing; and this is provided for in different places in the laws and canons, especially in the case of the sons and grandsons of those who have been guilty of treason against either the divine or human law, who are to be branded with *infamia* and with confiscation of their goods. Cicero says that the law is quite clear on this point. The reason of this was to make parents better citizens through their love for their children. These views of St. Augustine and others are set out in full and discussed by Covarruvias.

c. 7 and c. 8, C. 1.
qu. 4. Dig. 48, 19,
26. St. Aug., q. 8 on
Joshua.
Cod. 9, 47, 22. And
c. 2, X, 1, 2, and c. 3.
X, 3, 11. And cap.
Romana (?) X, 5, 39.
And Cod. 6, 58, 14.

Ezek. 18.

Deut. 24.

c. 5, X, 2, 6 (§ si
vero), and c. 6, Dist.
22 and the glossators
thereon. And c. 23
X, 5, 33. And c. 23
10 (clauses 1 and 2),
X, 5, 7. Gloss on c.
2, X, 1, 2. And there
is a leading text in c.
11, C. 1, qu. 4.

2 Sam., ch. 12:

Genes., ch. 19.

Exod., ch. 20.

Ch. 21.

Lev., ch. 20.

c. 4, C. 15, qu. 1

St. Aug., q. 8 on
Joshua. Thom., Card.
and others mentioned
by Covarruvias, bk.
2, varior. resolut.
c. 8.

Varior. resolut.,
bk. 2, ch. 8.
In Cod. 9, 8, 5.

As in Cod. 9, 8, 5
and the like.
Epist. to Brutus.

Varior. resolut., bk.
2, ch. 8.

[6] Whence (if I err not) it is clear that hostage-taking of this description is lawful, as is deduced by common consent from St. Augustine—not, however, to the bodily harm of the innocent, who are not

Joan. Papon., in Arrest., 5, 3, 2.

chargeable with any wrong-doing, but restricted to goods. For just as any one by mere consent can render himself liable to loss of goods, but not to hurt of limb or body, so also the laws and statutes, to which every one's consent is implied, can deal out punishment in proper circumstances even where there is no fault, provided it be pecuniary and not corporal.

Dig. 9, 2, 13, c. 36, X, 5, 39. Notable gloss on c. 19, c. 23, qu. 5. A neat gloss on rubric Cod. 10, 47, which gloss commentators follow in various places, and which is commended by Baldus on Cod. 4, 13, by Alex. on Dig. 42, 1, 63, num., 10, by Angel. and Jas. on Instit. 4, 6, 10, num. 68.

[7, 8] And so the rebuke which St. Ambrose administered to the Emperor Theodosius was a very just one, when that Emperor ordered the promiscuous killing of the populace because a soldier had been killed in some disturbance. The Emperor (said he) was entitled to inflict capital punishment on the killers of the soldier, but it was unjust to order the death of innocent persons, even on the ground of the disturbance. The Emperor accordingly confessed his guilt with tears and did public penance in the sight of the whole Church and he issued a decree that if ever the Emperor should pronounce too severe a sentence in anger, the execution thereof was to be suspended for thirty days.

q. 10 on Joshua, c. 2, C. 23, qu. 2 and c. 1, bk. 2, tit. 11 in vi: and thereon Anch., Dom. and Franc., Jac. de Canib. Bartolus on reprisals, 33. Sal. on Authentica, Omnino, Cod. 4, 12, 4 (Nov. 52, 1). And c. 16, X, 2, 23. Jacob de Bellou on Nov. 52.

c. 69, C. 11, qu. 3. St. Aug., Kingdom of God, bk. 5, ch. 26.

Cod. 9, 47, 20 and c. 69, C. 11, qu. 3.

[9] Further, just as intentional killing of innocent persons, for example, women and children, is not allowable in war (if unintentional, as when a town is assaulted with catapults and other engines of war, the case is different, because such things are inevitable in war), so also in this hostage-taking, although it is not allowable to inflict bodily hurt on the innocent, but only to confiscate their property, yet it may be that they are unintentionally killed without any liability arising, provided that the hostage-taking could not otherwise be carried out.

[10] Hostage-taking, it must be noted, is not lawful save in circumstances and conditions in which war would have been held lawful alike by divine and natural and civil law. And so the authority of a sovereign possessing power to declare war is required, nor has a judge competence to authorize it, nor may it be resorted to between citizen and citizen. Although it was lawful in Athens of old to resort to androlepsy on private initiative, yet fines were fixed for improper exercise of it (as Budæus has noted, on the authority of Pollux). Accordingly, it is a practice which even to-day must be submitted to for just cause, that is to say, on the ground that the country against which it is allowed has neglected to take proceedings against certain of its citizens for a wrong done by them. In other circumstances, where there is no true and just cause, a grant of hostage-taking will be inoperative.

c. 2, C. 23, qu. 2.

Novels 134 and 52.

Dig. 48, 19, 16, 8.

Dig. 40, 5, 26, 7; and 43, 4, 1, 5.

CHAPTER V.

Of Capture in War and the Law of Postliminy.

1. Things captured in just war belong to the captors.
2. The opinion of Alcinius rejected, that all present-day wars are civil wars.
3. Difference between movables and immovables as regards capture in war.
4. All booty is at the discretion of the general, not of the troops.
5. Generals sometimes send their booty to the treasury.
6. They sometimes divide it among the troops.
7. Part of the booty may be due even to persons not present at the battle.
8. Sometimes the booty is granted to the troops by proclamation and left to their discretion.
9. A share of booty due to the prince and to the general.
10. The Roman custom of dedicating part of booty to the Gods.
11. No taking of booty unless the enemy has been completely conquered, nor before due signal given.
12. Punishment to be visited on one who divides the booty fraudulently.
13. No share in the booty due to a soldier who has fled.
14. Soldiers ordered to sell their booty, so as not to overload the baggage trains.
15. *Res sacrae* may not be taken as booty.
16. Whether slavery is a natural or a human institution.
17. Enslavement does not destroy natural liberty.
18. No force (being merely matter of fact) sets up slavery (which is matter of law).
19. Those taken prisoners of war by Christians nowadays are not made slaves, save in a war with infidels.
20. A prisoner of war who returns home recovers his former liberty:
21. Unless he has sworn to return to his captors.
22. A deserter has no postliminy, unless he be a slave.
23. Those who surrendered have no right of postliminy, because taken with arms in their hands.
24. The ancient controversy about Mancinus.
25. Even women and children may be made prisoners of war.
26. A prisoner in a just war must pay such ransom price as he has promised.
27. To whom prisoners of war belong.
28. A prisoner of war may not be killed upon private authority.
29. The ransom price not to be increased after it has once been agreed on.
30. The remedies open to one who has paid for a prisoner's ransom.
31. Ransom of prisoners treated with favor.
32. Neglect of duty to ransom a prisoner.
33. Retaken land is within the law of postliminy.
34. Other things which may also be within it.
35. Whether things captured by the enemy and retaken from him vest in their former owner.
36. Property which the enemy has acquired is not transferable [*in commercio*] unless of a kind which is susceptible of postliminy.
37. When booty becomes the enemy's property.
38. Things captured by pirates do not become their property and, therefore, if retaken, must be restored to their former owner:
39. Though this is otherwise ordained by the laws of the Kingdom of Spain.
40. Whether stolen property which has been captured in war ought to be restored to the original owner.
41. Whether *res incorporales* can be captured in war.
42. Dispute between the Thebans and Thesalians.
43. A juristic whole [*universitas*] is not destroyed so long as one constituent part survives.

Offc., bk. 1.

The first business of justice, says Cicero, is to see that no one hurts another save under the pressure of some wrong done to him; and this is the underlying cause of just wars, as we have shown above at some length.

Bk. 6, ch. 18. But this saying of Cicero's is, however, repudiated by Lactantius, who

says that it is spoiled by the addition of the final member. The phrase "save etc." ought (says he) to have been left out in accordance with the teaching of Socrates to the effect that revenge, like all infliction of evil, is injustice. Nevertheless it is a safe statement that a sovereign prince who goes to war because of wrong done to him is entirely unblamable, when he is prompted, not by diseased pride, but by love of justice, and when his object is the restraint of a wicked enemy and the defense of his own people. For, as Seneca puts it, no wrong is done to you if you are yourself made to endure what you were the first to do to others.

[1] That is the basis of the rule whereby what we capture in a just war becomes our property; and this is a lawful mode of acquisition Instit. 2, 1, 17. (*justus modus acquirendi dominii*), as Cicero indicates in the passage where he says, "Nothing is private property by its nature; but things become private property either by long enjoyment on the part of the first occupant; or by victory, as when acquired in war; or by statute or covenant or stipulation or partition." This principle is obtained from the Offic., bk. 1. law of nations (*jus gentium*) and is approved by the divine, the canon, 1 Sam., c. 30. and the civil law. And the reason of this rule is to be found not so much c. 9, Dist. 1 and c. 10 Dist. 1 and c. 25, C. 23, qu. 5 and c. 29, X, 2, 24. in the satisfaction given to the wronged party as in the restraint imposed on those who wage unjust wars, as St. Augustine remarks in the passage quoted in the preface hereto.

[2] I do not agree with Alciatus in his attempt to show that in a war between Christians things captured do not become the property of the captors. His argument is as follows: All persons in the Roman world became Roman citizens by the enactment of Caracalla; at the present day Christendom is the Roman world; all Christians are brothers by the law of Christ; wars occurring between them are more like civil wars; therefore, that rule of war whereby things captured become the property of the captors does not apply between Christians. On Dig. 50, 16, 118.

Why, if that were so, there could not be a just war between Christians, but its falsity is clear enough from what we have said elsewhere. So things captured even in this kind of war will become the property of the captors, save that a very ancient custom prevails among Christians whereby persons captured at any time in a just war do not lose their liberty. We shall shortly deal with this exception.

It is impossible to describe a war between two sovereign princes or two free peoples as a civil war, for those are not fellow citizens who do not owe the same fealty and obedience; but even when the war is against rebellious subjects and citizens, the laws of war whereby we acquire ownership of things captured from the enemy are not straightway inoperative, for persons who embark on treasonable schemes against the imperial majesty cease to be citizens and become enemies. Cicero accordingly asserts with abundant argument that the war waged against Antony, an enemy of the State, was a just one, while on Antony's side the war was

Dig. 1, 1, 5.
c. 9, Dist. 1.
Instit. 2, 1, 17.
Dig. 49, 15, 28.
Dig. 41, 1: 5(7)
and 51.

Dig. 49, 15, 21, 1.

Bodin, Method. Hist.,
ch. 6, generally.

Dig. 49, 15: 26 and
19(8); and 4, 5, 5, 1.

unjust, and so, the laws of war which only apply to enemies did not apply in his favor—a topic discussed by us at length elsewhere, and what we then said can be imported here. On just war, above, ch. 2

[3] Again, it is indisputable that the ownership of things captured in a just war is transferred to the conqueror, but this is subject to a distinction between movables and immovables; for immovables, e. g., land, become public property—although we read that on more than one occasion, in days gone by, land taken in war was divided among the soldiery as a reward for strenuous exertions, and this was so ordained by Romulus. Dig. 41, 1, 16; and 6, 1, 15, 2. And Alexander Severus made grants of land, taken from the enemy, to the border lords and soldiery, to belong to them provided that their heirs also were soldiers and never to devolve on civilians, for he thought that they would be all the keener soldiers if the rights which they defended were their own. Dig. 41, 1, 16; and 6, 1, 15, 2. Seeing, however, that these lands are acquired for the prince and not for the soldiery, it will be left in the discretion of the prince to say how they are to be treated.

And according to the constitutions of the kingdom of Spain not only land but also any ships of war which are captured in a naval war are acquired for the king. Dig. 41, 1, 16; and 6, 1, 15, 2. But as regards movable booty of every other description, it was not customary to assign it to the soldiery nor had the general any right in it, but it was the quæstor's duty to sell it and to pay the price into the treasury. Dig. 41, 1, 16; and 6, 1, 15, 2. And Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us that there was a statute to that effect and that it was because he had violated this law in dividing among the soldiers the booty taken from the Volscians, more than for any other reason, that Marcius Coriolanus was condemned by the people. And that is the point, too, of St. Ambrose's remark, that it is an injunction of military discipline to deliver up to the king everything that is preserved, following the example of Abraham, who made over all his spoil to the king of Sodom.

[4] It is clear, however, that in later times at Rome all booty was at the disposal of the general and that is abundantly shown by several passages in Livy. Thus he tells us how the Phocæans opened their gates and surrendered themselves to the Romans, on the faith of an undertaking that they should receive no hostile treatment; nevertheless the soldiery went off in different directions for the purpose of sacking the city; thereupon Lucius Æmilius withstood and called the soldiers back saying that it was captured towns and not surrendered towns that could be sacked, and declared that these matters are under the control of the general, not the soldiers.

Elsewhere Livy describes how Camillus sought the advice of the Senate at the time of his siege of Veii. He saw that victory was within his grasp and that, consequent on the capture of so rich a place, there would be more booty than in all other wars put together. Now he shrank from incurring either the anger of the soldiers, should he be nig-

garding in his division of the booty, or the jealousy of the Senators, should his division be too generous; so he referred the matter to the Senate. Livy, bk. 5.

[5] Now commanders sometimes send the whole or a portion of the booty to the treasury through the quæstors. Thus Lucius Furius, prætor, when celebrating his triumph over the Gauls, brought into the treasury 320,000 pounds of copper and 170,000 pounds of silver. Cic., Epist. 27. Marcus Helvius and Quintus Minucius, too, brought into the treasury an enormous mass of silver and gold out of their Spanish booty; so did Titus Quinctius, after the overthrow of Philip; and so, to a much greater amount than the rest, did Lucius Æmilius Paulus, after the overthrow of Perseus. Livy, bk. 31. And Camillus, the general who scattered the Falisci, and took their camp, turned over the whole of his booty to the quæstors, thereby rousing no small anger in his soldiers, who, overborne by the severity of their commander, both detested and marvelled at this virtue (in Livy's words) : and in different passages of Livy the account may be found of the payment into the treasury of large sums of silver and gold, being booty taken from the enemy. Livy, bk. 34.

[6] Sometimes commanders sell the booty and divide the price among the soldiers, with a preference in favor of those whose bravery in the war had been the most conspicuous and with due regard to the rank and dignity of each participant. Thus Julius Cæsar promised in Gaul to give by way of booty to each soldier 200 sesterces in return for their toil and endurance (for they were indefatigably constant in toil in wintry days, on most arduous marches, and under intolerable cold) and 2000 sesterces to each centurion. And out of the booty taken by Lucius Æmilius Paulus, on the overthrow of Perseus, each foot-soldier received 100 denarii, and each centurion twice, and each horse-soldier thrice that amount. A. Her., on Gallic war, bk. 5.

Marcus Valerius Corvinus, after his defeat of the Samnites, and Caius Junius, after the capture of Bovianum, gave all the booty to the army. So did the Senate in the case of the booty taken from the towns of Epirus which had defected to Perseus. And so (says Livy) after the word had been given to sack the towns, the booty was so vast that each horse-soldier received 400 denarii as his share and each foot-soldier 200. And such division of the spoil is held lawful. Livy, bk. 45.

It is recorded in Holy Scripture, too, how the Lord commanded Moses that he and Eleazar should take "the sum of the prey that was taken" from the Midianites whom the Israelites had conquered and should divide it equally "between them that took the war upon them" and that a fiftieth part should be given to the Levites "which keep the charge of the tabernacle of the Lord." c. 10, Dist. 1. Cod. 8, 53, 36. Bartolus on Dig. 49, 15, 28. Sp. Ordin., bk. 1, 17, 19 and 20, tit. 26, par. 2.

[7] And after David had beaten Amalek in battle, he gathered together all the spoil, and they who had been present in the battle claimed that it should be divided among themselves alone without anything going

Num. 31.

to those who had not been with them there, but David said that they should share equally, both those that went down to the battle and those that tarried by the stuff; and from that day forward that was a statute and ordinance for Israel. The same ruling occurs in the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain. This is also the explanation of the conduct of Caius Fabius Ambustus, military tribune: At the time when he marched to the storm of Anxur, his colleagues, Cnæus Cornelius Cossus and Valerius Potitus, had gone with a part of the army on a ravaging expedition in order to draw off the Volscians; so after he had captured the town he kept his troops back from plundering it, until the arrival of his colleagues and their troops, for he said with emphasis that they too had taken Anxur, in that they had prevented the rest of the Volscians from aiding in its defense.

1 Sam., c. 30.

Span. Ordin., bk. 25,
tit. 26, par. 2.

Livy, bk. 4.

[8] Lastly, commanders sometimes rouse the zeal of their men by decreeing the whole booty to them before an engagement, each man being allowed to keep whatever the fortune of battle has put in his way; this is what the Senate decided with regard to the booty of Veii, in accordance with the opinion of Publius Licinius, to the effect that it would be more agreeable and pleasurable for each to take home with him what he had seized from the enemy with his own hand than to obtain many times as much on the award of another: this decree was made, however, with the dissent of Appius Claudius, who blamed the liberality as novel, lavish, inequitable, and ill-advised. So far, then, regarding the things which are acquired in actual fighting: it is otherwise with regard to enemy property which comes into one's hands apart from any struggle; this becomes his who first obtains possession of it.

Livy, bk. 5.

Dig. 41, 1, 51; and 41,
2, 1, pr.

c. 10, Dist. 1.

Span. Ordin., bk. 4,
tit. 26, par. 2.

Bk. 19, tit. 26, par. 2.

Span. Ordin., bk. 14,
tit. aforesaid.

Span. Ordin., bk. 29,
tit. aforesaid.

Span. Ordin., bk. 30,
tit. aforesaid.

[9] Again, even when booty is granted to the soldiery, the prince is none the less entitled to his share. By the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain this share is one-fifth, at times one-third, and at other times one-half; the same constitutions give one-seventh to the general, at times one-tenth. But if it chance that in a naval war the king supplies the ships and their armament and also provides supplies and wages for the soldiers and sailors, the same constitutions place the whole booty at the disposal not of the general or admiral but of the king, nor will the soldiers or sailors get any part thereof, except such as is granted to them by the king's liberality. In every other event, however, after the king's share has been set aside, the admiral can divide the residue between the soldiers and sailors, a seventh part of that residue being due to him himself.

Span. Ordin., bk. 20,
same tit.

Livy, bk. 5.

[10] Furthermore, the Romans were wont to secure victory by vowing a portion of the spoils to their gods; and so Camillus, at the outset of his attempt to destroy the town of Veii, vowed a tithe of his spoil to Delphic Apollo.

[11] And we must not omit to call attention to the rule of military discipline which forbade, under the severest penalties, the quest of booty

save after the enemy had been routed and his camp taken and his fortress or town completely reduced to submission, and not even then unless the commander had given the signal, notwithstanding that before the battle he had proclaimed that the booty should belong to the soldiers. The object of this rule was to prevent the greed of booty giving the enemy (as often happens) a chance to slip out of one's hands or to renew the engagement. This actually happened in the case of the Samnites. They had fought with the Romans on equal terms far into the night and at last were led by the greed of booty to make an attack on the Roman baggage-trains (which were stationed at some distance from the fighting force without a guard or defense); but they were scattered by Marcus Fabius, the master of the horse, acting under the orders of Cornelius Arinna, the dictator, and owing to their being encumbered with baggage they were miserably slain, yielding up the victory to the Romans.

Livy, bk. 8.

Besides, the common experience is, as Appius Claudius used to say, that the more backward the looter is kept, the more forward is every one wont to be in taking his share of toil and danger. And so at the taking of Veii, though the Senate had granted the spoil to the army, yet the quest of the booty was not allowed until the dictator, Camillus, had given his permission. It was just the same with the booty of the towns of Epirus, which had defected to Perseus. The Senate had given it to the army, but the signal for sacking the cities had to be waited for. And at the storming of Nova Carthago, when at last the fortress fell and the signal had been given, then the victors directed themselves towards the booty. And, accordingly, the provision in the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain is a very proper one, that any one who goes after booty before the enemy has been completely routed loses his share of the booty and has to pay a fine of double that amount and is put to a worse form of military service. And indeed if, through the fault of looters, the enemy are enabled to renew the fight and thus conquer or slay the king, these looters meet with the same punishment as if they were themselves directly guilty of those things.

Livy, bk. 5.

Livy, bk. 45.

Livy, bk. 26.

Span. Ordin., bks. 2, 3, 19, tit. 20, par. 2.

[12] He, again, who commits fraud in division of booty is by the same constitution subjected, by way of punishment, to a fine of double the amount and to loss of his share. But he who pilfers booty taken from the enemy is within the law against peculation and liable to a four-fold penalty, according to a response of Modestinus.

Dig. 48, 13, 15.

[13] Those, however, who have fled from battle or have been cowardly or slack, have no claim to a share of booty.

Baldus on Cod. 8, 53, 36 and Dig. 49, 16, 6, 3. Span. Ordin., bk. 1, and bk. 20, tit. 26, par. 2.

Accordingly when Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, the dictator, freed Lucius Minucius and his army from the besieging Æqui and captured the enemy's camp (which was fitted out with everything needful) he gave the whole of the booty to his own force only and upbraided both the army of the consul and the consul himself in these terms:

"You, my men, will have to do without any of the spoil of that enemy whose spoil you were so near becoming; and you, Lucius Minucius, until you begin to have a consul's courage, it will be as my legate that
Livy, bk. 3. you shall command these legions."

[14] Now, seeing that nothing irks or weakens an army more than a mass of baggage, it will be very conducive to military discipline to order the soldiers to sell all their booty: Publius Decius gave an example of this when, after storming several towns in Samnium, he forced his soldiers to sell all their booty at the first opportunity, so as not to burden
Livy, bk. 11. the marching column with heavy baggage.

[15] Be it remarked that *res sacræ* are not liable to be seized as booty: for, as they are no one's property [*res nullius*], they can not be said to belong to the enemy and it is only enemy property that is capturable as booty; and that which is *divini juris* (as the emperor says) is not the property of any individual and is not subject to the power of man. And so he who lays forcible hands thereon will be punished under the *Lex Julia* for sacrilege according to his rank and to the character of
Instit. 2, 1, 7 and Dig. 1, 8, 1. the thing. Wherefore, after the destruction of Carthage (which was accompanied by a grant of booty to the soldiery), Scipio distributed a large number of rewards and gifts among the soldiers, but he excluded
Dig. 48, 13, 11. those who had looted and had violated the shrine of Apollo.
Appian, Punic war.

Now there was a controversy in olden days whether it was sacrilege to take a privately owned article which had been deposited in a temple: the emperors Antoninus and Severus, however, declared in a rescript that the action on theft would be given and not the action on
Quintil., Inst. orat. bk. 7, ch. 4. Cicero, Invent., bk. 2. sacrilege and therefore the article in question must be held seizable as
Dig. 48, 13, 6. booty. But Cicero in his *De Legibus* draws no distinction between an article which is *sacer* (holy) and one which is intrusted to a place which
c. 21, C. 17, qu. 4. is *sacer*. And our canons take the same view. Now, however true this may be as between citizen and citizen, I do not think it holds good in the case before us. An article intrusted to a place which is *sacer* can not be taken to become *sacer* itself, for this involves its being a *res nullius* (i. e.
Instit. 2, 1, 7. no one's property). As, therefore, the article in question is not a *res nullius*, but belongs to a private person, and he an enemy, I hold that it may be seized as booty. In order that this may be so, it is enough for it
Dig. 41, 1: 5 at end and 51. to be an enemy's.

Again: our remarks about things captured in a just war apply also to free persons so captured. This is a doctrine both of the law of nations (*jus gentium*) and of the civil law; they become the slaves of their captors and are no longer persons but things subject to ownership. This
Dig. 49, 15, 24 and the whole title. Dig. 1, 1, 5. Instit. 1, 2, 1. is the origin of slavery.

[16] There is in truth an old-standing discussion among philosophers, whether this division of persons into freemen and slaves is a feature of our society which is of natural origin or of human institution:

Aristotle's view was that it was of natural origin, but our jurists affirm that slavery is against nature and belongs to the law of nations (*jus gentium*), seeing that by natural law all were born free in the beginning and that by nature all men are equal, a proposition which is approved also by Cicero, for (says he) no two things are so identical, so similar to one another, as we men are to each other. The doctrine of the jurists is not, however, free from difficulty, because the law of nature is immutable and the *jus gentium* can not derogate from it. Moreover it seems unjust and repugnant to nature for men to be slaves to men, though possibly expedient in the interests of the State, an argument on which some ancient thinkers relied very much in days gone by when attempting to defend the commonly stated proposition that a State can neither exist nor develop without injustice. And Cicero represents Philo as carrying on a discussion of these matters and as receiving an excellent and final reply from Lælius, referred to in the preface hereto where we showed that the reduction to slavery of prisoners of war is not unjust.

Note also, as aiding in the solution of the problem, that liberty is an institution of the law of nature, in that before the development of the *jus gentium* all men were born free and were reckoned each other's peers and equals—not, however, that the law of nature has any precept on the subject or that it forbids slavery. But the *jus gentium*, which has its basis in natural reason, introduced war and slavery. For, as man's wickedness increased, right natural reason—and there is nothing diviner than it; it is in virtue of it that we are superior to the beasts—taught that this wickedness of man ought to be restrained by war and captivity and slavery.

In the same way, under the law of nature, in that primitive time which pagans used to call the Golden Age, all things were in common and nothing belonged to any individual, but in following ages it was found that community of goods was not adapted to man's debased nature and so the *jus gentium*, under the guidance of natural reason, developed the system of private ownership and all the differences incidental to it. Community of goods, therefore, equality of men, one and the same freedom for all—these suit the blameless primitive time and Plato's ideal republic far better than they suit the iron age. They are therefore condemned by the *jus gentium*. Slavery, then, was unknown to the law natural—according to which all men were born free and reckoned each other's peers and equals; yet it was left open to the *jus gentium* to develop slavery and to introduce the doctrine that prisoners captured in a just war become slaves—and this all the more so because of its utility to the State as a means of repressing those who wage unjust war. That same reason, accordingly, which permits war enjoined the introduction of slavery. And to this effect are the following remarkable words of St. Augustine:

Polit., bk. 1, ch. 1.

Instit. 1, 3, 2 and 1, 2, 2 (latter half).

Dig. 50, 17, 32.

Instit. 1, 2, 2, at end.

In Republic.

Dig. 1, 1, 4.

Dig. 50, 17, 2.

Thom. Aquin. 1, 2, qu. 94, Art. 5.
Præp., c. 9, Dist. 1.

c. 8, Dist. 35.

Dig. 1, 1, 5.

Dig. 1, 1, 4; and 50, 17, 2.

Kingdom of God, bk. 19, ch. 15.

Dig. 41, 2: 3, 5 and 7.
Instit. 1, 2, 2,
latter half.

"Justly was the burden of servitude laid upon the back of transgression. So that it was guilt and not nature that gave its origin unto that name."

And then he adds:

"But take a man as God created him at first, and so he is neither slave to man nor to sin. But penal servitude had its institution from that law which commands the conservation and forbids the disturbance of nature's order; for, if that law had not first been transgressed, penal servitude had never been enjoined."

Consistent herewith is the apostolic injunction to servants to be obedient to their masters and to do their service with good-will; and Canaan was for his sin declared a slave by his father Noah and made a servant of servants unto his brethren. The same apostle, however, recommends masters not to insist too strongly on their rights and in certain matters he declares that all men are on an equality.

[17] It must also be borne in mind that the freedom which this enslaving of persons does away with is not that natural freedom which consists in action (for a slave, however much his master may order, may refuse to enter on an inheritance), but that which results from certain matters of law and is an institution of the *jus gentium*.

[18] No mere force, which is matter of fact, can create slavery, which is matter of law. For captives other than those made so in just war do not become slaves—not those made by brigands or robbers or by those who are not "just" enemies.

[19] And indeed there has grown up in the Christian world a laudable and long-established custom that the prisoners on either side, however just the war, are not enslaved, but they are kept with their freedom intact until payment of ransom (Greek *λύτρον*). Romulus, in truth, with intent to add to the size of his State and to make it big instead of little, forbade the slaughter and even the sale of prisoners taken in war, and he settled Roman colonists on portions of the enemy soil and gave to many conquered peoples the rights of citizenship.

If, however, any Christians fight on the side of Saracens and infidels against fellow-Christians, or render them any aid whatever, then, should they be taken prisoners, they will be enslaved and they are by the fact itself excommunicate, for by that time they are no longer to be classed among Christians, but among the infidels, to whom they have allied themselves. They may not, however, be sold to others than Christians. But if the war be with infidels and pagans, then indeed the condition of the prisoners taken on each side will be that which is fixed by the civil law for prisoners taken by the enemy. This is decided by the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain. And so the fictions of the *Lex Cornelia* and of postliminy will be in operation. Now how inexpedient and charged with danger to the State it is to increase the number of slaves,

Span. Ordin., bk. 9.
Cod. 1, 10 (?).

Alciat. on Dig. 50, 16,
118. Claud. Cant. on
Instit. 2, 1, 17. Covar.
on c. 6, Reg. jur., in
vi, 2 par. relect. §11.

Ephes., ch. 6. 1 Tim.,
ch. 6. Tit., ch. 2.
Coloss., ch. 3.

Genes., ch. 9.

Gal., ch. 5.
Ephes., last ch.
Coloss., ch. 4.

Cod. 6, 24, 3.

Dig. 1, 1, 4.
Instit. 1, 2, 1.
Dig. 48, 19, 17.

Dig. 49, 15: 19, 2; and
24; and 32, 1, pr.;
and 28, 1, 13.

Boerius, Decis. 178.
Baldus on Dig. 49,
15, 24. Alciat. on
Dig. 50, 16, 118.
Span. Ordin., bk. 1, tit.
29, par. 2.

Dion. Hal., Rom.
antiq., bk. 2.

c. 6 and c. 17, X, 5,
6. Span. Ordin., bk. 4,
tit. 21, p. 4 and bk.
9, tit. 29, part 2.
Leading text in Dig.
48, 8, 3, 6; and 49, 16,
7; and 41, 1, 51.

Span. Ordin., bk. 2,
tit. 21, par. 2.

is shown by the frequent servile wars and plots which at different times vexed the Roman State and led to the bitterest conflicts. Bodin demonstrates this at length.

Repub., bk.1, ch. 5.

[20] Further, suppose that free persons, who have been made prisoners of war and reduced to slavery, succeed in returning to their own country—whatever may be the manner in which they have got out of the enemy's hands, they regain their original liberty, just in the same way that wild animals cease to belong to their captor if they make good their escape from him.

Dig. 49, 15, 26.

[21] Further, captives who have returned from the enemy reacquire every right which they had forfeited by their captivity: and this is owing to the law of postliminy; but that is not the case if they have given their parole to return to the enemy or not to depart from him, for those who have returned to their own country in such circumstances can not be said to have returned by postliminy, as was held in the case of Attilius Regulus and those whom Hannibal sent to the Senate after the defeat of Cannæ under an oath to return to his camp if they failed to obtain ransom. For it is not enough to have returned to your country *corpore* (i. e. physically) unless you do so also *animo* (i. e. with intent to remain there), and so in the case of those who only came home with an intent to return to the enemy there was no postliminy.

Instit. 2, 1, 12.
Dig. 41, 1, 5.

Dig. 49, 15, 19, pr.

Dig. 49, 15, 5, 3.
Span. Ordin., bk. 9, tit. 29, par. 2. Cic., Offic., bk. 3.

Dig. 49, 15, 26.

[22] A deserter also has no rights of postliminy, for (to quote Paulus) one who has abandoned his fatherland with the foul plan and intent of a traitor, must be deemed an enemy, and this is so alike in the case of female or male, of *filiusfamilias* or *paterfamilias*. Accordingly a *paterfamilias* did not by postliminy regain a son who had deserted, because the father had lost him (again to quote Paulus) in the same way as the State did and because military discipline was esteemed a greater thing by Roman parents than their love for their children. The case is different with a slave deserter, for the master has rights by postliminy over him, since a rule to the opposite effect would not so much be injurious to the slave as hurtful to the master.

Dig. 49, 15, 19, 4.

Dig. 49, 15, 19.

Dig. 49, 15, 19, 4.

[23] It must be remarked that postliminy may apply to all, whatever their sex, age, or rank, but, in order that it may apply in the case of soldiers, they must prove that they were captured fighting, there being no postliminy in the case of those who surrendered to the enemy after defeat and with arms in their hands. For the Romans deemed it most shameful to fall into the power of the enemy by surrender and not by superior force. The Senate, accordingly, refused (though they had the opportunity) to ransom the 8,000 Romans who had surrendered to Hannibal after the defeat of Cannæ but who had been captured in the camp where they had been left and not in the fighting line—the intent being to implant in the Roman soldier that he must either conquer or die. We shall have more to say on this topic later.

Dig. 49, 15, 19, at end.

Dig. 49, 16, 5, 6.

Dig. 49, 15, 19.
Span. Ordin., bk. 9, tit. 29, par. 2.

Livy, bk. 22.
Cic., Offic., bk. 33.

Bk.iii, ch. 15, post.

A soldier who has been made prisoner and who returns with postliminy can not, however, claim pay and largess for the time of his captivity. The Emperor Antoninus ruled this in a rescript. If, however, he be captured by the enemy after the completion of his period of military service and then return, he is entitled to his veteran's rights and pension, according to a response of Arrius Menander. There was a difference of opinion between Brutus and Scævola on the question whether those reacquire their former status who return home after having been surrendered to the enemy by the *fecials*, pursuant to a decree of the Senate or an ordinance of the people.

Cod. 12, 35, 1.
Dig. 49, 16: 3(10),
and 5.

[24] This was the issue in the celebrated case of Mancinus. He had made peace with Numantium in improper fashion; the Senate decreed his surrender to the enemy; they would not accept him. A question then arose whether he continued to be a Roman citizen, there being some who thought he did not. Thereupon a tribune of the plebs, Publius Rutilius, the son of Marcus, ordered his expulsion from the Senate-house, into which he had not scrupled to enter after his return. Rutilius did this on the ground that he was no longer a citizen, it being a matter of long tradition that there was no postliminy for one whom either his father or the people had sold or whom the *paterpatratus* had surrendered. And it was taken to be immaterial that the enemy had refused to receive Mancinus, he ceasing to be a Roman citizen whom the State has repudiated, whether the enemy has accepted him or no, just as in the case of one interdicted of fire and water, or proclaimed an enemy, or deported to an island. And this seems to be supported by the dictum of Marcellus that a prisoner of war who returns is not a citizen unless received as such by his fellow citizens.

Cic., Orator, bk. 1.

By inference, Dig. 41,
2: 1(4) and 18(1).

Dig. 4, 5, 5, 1.
Instit. 1, 16, pr.
Dig. 49, 15, 4.

There was, however, a party that held that, as Mancinus had not been accepted by the enemy, he remained a citizen. This view was approved by Cicero, on the ground that a person is not surrendered who is not accepted, surrender being like donation and requiring acceptance. We read in Pomponius, however, that by subsequent statute Mancinus was declared a Roman citizen. This seems to show the soundness of the opinion of Modestinus, that one whom the enemy would not accept does not on return become a citizen unless received as such, for otherwise what need would there have been for any statute about Mancinus?

Topic. and pro
Caecina, at end.
Dig. 39, 5, 10 and
Cod. 8, 53, 6 and
Dig. 41, 2, 34.

Dig. 50, 7, 18.

[25] Again, in war not only men but women also may be taken prisoners. Thus we read that the wife of Darius and his mother and his whole family were captured by Alexander; Sophonisba, the wife of Syphax, by Masanissa; and Cleopatra by Augustus. Scipio, however, won for himself throughout Spain a great reputation for clemency when, after the capture of Carthage, he freely restored, unharmed, the lovely bride of Allucius, prince of the Celtiberians, who had fallen into his hands.

Cod. 8, 50: 1, 7, 8, 9
and 16.
Dig. 49, 15: 6 and 8.

Livy, bk. 26.

Nor are the young exempt from capture in war, although Camillus set a praiseworthy example in the case of the young nobles of Falisci. Their schoolmaster had craftily brought them into Camillus' camp. Camillus, however, did not take them, but stripped the traitor and turned him over, with his hands tied behind his back, to the youths to be beaten and led home, saying, "There is no alliance between us and the Falisci such as is made by human agreement, but there is and will be one of nature's making. There are laws of war just as there are laws of peace. We bear arms, not, however, against those who are so young as that they would be spared even on the storming of a town, but against warriors." This moderation so stirred the Falisci that they surrendered to the Romans of their own accord.

Livy, bk.

Of course, severity towards women and the young was always reckoned very disgraceful, their very sex and age exempting them from the hazards of battle and the rage of the conqueror. It is accordingly a precept of the divine law, given to the Jews, to slay all enemies who resisted and who would not make peace, but that the women and the little ones were to be taken as spoil and made slaves. The canons indeed contain an injunction that the following be spared: clergy, monks, converts, foreigners, merchants, and country folk, but this (says Panormitanus) has been abrogated by contrary usage. I do not think, however, that it has been abrogated as regards the clergy, upon whom it is forbidden to lay hands under penalty of anathema—unless indeed they take active part in the war, for he who misuses a privilege loses it.

Deut., ch. 20.

c. 2, X, 1, 34.

Ibid.

c. 29, C. 17, qu. 4.

*c. 7, Dist. 74 and
c. 14, X, 5, 19.*

It deserves notice, too, that when war breaks out between two countries, those of the enemy who are found on the soil of either country may be made prisoners despite the fact that they came there in time of peace, and in olden days they would have been made slaves.

Dig. 49, 15, 12, pr.

[26] Now a prisoner made in just war who has promised a reasonable price for his ransom can not claim discharge from his obligation by alleging that he gave the promise under fear and duress, for the edict of the prætor, under which duress is a ground of rescission, does not apply to that kind of duress which is legally imposed. Besides, what we have here is not so much a case of promise of a price under duress as of release from the fear of justly imminent death by means of that promise; and this is especially so where the ransom-price has taken the place of slavery.

Leading text in Dig. 4, 2, 21 pr. Panormitan. on c. 2, X, 1, 40, col. 3, and c. 6, X, 1, 40. Felinus on c. 5, X, 2, 25, nu. 20. Domin. on c. 4, Dist. 5, last col. Sylvest., on word Metus, qu. 6.

Fort. on Dig. 2, 14, 5; and 3, 5, 20.

[27] Now as regards the acquisition of ownership in prisoners of war, the same holds good as with other booty of things movable, i. e., it is subject to the discretion of the general, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus is a witness that this was the former practice, but it is more usual nowadays to grant prisoners of war (like other movables) to their actual captors, unless the ransom happen to exceed the sum of 10,000 crowns, as where the prisoner is a duke or count or baron or other person of note. By the long-standing practice of Spain and France and England these

Rom. antiq., bk. 5.

latter belong to the king, and the chance of ransom ought not to be denied them, not even when the prisoner is the commander-in-chief, unless further disturbance of the peace is apprehended as the result. For (in the language of St. Augustine) just as violence is the lot of those who fight and resist, so, after a victory, mercy is at once the prisoner's due. On this principle (says Cicero) our forefathers made the excellent rule that none should kill a king who had been made prisoner of war, because it would be improper to waste the opportunity which fortune has put in our way in the punishment of those who, but a little while before, owed a splendid position to the same fortune.

But there ought to be no respite for a man so capable that there would be a grave risk of his breathing new vigor into the war; that would be an unjust mercy, says St. Ambrose. And that was the point of view of Ferrandus the deacon, when he was writing to Count Reginus on the subject of the duty of a pious Christian general, for he included among the seven rules of innocence which he enjoined on generals, this: "Do not be over just." And so it was a practice among the Romans for a general when celebrating his victory with triumphal pomp to turn aside from the forum into the capitol and to order those prisoners of high rank, who had sown the seeds of discord and who were responsible for the war, to be cast into gaol and put to death at the close of the triumph.

[28] In other circumstances, however, it is not allowable for any private person on his own authority to kill a prisoner, nor to treat him with great severity, since it was not allowed, even in the olden days when prisoners of war were enslaved; for the civil law included among the limitations which it imposed on the power of a master this: that he was only allowed to kill his slave if he detected him in a deed for doing which a freeman might, if detected, have been killed; in other cases a master might not kill his slave, but only inflict on him a moderate degree of chastisement. And a rescript of the Emperor Antoninus protected slaves against excessive severity and intolerable cruelty on the part of their masters. There was a corresponding constitution of the Kingdom of Spain as regards prisoners taken on either side in a war between Christians (but not in a war between parties of differing religious professions).

[29] Again, if a bargain about ransom has once been concluded between a prisoner of war and the person who holds him captive, the terms of the bargain can not subsequently be stiffened (say) on the ground that the latter has ascertained that the former is a person of such and such a family and wealthy, and any subsequent bargain will be invalid and the earlier one will be substituted for it. This is the principle on which the following response of Paulus is founded: "One ransoms a prisoner of war from the enemy and then transfers to a third person

Bartol. and Bald. on Dig. 3, 5, 20.

Joa. de Ana. on c. 21, X, 2, 1, in not.

Boer. decis., 178.

Span. Ordin., bk. 5 and 8, tit. 26, par. 2.

c. 3, C. 23, qu. 1, at end. Ibid.

Cic. to Herenn. bk. 4.

Offic., bk. 1, and c. 33, C. 23, qu. 4.

Alexand. ab Alexand., Genial. dies, bk. 6, ch. 6.

Dig. 48, 5, 25; and 30, 53, 3.

Cod. 9, 14.

Dig. 1, 6, 2.

Span. Ordin., bk. 1, tit. 29, par. 2.

Guid. Pap., qu. 113. Papon. in Arrest., 5, 6, pr.

for a greater sum the lien which he has over the person ransomed: the person ransomed only owes the ransom-price and not the greater sum." Dig. 49, 15, 19, 9.

Cod. 8, 50: 2 and 17.
Dig. 30, 43, 9; and 28,
1, 20, 1; and 49, 16, 8.

[30] He, moreover, who has paid or has undertaken to pay the ransom price in order to procure freedom for a prisoner of war, not only has the *actio negotiorum gestorum* (i. e. the action to recover money spent on another's business)—and this whether the captor was or was not a "just" enemy—but he also has a lien over the ransomed person until he be repaid, and he is not fettered by the interdict *de libero homine exhibendo* (i. e. ordering production of the freeman); nor does the person ransomed regain his original status until he has paid or tendered the amount of the ransom, but he does not become a slave nor did he in the olden days when slavery existed in some places. And, as a privilege arising from his status of freeman, he will be able to assert his rights of succession so that he may be able to pay out of the succession the price that has been given for him; and his son has rights of succession to him, even if his death occur before he discharges himself; nay, by his death the person ransomed is freed from his ransomer, the lien being (so to say) determined and the result is that his heir and any surety are under no obligation to pay the ransom-price. And although we admit that the issue born of things which are subject to a charge is fettered by the same obligation, yet the emperors declined to allow that issue born to a prisoner after his ransom was subject to the lien. Leading text in Dig. 24, 1, 28. Covarruv. on c. 4, X, 4, 1, 2 par. c. 3, §4, nu. 14.

Dig. 43, 29, 3, 3.
Cod. 8, 50, 17.

Cod. 8, 50, 2.

Cod. 8, 50, 15.

Dig. 49, 15, 15; and 38, 16, 1, 4.

Dig. 20, 1, 13.

Cod. 8, 50, 8.

Now what has been said holds good of freemen captured by the enemy and ransomed, but slaves captured by the enemy and ransomed become the slaves of him who ransoms them; when, however, the price which he has given is proffered to him they are taken to have returned or been received back with postliminy.

Dig. 49, 15, 7.

[31] Again, the ransoming of prisoners is viewed with such favor that a gift towards this purpose, however big it may be, is irrevocable and need not be registered; and although not even a soldier may make a bequest to an uncertain person, yet the emperors, upon duteous grounds and out of pity for the sufferings of prisoners, ruled that a legacy for the ransom of prisoners—even of the whole of the testator's fortune—is valid despite the uncertainty of the persons. And when a prisoner has been ransomed upon duteous considerations, e. g., a son by his mother, it is not seemly to discuss about claiming back the price, but a gift is presumed, and one who ransoms a maiden out of wantonness or who prostitutes her, loses the ransom-price and the maiden can escape from him without punishment. Cod. 8, 53, 36.
Instit. 2, 20, 24.
Cod. 1, 3, 48.
Cod. 1, 3, 28.
Cod. 8, 50, 17, 1.
Span. Ordin., last bk., tit. 29, par. 2.

Cod. 8, 50, 7.

[32] Also neglect by a child to ransom his father is a good ground for his exheredation, and, by a statute, instituted heirs who neglect to ransom a prisoner lose their rights in that person's succession, and the succession goes to the Church to be devoted to the ransom of prisoners. Authentica. Si captivi, Cod. 1, 3, 49 (Nov. 115, 3, 13). Span. Ordin., bk. 3, tit. 29, par. 2.

We have stated that postliminy applies to prisoners whether free or slaves, and whether male or female; let us now consider the other things which return with postliminy, and when we have found out what these are we shall know what the things are to which postliminy is inapplicable.

Topic. For (as Cicero says) the force and characteristic of contraries that negative each other is this: that when one is found to be present the other is at once known to be absent, and when one is ascertained the other is

Text in Instit. 1, 8, ascertained also.

pr. and Dig. 32, 103,
3 (?), and Bartol.
thereon.

[33] Well, land and the usufruct thereof are other things which revest by postliminy. If an enemy has been driven away from land which he had taken, the former owners reacquire their ownership in it, and any usufruct which existed over it is set up afresh. Paulus has a response to this effect, with which I fully agree. This doctrine holds good, no matter how great an interval of time has elapsed; and so when the town of Saguntum, which had been in hostile occupation for over seven years, was at last retaken, it was restored to such of the former inhabitants as had survived the stress of the war. And a constitution of the Kingdom of Spain provides that empires, kingdoms, earldoms, and other greater dominions revest by postliminy if they are recovered from an enemy and that a title to them can not be based on usucapion, not even reckoning from the day of their recovery; but other smaller dominions are subject to prescription if the owner does not appear for four years after their recovery, unless indeed he be a minor. The same constitutions enact that if any subject by his own fault loses a fortress, even his own, and the fortress is recaptured, it must be handed over to the king on his demand, even though the recapture was due to the exertions of the former owner.

Dig. 49, 15, 20, 1; and
7, 4, 23; and 1, 8, 6 pr.
c. 13, C. 16, 4 and
gloss thereon.
And Cod. 3, 28, 16.

Livy, bk. 24.

Span. Ordin., bk. 10,
tit. 29, par. 2.

Span. Ordin., bk. 32,
tit. 28, par. 2.

[34] Lastly, large vessels and transports may revest by postliminy. Marcellus gave a response to this effect and he also was of opinion that a horse and a mare that had been broken in were recoverable by postliminy, because they might bolt without any fault of the rider. And Cicero's evidence agrees herewith, for he says, "The following things may revest by postliminy: men, ships, mules, beasts of burden, horses and mares that have been broken in." Arms are not in the list, they do not revest by postliminy because they can not be lost without blame. More will be said on this point hereafter.

Dig. 49, 15, 2.

Topica.

Dig. 49, 15, 2.

Bk. 3, ch. 16.

[35] And now (unless I mistake) we are naturally brought, by what has been already said, to a question which in different ways has proved exceedingly troublesome to nearly all commentators. I refer to the well-known question whether things captured by the enemy and then recaptured from them ought to be restored to their former owners, or not. Some say, aye; some say, nay; others foolishly divide and subdivide, to the satisfaction neither of themselves nor of any one. Some there are who draw a distinction between movables and immovables and

Dig. 49, 15, 20, 1. hold that the latter must always be restored and the former never. There are others who distinguish immovables recovered by an exploit of war—which they would refuse to restore—from immovables ransomed under a bargain, which they would allow to revest in the former owner on his tendering the amount of their ransom.

By inference, Dig. 49, 15, 28. Ang. Salic., Jas. Mart., Laud. and others whom Covarruv. mentions, on c. 4, Reg. jur., in vi, 2, relect. §11.

Lastly there is a school which declares that all recaptured property, movable or immovable, without any distinction, ought to be unconditionally restored to the former owner—and this despite the unmistakable opinion of Labeo, who says in one place: "Whatever is captured in war is booty and does not revest by postliminy"; and in another place: "What has been captured by the enemy and then recaptured by our side, only revests by postliminy if it be of a kind to which postliminy applies."

By inference, Cod. 8, 50, 2. Dig. 49, 15, 12, 7. Franc. Ripa on Dig. 41, 2, 1. Covarr. in place named and others cited by him. By inference, Cod. 8, 50, 2. Dig. 30 and 41, 1, 44. Joh., Andr., Alex., Pyrrh. and others mentioned by Covarr. on c. 4 Reg. jur. in vi.

In Dig. 49, 15, 28.

In Dig. 49, 15, 30.

Marcellus approves this distinction. And the school in question ignores this point, that slaves recaptured from the enemy are (pursuant to the imperial rescript) to be restored to their former owner, precisely because there is postliminy—not only in the case of freemen, but also in the case of slaves. And, so, the response of Octavenus, affirming that property in the enemy's hands can be bequeathed and is subject to postliminy, must undoubtedly be understood as referring only to property of a kind which admits of postliminy, in accordance with the distinction drawn by Labeo.

Dig. 49, 15, 2.

Cod. 8, 50, 2.

Dig. 30, 9.

Dig. 30, 9.

[36] Note also that, though enemy property is not a subject of transfer (*in commercio*), yet things which the enemy has captured may, if of a kind which admits of postliminy, be sold and bequeathed or alienated in any way whatsoever. Livy furnishes us with an example of the operation of this principle. When Hannibal had got as near to Rome as the fourth milestone, he heard that the very spot on which his camp was pitched was selling at exactly the same price as before his arrival; this enraged him so much that he had a herald fetched and bade him announce the sale of the silversmiths' shops in the forum at Rome; now the sale of the land was perfectly valid because of the chance of postliminy, but the sale of the shops was invalid because they had never been the enemy's and there was no postliminy as regards them.

Dig. 45, 1, 103.

Bk. 25

Dig. 10, 2: 22 and 23 and 30(9).

Dig. 10, 2, 22.

Dig. 45, 1, 103.

And I do not think that the question is affected by the citation from the Digest (*de acq. rer. dom.*)* of the passage in which Pomponius deals with the case where wolves carry off my swine from my herdsmen and a neighboring farmer follows them up with stout dogs and rescues the swine; the jurisconsult laid it down that the swine do not become the farmer's but remain mine, as long as any one could have recovered them, and he distinguishes the case where my neighbor by the same means deprived me of some wild animal, seeing that a wild animal ceases to be ours if it passes out of our control and it becomes the property of the captor.

* Dig. 41, 1.

This passage, I repeat, does not affect the question; for, in it, Pomponius expressly says that swine and other tamed animals remain ours, even though carried off by a wolf, as long as they can be recaptured, just like goods lost in a shipwreck; and he says that an action on theft would lie on these facts; but the case of property taken from us by the enemy is entirely different, for it is incontestable that the ownership therein passes immediately to the enemy. It is, accordingly, a better parallel to say that just as we lose our ownership of a wild animal when it passes out of our control, and the animal becomes by *occupatio* the property of any subsequent captor, so it is with things captured by the enemy: we immediately lose our ownership of them and they become his who retakes them and the former owner has no claim for restitution, unless they are of a kind which admits of postliminy.

And this is fatal to the doctrine that all movables without distinction become the property of those who rescue them from the enemy, and also to the doctrine that a distinction must be drawn between things that have been recaptured by military exploit and those that have been ransomed by bargain.

To sum up: those things which admit of postliminy revest, on recapture, in their former owner and resume their former status, whether movables or immovables, and whether their restoration is due to military exploit or to bargaining or is brought about in any other way—subject to this, that the ransom-price of those things that have been ransomed must be repaid; but those things which do not admit of postliminy pass as booty to the captor.

[37] It must, however, be observed that booty only begins to belong to the enemy at the moment when it is taken within his lines (*intra præsidia*). If, then, it is recaptured before having been taken within the enemy's lines, it must be unconditionally restored to its former owner, for it has never ceased to belong to him, never having become the enemy's. And, should those who have retaken the booty have fraudulently allowed it to be first carried off by the enemy and taken within his lines and neglect to follow it up, they will not only have to restore to its former owner what they have retaken, but they must also make good to the owner anything which they might have succeeded in saving, and which has been lost through their fault. There is an excellent rule to this effect in the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain, and there is a text on the subject in Dig. 6, 1, 17.

[38] Once more: property taken by pirates or brigands or those who are not "just" enemies is not affected in any way by the distinction whether or no the recaptured thing is of a kind which admits of postliminy or by the question whether or no it has been taken *intra præsidia*; for the things which such persons capture never pass into their ownership and accordingly, when they are retaken they must be restored, with-

Dig. 49, 15: 24, 27, and 19(2). And 28, 1, 13.

Last §.

Leading text in Dig. 49, 15: 4 and 26. Instit. 1, 12, 5 and Cod. 8, 50, 2.

Span. Ordin., bks. 26 and 31, tit. 6, par. 2: and bk. 13, tit. 9, par. 5.

Dig. 49, 15: 5, (pr.) and 19(10). Dig. 49, 15, 5, pr.

Dig. 49, 15, 12, 7. Cod. 8, 50, 17. Dig. 49, 15: 28 and 30.

Dig. 49, 15: 2, 4, 20(1), and 30. And Cod. 8, 50, 2.

Instit. 1, 2, 16.

Dig. 49, 15: 28 and 24.

Dig. 41, 1, 44 and Instit. 2, 1, 12.

out any distinction or condition, to their former owner, who has never lost his ownership of them.

[39] This makes one wonder at that ordinance of the Kingdom of Spain according to which this distinction (namely, whether or no the recaptured property has been taken *intra præsidia*) applies to property seized by pirates and not only to property captured by enemies; for, if we take the moral and equitable point of view, we find that there is no law, human or divine, by which the ownership of captured property can pass out of the true owner to one who is not a "just" enemy, and so reason and justice require that such property when recaptured shall be unconditionally restored to its former owner, unless a contrary rule be found expedient in the public interest in order to increase the keenness of soldiers in the pursuit of brigands and pirates, especially since measures may be concerted for the public good, even when they involve private loss. This is the idea underlying Tacitus' remark that on every great occasion there is an element of injustice present in which the detriment of individuals is counterbalanced by the gain to the public. Otherwise the exception which we are considering seems quite harsh.

Span. Ordin., bk. 31,
tit. 29, par. 2.

Dig. 21, 2, 11; and 6,
1, 15. And c. 53 (?)
Reg. jur. in vi.

The Romans, moreover, often would order the restoration to their allies or citizens of booty which they discovered to have belonged to them when found in the possession not only of brigands and pirates, but also of a "just" enemy. Accordingly after the Volscians had been compelled to surrender and their camp had been captured, a part of the booty was handed over to the Latins and Hernicians, allies of the Roman people, who recognized it as their property. Similarly with the town of Sutrium: its inhabitants, allies of the Roman people, had surrendered their town by treaty to the Etruscans, as they were unable to endure any longer the siege of it; on the same day it was retaken under the leadership of Camillus, and before nightfall it had been restored to its inhabitants whole, inviolate, and unhurt by any havoc of war. So also on the capture of Carthage, which was full of statues and votive-offerings in the Greek style brought from Sicily, Scipio issued a proclamation inviting representatives from each quarter of the city to come and find out what belonged to them and take it away with them. But of course treatment of that kind depends on the complaisance of the general, who has, as we have shown, all discretionary power over booty.

Livy, bk. 4.

Livy, bk. 6.

Plut. Apophth.

[40] The following is a question on which there is genuine room for doubt: A thing is stolen by robbers or seized by "unjust" enemies and subsequently it comes into the power of a "just" enemy; from him it is won back by our citizens, either by military exploit or for monetary consideration: ought this thing to be restored to its original owner? Now Javolenus has a response to the effect that a stolen slave who subsequently falls into the hands of the enemy can not, nevertheless, be usucaptured by a buyer, just because of the original theft. That the slave had

Dig. 49, 15, 27.

been an enemy's, or that he had become subject to the law of postliminy upon his return, would not have prevented usucapion.

I admit this in the case of a slave, because of the law of postliminy, but I should hesitate to follow it in other cases to which the law of postliminy is inapplicable, since it is certain that the thing has become enemy's property and that its original owner has thereby lost his ownership. For what difference does it make, so long as the war was a just one, whether the enemy has seized the thing from a true owner or from a thief? For the rule that the taint of theft, inhering in a thing, can not be purged until the thing returns into its true owner's power (as provided by the

Dig. 41, 3, 4, 6.

Lex Atinia) only operates (so I think) between citizens and citizens, and not between citizens and enemies; and, in order that a thing captured in war may become our property, nothing more is needed than that it belonged to an enemy. This opinion seems to me agreeable to law; but

Dig. 41, 1: 5 and 51.

I have no objection to every one using his own judgment. If, however, the final decision is that the thing continues *furtiva* (tainted with theft) I think it would be fair only to grant an action against the present pos-

Dig. 15, 1, 4, 5. sessor if the thief or his heir be insolvent.

So far then about corporeal things and persons, whether free or slave, captured in war.

[41, 42] Now there used to be a question whether incorporeal things also can be captured in war and transferred into the victor's ownership, and, assuming that they can, whether they are subject to the law of postliminy or not. That question underlay the celebrated lawsuit be-

Bk. 5, ch. 10.

tween the Thebans and the Thessalians, which Quintilian mentions. For when Alexander overthrew Thebes he found a bond under which the Thessalians stood indebted to the Thebans in the sum of a hundred talents. This bond he gave to the Thessalians in requital of the military services they had rendered to him. Subsequently the fortunes of the Thebans were restored by Cassander and they brought action against the Thessalians. The point of the suit was about the effect of Alexander's gift of the bond. Now it is clear that Alexander could not make over that obligation to the Thessalians by way of gift since it was a matter of

Dig. 17, 2, 3 and

Accurt. thereon.

Dig. 15, 1, 51.

Dig. 49, 15, 28.

Instit. 2, 1, 17.

law cohering to the person in an inseparable manner; besides, matters of law are incorporeal and do not admit of manual seizure, and only those things become the conqueror's which he has actually seized. Nay, they do not remain his longer than he is actually in possession of them, since they can be taken away from him by the same right as that by which he got

Dig. 49, 15, 28 them.

There is, further, a marked difference between the position of an heir and that of a conqueror; what passes to the former is a right, what passes to the latter is a thing. And the proposition that a public right of credit can not pass to the conqueror may be maintained on the ground that a public credit is due to each individual and so as long as there is a

Dig. 5, 3, 1.

Dig. 49, 15, 28.

single surviving creditor he is the creditor of the whole amount. Nay, the same people and State may be considered as surviving, even if there be no survivor of those living at the date of the contract, but only their successors. There is a considered opinion of Alphenus to this effect.

Dig. 5, 1, 76; and 30: 24 and 22, at end.

[43] For the rights of a people do not reside in individuals, but in the *universitas* (aggregate), and this *universitas* is represented by successors as well as by those alive at any given time: and that is the meaning of saying that a *universitas* does not die or come to an end so long as there is even one survivor.

Dig. 3, 4, 7, 2.

One remaining point may be urged in the case before us, namely, that the legal situation did not depend on the fate of the document, the writing not being the substance of the contract, but only furnishing evidence thereof; and, accordingly, Alexander got nothing and the Thebans lost nothing either by the seizure or by the gift of the document.

Dig. 20, 1, 4.
Cod. 2, 4, 2.
Dig. 22, 4, 4.

However, notwithstanding all this, the decision in the case before us must be that the right of public credit was embodied in the document and vested in Alexander, and that Alexander could, accordingly, release the Thessalians from their bond-obligation to the Thebans, which he is taken to have intended by the gift of the document. For since the law of war invests the conqueror with power and dominion over the conquered and allows him to issue such commands to them as he pleases, he can not only seize their corporeal property, but also such as is mere matter of law, and he can lay down or repeal laws for them at his discretion. And seeing that (as Livy says) everything is yielded up to the military conqueror it is within his right and discretion to keep as much thereof as he likes by way of penalty.

Now a debt due is part of the estate of the creditor; hence any debts due to the conquered pass, with the conquered themselves, into the dominion of the conqueror; for he who is in the power of another can have nothing in his own power. The immediate result is that the ownership of the debt which the Thessalians owed to the Thebans vested in Alexander, and that when he made it over by way of gift to the Thessalians—for a gift of a document is taken to be a gift of the contents of the document, and an agreement not to sue is implied when a creditor returns the bond to the debtor—the Thessalians were in consequence freed from their debt. This will be our conclusion—unless we hold that the Thebans retook the debt by way of postliminy when Cassander came to their rescue; for when a person returns with postliminy, all matters of law are put in the same position as if he had never been in the enemy's power; and in that case we should have to assert that a State can be restored by the fiction of postliminy and be made the same as before, reacquiring its rights and status just as we have asserted with reference to the ownership of land which has been taken and retaken, and with reference to the usufruct thereof (which is mere matter of law); and it is in

Dig. 35, 2, 1, 13; and 15, 1, 9, 1. Accurt. on Cod. 4, 39, 2.

Dig. 50, 17, 118.

Cod. 8, 53, 1.

Dig. 2, 14, 2; and 39, 6, 18, 2.

Dig. 49, 15, 12, 5 and 6.

Dig. 49, 15, 20, 1.
Dig. 7, 4, 23.
Instit. 2, 2.
Dig. 11, 7, 30.

this way that the fiction of postliminy operates in the case of sacred and religious places.

Suppose, however, that in the case before us the Thessalians had paid the debt to the conquering Alexander, in whom, as we have said, it vested: I hold that then, after the fortunes of the Thebans had been restored by Cassander, they would not have been able to invoke the law of postliminy, in order to reacquire a debt which had once been extinguished. A judgment to this effect in an almost precisely similar case is

In Arrest., bk. 5,
tit. 6.
Dig. 5, 3, 25, 17, at
certe.

recorded by Joannes Paponius. For payment duly made utterly destroys an obligation, both civilly and naturally (as the jurist Pomponius says), it being in the nature of things that the manner of unbinding should

Dig. 46, 3, 107.
Accurt. on Dig. 46,
3, 23.

Dig. 50, 17, 35. correspond to the manner of binding.

Now the law of postliminy does not restore things which in fact and nature have been lawfully destroyed; and, surely, matters of law have in this respect no supremacy over matters of fact. This is the basis of the rule whereby, although a slave can not bind himself even *naturaliter*, yet if any one repays a slave's loan—even the slave himself after his manumission—no action will lie to get back what has been paid; for one fact balances the other. Between fact and fact there is an exact and harmonious proportion and resemblance; it is not so between fact and law; but between law and law it is so in a very striking manner.

Dig. 49, 15, 12, 2.
Dig. 2, 14, 27, 2; and
50, 17, 8.
Cod. 6, 24, 3.

Dig. 50, 17, 106.

Accordingly, if the mode in which the Thessalian debt was released was either formal discharge (*acceptilatio*) or an agreement not to sue or the return of the bond—involving much less evidential certainty than payment does—then, since there has been no intervention of a matter of fact, the right of credit must be held to revest in the Thebans by law of postliminy. For in none of these modes is the obligation destroyed quite as it is by payment, for payment utterly destroys the obligation, by the fact itself, nor have equity and good faith (which prevent the same debt from being paid twice over) the same operation in the cases named.

Instit. 3, 28, 1; and
4, 13, 3.
Cod. 8, 42, 14.

Instit. 3, 28 and
Dig. 5, 3, 25, 17.

Dig. 50, 17, 57.

And indeed, if the documents which we are dealing with had been seized by any other than a sovereign prince (such as Alexander was) my opinion is that no right could have been claimed by him in reliance on the considerations just urged by us against the contrary opinion, and that there would, accordingly, be no occasion for the fiction of postliminy—not even if the documents related to a private right of credit, unless the creditor in whose possession the documents were, chanced to be a prisoner of war, i. e., one who in olden times would have been made a slave, incapable of owning anything and subjected to another's ownership both as regards person and property. Since, however, prisoners taken in war between Christians are not nowadays enslaved, the case is different, for the person of the prisoner does not pass into the ownership of his captor, nor does any right which is so inherent in his person as to be inseparable from it, vest in his captor.

Dig. 17, 2, 3 and
Accurt. thereon.

CHAPTER VI.

Of keeping faith with an enemy.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Romans paid great respect to good faith. 2. When we have given our word to an enemy, whether in public or in private, it must be kept. 3. The edict <i>quod metus causa</i> inapplicable where we have given our word to an enemy. 4. Perjury can not be justified by resort to subterfuge or trick. 5. Whether the giving of hostages discharges the obligation to keep faith. 6. Whether faith must be kept with an unjust enemy. 7. The laws of war not framed for unjust enemies. 8. Agreements extorted by tyranny or rebellion are not binding. 9. The prince can not alienate what belongs to the royal prerogative. 10. The special functions of the sovereign. 11. Agreements made with rebel subjects have no validity. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Rebels and brigands to be put down by force, not by bargaining. 13. Faith not in every case to be kept with an enemy. 14. An oath to commit an unlawful act not binding. 15. An oath by a private person to do something detrimental to the State not binding. 16. Better to abstain from unlawful oaths than to break them. 17. Faith need not be kept with an enemy who has broken his word. 18. Whether a truce subsists if the enemy breaks it. 19. A truce may be granted to continue for a long period. 20. Meaning of saying that faith need not be kept with one who has broken his word. 21. Unlawful to requite perfidy with perfidy. 22. Whether an agreement induced by fraud is binding. |
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[1] They of olden time always held that there was no grander or more sacred matter in human life than good faith; and the Romans had Good Faith placed next to Jupiter Optimus Maximus in the Capitol; and when they had once pledged their word, there was nothing more durable. And so Aulus Gellius tells us that, while the Roman people carried to a high pitch the reverent pursuit of all kinds of virtue, yet they revered good faith over and beyond all, holding it sacred alike in public and in private affairs. Among the numerous proofs and examples of this, the following is extremely striking. When the arrangement of a truce between them and Perseus was being celebrated with public games in the Circus, some of the enemy's chieftains entered and took part in the chariot race and they were crowned as winners. Aye, and the Roman people gave up very illustrious consuls to the enemy rather than suffer their public good faith to be impugned, as we have elsewhere mentioned in connection with Postumius and Mancinus. On this account King Ptolemy, of Egypt, recognizing the good faith of the Roman people, made a will appointing them guardian of his infant son and heir. And Ulpian speaks truly in saying that it is a serious thing to break faith; nor is anything so characteristic a manifestation of good faith as the keeping of agreements.

Noet. Attic., bk. 20, ch. 2.
Above, ch. 1.
Dig. 13, 5, 1.
Dig. 2, 14, 1.

Offic., bk. 3.

Further (as Cicero says) our forefathers insisted that there was no more rigid fetter for safe-guarding the inviolability of good faith than the oath. This is demonstrated by provisions in the Twelve Tables, by religion, and by treaties in which the obligation of good faith, even with an enemy, is postulated.

Indeed the Romans, in addition to their sedulous respect for the laws of war and peace in general, attached a most sacred importance to the keeping of good faith on every occasion when circumstances led them to give an undertaking to the enemy. Accordingly we have that renowned reply given by Sextus Pompeius, son of the great Pompeius, to Menodorus, the admiral of Pompeius' fleet. Pompeius had made an alliance with Antonius and Octavius, and they were dining with him on board ship off Puteoli. Menodorus sent a message to the effect, first, that it was the very moment for Pompeius to avenge the death of his father and brother and seize the opportunity of claiming his father's sway for himself; and, secondly, that he would see that no one escaped from the ship. Pompeius replied, "Would that Menodorus could accomplish this without me; perfidy is befitting to him, but not to Pompeius."

Appian, Civil war,
bk. 5.Bartol. and others on
Dig. 2, 14, 5. Zas.
in apolog. against
Eck. and in Jud.,
qu. 3.

Offic., bk. 3.

[2] There are, however, those who hold it obligatory to keep faith with an enemy when publicly given, but not when given by a private person—a position unsupported by any solid arguments and at variance with the examples furnished by men of old and with the institutions of our forefathers and with the teaching of the weightiest philosophers, as described by Cicero in his elegant manner and by Gellius. Accordingly, whenever a transaction is entered into with a just and lawful enemy, I hold that terms and agreements relating to the war and hostilities ought not to be perfidiously upset, even when they have been entered into by private persons, for it is a serious thing to break faith.

Bk. 7, ch. 10;
bk. 20, ch. 1.

Dig. 13, 5, 1.

Offic., bk. 3.

Text in c. 3, C. 23
qu. 1. Dig. 49, 15, 5,
3. Fortun. and
Duaren. on Dig. 2,
14, 5. Decius on Dig.
50, 17, 65. Covarr.,
bk. 4. Decret.,
2, par. C. 3, §4.

And certain duties are owed (as Cicero points out) even to those at whose hands we have suffered wrong. In this connection we have the fine deed of Marcus Attilius Regulus. He had been taken prisoner by the Carthaginians in the first Punic war and been sent to Rome, under an oath to return, in connection with an exchange of prisoners. Immediately on his arrival he dissuaded the Senate from returning their prisoners; and then, when his relatives and friends would have kept him, he preferred to return to punishment rather than break the word which he had given to an enemy. St. Augustine highly extols this conduct. Jacob, too, was incensed with his sons, Simeon and Levi, for violating the agreement which they had made with the Shechemites and he cursed them on his death-bed.

Cic., Offic., bk. 3.
Val. Max., bk. 1,
ch. 1.

Genes. 34.

Genes. 48.

Kingdom of God,
bk. 1, ch. 18.

We must also repudiate the doctrine that there is no need to abide by an agreement which the enemy has obtained by force. For, as Cicero puts it, you can not apply force to a brave man, and good faith (which

Seneca terms the most sacred possession of the human heart) can not be debauched by the stress of any necessity or perverted by any lure. Cicero, accordingly, writes: "There is nothing which is capable of exercising upon one a greater degree of duress than good faith does."

[3] Further, when the prætor's edict promises *restitutio in integrum* (rescission of the transaction) in cases of duress it does not refer to that duress which is lawfully exercised, as in a "just war," or to engagements formed with the enemy, but between citizen and citizen. And the force of an oath in earlier days is shown by the case of Marcus Pomponius, tribune of the plebs. He had named a day for the trial of Lucius Manlius, son of Aulus, on a charge of having added a few days to the period of his dictatorship and also of having banished his son Titus, later styled Torquatus, and having ordered him to live in the country. Thereupon a youthful son of Lucius Manlius, who gathered that his father was in trouble, came with drawn sword and compelled Pomponius, in the absence of any witnesses, to swear that he would release his father. And, although this put him under no legal compulsion so to do, yet he stopped the proceedings against Lucius Manlius and released him.

And so Ferrandus the Deacon, writing to Count Reginus on the subject of the duty of a true and pious Christian general, fitly condemned false swearing in order to deceive any enemy, no matter how inveterate and dangerous to the State, or how great an obstacle to peace his life is and how great a help his death would be, seeing that divine claims are higher than human and (in the words of Peter, chief of Apostles), "We ought to obey God rather than men." Wherefore, with whomsoever we are at war, as the aforesaid Ferrandus says, even when no good faith has been pledged in the war or when peace was made, the State must be saved or served by an inviolate respect for the oath; for what advantage will it be to conquer one whom the Devil, by making him swear falsely in the hope of victory, has conquered already. Accordingly, when the Psalmist sings, "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? who shall dwell in thy holy hill?" he answers himself with these words which he puts into God's mouth: "He that speaketh the truth in his heart, that backbiteth not with his tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbor, nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor; who sweareth to his neighbor and deceiveth him not."

Now, says the Deacon already mentioned, he swears to his neighbor and deceives him not who carries out in conduct whatever he has sworn with his tongue; and let no one imagine that an enemy with whom an oath is made is not included in the word a "neighbor," for the object of the oath is that he should be reckoned a neighbor. A treaty of peace turns an enemy into a friend. It is, therefore, the height of impiety to swear falsely and, considered closely, such conduct is unprofitable and

Epist. 89.

Leading text in Dig. 4, 2, 21. Panormitan. on c. 2, X, 1, 40, col. 3, and c. 6, X, 1, 40. Felinus on c. 5, X, 2 25, nu. 20. Doni. on c. 4, Dist. 5, last col. Sylvest. on word metus, qu. 6.

Cic., Offic., bk. 3.
Livy, bk. 7.

Acts 5, 29.

Psalm 15.

hurtful in the extreme to a general or leader of an army, for the sacredness of the oath is the bond of military discipline and if the general sets the example of lightly esteeming it as regards both enemy and his own men, everything must fall into muddle and confusion, for he will not be able to rely on the word of his enemy or on the fidelity of his own men.

Whatever, then, is confirmed by the addition of an oath and the invocation of God's name—whether it be a promise of clemency to an enemy or of pardon to the guilty or of reward for good conduct to the troops—must not be brought to naught by any consideration of expediency or by any fear of danger. A declaration, to the good faith of which God has been invoked as witness, must stand fixed and unchangeable.

[4] We must, in addition, check all attempts to overreach by false swearing and to impair the sanctity of the oath by a sort of chicanery and over-cunning and perverted interpretation of the law—such as his
 Cic., *Offic.*, bk. 1. who during a truce of thirty days used to go ravaging by night; or such as that of Quintus Fabius Labeo, who (according to some accounts) being entitled, under a treaty made after his defeat of Antiochus, to keep a half part of Antiochus' fleet, cut each ship in half in order to deprive the king of the whole of his fleet. A similar example was furnished by
 Val. Max., bk. 7, ch. 3. one of the ten whom Hannibal sent to the Senate after the defeat of Cannæ, under an oath to return to his camp if they failed to arrange for a ransom of prisoners. This man stayed behind in Rome on the pretext that he had returned to the camp very shortly after leaving it and that this return released him from his oath. This was incorrect, for, as Cicero says, fraud may foil perjury but does not annul it, and so the Senate ordered the sly old fox to be bound and taken back to Hannibal.

Cic., *Offic.*, bk. 3. And the answer of Censorinus (if we may trust Appian) is suscep- Punic war.
 Livy, bk. 22. tible of an explanation in this sense. The Carthaginian envoys had remonstrated because, after their surrender of hostages and all arms, he proposed, in defiance of his pledged word, to destroy Carthage into the bargain; he replied that when the Romans undertook that Carthage should be free they did not mean by the word Carthage the town and the soil.

[5] Nor is that opinion sound which is maintained in some quarters, that the giving of hostages operates to discharge one from the obligation to keep faith. That is the ground upon which Bodin held that
 Republic, bk. 1, ch. 8. Francis of France was freed from the obligations of the treaty of Madrid, because he had given his sons as hostages—on the analogy of the peace of Caudium, which Bodin asserts to have been discharged after hostages had been given. This, however, is contrary to the truth of history, for when the consul Postumius, the author of the peace, was asked his opinion, he declared that the Roman people were not bound by the undertaking into which he had himself entered with the Samnites,

because he had entered into it without authorization from the Roman people. His words were: "I do not deny, Conscript Fathers, that engagements and treaties are alike binding among those peoples who put the observance of good faith in the same rank as their duty to the gods, but I assert that no solemnity which the people have not authorized can cast a binding obligation upon them." He declared that he was himself, however, bound by the engagement, whether justifiable or unjustifiable, and he started and supported the proposal that, in order to free the Roman people from any obligation and to enable them to repudiate the peace with the Samnites, he and the other authors of the peace should be delivered up, and this although six hundred knights had been given as hostages, who would be put to death if the bargain were departed from.

*Livy, bk. 9.
Cic., Offic., bk. 3.*

Now hostages, like sureties and pledges, are accessory to some principal obligation, in order the better to safeguard the interests of the other party, and so little do they destroy the principal obligation that they can not exist apart from it, any more than an accessory in general can exist apart from its principal or an accidental quality without the subject in which it inheres.

*Instit. 3, 20, pr.
Dig. 44, 7, 1, 7.
Dig. 46, 1, 16, pr.;
and 20, 1, 33. Alciat.
de sing. cert. ch. 44.*

*Dig. 50, 17, 178;
and 8, 4, 1.*

Francis, accordingly, ought to have kept faith—if not the public faith (so far, maybe, as concerns those matters as to which the assent of people and estates was required), at any rate his own faith—and he ought to have returned to prison rather than break faith, following the example of Postumus, Mancinus, Regulus, and others; and this all the more because a prince, to whom the people has intrusted all its sovereignty and power, is the fit and proper person to frame bargains about State affairs, whether it be a case of making peace or any other arrangement with the enemy.

Dig. 1, 4, 1.

Dig. 2, 14, 5.

The behavior of John of France, then, was more correct. The English had taken him prisoner in battle and had released him on his parole that he would return if the terms arranged were not wholly carried out; and, as he could not perform all that had been agreed, he preferred to return to captivity rather than to break his word—and this although he had himself given a son as hostage.

*Bodin, Republic,
bk. 1, ch. 8.*

[6] Now what we have laid down about keeping faith with an enemy must be scrupulously observed whenever we are dealing with a just and lawful enemy; but if any one happens to be compelled, by one who is not a "just" enemy, to pass his word about paying a ransom-price or such like, we hold that he is under no obligation to keep his word. And so (as Cicero says) if you fail to pay to pirates the sum promised for sparing your life, there is no fraud, not even if you swore to do what you have failed to do, for a pirate is not included in the list of State enemies, but is the common enemy of all and we ought to have no matter of good faith or oath in common with him; and that is the reason why the jurists say that brigands and pirates are not denoted by the word "hostes."

Offic., bk. 3.

*Text in c. 2, and c.
29, X, 2, 24, and c.
2, X, 2, 13.*

*Dig. 49, 15, 24;
and 50, 16, 118.*

[7] The laws of war, therefore, and of captivity and of post-liminy, which only apply in the case of enemies, can not apply in the case of brigands; and those who are taken prisoners by pirates or brigands remain entirely free. Since then those alone who are "just" enemies can invoke to their profit the law of war, those who are not reckoned as "hostes," and who therefore have no part or lot in the law of war, are not qualified to bargain about matters that only inure to the benefit of "just" enemies, nor are they justified in effecting such bargains by coercion.

And so, the edict of the prætor which promises rescission of transactions induced by duress is applicable; nay, anything done or promised in these circumstances is *ipso jure* void and will not be validated by the employment of an oath, for there is no confirming what is null, nor does an oath carry any obligation when it was extorted by gross and abominable compulsion. For greater security, however, absolution can be sued for and ought willingly to be granted.

What we have just now been saying is not vitiated by the fact that the law allows a robber the actions on pledge and deposit and loan, for this is the case when he contracts with some one other than his victim; he may well be a robber as regards him whose property he has seized without being a robber as regards him with whom he has made the contract, since in matters of contract the standard of good faith is fixed between the contracting parties only, without bringing in any outside considerations.

Again, our remarks about pirates and brigands apply equally to rebels: they can not be called "just" enemies, the two ideas "enemy" and "rebel" being quite distinct; and no one ought to be profited by his own wrong-doing. It is, however, true that, comprehensively and colloquially, all those are called enemies against whom we carry arms.

[8] It follows that those agreements which are extorted by a usurping force need not be respected; for consent, which is a necessary element in all contracts, is wanting in acts which have been procured by violence; transactions entered into in such circumstances are therefore void. Cicero, accordingly, lays it down that the laws of usurpers are not laws, especially naming the *Lex Valeria*. This law was introduced by Lucius Valerius Flaccus, who had been nominated *interrex* by the Senate when the slaughter of Carbo and Marius left the State without consuls and the Republic was overborne by the arms of Sulla. It proposed the appointment of Sulla as perpetual dictator in order to re-establish order in the State and the ratification of all that he had done, whether as consul or proconsul. And the same writer, Cicero, shows that this was of all laws the most unjust and un-lawlike.

Precisely the same thing holds good of those agreements which a lawless people (called usurper, too, by Cicero) extorts by rebellion from

its prince; and, indeed, if some have hesitated to admit that a prince and his subjects can be bound contractually, what are we to say of public agreements extorted by subjects through revolt and perfidy? For, inasmuch as rebels by the mere fact of rising against their prince violate their pledged word, it is vain for them to demand that faith be kept with them. (We shall soon have something to say on this point.) And how is it to be expected that any treaty will be ratified or any pledge be treated as sacred by those who, in violation of both divine and human law, have not shrunk from the depths of infamy and perfidy in their betrayal of their country. Or how can they swear by God who oppose what He has ordained? Or how can there be a compact of peace, in which nothing can be granted to him with whom the peace is made?

Moreover "unjust" enemies, as we have just shown, can not avail themselves of the law of war; for, as Cicero says, there can not be a just cause for taking up arms against one's country, and, consequently, against one's prince, who is the common father of all and has received all his power from God.

Further, seeing that the people can not even treat with outsiders about the concerns of the commonwealth—this matter being in the sole prerogative of the prince to whom the whole State has been intrusted and who has in his hands the choice of war and peace—much less can it drive the prince into an inequitable bargain; for the prince, whose office it is to give laws to his people and not to receive them, being outside the law, can not be fettered by any conditions of his subjects' imposition; nor can any one (as Ulpian says) give orders to himself and play the double part of coercer and coerced.

[9] Nor can there be an obligation which rests on the pleasure of the promisor. This is the bearing of what the canonists tell us in various places, that the Pope can never tie his own hands. And these principles are even more cogent when the prince is damnified by the bargain in question. In such a case he can claim the same reinstatement (*restitutio*) as a minor, especially where it is sought to detract from the sovereignty of the prince: for just as sovereign princes are incompetent to alienate any part of their realms—they being only life-tenants thereof; or, if

owners, then only in the sense in which a husband is owner of the dowry (*dos*) without any power of alienation—so it is also with regard to any of the attributes of sovereignty and the royal prerogative; and if any of them has been alienated in point of fact, it ought to be put back in its former position and the prince's successors are not bound by the contract. Things which are part of the royal prerogative are not *in commercio* (i. e., objects of transfer), but are so annexed to the crown as to be inseparable from it, and they can not be alienated even by the prince, not even on a considered judgment or of his own motion. This is in keeping with Gaius' dictum that things belonging to the divine or public law are

not susceptible of private ownership.

Bartol. on Dig. 43, 24, 3 4.
Bald. on Feud. law, c. 1, 7
and on c. 1, X, 2, 19, and on Cod., 2, 4, 43.
Panormit. on c. 13, X, 2, 1. Specul. 2, 2, de instr. edit. §11.
Anchor., Consult., 2. Felinus on c. 1, X, 2, 19, and others named by Bodin, Repub. 1, 9.

Cic., Philipp., 12.

Nov. 98 (end).

Paul, Rom., ch. 13.

Dig. 2, 14, 5.

Dig. 1, 4, 1.

c. 4, C. 23, qu. 1.

Dig. 1, 4, 1.

Dig. 1, 3, 31.

Dig. 36, 1, 13, 4; and 4, 8, 51.

Dig. 45, 1, 108, 1.

Cod. 2, 53, 4.

Bald. on Authent. Hoc amplius, Cod. 6, 42, 32 (Nov. 1, 1, 1). Joan Papon., in Arrest. 5, 10, generally.

Dig. 31, 69, 3. Cod. 11, 62, 8, and 12, 56, 2, and 11, 60, 2.

Cod. 11, 62, 8; and 11, 60, 2.
Decision of Andr. Iser. Luc. in Joan. Papon. Ompha. approves, and others whom Molin. cites and follows, Custom of Paris, tit. 1, gloss 5. nu. 23. Bartol., Jas., Cyn., and others whom Bodin cites, Repub., 1, 10.

Dig. 30, 39, 7; and 36, 4, 17.

Dig. 1, 8, 1.

And even the employment of the oath will be of no avail in this matter, for the prohibition to alienate, being inherent in the thing itself, renders unlawful any oath thereafter taken. Whatever, indeed, belongs to the State or Kingdom can neither be alienated nor acquired by long user (*longi temporis præscriptio*): how, then, can those things which are reserved to the king's majesty in token of his sovereign power be severed from him, seeing that a prince does not lose his sovereignty even by a voluntary abdication?

And if (as is Ulpian's opinion) an agreement with a husband excluding the *beneficium competentiæ* (right of limiting his liability) and providing that he may be sued for the whole debt, ought not to be upheld, as being against good morals and inconsistent with the customary respect to which husbands are entitled, what must be our attitude towards a bargain which encroaches on the dignity due to the prince alike by divine and human law? There have been many writers, and much has been written, on this topic. It explains why a private person who usurps the royal titles and emblems is liable to capital punishment and to forfeiture of property; and in days gone by, under the *Lex Valeria*, any one who plotted to seize the throne was to be outlawed in body and in goods. And this also explains Bodin's doctrine that if the prince were to grant a special license to annul condemnations and remit penalties, it would be void, inasmuch as these are prerogatives of the sovereign and can only be exercised by him; and Baldus writes that no lapse of time bars the right of appeal to the sovereign prince.

[10] Further, Bodin correctly enumerated the especial functions of a sovereign as follows: to appoint the higher magistracy and allot his duties to each magistrate, to enact or repeal laws, to declare or conclude war, to be the ultimate court of appeal from all magistrates, and to exercise the power of life and death. And even if judges inflict punishments on wrong-doers, it does not follow that the power of life and death is theirs, for they are strictly limited by the laws and have no power to remit the death penalty where it has been deserved, it being an attribute of the sovereign to determine when to temper law with mercy. And so, on the expulsion of the kings, some regretted the changed character of the State, saying that the king was a man and one could apply to him personally to obtain one's right or one's revenge; that one could win a favor and a boon from him, and that he could be angry or could pardon; but that the laws were deaf and inexorable things, utterly bare of indulgence and forbearance.

And so, when Cicero craved pardon for Ligarius from Cæsar, he said: "I never addressed a court in this manner: Pardon him, judges; he has erred and fallen; he did not consider; if ever hereafter, etc.; but to a father that is the usual strain. Before a court it is: He never did it, never planned it; the evidence is false, the accusation false."

c. 8, X, 3, 13, and c. 32, X, 2, 24.

Cod. 11, 62, 8, and 11, 60, 2.

Dig. 1, 18, 20.

Dig. 24, 3, 14, 1.

Baldus, c. 1, nu. 3, on Feud. Law II, 56. Felinus on c. 12, and c. 13, X, 2, 26. Anton. Butr., on c. 13, X, 4, 17. Abbas on c. 12, X, 2, 26. Whom Zoannettus on Rom. Emp. mentions and follows.

Dig. 48, 18, 1, end; and 48, 19: 8, end, and 31 and 4.

Bald. on Authent. Quas actiones, Cod. I, 2, 23 (Nov. 131, 6), nu. 14, para. Ex his apparet.

Cod. 1, 23, 6; and 2, 15, 2.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 5. Republic, bk. 1, last ch.

Text in c. 19, X, 2, 24.

Method. hist., ch. 6.

Livy, bk. 2.

The matters I have been referring to are, then, reserved to the prince; and when the Roman people, who were the repository of sovereignty, demitted many other matters to the Senate, they reserved these to themselves: Dionysius of Halicarnassus shows this over and over again. This applies especially to the power of appointing magistrates, passing laws, and deciding questions of war and peace; but the right of receiving ultimate appeals and the power of life and death were admittedly vested in the people by the *Lex Valeria*. These are matters which jurisconsults hold to be so integral a part of the prince's majesty that they can not be shared with others; and in addition they name the granting of permission to seize hostages and of concessions to gather taxes and tribute and the power to mint money and some other matters. There are, however, instances in which some of these have been allowed to others than sovereigns: see, for all of them, Joannes Paponius, generally.

Rom. antiq., bks. 2, 4, and 6.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 5.
Livy, bk. 2.
Val. Max., bk. 4, ch. 1.
Plutarch, life of P. Valer. Publicola.

Guido Papae, quest. 498.

In Arrest., bk. 5, 1, and follg. titles.
Bodin, Repub., bk. 1, last ch.

[11] Again, Bodin remarks that, for the reasons just now set out, there are no agreements which are more easily upset or require more wariness than those which rebel subjects make with their prince, and so he recommends insurgents not to make such contracts themselves, but to induce some outside neighboring prince to act for them. My advice, however, would be that they should return into the right way and humbly seek forgiveness and try to earn their prince's clemency by penitence instead of vexing his soul with compacts that have no law or equity about them; for nothing is more mortifying to a prince than to enter into a compact with rebellious subjects and to keep faith with them. Accordingly we read in Livy how Philip, after his defeat by the Romans, found one thing more galling than all others, namely, that among the conditions which were imposed on him by the Romans was one which deprived him of his right to chastise the Macedonians for revolting from him in the war.

Bk. 39

Those conventions, then, being bad which impair the majesty of the king, there can be no doubt about our attitude towards those which affront the Majesty of God (which can not suffer any derogation at man's hands, either by contract or by any length of prescription). Consistently herewith, Themistocles was wont to tell the Athenians, and Cato was wont to tell the Romans, that men can not acquire by usucapion anything which is the due of the Divine Majesty nor private persons anything belonging to the State; and Gaius similarly laid it down that things *divini juris* or *publici juris* are in no man's private ownership. And that noble passage of Ambrose is all in the same direction, in which he says, regarding the Emperor Valentinian:

"I am sued by court officials and tribunes, claiming a speedy delivery of the Basilica, and they say that the Emperor is within his right, because everything is under his power; my reply is that if he wants from

Plutarch, on Themistocles and Cato of Utica.

Dig. 1, 8, 1.

Epist. 33.

me anything that is mine—my land or my money—I shall make no opposition as regards any right of mine of this kind (although all that is mine might be said to belong to the poor); but the things which are God's are not subject to the imperial power."

Further, although compacts with brigands and rebels are invalid, as we have just shown, yet the prince would do well to abstain, as far as possible, from making them, both because they ill befit the prince's majesty and because there are certain evils which it is better to endure rather than that there should be any truck with the wicked.

[12] Moreover, the Romans pronounced it disgraceful in the extreme to make any terms with pirates, brigands, or rebels about peace or war or truces; and so we read that they would never arrange matters by a treaty or compact with those subjects who had revolted against the Roman sway; nay, they never rested until they had subdued them all, either by hard fighting or by compelling them to surrender, as we read was the case with the Latins and Campanians and other rebels. Cicero accordingly dissuaded Plancus from arranging a peace between Brutus and Antony, calling Antony's men the foulest of robbers, who either ought to throw down their weapons and beg for peace or, if they sought it with weapons still in their hands, ought to learn that peace is procured by victory and not by bargaining. And Cicero added that those who advised the despatch of envoys to Antony were ignorant of the laws of war and of the examples of their forefathers, and of what was required by the majesty of the Roman people and by the dignity of the Senate; for it was not the time for verbal requests, but for armed compulsion. And Cicero termed this war inexpiable, asserting thereby that the possibility of peace was excluded.

Similarly in the Social war, this war was commenced by the allies of the Roman people in the hope that they would no longer be subject to the Roman dominion but would become sharers in it, and they sent a mission to Rome to complain that they were not admitted to the rights of citizenship, although it was by their labor and assistance that the Romans had extended their dominions so far and wide. The Senate austere replied that it would not receive their mission until they recovered their senses.

The case of Tacfarinas teaches the same thing: He was a robber of good birth who had reached such a pitch of arrogance as to send an embassy to Tiberius and to demand into the bargain a dwelling-place for himself and his troops under a repeated threat of inexpiable war. Tacitus tells us that it was said that the Emperor never felt more indignation at any insult offered to himself and the Roman people than at this:

"That a renegade and freebooter should act in the mode of a regular enemy (*hostis*). Why, it had not even been granted to Spartacus, when spreading fire through Italy unavenged and destroying one consu-

lar army after another—even although the commonwealth was tottering under the tremendous wars of Sertorius and Mithridates—that he should be received by agreement into a position calling for such good faith: much less that Tacfarinas, a brigand, when the Roman people was at the height of its splendor, should be bought off by a treaty of peace and a grant of lands.”

Thus Tacitus.

It is, however, usual to spare those who, without any compact, throw themselves on the good-faith of a commander. Fabius Maximus Æmilianus, accordingly, spared Conoba, a brigand-chief who had surrendered to him, and Augustus pardoned Crocola, a notorious brigand in Spain, upon whose head a price had been set and who had voluntarily given himself up; and Augustus caused the price to be paid to Crocola when he demanded it and forebore to punish him lest he should seem to play tricks in connection with the promised reward or to make treacherous use of Crocola's reliance on public law.

Dion. bk. 56.

[13] Again: there are occasions which are exceptions to the rule about keeping faith, and these occur not only when we are dealing with rebels and brigands and others who are not included in the list of enemies, but also when we are dealing with enemies and those who are arrayed against us in just war.

[14] First and foremost is the case where a person, overcome maybe by a weakness to which all are liable, has sworn to do something offensive to God, by whom he has sworn: he must not fulfil his oath, for an oath should not be a bond of iniquity, nor is it expedient to keep faith in wrongful promises, nor is there any bindingness in an oath, the taking of which violates good morals. Nay, he who does what is forbidden, simply because he has sworn to do it, adds one sin to another.

Sometimes, then, (as St. Ambrose says) it is a breach of duty to keep one's word: Cicero, too, perceived this; so did Seneca in his *Heracles* *Œtaus*, where he says:

Præstare fateor posse me tacitam fidem,
Si scelere careat: interim scelus est fides.

(I admit that I can pledge my word to silence when this is innocent: but otherwise to keep that pledge is guilty.)

For, in St. Augustine's words, to call the commission of a crime an exhibition of good faith, is to make a strange use of the term "good faith." David adopted a much juster course in departing from his oath to destroy Nabal than Herod did in killing a most holy man for his oath's sake. And Cicero is quite right in blaming the act of Agamemnon in sacrificing Iphigenia in pursuance of his vow to sacrifice to Diana the loveliest child in his kingdom; for, as Cicero says, it would have been far better not to carry out the promise than to commit a crime so foul. For the same reason we reprobate the deed of Gideon, similar to the

c. 22, C. 22, qu. 4.

c. 69, Reg. jur. in vi.

c. 58, Reg. jur. in vi.

c. 1, Dist. 13, and
c. 21, C. 22, qu. 4.
Offic., bk. 1.

Offic., bk. 3.

c. 2, and c. 4,
C. 22, qu. 4.

Offic., bk. 3.

last-named, in having Jephtha's daughter sacrificed, in fulfilment of an oath.

An oath to do something unlawful ought, therefore, not to be performed and if there be any penalty attached to the non-performance it ought to be exacted from him who insists on the performance. And this holds true even where it is but a venial sin that is in contemplation.

[15] A corollary is that a pledge given by a private person to the

hurt of State or Church must not be observed. This holds good where this hurt is the main point in issue, for the proximate cause must be regarded, not a remote cause. The case of Themistocles is in point here.

When he was sent into exile, he betook himself to Xerxes, promising him that he would make war on the Athenians; subsequently that king called on him to keep his promise; and then, although he had received scandalous treatment from his fellow-citizens and been most humanely welcomed by Xerxes, yet he held it more honorable to put an end to his life than to fight his fatherland; so he committed suicide by poison.

We have also in this connection the fine discourse in which Caius Claudius begged Appius Claudius and the other decemvirs to resign their usurped power. The fact (if it were one) that they had made secret agreements with one another and had called the gods to witness their exchange of pledges, ought not, said he, to influence them; the keeping of such agreements would be impious, he insisted, and the breach of them a pious act, seeing that they were opposed to the interests of the citizens and the State; nor would the gods be gratified by being made parties to base, unjust conduct.

This idea is at the bottom of Ulpian's dictum that a partnership (*societas*) can not be formed with wrong-doing and dishonesty for its object; and it leads Cicero to declare that at times a breach of faith is a just act, e. g., to refuse to return a sword that has been deposited with one by a madman or by an enemy of one's country. For every act of ours ought to conform to the principles of justice, which are, first, to injure nobody and, second, to serve the common weal.

And so the poets, too, condemn rash oaths in their fable of Phaëthon, the moral of which is that it would have been better to violate an oath than to intrust the reins of the sun to an unskilled youth, to the whole world's ruin. And Paulus supports this doctrine where he says that an agreement which is outside private competence must not be kept: Ulpian, too, lays down the general principle that no agreement which infringes the common law ought to be kept, not even when accompanied by an oath, the law being superior in authority to an oath.

An oath, therefore, is void which is antagonistic to statutes and to the authority of the law. Hence in every oath there is an implied reservation in favor of paramount authority; and wherever the power of such a superior is involved, no oath can derogate from his power. For, one

Authent. Quod eis.
Cod. 5, 4, 23, 2 (Nov.
51, 6). And Cod. 6,
25, 5.

Dig. 2, 14: 7(14) and
16 and 38. And 2,
8, 16. Glossators and
doctors on Dig. 2, 14,
5, and c. 2, bk. 2, 11,
in vi.

Bartol on Cod. 3, 27,
2. Alciat. De sing
cer., c. 44. Text in
c. 27, X, 2, 24 and
c. 1, bk. 2, 11, in vi.
Span. Ordin., last bk.,
tit. 28, par. 2.

Dig. 2, 14, 7 and
doctors thereon: c.
2, bk. 1, 18, in vi.

Dig. 25, 2, 21.

Plutarch on
Themistocles.

Dion. Halic., Rom.
antiq., bk. 11.

Dig. 17, 2: 53 and 57.

Gloss on c. 6, C. 22,
qu. 4. Felinus on c.
8, X, 2, 24. Roland
a Val., consult., 98,
nu. 18. Alciatus on
Cod. 2, 3, 6, nu. 52.

Offic., bk. 1.

Ovid, Metam., 2.

Dig. 2, 14, 27, 4.

Dig. 2, 14, 7, 16.

Dig. 30, 112, 4; and

37, 14, 6, 4.

Cod. 1, 14, 5.

c. 19, X, 2, 24 and

Felinus thereon:
c. 16, X, 2, 24.

can not enter into an agreement relating to things beyond one's competence. It is for this reason that no stigma of perfidy attaches to Gonzalo, Viceroy of Naples, for his conduct in flinging Count Valentino into prison in obedience to an order from King Ferdinand, although he had pledged his word to the count that he would protect him. Hence, too, the emperors Severus and Caracalla intimated by rescript that they released from his oath a man who had vowed not to attend a meeting of the Senate.

Nay, an oath which is opposed to the interests of the State is taken to be released by mere operation of law: Paulus is an authority for this where he says that the *Lex Julia* releases oaths which are in restraint of marriage. For a condition or promise in restraint of marriage was so much discountenanced among the Romans that it was utterly expunged from testaments and other documents and taken as unwritten.

It will therefore be permissible to ignore private pledges in the interests of public security. For (says Cornelius Tacitus) the learned declare those transactions to be null and void where both the giving and the receiving are inconsistent with the welfare of the State; and, as comment on that opinion, we have the noble utterance of Postumius, in which he demonstrated that the Roman people were not bound by the arrangement which he had made with the Samnites, despite the exertions to the contrary of Lucius Livius and Quintus Melius, tribunes of the plebs, who had shared with him the authorship of the peace of Caudium and who were trying to show that the Roman people were bound by the oath, so as to save themselves from being surrendered.

[16] It would, however, be much the safer and more praiseworthy course not to allow oneself to be driven by any fear of danger into pledging one's word to do something unlawful rather than to break the word so pledged; for he who vows to do something which is unlawful is, by the very fact, forsworn, and every conceivable evil is more tolerable than to truck with evil. And on this ground the intrepidity of Pontius, a soldier of Cæsar's faction, is indeed praiseworthy. He was out on the watch before Cæsar's quarters and was cut off by a troop of Scipio's guards; one chance of safety was given him, namely, that he should declare that for the future he would be a soldier of Cnæus Pompeius; but he hesitated not to reply: "I am much obliged to you, Scipio; but the match which you propose does not suit me."

Equal confidence was displayed by Caius Mevius, a centurion of Augustus: he had often brought off notable fights in the course of the war with Antony, but fell into an undetected snare of the enemy and was taken to Antony at Alexandria; there he was asked what the decision in his case ought to be: "Have me killed," said he, "for I can not be lured from Cæsar's service into yours by any bribe of safety or by any threat of death." But it was just this intrepid scorn of life which easily gained it for him; for Antony rewarded his valor with a grant of safety.

Bodin, *Repub.*, bk. 1, ch. 8.
[In l. ult. D. de adminic. (7).]

Dig. 37, 14, 6, 4.

Cod. 6, 40, 2.
Dig. 35, 1: 62(2) and 74.

Livy, bk. 9.

c. 27, X, 2, 24.
Gloss on c. 1, bk. 2, 11, in vi.

c. 3, C. 32, qu. 5.

Val. Max., bk. 3, ch. 8.

And, not to mention individuals, Saguntum, a wealthy town in Spain, is a conspicuous, though sad, monument of good faith towards the Romans. After a protracted siege it was unable to defend itself from Hannibal any longer, and the Romans could send no help to it; so, spurning dishonorable terms of peace, the whole of Saguntum threw itself and all its goods upon the funeral pile rather than defect from the Romans to whom it was bound by treaty.

Livy, bk. 21. Val.
Max., bk. 6, ch. 6.
Florus, bk. 2, ch. 6.

[17] Lastly, faith need not be kept, not even when accompanied by an oath, with an enemy who breaks faith. This applies both to public and to private agreements; according to the verse,

c. 3 and c. 29, X, 2,
24. And Dig. 2, 15,
16; and 19, 1, 13, 8;
and 5, 2, 27;
Cod. 2, 3, 21; and
2, 4: 17 and 14.

*Fallere fallentem, fraudemque repellere fraude,
Exemploque licet ludere quemque suo.*

(Cheats we may cheat, and fraud by fraud evade,
And trick each trickster by the trick he played.)

Text in c. 29, X 2,
24, last §. Gloss
on Dig. 2, 14 (?).

For it is part of the general law of contract that no one is bound by a contract unless the other party performs what he has undertaken, it being futile for one who refuses to keep faith with another to claim that that other shall keep faith with him. It is knavish to insist that a given principle applies as against the other side, but not as against oneself, and the prætor's edict meets such conduct by providing that whatever proposition of law one party sets up against the other party he must submit to himself. Nor can any one be charged with breach of faith in consequence; he is rather proceeding under the law of war, upon a new and the same most just cause, i. e., breach of faith, against enemies who have slighted both divine and human law. That is why infraction of treaties led the Romans to make war on the Sabines, Latins, Privernians, Volscians, Hernicians, Apulians, Samnites, Etruscans, Æquians, and Carthaginians, and on very many others, and why the Senate visited the infraction of treaty which the towns of Epirus had been guilty of in defecting to Perseus, by razing their walls to the ground and giving them over to the army to loot.

Cod. 2, 3, 21.

c. 75, Reg. jur. in vi.
And Dig. 31, 77, 27.

Livy, bk. 35.

For circumstances that may hereafter arise are outside the scope of an oath, and, if some novel factor emerges, any one can refuse to carry out what he has sworn. This tallies with Cicero's doctrine, that there are occasions when duty completely changes shape, and the just course is not to keep faith, e. g., when it is a question of returning to a madman or to an enemy of one's country a sword that he has deposited with us. And there is implied in every oath a condition such as, "Provided that good faith be kept with me," or as, "Save so far as the other party is responsible for the non-performance of this agreement." If this latter clause is called into operation, a tacit release of the agreement is assumed to occur, and the first to contravene the agreement is alone taken to have broken faith, so that the consequential act of the other party can not be reckoned a violation of his oath.

c. 20, c. 25 and c. 35,
X, 2, 24. And c. 2,
X, 1, 9. And Dig.
38, 9, 11; and 2, 15:
5 and 9. And 2, 14,
35. Cod. 2, 4, 31.

Offic., bk. 1.

c. 3, c. 25 and c. 29,
end, X, 2, 24.
Dig. 19, 2, 54, 1.

Cod. 4, 33, 4.

c. 7, X, 5, 37.

This explains that well-known dispute between Romulus and Cluilius, the Alban dictator, as to which of them had been the first to depart from the terms of the treaty, for that one would alone be guilty of violating the treaty and the earlier act of non-observance would, accordingly, be held to be the subsisting cause of the war. For if a breach of faith occur with regard to some matter in contemplation of which the contract was entered into, the whole agreement falls to the ground and everything goes back into its original position.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 3.

Cod. 4, 54, 6; and 2, 3, 21. Dig. 4, 3, 7.

Ulpian, accordingly, says that the action on partnership does not lie against one who retires from a partnership because of failure of some condition subject to which the partnership was formed. The same writer lays it down that a right of action on an undutious will subsists unimpaired despite a compromise, should the heir break faith in carrying the compromise into effect. For there is a mutuality in an obligation whereby each party is so bound as that either is released on his side if the other fails to perform what he has undertaken. And this holds good whether a penalty is stipulated in the agreement or not, no penalty being due in the former case, and even when it is something quite unavoidable that prevents the other side from carrying out his part. For such a hindrance may save him from being *in mora* (accountable for delay) or from incurring a penalty, but it is inadequate to keep alive his right of action.

Dig. 17, 2, 14.

Dig. 5, 2, 27, pr.

Dig. 19, 2, 54, 1.

Alciat. on Cod. 2, 3, 21.

Dig. 14, 2, 10, 1, mid.

Dig. 19, 2, 15, 4.

All this applies, no matter how small the matter in which there has been a neglect to keep faith, unless it be so trivial that there is no likelihood of either side having attached much importance to it. Further, the duty imposed on each side to keep faith is so absolute that even if the moving consideration of the promise fails, the obligation none the less endures. Should it not be quite clear which of the two was the first to break faith, there must be a kind of mutual set-off and each must be absolved from the stipulated penalty; for it is a common saying that there can be set-off in cases of equal delict. Hence comes the admitted doctrine that a litigant may counter the craftiness of his opponent with craftiness of his own, picking out the crow's own eyes (as the saying goes); but this is subject to the provision that he has a good cause and abstains from such fraud as overpasses the boundary into crime, such as forgery, criminal knavery (*stellionatus*), and the like.

Dig. 21, 1, 1, 2.

Alex. on Cod. 6, 35, 11. Corn., Consult. 246, bk. 3, Ale., Consult. 167. Bald. on Dig. 18, 1, 72. Tiraqueau on title De jud. in reb. exig. ferend. Dig. 18, 5, 10, 1.

c. 7, X, 5, 27.

Dig. 24, 3, 39.

c. 2, C. 23, qu. 2.

Gloss on c. 16, bk. 1, 6 in vi. versic. malignantium.

Butr. on c. 3. Reg. jur. in vi. Alciat. on Cod. 2, 4, 17.

[18] What has just been said is generally accepted with regard to compacts, or treaties, of peace, but there are many who reject it with regard to truces, it being thought that these ought to be considered inviolable, even though the enemy breaks his word with regard to them; and this opinion as being the sounder and juster has been adopted by the assessors of the imperial chamber, so Mynsinger tells us, and he adds a reason for the distinction, which others too rely on, namely, that when the period of a truce is at an end the aggrieved person can take measures

Vinc., Joan. Andr., Ant. de Butr., Card., Angel., Cast., Felin., Ias., Alciat., Laud., and the two Socini whom Petrin. Rel. mentions de re militari, par. 5, tit. 3, and Mynsin., cent. 4, obser. 7 and Decius, 3, consult. 21.

of vengeance. This reason does not seem satisfactory to me, especially as applied to time of war (when, in Livy's words, if you make never so small a delay at the critical moment, when opportunity is flying by, you will vainly try to repair the omission afterwards). Nor is the reason sound in law, for the only difference between peace and a truce is that the one is perpetual, the other temporary, but the time involved neither intensifies nor diminishes the quality of the obligation. And exactly as peace is destroyed when one or the other party breaks faith, so also the dissolution of a truce is held to result, for, underlying each case is a common factor, i. e., a breach of faith; and no one ought, by his own guile or delict, to be a gainer or cause injury to others.

Dig. 49, 15, 19, 1.
Gell. bk. 1, ch. 25.
Dig. 44, 7, 44, 1; and
45, 1, 122, 1.

c. 13, X, 2, 1, and
[c. ille novit] and
c. 2, X, 1, 34.

Dig. 19, 2, 54, 1.

Cod. 4, 48, 3.
Dig. 50, 17, 134, 1;
and 24, 1, 3, 1.

And, unless I mistake, there is a neat response of Paulus which fits this case. The facts were that a lessor had covenanted with a lessee, under a penalty, that he should not be ejected during the term. Paulus held, however, that if the lessee was in arrears with the rent for two years, the lessor could eject him without incurring the penalty, even if there had been no mention of the rent in the penal stipulation.

Pan., Imo., Alex.,
Decius, Aleiat., Bell.,
Cor., whom Mynsinger
cites, cent. 4, obser. 7.

Petr. Bell. de re
milit., par. 5, tit. 3.
Livy, bks. 1 and 2.

Gell. bk. 1, ch. 25.

[19] For these reasons I am inclined to side with those who think that the same legal principles apply to a truce as to peace and treaties, especially so since a truce also may extend over a long period of time.

We read that the people of Veii were granted a truce of a hundred years by Romulus, one of forty years by Servius Tullius, and one also of forty years by the consuls Lucius Furius and Caius Manlius, and a truce is reported to have been made with the people of Cære for a hundred years.

Livy, bk. 7.

And when the Volsinians were weary of war a truce for twenty years was granted them. The Tarquinians were driven by fear to crave a truce for forty years from the consul Decius. The Æquians obtained a truce for eight years. When the chief powers of Etruria (the Volsinians, Perusia, and Aretium) begged for peace, they secured a truce for

Livy, bk. 5.

Livy, bk. 9.

Livy, bk. 4.

Livy, bk. 11.

forty years. We read accordingly that the Romans treated a breach of a truce as a cause of war just as much as a breach of a treaty, and they were people who always observed the laws of war most religiously. And so they went to war with the Samnites in the same year in which they had

Livy, bk. 9.

granted them a two years' truce, because they had broken the truce. And they brought to a successful issue a war with the Etruscans, who in reply to a request for peace and a treaty with the Romans had received a grant of a thirty years' truce, yet had reopened the war a very little later in

Bk. 9.

flagrant breach of sworn truce. And in the same year, says Livy, the consul Fabius engaged with the rest of the Etruscans near Perusia, which had itself committed a breach of sworn truce; his victory was neither dubious nor difficult, and he would have captured the town also (for he marched near the walls after his victory) had not envoys come out to

Bk. 11. surrender the town. The same writer, Livy, tells in another place how

the Romans made war on the Etruscans for making military preparations in breach of a truce. (Peace had been refused them, but they had been granted a truce for two years.)

There is this additional point, that greater sanctity attached to a treaty, which was made by aid of an imprecation*, than to a truce or other kind of agreement (*sponsio*). A treaty, accordingly, could not be concluded without a mandate of the people, or without the *fecials* and other solemn ritual, but we read that truces and other kinds of agreement were frequently made by generals without the *fecials* or other solemnity and without any mandate from the people. In the next chapter we shall show this at greater length. Livy, bk. 9.

And yet nothing (says Cicero) could be sacrosanct save what the plebeians and people (*plebs populusque*) had sanctioned and what had been rendered sacred either by its nature or by the solemn testimony of a statute or of a penalty whereby any offender is made *sacer* (i. e., outlaw). Well, then: if a treaty, which possesses a higher degree of sanctity, ceases to bind when the other party breaks faith in regard of it, much more is this the case with a truce. In orat. pro
Corn. Bal.

No blame, however, attaches to those who during a time of truce receive provocation at the hands of a wrong-doer, yet abstain from all form of retaliation (especially where the damage in question has been but slight and temporary) with the idea of throwing on the enemy all the disgrace of breaking faith. This, however (Alexander asserts), is rather a matter of use and custom than a counsel of law. Consistent with it is the conduct of Scipio on an occasion when the Carthaginians not only had perfidiously broken a truce, but also had violated the Law of Nations in the person of his envoys. Scipio, nevertheless, declaring that he would do nothing unworthy of Roman institutions or his own character, let the envoys of the enemy, who had come to him at Rome at that juncture, return inviolate. By so doing Scipio earned much praise, but (if we must pronounce a verdict) he was bound to spare the Carthaginian envoys, no matter that the truce had been broken with the dastardly duplicity that appears in Livy's narrative. What was open to him was to renew the war (as in fact he did) without any stigma of perfidy; but he could offer no violence to the enemy's envoys, they being protected by the Law of Nations and declared inviolable and sacred, apart from any agreement for peace or a truce and even in the heat of war. And it is immaterial that the enemy have already broken a truce and done violence to envoys sent from the other side to them. Cod. 2, 3, 21.
Livy, bk. 30.
Dig. 50, 7, 13.

[20] Now, what we have said about not being bound to keep faith with one who breaks faith, must be limited to one and the same agreement which has been broken, and to matters included in one and the same *sponsio*, and to promises where the moving consideration of each party's promise is the promise of the other party. For things that are

Alciat. on Cod.
2, 3, 21, nu. 31.

Alex. on Cod. 2, 3, 21.
Dig. 4, 3, 36 and
Accurt. thereon.

* See following chapter, section 4.

c. 3, X, 1, 2. mutually dependent are to be judged upon one and the same principle;
 Dig. 43, 16, 18. but it is otherwise with things that are independent of each other. Accordingly, an offender against one law is not deprived thereby of the benefit of another law; and a man who is the instituted heir under an earlier will, but a substituted heir under a later will, may renounce the inheritance under the earlier will and enter under the later one.
 Dig. 28, 6, 12.

[21] In war, accordingly, even though you have a perjured, treaty-breaking foe to deal with, and one who has once and again and repeatedly played you false, yet you may not break your faith in return. This admits an exception (as already shown) when your enemy makes it impossible for you to perform what you have sworn—in all other cases it was always held a deep disgrace to requite perfidy with perfidy. In this connection Lucullus fell into disrepute. The Lusitanians had broken a treaty and made war, and Lucullus, surrounding them by a stratagem and in breach of his pledged word, had them all put to death with the utmost cruelty, after the fashion of barbarians and without any regard for the dignity of Rome. And Servius Galba was accused before the assembled people by Libo, tribune of the people, for that, while prætor in Spain, he had, despite his sworn pledge, put to death a large body of the Lusitanians, when that tribe was renewing the war in breach of treaties.
 Appian, Span. war.
 Val. Max., bk. 8, ch. 1.

[22] Lastly, a compact whether of alliance or of peace or of truce, is void if it has been obtained by fraud, for such agreements as are invalidated by fraud are not upheld by the prætor, and fraud inducing a *bonæ fidei* contract (i. e., one of a certain group of contracts in Roman law) makes the contract null by mere operation of law subject to this that the deceived party may, in his discretion, elect whether to affirm the contract or not; but the other party, who has committed the fraud, has no voice in the matter, for no one, by his own guile, may profit himself or injure others. The bad faith of one of two contracting parties subjects the fate of the contract to the discretion of the other party.
 Dig. 2, 14, 7: 7 and 9.
 Dig. 4, 3, 7; and 4, 4, 16, 1.
 Cod. 2, 4, 26.
 Cod. 4, 48, 3; and 7, 8, 5.
 Dig. 18, 1: 62 and 57.
 And 19, 1, 13, 5.
 And 17, 1, 60, 4.

We read, however, in Holy Scripture, how Joshua treated the Gibeonites. They were a neighboring people, belonging to a land which the Lord had promised to the Israelites; but, in order to secure peace at the hand of the Israelites, they had lied that they were strangers from a very far country. Joshua was deceived by this fraud, but when he discovered it he decided that the peace which he had granted could not be revoked, lest he should allow himself to commit the same perfidy which he was reprobating in another. However (to quote St. Ambrose), on that occasion Holy Scripture uttered, not the ancient formula of the jurisconsults concerning fraud, but the opinion of the Patriarchs. Moreover, though Joshua took the Gibeonites out of the hand of the Children of Israel so that they were not put to death, yet he cursed them for their deceit and ordered that they should be servants to the congregation, every one of them.
 Joshua, ch. 9.

CHAPTER VII.

Of treaties and truces.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Three kinds of treaty. 2. Usual to insert in a treaty, for what it is worth, clause <i>Majestatem comiter conservare</i> (i. e. courteous recognition of superiority). 3. The Romans' custom not to make a treaty with an armed enemy. 4. The difference between a treaty (<i>fœdus</i>) and a sponsion (<i>sponsio</i>). | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. A general can not make peace with the enemy without his prince's authorization. 6. Does this prohibition apply to truces? 7. Can a prince grant away private property on grounds of public expediency? 8. The prince is bound by the law of nature. 9. How far kings are owners paramount. 10. Whether a prince is bound by a treaty struck with his predecessor. |
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[1] Now concerning treaties wherein we pledge our faith to an enemy, be it remarked that in olden days three classes used to be made of those treaties whereby states and kings formally bargained for each other's friendship. Menippus, the envoy whom Antiochus sent to Rome about peace, lucidly discoursed of this to the consul Titus Quintius. The first class was that in which terms were dictated to the vanquished in war. For since all their property had been surrendered to the stronger in arms, it was within his right and discretion to say what part thereof he purposed as victor to keep and in what to mulct them. Livy, bk. 44.

Such was the treaty which was granted to Æneas after he had fled from Troy and was begging for peace from the pursuing Greeks. The terms were that Æneas and his allies and all the property which they had carried off with them should quit Trojan soil within a specified time and that their fortresses should be delivered into the power of the Greeks. Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 1.

Another example is the treaty made by the Romans with the Æquians, the conditions of which were: The Æquians, retaining their territory intact, are to become subjects of the Romans; they are to send nothing to the Romans save troops as often as summoned and then at their own expense.

Such also was the treaty which the Apulians obtained from the Romans, for they did not enter into it on equal terms (as Livy says), but as being under the sway of the Roman people. Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 9.

Of the same class, too, is the treaty in which Philip was bidden to withdraw his guards from all the towns of Greece, to surrender his fleet and elephants, and to pay a thousand talents to the Roman people, and was forbidden to make war outside Macedonia without the Senate's authorization. Livy, bk. 43.

So also was the treaty by which Antiochus, after the whole of Asia this side of Mount Taurus had surrendered to the Romans, was to hand over his fleet and its equipment and pay twelve thousand Attic talents, over twelve years, by equal instalments.

Livy, bk. 48.

The second class of treaty was that in which combatants of equal strength in war entered on equal terms into a treaty of peace and friendship.

Such was that which we read of as struck between Romulus and Tatius, King of the Sabines; there had been three drawn battles between them, with very great slaughter on either side; so the wives of the Romans, who were of Sabine origin and about whom the war had arisen, intervened, and the combatants elected to end the war by a treaty rather than by fighting; this treaty provided that Romulus and Tatius should reign jointly in the City with equal power and honor and that the rights of Roman citizenship should be given to the Sabines.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiqu., bk. 2.

Dig. 49, 15: 12, (pr., and 20).

Now in this kind of treaty it is usual to arrange on equal terms for mutual return of prisoners, restoration of towns and the like; accordingly in the treaty between Octavius Cæsar, Antony, and Pompey it was agreed that there should be a cessation of hostilities by land and by sea and that the contracting parties might freely come and go everywhere; also that Pompey should withdraw his garrisons from every place in Italy, that he would not receive any more fugitive slaves, that he should rule over the islands of Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, and the others which were then in his possession, and receive the Peloponnese into the bargain, and that Cæsar and Antony should possess what was left.

Appian, Civil war, bk. 5.

And of this kind, too, the treaty seems to have been in which the Romans granted peace to the Ætolians, upon the following conditions: The Ætolians are to recognise the empire and superiority of the Roman people without fraud and are to have the same enemies as the Roman people, bearing arms and making war upon them side by side. For, although the treaty in question can not be called one on equal terms, yet it was not a case where conditions were imposed on the vanquished or they were deprived of anything, but they were left in the free enjoyment

Livy, bk. 48.

Dig. 49, 15, 7. of their own laws.

Again, the third class of treaty was that in which peoples who had never been enemies knitted themselves together by a bond of alliance and entered into a compact of friendship. It is not usual for peoples in such a case either to impose or to receive conditions (for that would be between conquerors and conquered), but they framed certain conditions for the alliance and friendship on which they were entering. Such was the treaty which Latinus made with Æneas, when the Trojans were admitted into a part of his territory. He bargained that they should coöperate with each other in the war which they were preparing to wage against Rutulus and that each would assist the other to the utmost of his

Dion. Halic., bk. 1. strength.

This is also the place to mention the treaty in which friendship was inaugurated with the Latins, during the consulship of Postumius Cominius and Spurius Cassius; for, though it appears, from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, that the Latins had formerly been subject to the Roman sway, nevertheless the faithful services which they rendered to the Romans led to their being subsequently united to them by a treaty of alliance, which ran as follows: "Let there be a mutual peace between the Romans and all the peoples of Latium so long as heaven and earth stand fast, and let neither make war on the other or bring enemies from any direction upon him, and let them not afford safe passage to invaders; let each render aid with all his might to the other when molested by war and let them share booty and spoils equally." These same Latins, however, repeatedly renewed war in subsequent years and were at length crushed by Camillus and reduced into the power of the Roman people.

[2] A treaty can also be classed here by which some province or city places itself under the guardianship and protection of some foreign prince or joins some kingdom or republic on specified conditions. For, as Proculus ruled, it remains a free people whether the treaty of friendship is drawn on equal terms or whether it includes the formula that the people in question consents to a courteous recognition of the superiority of the other people. For the object of the addition of this formula is to show that the one people is superior to the other, but not that the latter is unfree; and that is the force which Cicero attributes to the clause "majestatem comiter conservare," which was common form in Roman treaties.

This third kind of treaty can be divided into two kinds according as the treaty is a purely defensive one or is both offensive and defensive (to employ the current phraseology), i. e., is designed both for resisting and for making war, and this can be framed either so as to refer to all the rest of the world, so that the allied peoples have exactly the same enemies and the same friends, or it may be made with specified exceptions.

With this class may also be grouped treaties the object of which is purely commercial and which provide free ingress and egress for merchants and which can exist even between enemies.

[3] It was, however, a principle of the Romans never to enter into a treaty with an armed enemy, nor were they wont to exercise over any even a peaceful rule, unless they had made surrender of everything, whether divine or human, and had admitted a garrison or, lastly, were bound by an alliance or a treaty. For it was ever a matter of strict solicitude with the Romans, not to give the appearance of submitting to demands under hostile pressure. Accordingly, the consul Spurius Cassius told the envoys of the Hernicians, when they asked for peace, that they must first comport themselves in a manner befitting a beaten and

Bks. 3 and 4.

Dig. 49, 15, 7. Doctors on Dig. 13, 7, 4. Franc. Ripa, Consult. 55. Socin (grandson), consult., 6, p. 1.

Orat. pro Corn. Balb.

Dion. Halic., bk. 8.

subjugated people and that only so could they make their requests for friendship.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 8.

The consul Titus Largius, too, told the Fidenati, when they applied for a truce, that before they could get an audience they must lay down their arms and open their gates, and that apart from so doing they had nothing to hope for from the Roman people in the way of peace or truce or anything else of a humane and moderating character. So, also, after the consul Albinus had been put to flight with heavy loss, Pyrrhus so much admired the Romans because they made no mention of a peace that, although he was the conqueror and had received large reinforcements, he made the first advance and proposed peace on quite equal terms, with liberation of prisoners, and offered the Roman people his help in the subjugation of Italy, and all he asked in return was safety for the Tarentines and their friendship for himself. The answer, on the advice of Appius Claudius Cæcus, ran, that Pyrrhus must first quit Italy and that then, if it suited him, he might treat for friendship and alliance, but that as long as he remained under arms the Roman people would fight him, even if he had beaten a thousand Albinuses.

Plut., Life of Pyrrhus. Val. Max., bk. 8, ch. 13. Cic. on Old age.

In the same way, when the Ætolians sought peace, the consul Marcus Fulvius replied that he could not entertain any suggestion of peace from them until they were disarmed and that they must begin by surrendering all their weapons and horses and then pay a thousand silver talents to the Roman people.

Livy, bk. 48.

And when Vermina, son of Syphax, sent a mission to beg that he might be styled king and their ally and friend, the answer was that he must sue for peace from the Roman people before he could be styled king and their ally and friend.

Livy, bk. 51.

[4] Again, arrangements such as we have been considering are not always made by treaty, but sometimes also by sponson. The following passage from Livy shows what the difference was between the two:

"When the consuls went to Pontius to confer with him, he began to talk about a treaty in the strain of a conqueror; but they declared that such could not be concluded without an order of the people, and the ministry of the fecials, and the other customary rites. Accordingly, the Caudine peace was not effected by a treaty, as is commonly thought, and asserted by Claudius, but by a sponson. For what occasion would there be either for sureties or hostages in the case of a treaty, where the business is effected by the imprecation, 'Whichever nation shall cause the said terms to be violated, may Jupiter strike that nation even as the pig is struck by the fecials'? Now the consuls, prefects, legates, quæstors, and military tribunes became sureties in this case, and the names of all the sureties are preserved; whereas, had the business been transacted by a treaty, none would have appeared but those of the two fecials. Further, on account of the delay necessitated by the treaty itself, six hundred

horsemen were demanded as hostages, who were to suffer death if the compact were not fulfilled."

Now, just as the sovereign prince alone may set warlike enterprise on foot and make war and collect an army and summon a levy, so also the opposite matters of making treaties and truces with the enemy are functions also reserved to the sovereign, as we have shown above.

Dig. 48, 4, 3 and above, on just war.

[5] Accordingly, a peace can not be set up by generals without the consent of the prince or people in whose behalf and under whose management the war is being waged. In olden days this was provided for by the feacial law and later by the *Lex Julia* about the provinces and the *Lex Cornelia* about treason. For, without authorization by the people and initiation by the Senate (all whose power has been transferred to the prince) nothing could be solemnized so as to bind the people. And indeed if, in civil and forensic business, an agent who has been appointed with general authority to carry on an action has no power to compromise and settle the case, it follows that one who has been appointed to the command of an army in order to carry on a war exceeds the limits of his functions if he makes peace with the enemy, and such excess was always considered an extremely grave blunder in military matters.

Cicero against Piso.

Cic. pro Corn. Balb.

Dig. 3, 3: 60 and 63.

Dig. 49, 16, 3, 15.

It was on that account that the Senate refused to ratify the peace of Caudium made by Titus Veturius and Spurius Postumius, and the treaty concluded by Caius Mancinus with the Numantines. And in just the same way the dictator Camillus repudiated the agreement entered into between Sulpicius, a former military tribune, and Brennus, the Gallic chieftain, by which it was agreed that the Gauls should receive a thousand pounds of gold from the Romans and raise the siege. The refusal of Camillus was based on the ground that the agreement had been made by an inferior magistrate subsequently to his own appointment as dictator and without his authorization; for the dictator exercises sovereign power.

Livy, bk. 4.

Pompon. in Dig. 1, 2, 2.

And Sallust, speaking of the agreement made between the Roman general Aulus and Jugurtha, King of the Numidians, said, The Senate decreed (as was correct) that no treaty could be made without the joint consent of the people and itself.

From the foregoing it is clear that no one can, apart from the prince's authorization, come to terms with an enemy without committing the offense of treason, for this is a matter of sovereign prerogative. On this ground more than on any other Bodin thinks that the execution of Louis, Duke of Orleans, was justified, because he had made a treaty with the Duke of Lancaster without authority from the King of France. Accordingly, I can not agree with Duarenus (whom others follow) when he declares that the opinion just cited is sound in the case of one who has only been intrusted with the business of leading and governing the army, but unsound in the case of one who has been invested with full and free power over everything.

Dig. 2, 14, 5.

Repub., bk. 7.

On Dig. 2, 14, 5.

Dig. 1, 4, 1.

Duarenus holds that the latter person has even the power of making peace with the enemy; but I can not admit this. For matters of public and royal right rest on a different basis from that on which private rights rest and they can not be shared with private persons, as was shown in an earlier chapter. And so, no matter how full and free be the general power which is allowed to a commander, I do not think that the power of making peace with the enemy is meant to be granted to him, for matters of royal prerogative do not pass under general words, but require nothing less than an express and special grant.

Now in this case if the commander or general has received an express grant of power to solemnize a treaty (which would be very unusual), he can not go beyond his mandate or delegate his power to another, for he has not got it in virtue of his magistracy and command, but he has a mere right of proceeding under the law and therefore (in Julian's words) he does not do anything of his own right, but in right of him who gave the mandate. For, as already said several times, the power of peace and war resides in the sovereign and can not be transferred to another.

And so, beyond question, when the Roman consuls, in whose hands the highest authority was lodged, took command of an army, they had indeed power to carry on war and to harass and attack the enemy at their discretion and also autocratically to control military discipline, but the making and the ending war, apart from the authorization of the Senate and the command of the people, were beyond them.

Accordingly, the phrase employed by Livy is that the Senate, on the command of the people, decreed that Publius Scipio, subject to the opinion of the ten envoys, should make peace with the people of Carthage on such conditions as seemed good to him. Similarly, full discretion with regard to peace and war with Philip was intrusted to Titus Quintius. So also peace was granted to the Etruscans on such terms as the consul Lucius Æmilius should think best, and to the Æquians at the pleasure of the consul Quintus Fabius. And we read that this was a frequent practice of the Romans, for they were well aware that no one was better able than a commander to form a correct estimate of the intention with which proposals of peace were made and of the general position of affairs.

[6] Now it has been generally held that the doctrines which have been laid down about peace apply equally to truces, although Bartolus dissented on the ground that this is to make a departure from the analogy of mandate, as in the foregoing case, seeing that in civil business an agent is not allowed to give one's opponent an extension of time for payment any more than he is allowed to make a compromise with him.

And this is the view I myself take, so far as truces of long duration are concerned, which are rather by way of putting an end to the war—a

By inference from Dig. 3, 3, 58 and Cod. 1, 50, 2. And Bartol. thereon, and on Dig. 32, 1, 2.

Dig. 1, 1, 1, 2; and 2, 14, 5. Connanus excellently, bk. 5, ch. 1.

Leading text in c. 4, X, 1, 30, and in Dig. 1, 21, 1—the Doctors also—in Feud. law, ii, 56. Molin. on custom of Paris, tit. 2, sec. 1. Gloss. 5. Text in Dig. 49, 14, 30.

Dig. 1, 21, 3.

Bk. 40.

Livy, bk. 42.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 9.

On Dig. 2, 14, 5.

Dig. 45, 1, 122, 1. Duaren. on Dig. 2, 14, 5.

function reserved to the sovereign—than procuring a cessation of hostilities. We read accordingly that truces of that kind were never granted by the consuls and other Roman commanders, but by the Senate and the Roman people. Thus the Samnites, after their defeat, obtained a truce for two years instead of the treaty which they were suing for. In the same way truces for several years were granted by the Senate and the people to the Veians, the Volsinians, the Æquians, and a great many others.

Livy, bk. 9.

Livy, bks. 2, 4, 7, 9, and 10.

I hold, however, that it is competent for generals to make with the enemy that variety of truce which takes effect at once and holds good for a short time only, putting a stop to attacks on both sides—and this is the variety that Paulus deals with—and my reason is that these truces do not put an end to the war; for though the fighting stops, the war continues. This is especially the case where the truce is rendered desirable by some crisis or is otherwise necessary or expedient. For the grant of authority to a general to harass and attack the enemy at discretion gives him competence in all administrative matters which concern the war.

Dig. 40, 15, 19.

Gell., bk. 1, ch. 25.

Roman generals, accordingly, were wont of their own authority, when the enemy sought for peace, to grant a truce during which envoys might be sent to Rome to prefer the request for peace. And so Scipio allowed the Carthaginians a truce for three months, during which their envoys might treat for peace at Rome. And the same thing happened when Libo and Bibulus, of the faction of Pompey, were stationed with their fleet at Oricum and found themselves reduced to great straits through lack of necessaries. They expressed a wish to discuss matters of great moment with Cæsar, giving the impression of being about to suggest an arrangement; and they obtained a truce for the time being from Marcus Acilius and Statius Murcus, Cæsar's representatives—the one of them was in charge of the town-walls and the other of the land-garrison—for the proposals made were of obvious importance and such as Cæsar was known to be very desirous of receiving.

Livy, bk. 40.

Caes., Civil war, bk. 3.

Further, generals have, not infrequently, themselves laid down the conditions of peace and then, when these have been favorably received by the enemy, have granted a truce to allow of envoys being sent to Rome to submit the question of peace to the Senate. This was the course adopted, with much success, by Scipio in the case of the Carthaginians; and it was on his initiative, too, that his brother, Lucius Scipio, after the defeat of Antiochus, proffered terms of peace and allowed the despatch of an embassy to Rome about the matter. Titus Quintius, also, granted a truce for six months to Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, to allow time for the confirmation by the Senate of the terms of peace laid down by himself; and on another occasion he granted a truce for two months to Philip and allowed him to send a mission to Rome to treat about the terms of peace which they had already been discussing. And the Senate would often

Livy, bk. 40.

Livy, bk. 47.

Livy, bk. 44.

Livy, bk. 42.

follow the advice of a general in granting or refusing a peace which the enemy sought, as just said.

There have been peoples, however, who have not allowed their generals so much latitude. We read, accordingly, how a truce for four months had been agreed on between Agis, King of Sparta, and Thrasybulus and Alciphron, Argive generals; but on the proposal of Alcibiades the Argives refused to ratify the agreement and the Spartans also treated it as null. And Thucydides tells us that this episode made the Spartans so angry with their king that a law was introduced providing him with a body of twelve counsellors, apart from whose advice no truce or treaty of any kind could be entered into with the enemy. It is, however, notorious that the kings of Sparta had no sovereign power and no unfettered discretion.

Dion. Halic., bk. 2.
Bodin, Method.
hist., ch. 6.

Dig. 1, 4, 1.

Dig. 2, 14, 5.

Dig. 2, 14, 5, and
Cod. 7, 37, 3.
Fern. Vasq.,
bk. 1, ch. 4.

[7] But now, suppose that a prince who has received from his people a grant of all their power and sovereignty, makes a proper and expedient agreement touching a matter of State concern—whether a peace or some other treaty made with the enemy—the question has been raised by jurists whether in thus making peace with the enemy he can condone all private hurts and losses sustained by reason of the war and even make a grant to the enemy of the property of his subjects.

Now no doubt can arise with regard to things captured by the enemy during the war, because the law of war vests these in the enemy, quite apart from any agreement with the prince, and the same holds, too, of hurts and losses caused under the laws of war. But what about other things which have not been acquired by the enemy or which have been seized by an “unjust” enemy? They, too, can be taken from their private owners and granted to the enemy if no other measures can be adopted to secure public safety, for public safety must come before

Authentica, Res
quae, Cod. 6, 43, 3
(Nov. 39, 1).
Dig. 17, 2, 65, 5.
Cod. 6, 51, 16.

Epist., bk. 7.

private advantage, or (as Pliny puts it) public interests must be preferred to private, and eternal interests to mortal. This is the idea underlying the remark of Tacitus that every great achievement contains an element of injustice in so far as public gain is relied on to counterbalance private loss. And so, when Thrasybulus had freed Athens from the excesses of the Thirty Tyrants he had a *plebiscitum* (decree of the people) enacted to prevent the raking up of bygones; and this forgetting of wrongs (called in their tongue *ἀμνηστία*) reestablished the shaken and tottering State in its original position. And Cicero thought that this was an example which at times might well be followed at Rome with the object of furthering the public peace.

Val. Max., bk. 4,
ch. 1.

Philipp. 1.

And this is, admittedly, more than ever necessary in the case of property which has been wrongfully taken possession of and enjoyed for a considerable tract of time, for if such property were taken out of the hands of its possessor and restored to the original owner there would inevitably be a great upsetting and disturbance: and this was the very

sound opinion which, in a not dissimilar instance, the Emperor Trajan embodied in a rescript when consulted on the point by Pliny. But otherwise, and except in cases of imperative necessity and where great advantage will accrue to the State, a prince may not take his subjects' property away from them; so to do would be repugnant alike to natural and divine law.

[8] For, however much a prince may be freed from the yoke of the law, yet all kings and princes (as Pindar said) are subject to the law of nature; and ample as the power of a prince may be, yet it does not extend to acts of injustice; and what Pliny wrote to Trajan is in point in this connection: "Just as it is the essence of happiness to be able to do as much as you want to, so it is the essence of greatness to want to do just as much as you can." Rescripts of princes, accordingly, ought to receive such an interpretation as will enable them to be carried out without detriment to others and those which are in conflict with the rights of another are invalid. Accordingly, the gift of the duchy of Milan, made by the Emperor Maximilian to King Louis XII of France, led to war, because of the right which the Sforzias asserted to that duchy and which the Emperor is not taken to have intended to give, nor could he.

[9] For, however much kings may be styled lords of all, this is to be interpreted as referring to sovereignty and power and not to ownership and possession, which are matters affecting private parties. And this was neatly put by Seneca, where he says, "Power over everything belongs to kings, and to individuals property." Or a little later: "The king possesses everything in sovereignty, individuals possess everything in ownership; for everything is in the sovereignty of Cæsar, but what is owned by individuals is in their patrimony."

And Cicero tells us that Aratus of Sicyon deservedly gained much praise on this ground. He had freed his country, which for fifty years had been in the hands of tyrants, by the overthrow of the tyrant Neocles, and had restored large numbers of exiles; now the property of these persons had got into the possession of others, and Aratus found that much of this property had for a long time been enjoyed by right of inheritance, and much by right of sale, and much by right of dowry; and that on the one hand it could not be taken away from the possessors without inflicting wrong on them, and that on the other hand the former owners would be dissatisfied. So he obtained from King Ptolemy the help of a large sum of money and joined to himself a council of fifteen notables, with whose assistance he examined the cases, both of those who were in enjoyment of the property of others and of those who had lost the possession of their own property; and in the end he succeeded, by assessing the money value of this property, in persuading some to prefer to take cash and cede their property to its possessors and in persuading others to think it better to be paid a money equivalent than to reclaim

their property. The upshot was that harmony was established and that all went off without complaining.

In like manner Brutus and Cassius, after Cæsar's death—seeing that it had been resolved that his acts should be ratified by the State—ordered that the former owners of lands of which they had been deprived by Sulla and Cæsar in the civil wars should at any rate be paid a price therefor out of the public funds. Thereby these persons were

Appian, Civil war, bk. 2.

[10] One further question remains, whether on the death of a prince with whom a treaty has been struck, the treaty subsists with his successors. Now as regards other contracts it is held that a distinction must be drawn according as the succession passes by way of inheritance—in which case the successor is by the very fact bound by the contract of the deceased—or under some statute or by election, in which case he has not to answer for what was done by the deceased. For a personal obligation does not extend to any other successor than an heir, not even if a man has expressly promised for himself and his successors.

Cod. 3, 32, 14.

Dig. 18, 1, 81, 1; and 36, 1, 1, 16.
Cod. 4, 16, 7.

Dig. 45, 1, 38.

As regards treaties, however, and other public agreements into which a man enters not on his own behalf, but on behalf of the State (which is just as effectually represented by subsequent officials as by those of to-day), we must declare that a prince is entirely bound by his deceased predecessor's contract and that the parties to the treaty continue to be subject to it. The Veians and the Fidenates, therefore, in the reign of Tullus Hostilius, had not any just cause for reopening the war; nor had the Latins who, in the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, assumed that the death of Ancus had freed them from the bond of the treaty; nor had the Etruscans who, on the death of Tarquinius Priscus (to whose power they had submitted themselves) declined to abide by the terms of the treaty any longer. And the Romans were quite justified in declaring war on Perseus when he gave out to their envoys that the treaty made with his father Philip had nothing to do with him.

c. 1, X, 2, 9, and doctors thereon.
And c. 59, C. 16, qu. 1. Jason and others on Dig. 1, 4, 1, col. 3. Note on c. 4, X, 5, 4.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., ch. 3 and 4.

Livy, bk. 42.

It is, however, the general opinion that if such a treaty is a cause of very great injury to the State, the succeeding prince is not bound by it. Herein I agree, provided that the treaty relates to the transfer of something appurtenant to the royal crown and has been made without the requisite consent of the people or estates, or if the treaty derogates from the royal prerogative, for the deceased prince would not be competent to effect this; and such a treaty would be quite devoid of force right away from its inception.

Cyn. and doctors on Cod. 1, 14, 4. Bald. on Feud. law, c. i, 7.

c. 1, X, 3, 19. And c. 20, C. 12, qu. 2. And generally in Joan. Papon., Arrest. 5, 10.

c. 20, X, 1, 6.

Above, ch. 6.

From the foregoing it is clear that the most effective treaties are those which are entered into on both sides by both king and people. This is illustrated by the reply of the Hernicians when Roman envoys made expostulations about their wrongdoings and robberies. The reply was that no treaty had ever been made between themselves and the Roman

people, and that the treaty made with King Tarquin was in their opinion at an end by reason of his exile and death. So also when Edward IV of England, after his expulsion from the throne, sought aid from the King of France pursuant to a treaty: the answer came that the old treaty was between king and people on either side and that, therefore, after Edward's expulsion, the treaty remained in force with the people and the then reigning king. But when the exiled Tarquins made war on Rome, the Latins refused to help either side on the ground that their oath forbade them to make war alike on the Tarquins and on the Romans, seeing that they were equally bound to both sides by the treaty.

Dion. Halic., ch. 8.

Bodin, Repub.,
bk. 1, ch. 7.

Dion. Halic., bk. 5

CHAPTER VIII.

Of trickeries and deceit in war.

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| 1. Trickeries are permissible in warfare.
2. What is permissible deceit.
3. Stratagems are praiseworthy in a general.
4. The old Romans disdained all deceptions. | 5. The ancients sometimes found the mere reputation for untarnished good faith more useful than arms. |
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c. 2, C. 23, qu. 2. [1, 2] In the conduct of war, says St. Augustine, it is indifferent from the standpoint of justice whether the fighting is all open and above-board or whether trickery be used. And Ulpian declares that it is permissible deceit (what the ancients understood as shrewdness) to devise contrivances against an enemy or a brigand. Accordingly, that excellent general, Lysander, used to say that where lion-skin ran short fox-skin must be patched on. And the poets feigned that Hercules carried instead of arms the skin of the Nemæan lion and arrows dipped in the gall and blood of the Lernæan Hydra, as if to show that a good commander ought to make use at the same time alike of cunning and of bravery; and that is the purport of Virgil's

Dig. 4, 3, 1, 3.
Plut. in Apophth.

Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?
(Guile or valor, what matters it in an enemy's case?)

And this is a correct idea, provided the claims of good faith are respected, for we ought not to be like the tyrant Dionysius, who used to say that boys are duped by dice and men by oaths; or to copy the Persians, who paid no heed to good faith, both in words and in deeds, save so far as it suited them. On the other hand it is recorded that Joshua laid an ambush for his enemies on the command of God himself.

c. 3, C. 23, qu. 1.
Plut. On fortune and valor of Alex.
Justin, bk. 12.
Joshua, 8.

And praise has been awarded to the stratagem of Pittacus of Mitylene (one of the seven wise men), which was as follows: He was entering on a contest with Phryno, an Athenian general, who had a little figure of a fish on his helmet, and so he took a net out into the arena and, saying that he was going a-fishing, he coiled the net round Phryno in such a way that he could not free himself and then slew him.

It was, therefore, a just remark of Agesilaus that, while the breach of a pledged word was impious, it was not only quite right to deceive an enemy, but pleasing, too, and profitable. And in Xenophon we have Cambyses replying to Cyrus' question, "What was the best way to secure victory," that in the quest of victory the foe must be trapped in every possible way, and tricked by hidden snares and guile and fraud, and worn

Plut. in Apophth.

down by theft and rapine. Thus an opportune lie on the part of a general has sometimes given him the victory, as in the case of that lie of Valerius Levinus who, having his sword bloody with the slaughter of a private soldier, shouted out that he had slain Pyrrhus and thus caused such consternation to the Epirotes that they fled to their camp with all speed, panic-stricken and weeping. In the same way when the consul Titus Quintius was fighting with the Volscians and his men were giving way, he resorted with success to a falsehood and cried out that the enemy were in flight on the other wing, and thus he got his men in hand again, led them to the attack, and conquered those who imagined they were conquerors.

Livy, bk. 2.

[3] Indeed, stratagems of this kind bring as a rule very great praise and glory to a general. Now in this fashion of plotting and tricking Philip of Macedon was reckoned an adept, for he took much more pleasure in outwitting an enemy by a ruse than in beating him on the open field, saying that a victory won by guile and cunning never cost any lives of his soldiers, while that kind of victory which comes from the foughten field is ever a bloody one. The Carthaginians, too, and pre-eminent among them Hannibal, and the Greeks plumed themselves on their skill in such trickery and deceit, and no blame would have been imputable to them had they not at the same time made so little of breach of faith.

[4] Those old Romans, however, disdained all such frauds and deceptions and had no wish to conquer save by sheer valor and downright force—what they used to call Roman methods. But the Romans of a later day discarded this maxim of their ancestors and were quite ready to call the arts of dupery and deceit to the aid of themselves and the State. And so when Quintus Martius and Aulus Attilius returned from the mission on which they had been sent to Perseus, King of Macedonia, they made it a matter for especial boast in the Senate that they had fooled the enemy by means of a truce and the hope of peace, for his preparations for war were so complete, as contrasted with their own utter unpreparedness, that he could have occupied all points of vantage before their army could be transported into Greece; if, however, the period of the truce were utilized he would lose all his superiority in preparedness and the Romans would begin the war better fitted out in all respects. Livy tells us that the majority of the Senate approved of this as a sound bit of business; but these novel tactics found less favor with the greybeards, who called to mind the usage of days gone by; they failed (said they) to recognize Roman methods in this embassy, declaring that their ancestors' manner of warfare was not by ambushes and nocturnal fights, nor by simulated flights and sudden returns upon an incautious foe, nor by vaunting craft rather than true valor; and that they were wont to declare war before waging it, nay to do so with all solemnity by messengers, and sometimes to indicate the precise spot for

Bk. 34.

conflict. It was (said they) this same good-faith that informed Pyrrhus of his doctor's plots against his life and that sent back in chains to the Falisci the betrayer of the king's sons. These (said they) were the Roman methods, alien alike to the slyness of the Carthaginians and the cunning of the Greeks, who deemed it a proud thing to overcome an enemy by craft rather than by force, and even if at the present day guile may seem occasionally more profitable than valor, yet you have finally conquered an enemy's courage only when you have extorted from him the acknowledgment that he has been beaten in a just and righteous war by no trickery or chance, but in a hand-to-hand measurement of strength. This, as Livy tells us, was the contention of the greybeards, but it did not prevail.

[5] We find on record, however, that the Romans of olden time sometimes found the mere reputation for downright valor and untarnished good-faith more useful than their unconquered arms. The story of Camillus furnishes a striking illustration of this; for at the siege of Falisci, which promised to be of indefinite duration, his surrender of the schoolmaster who was betraying the sons of the Faliscan nobles and his declaration that he had no wish to conquer save by Roman methods—
 Bk. 5. valor, toil, arms—impressed all ranks of the Falisci (as Livy narrates) with such respect for Roman good-faith and for the general's justice that, by common consent, a mission was despatched to the camp of Camillus, and thence by his permission to the Senate at Rome, to surrender Falisci. And when the mission was introduced to the Senate it is recorded that its address contained the following passage: "The issue of this war bequeaths two salutary examples to the human race. You preferred to keep faith in war rather than gain a present victory; we, stirred by your good-faith, spontaneously offered you victory."

So, also, Fabricius overcame Pyrrhus with an equal display of virtue, though he could not get the better of him in arms, for he surrendered to Pyrrhus a doctor who was plotting against his life; and when Pyrrhus sent back to him some prisoners of war gratuitously, he declined to accept the gratuitous favor and himself sent back just the same number, so that there should be no appearance of payment for his good deed and because the Romans, who had not been prompted by any special favor towards Pyrrhus, wished to avoid the imputation of compassing any one's death by guile and of securing in that way a victory which they were powerless to gain in the open field. And this act of Fabricius was highly praised by the Senate, who esteemed it a great scandal and disgrace to overcome any one with whom they had an honorable contest, not by valor but by crime.

Plut. in Apophth.
 Cic., Offic., bk. 3.

The case of Saul and David is parallel: They were fighting one another and David had repeated opportunities of destroying Saul, unpremeditatedly and without any trouble, but he would not do so, vowing

that he would not stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed unless Saul should happen to descend into battle and perish or the Lord should smite him.

1 Sam., ch. 26.

Further, the conduct of Quintus Servilius Cæpio was much reprobated in that he made away with Viriatus by fraud and snares and domestic assassins, so that he was said to have trafficked for a victory rather than to have gained one.

Val. Max., bk. 9,
ch. 7. L. Florus,
bk. 2, ch. 17.

The reputation of Fabius Maximus as a consummate general rests, moreover, not on any employment of deceit, but on his skill in concealing his plans and in lying quiet and dissimulating and laying ambushes and anticipating the plans of the enemy.

Cic., Offic., bk. 1.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the law of ambassadors.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ambassadors inviolable. 2. Usual to surrender to the enemy one who assaults an ambassador of the enemy. 3. Ambassadors can not go beyond the scope of their embassy. 4. The law of ambassadors only obtains in the case of "enemies." | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. A rebel is not inviolable even if employed on the business of an embassy. 6. The despatch of an embassy to rebels is unbefitting the king's majesty. 7. Wisdom and dignity to be displayed by ambassadors. 8. Embassies sometimes intrusted to women. |
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[1] Ambassadors were safe and inviolable among all peoples. This was provided by the law of nations. The word *sancti* was used of them by the Romans, it being derived from the tufts of herbs (*sagmina*) which the ambassadors of the Roman people used to carry—just as the ambassadors of the Greeks used to carry what were called *κηρύτεια* (wands), as Marcian tells us.

[2] Any one, therefore, who had assaulted or injuriously treated an ambassador of the enemy was ordinarily surrendered to the enemy, a proceeding which, as we have said, was secured by fecial law. Thus, in the consulship of Marcus Æmilius Lepidus and Caius Flaminius, for laying violent hands on the ambassadors of the Carthaginians, Lucius Minucius Myrtilus and Lucius Manlius were surrendered by the fecials to the ambassadors at the bidding of Marcus Claudius, the urban prefect, and were carried off to Carthage. And Quintus Fabius and Cnæus Apronius, ex-ædiles, for assaulting the ambassadors who had been sent to Rome by the city of Apollonia, in the course of a dispute which had broken out, were forthwith surrendered by the fecials. And, indeed, if those who had violated the ambassadors had not been surrendered, or if the violent act had been planned by the State, custom would have justified a declaration of war.

The Romans, accordingly, made ruthless war on the people of Fidenæ for slaying the Roman ambassadors at the bidding of Tolumnius, King of Veii, to whom they had defected; and also on the people of Illyria in return for the beheading of the Roman ambassadors. David, too, made war on the King of the Ammonites in return for the outrage upon his ambassadors. For an outrage offered to ambassadors is deemed offered to the king or State whose embassy they are carrying out. Nay, although, on a sudden outbreak of war, those who are found among either people may be enslaved by their enemies, even when they came in time of peace, yet (so Pomponius ruled) ambassadors continue

free, and this agrees with the law of nations. And, of a truth, these concessions to ambassadors are made with the utmost reasonableness, in order that representatives of each side may be in a position to treat with safety about the terms of a peace or a treaty or a truce. They frequently lay very big controversies to rest by means of a little labor. Dig. 50, 7, 18.

And so the Romans attached to the law of ambassadors an exceptional degree of inviolability over and above that which they attached to the laws of war and peace. This was carried to such a pitch that Scipio Africanus let go unharmed a vessel loaded with many illustrious Carthaginians, which had fallen into his power, because these persons declared that they were ambassadors sent to himself—and this although it was clear that they had falsely assumed the style of an embassy in order to escape a danger. Scipio, however, preferred it to be adjudged that the good faith of a Roman general had been abused rather than that it had been invoked in vain.

A similar thing happened after the expulsion of Tarquin from the throne. His ambassadors had come to Rome to claim some property of which he had been despoiled and entered into secret negotiations with some young nobles with a view to the restoration of the king; the thing was detected. Although their conduct was such as to rank them with enemies, yet (in Livy's words) the law of nations prevailed. A similar thing happened when the Volscians despatched certain spies in the guise of ambassadors to the Roman camp, in order to spy out their number and warlike equipment. Convicted and confessedly guilty as they were, yet the dictator Postumius saved them harmless from the mob that had been roused up to attack them. He made this concession to the mere empty name of embassy, lest perchance the enemy should be furnished with some honorable pretext for war by feigning that violence had been offered to their ambassadors in breach of the law of nations. Val. Max., bk. 6.
ch. 6.

[3] I do not, however, think that this case provides complete legal safety for ambassadors who comport themselves similarly, seeing that ambassadors may do nothing outside the scope of their embassy. Accordingly, the conduct of the Gauls, on the occasion of their attack on Clusium, was correct. The Fabii, who had been despatched as Rome's ambassadors to require the Gauls not to molest her allies of Clusium, took up arms, after the termination of their mission, and, in defiance of the law of nations, actively joined the battle-array of Clusium. When the Gauls saw this, they sent an embassy to Rome to complain of the outrage and to demand the surrender of the Fabii on the ground of their violation of the law of nations; but so far were they from obtaining it that they heard that the very men whose punishment was being mooted had been appointed military tribunes for the following year. Burning with anger at the honor wantonly done to the violators of human law and at the indignity offered to their embassy, the Gauls passed by Dien. Halic., Rom.
antiq., bk. 6.

Dig. 50, 7, 9, 2.

Clusium and made straight for Rome and, after defeating the Romans
 Bk. 5. on the Allia, took the City and sacked it. And this calamity, Livy tells
 us, overtook the Romans because of the violation of the law of nations.

[4] It must be further noted that this law of ambassadors, like
 the other laws of war, holds only in the case of enemies (*hostes*) and
 not in the case of robbers and rebels and others not covered by the term

“enemies” (*hostes*). This has been already mentioned. And so Chs. 2 and 6.
 Dig. 49, 15, 24; and
 50, 16, 118.
 Philipp. 8.

Cicero remonstrated against the concession made to the envoy of An-
 tony, to whom access to the City gates ought not to have been allowed,
 and maintained that his return to Antony ought to be prevented. And
 the Emperor Theodosius, too, was within his right in throwing into
 prison the envoy of a certain tyrant who had risen against him. So also
 the Emperor Charles V, when he threw into prison the envoys of the
 Duke of Milan, one of his vassals, who was plotting war against him.

Acc. to Bodin, Re-
 public, bk. 1, ch. 6.

[5] Nor will citizens and subjects, who with wicked intent and
 Dig. 49, 15, 19, 8. traitorous design are among the enemy and whom Paulus would class as
 enemies (*hostes*), receive any protection from the law of nations, not
 even if they are clothed with the functions of ambassadors; for although
 they may be classed as enemies, yet the same law does not apply to them

Above, on just war
 and on keeping faith
 with an enemy.

as to enemies, as we have elsewhere shown; for they are rebels and unjust
 (*injusti*) enemies and they can not by any means whatever free them-
 selves from the jurisdiction and power of their sovereign, which bind

Dig. 50, 9, 6.
 Cod. 4, 63, 4. And
 c. 2, bk. 1, 2 in vi.

his subjects all the world over—any more than the slave Barbarius Phi-
 lippus, who had been appointed prætor at Rome, succeeded in buying his
 freedom when he was claimed as slave by his master who had followed

Dig. 1, 14, 2.

Bk. 1, ch. 6.

him up (as Bodin tells us, following Suidas). And the same principle
 justified the imperial officials in killing Rangonus and Fregosa, vassals
 of the Emperor Charles V and ambassadors of the King of France to the
 Turk, although this was done without the Emperor's orders.

[6] Now it is utterly unfitting the majesty of a sovereign to send
 ambassadors to rebels and it was on this ground that Cicero resisted as
 strenuously as he could the despatch of ambassadors to Antony when he
 was making war on the Republic; maintaining that, since a citizen and
 not an enemy was concerned, the situation called for armed coercion and
 not for verbal demands. Indeed, God himself so abominated rebels and

Philipp. 5.
 And see above,
 chs. 2 and 6.

schismatics that when the man of God was sent to Jeroboam (to whom
 the ten tribes of Israel, abandoning their king, had revolted) to denounce
 his iniquities, he was forbidden to eat bread with them or drink water,
 and when he gave not heed, but fed in defiance of the Lord's command,
 he was visited with the divine vengeance and killed by a lion on his way
 back. And not only is it unworthy of a sovereign's majesty to send an
 embassy to rebel subjects, but also extremely hazardous, for it is not
 to be looked for that the law of nations should be respected by those
 who are contemning divine and human law.

1 Kings, ch. 13, and
 c. 9, C. 7, qu. 1.

[7] Further, prudence and dignity are prime requisites in an ambassador. For when the Carthaginians sent ambassadors to Rome about peace they failed to obtain it, because the ambassadors who were sent were young and of no dignity and declared themselves unable, by reason of their youth, to remember the contents of previous treaties; and on this ground they were also had in suspicion and the selection of them to demand the ancient peace, which they did not themselves remember, was put down to Punic trickery; but later, when the fortunes of the Carthaginians were at the lowest ebb, they sent Hanno the Great and Hasdrubal Hedus and others of respectable age and dignity to beg for peace at Rome, and then only did the Romans admit that the Carthaginians were really and sincerely treating for peace, and for that reason they granted it.

Livy, bk. 30.
Appian, Punic war.

Well known, too, is that utterance of Cato about the ambassadors of the Romans who were sent to arrange peace between Nicomedes and Prusias. One of these ambassadors carried disfiguring scars caused by a rock which had in earlier life struck him on the head, and a second limped, and the third was reckoned simple-minded to the verge of foolishness; so that Cato made mock of that embassy and said that it had neither mind nor feet nor head.

Appian, Mithridatic war.

Gravity also is at times of much advantage in an ambassador and sternness for the sake of the State. An example was shown by Caius Popilius: Antiochus tendered his right hand to him on his arrival, but he delivered to him the tablets which contained the decree of the Senate charging the King to desist from the war with which he was harassing Pompey; and then, when Antiochus, after perusing these, said that he would take counsel with his friends as to the course he should adopt, Popilius, with the usual asperity of his disposition, drew a circle round the King with a rod which he held in his hand and demanded, "Before you leave this spot give me an answer to take back to the Senate." The King, taken aback by such an overbearing command, replied, after a short hesitation, "I will do as the Senate requires": and only then did Popilius proffer to the King his right hand, as to an ally and friend.

Livy, bk. 45.
Val. Max., bk. 6,
ch. 4.

[8] Sometimes, indeed, embassages have been intrusted to women with the greatest profit and utility to the State. Accordingly during the Sabine war, in the reign of Romulus, a decree of the Senate was made whereby the opportunity was given to those Sabine women who had children at Rome, to go on a legation to the Sabines, leaving their children with their husbands. The head of this embassy was Hersilia, and she arranged peace between Romulus and Tatius, the Sabine king; for this the women received great honors from the kings.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 2.

Again, when Marcius Coriolanus, who had been unjustly punished with exile, in order to avenge his wrongs, approached to the very walls of the city, after the defeat and slaughter of several armies of the Romans, and neither the envoys who had been sent to intercede with him

nor the priests with their sacred fillets could aught avail, his mother Veturia, taking with her his wife Volumnia and his children, won her

Val. Max., bk. 5, son over and disarmed him by her entreaties and tears, and so (in the
ch. 4. L. Florus, words of Livy) a city which its men could not defend by arms was de- Bk. 1.
bk. 1, ch. 22.

fended by the entreaties and tears of its women. The Roman people, too, compelled Mutia, the mother of Pompey, by threats to undertake an embassy to him; and, on her initiation and that of Julia his wife, a

Appian, Civil treaty was struck between Pompey, Antony, and Octavius Cæsar.
war, bk. 5.

And that is noteworthy which we read of the Celts, how that they join their women with them in consultations about peace or war and discuss with their help differences that have arisen between them and their allies—the explanation being that at an earlier date, when a grave and implacable discord had plunged them into civil war, their women flung themselves into the thick of the fight and settled all the disputes with an admirable adroitness and re-established concord. Accordingly, in the very treaty which they arranged with Hannibal, it was provided that if the Celts should have any matter of complaint against the Carthaginians the matter should be dealt with by the Carthaginian generals and prefects in Spain, but that if the Carthaginians should have aught against the Celts, the inquiry into the matter should be conducted before the

Plut. on Virtues women of the Celts. But it was wise advice that Marcus Cato gave, to
of women. the effect that public audience should not be given to the three orators of the Athenians,—Carneades, Critholaus, and Diogenes,—for he knew them to be of such availing eloquence as that they could persuade to

Pet. Cinit., whatever course they wished, whether right or wrong.
de honest. discipl., 22, 4.

BOOK THE SECOND

Of the Law and Duties relating to War and of
Military Discipline



CHAPTER I.

Of the duties relating to war.

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| 1. War to be undertaken only for just cause. | 9. By what means the country's interests may be served. |
| 2. Lust of power brings many evils with it. | 10. To die for the State is honorable. |
| 3. Resort not to be had to war, save of necessity. | 11. Those are not blameworthy who in war subject themselves to the risk of death. |
| 4. Sometimes victory is a cause of more loss than gain. | 12. For the good of the fatherland it is lawful to kill one's father or one's son. |
| 5. Good fortune to be borne temperately, bad bravely. | 13. In war the defense of those is not to be undertaken who can not be adequately defended. |
| 6. The Romans neither elated when victors, nor cast down when vanquished. | 14. Those things are not rashly to be given up which can withstand the enemy's attack. |
| 7. Two maxims of Plato especially applicable to the duties of war. | 15. Excessive severity not to be wreaked on the vanquished. |
| 8. A brave man will do naught for his own ends, but everything for the commonwealth. | |
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[1] It being the prime function of justice (as Cicero tells us) to prevent one man hurting another save in return for wrong done to him, it is one of the first of the obligations connected with war to abstain from making war except on just grounds, so that the law of human society may be preserved inviolate, and to repress all lust of conquest, as being not only inconsistent with justice but also fraught, ordinarily, with many other ills.

[2] For (as Livy says) no great State can be in repose if, though having no external enemy, it finds one within itself, just as exceptionally strong frames seem safe as regards external influences, but find their very strength a source of trouble. And, as the ambassadors of Darius told Alexander, there is a hazard in over-swollen empery, it being difficult to hold in check what is beyond one's grasp. This led St. Augustine to say, "As in men's bodies it is better to have a moderate stature coupled with health than to attain a gigantic bulk involving constant illnesses and not giving you rest when you have attained it, but worrying you with more and more troubles the bigger you get, so a small peaceful dominion is better than a large and turbulent one."

And this seems to be what Calanus the Indian (a distinguished name in philosophical pursuits) was driving at: for he came to Alexander the Great and threw down in front of him a dry ox-hide and then walked on the edges of it, pressing them down with his feet, with the result that, when the hide was trodden on on one side only, the other sides were lifted up high; then after doing this he firmly stood upon the

middle and the whole of the hide remained at rest. By this illustration he was intimating to Alexander that he ought not to spend time on the outlying parts but ought to be looking after the heart of his empire, and that this was the way of insuring quiet to the whole of his dominions.

Life of Alexander.

The Spartans afford us an adequately instructive illustration of the same thing. They had made themselves overlords of the whole of Greece, both by land and by sea, and were so consumed by the lust of dominion that they thought to reduce all Asia under their sway, and thereby they stirred up such envy and hatred against themselves that they lost alike empire and liberty. Accordingly, it was a wise reply which Theopompus, King of the Spartans, gave to his wife: he was the first to conjoin Ephors with the kings of Sparta, and his wife upbraided him that he would leave a smaller kingdom to his sons than he had received. He replied that he would be leaving it greater, in proportion as he left it securer. And this doctrine seems to have commended itself to the warrior Hannibal, when he said to Scipio, "It would have been best if the gods had given to our forefathers the disposition to be content, you with the rule over Italy and we with the rule over Africa, for we have been so greedy of other persons' possessions that we have had to fight for our own." It holds good in all businesses, but especially (as Cicero says) in the business of war, that before an advance is made careful heed must be given to preparations and to the thinking out of future plans, and all possible happenings of either kind must be arranged for, some time beforehand, and the way of dealing with all emergencies decided on, and there must be no muddling so that at some future date one may have to say, "I did not think of it"—which Iphicrates used to insist was the most disgraceful thing that a general could say.

Plutarch, Education of a prince.

Livy, bk. 30. Offic., bk. 1.

Plutarch, Apoph.

[3] Further, just as doctors rarely and reluctantly resort to cutting and burning, so we to war, and in no case except of necessity because no other medicine can be found. Augustus furnishes an example of this, for he held all war in utter detestation and never declared war against any people except on the gravest grounds, for he was wont to say that it marked a vainglorious and petty mind to stake the security of the citizens on the uncertain issues of fighting, in order to gratify the passion for a triumph and for a laurel-wreath.

War must also not be undertaken unless the hope of profit bulks larger than the fear of loss; it will otherwise be best to remain quiet, as Archidamus warned the Eleans who were projecting a war without due consideration. For (as the same Augustus used to say) those who, in quest of small advantage, subject themselves to no small struggle are like the persons who go fishing with a golden hook, the loss of which, if it were torn off and lost, could not be compensated by the profits of any catch. It will, therefore, not be a wise proceeding to make war on the poor. Sesostris, King of Egypt, may be cited as an example of this

Plut., Lacon. Apoph.

Suetonius on August.

point. When he first made war on the Scythians he sent ambassadors beforehand to demand the submission of the enemy, and the Scythians replied with an expression of surprise that the king of so wealthy a people should be foolish enough to enter on a war with poor folk, especially when that course would cause difficulties for him at home; for the issue of battle (said they) is twofold, and the rewards of victory would be none, and the losses were manifest; and so the Scythians (said they) did not anticipate that the loss would fall on them, since the enemy had so many more objects of their desire than they had, and that they would willingly go out to meet him. This they did and drove the king off in flight.

Justin, bk. 2.

Reason in arriving at determinations is therefore more to be sought after than bravery in fighting, and it is becoming in a wise man to try every other course before resorting to arms. The Spartan custom, accordingly, may be properly praised, whereby before attacking the enemy they honored Amor with due rites; and the Spartan kings before an onslaught sacrificed to the Muses, to Clemency and Friendship, and not to Mars, deeming it preferable to conciliate the minds of the enemy by agreement and a bloodless peace than to risk the cast of battle. But where the occasion and necessity demand it, there must be hand-to-hand fighting; and an honorable war, in Demosthenes' opinion, is ever preferable to a shameful peace. With wisdom, then, did the Spartan commonwealth, in conformity with the extremely severe laws of Lycurgus, withdraw for some considerable time the eyes of its citizens from Asia, lest caught by its allurements they should lapse into a too dainty manner of life. And that this was no groundless fear is sufficiently shown by their general Pausanias, who, after great exploits, directly he indulged himself in the practices of Asia, did not blush (according to Valerius Maximus) to weaken his courage with its effeminate practices. Bk. 2, ch. 9.

[4] It very often happens, then, that more is lost by victories of that description than is gained. To this that same Asia testifies, for when it became a Roman possession it took over to Rome, together with its wealth, its vices.

Justin, bk. 36.

[5] Now it is the part of a brave soul, such as war calls for, to bear success temperately and misfortune bravely, not to be disturbed by difficulties nor (as it is put) be flustered and lose his head, but to employ the resources of an alert mind, and not to quit the path of reason but to confront all kinds of fortune with unvarying courage. And he, in fine, will be a man whose mind (in Livy's language) is neither carried away by the breath of prosperous fortune nor bruised by adverse fortune, such a man as Camillus is depicted in his utterance, "The dictatorship did not give me my courage, nor has exile robbed me of it."

[6] And memorable Roman examples of this thing remain to us, so that it is doubtful whether the Romans were more admirable in adversity or in prosperity, it being said of them, "Defeat does not abate their Justin, bk. 31.

courage; nor, if they conquer, does success elate them." And so in the consulship of Albinus, after the army had been cut to pieces by Pyrrhus and the defeat of Cannæ had been sustained (which was indeed of the gravest character) and when there had been three successive defeats by Hannibal, there was not displayed at Rome even the slightest indication of despair nor any talk of peace, but rather was there a high-souled consideration how to repair the fortunes of war. And it was decided not to ransom eight thousand prisoners who by surrender and without striking a blow had fallen into the hands of Hannibal, though they could have been ransomed at a low figure; but eight thousand stronger young men were bought out of slavery and invested with arms at the public expense.

Bk. 22. This soldiery was preferred (says Livy) although there was the opportunity of ransoming the prisoners at a lower figure.

The same thing happened after the Romans had been defeated in a cavalry engagement by Perseus, King of Macedonia. Perseus yielded to the advice of friends who urged that favoring fortune should, for choice, be employed in furthering an honorable peace, and that he should not be carried away by empty hope and so land himself in irreparable disaster; he accordingly sent envoys to Publius Licinius, the consul, to sue for peace on the same terms as had been granted to Philip. During the de-

Bk. 42. liberations spectators were excluded and (in Livy's words) the Roman firmness of design prevailed and it was decided to return the answer that peace would be granted provided that the King would allow to the Senate the power to issue decrees in all matters of high politics touching himself and the whole of Macedonia. The conquered laid down for their conquerors conditions such as are usually imposed on the conquered. For such was then their habit—in reverses to adopt the bearing of success and in successes to curb their spirits.

Like to this was the conduct of Marcellus. His army had been defeated and put to flight the previous day; so the following day, after severely rebuking his troops, he advanced in battle array; and, when Hannibal received the news of this, he exclaimed, "I have, for sure, to deal with an enemy who can not bear either good or bad fortune; either he wins and then he fiercely follows up the beaten or he loses and then he renews the contest with his conquerors." Marcellus indeed gained a great victory, and so when Pyrrhus saw that though he had overthrown a number of Roman armies the survivors made haste to form a new army, he said, "I see clearly that I was born under the constellation Hercules, who found the lopped-off heads of his enemies springing up again from their own blood in just the same numbers, as if from the Lernæan serpent."

Livy, bk. 27.

Florus, Rom. Hist., bk. 1, ch 18.

And indeed this high-souled firmness of the Romans was of such avail that it constrained Pyrrhus to be the first to sue for peace, although he was the victor and although his army had received large reinforce-

ments; and though he claimed that the terms of the peace should be on the footing of equality, yet, on the proposal of Appius Claudius Cæcus, it was decided to tell the King in reply that he must quit Italy and that then if it suited him he might make proposals for friendship and alliance; but that, so long as he continued under arms, the Roman people would fight against him even if he had got the better of a thousand Albinuses in battle.

Plut., Pyrrhus.

Indeed, just as we have shown by previous examples that it was a difficult thing to vary the Roman custom of refusing to be upset by reverses, so let their rule of not being elated by success be illustrated by the reply which Scipio Africanus made to Antiochus when the latter, after his defeat, was suing for peace:

"We Romans [said he] have ever borne (and ever will) the same heart and courage in all fortunes. Neither has prosperity lifted it aloft nor adversity put it down. For proof hereof I might produce your friend Hannibal as witness, to say nothing of others, but that I can address me to your own selves. For after we had passed over Hellespont, even before we saw the King's camp and army, when the hazard of war was indifferent, when the issue doubtful and uncertain, look what conditions we then offered upon your treaty for peace, while we were equal one to the other; well, those same and no other we present to you now that we are conquerors and you are conquered."

Livy, bk. 37.

Of a truth this equability of temper and this moderation are not only worthy of a great man (for, as Varro writes, the wise man ought alike to bear prosperity temperately and misfortune bravely and mildly), but they are also frequently and commonly found to be of the highest importance in the conduct of affairs, for it usually is the case that prosperity begets negligence. It was on this that Lucius Marcius relied after the death of the Scipios; for with the remains of their armies, after an address to the troops, he attacked the two camps of the Carthaginians in Spain on the same night, finding everything there in neglect and disorder, and he took them and slaughtered the enemy. Amyntas, too, proving superior in battle, drove the Egyptians to Memphis and besieged this place and led his troops out to lay waste the country; but the enemy seeing that their conquerors were dispersed and reckless, in reliance on their victory, attacked them, and Amyntas with all his men was put to the sword.

Livy, bk. 35.

Quint. Curt., bk. 4.

It was accordingly a wise remark of Quintus Fabius Maximus that he was more apprehensive of some evil arising from the success of his colleague Minucius than from any untoward event; and his judgment was not at fault, for his colleague, elated with success, joined battle with the enemy and placed himself and his army in unmistakable peril, but was rescued by Fabius. So also when that rash man the consul Terentius Varro, in the course of operations against pillagers, had come off best in a certain

Livy, bk. 22.

irregular encounter, Hannibal without any difficulty put up with that loss, nay he preferred to believe it the (as it were) insatiate rashness of an impetuous consul and a raw soldiery; and so indeed it turned out to be, for by their foolish rashness (against which Varro's colleague, Lucius Æmilius Paulus, strove in vain) that disastrous defeat at Cannæ befell the Romans; and the self-same Varro, who was just as humble after his experience of defeat as he had been impetuous before it, indisputably alienated the minds of the Campanians from the Romans by the way he disclosed the defeat. A brave man ought therefore to use every endeavor not only not to be broken by failures, but also not to be puffed by successes—and all the more so because we can ordinarily bear bad fortune better than good fortune.

Livy, bk. 22, end,
and bk. 23, begin.

Accordingly, the day after Epaminondas gained the victory of Leuctra he went forth in neglected and lowly fashion (though he was, on other occasions, wont to be seen with anointed body and beaming countenance), saying that on the previous day he had been too elated in mind and that he was chastising that excessive joy. And when Philip overthrew the Athenians, with whom certain Greek cities had joined themselves, in a great battle, it was wise of him so to conquer as that no one felt the victory, and he so restrained himself between his own silent joy and the enemy's grief that he was not deemed by his own men to be rejoicing nor by the enemy to be overbearing; yet that victory gave Philip the overlordship of the whole of Greece.

Plut. Apoph.

Justin, bk. 9.

[7] Further, there are two well-known precepts laid down by Plato for the guidance of statesmen, which are peculiarly applicable to the obligations connected with war. One is, so to watch over the interests of the citizens as that the statesman's every action should be referred to that object, regardless of his own private advantage; the other is to take care of the whole of the body politic, not paying regard to some one part and neglecting the rest; for the curatorship of the State, just like private guardianship, is to be conducted in the interests of the parties whose business has been put in trust and not in the interests of the trustee.

Cic., Offic., bk. 1.

[8] A brave man, then, will take heed (as Cicero says) that he does not campaign and expose himself to dangers more for his own advantage than for that of the community, for the greatness of soul which manifests itself in dangers and toils is in fault if it lacks justice and fights not solely for the common advantage but for private gain—if indeed the Stoics be right in declaring that bravery is a virtue when fighting on behalf of right, and that nothing can be honorable which lacks justice.

That quality of mind, therefore, which is ready to encounter dangers (the afore-mentioned Cicero tells us) must be labeled audacity rather than bravery, if it be driven into dangers by its own greed and not for the public weal. Accordingly Callicratides, the Lacedæmonian general, was deservedly blamed for preferring the loss of his fleet to that

of his private renown; and so, too, Cleombrotus, who through fear of detraction joined battle rashly with Epaminondas. How much more correct was Quintus Fabius Maximus, who preferred that his own power should be lessened by the empty populace rather than win fame by mismanagement. And the man in question urged Lucius Æmilius Paulus, when the latter was starting for the war against Hannibal, with the rash Terentius Varro as his colleague, to conduct the war against Hannibal by sitting still and not rashly to engage with the enemy; and he made him the following address:

“ Resist them you shall well enough if you will stand firm and hold your own against all bruits and speeches of the people; if neither the vainglory of your colleague, nor the rumors that shall be falsely blown abroad to your disgrace, shall once stir you. Old saws these be: That truth may too often be sick, but it shall not die: He that will despise vain-glory, shall attain in the end to true glory. Let them call you fearful for careful, slow for considerate, an ill soldier and ignorant for a skilful warrior and experienced. If you adventure all things boldly, Hannibal will contemn you; enterprise nothing rashly, and he shall dread you.” Livy, bk. 22.

There is extant also the celebrated speech of the eminent Lentulus to the same effect, made on the occasion when the Romans had been surrounded at the Caudine Forks and an embassy had been received from the Samnites saying that there would be no other conditions of peace than that the Romans should pass under the yoke, unarmed and with one garment apiece. These were his words:

“ I have heard my father, O ye consuls, oftentimes make report that he was the only man in the Capitol who persuaded the Senate not to ransom the City from the hands of the Gauls with gold, seeing that they were not inclosed either with trench or rampart by their enemies (who were most idle in such works and in making fortifications), but might break through them, if not without great danger yet without assured destruction. Were the case so now, that just as they then, being armed, might have run down out of the Capitol upon their enemies (in which sort oftentimes the besieged have sallied out upon them that lay in siege), so we might but fight with our enemies in any place (it skilleth not), good or bad, even or uneven, I would not in giving counsel be any jot behind my father in courage and valor. For I confess, verily, that to die for our country is a brave death; and for my own part ready am I even to offer my body as a sacrifice to present death, and engage myself among the thickest of my enemies, thereby to save the people of Rome and the legions. But, alas, here I see my country, here I see all the Roman legions that there are, who, unless for their own selves they will run upon their death, what have they else to save by their death? Why, some man will say, the houses and buildings of the city, the walls, and that multitude that inhabit the city. Nay, rather, if this army fortune

here to miscarry, they are all clean betrayed into the enemy's hands and not saved. For who shall defend them? Peradventure the weak and unarmed multitude: even as well surely as they defended it against the violence of the Gauls! Or will they send for an army from Veii and beseech again the help of Captain Camillus? Nay, here in this place is our whole hope and puissance; in saving it we save our country; in offering it to death, we abandon and betray our country. To yield ourselves is a foul and shameful thing; but such is the love of our country that we ought to preserve it as well with our utter shame, if need require, as by our death. Let us undergo then and abide this shameful indignity whatsoever, and obey that necessity which the very gods themselves can not

Livy, bk. 9. Overcome."

[9] We are bound, then, to take all measures which will serve the interests of our fatherland and State, and we ought to shrink from no disgrace in its defense, not even from death itself if circumstances demand it, but (in Plato's words) if your fatherland requires that you should give yourself up to be flogged or to be imprisoned, or if it sends you to battle where wounds may be received and death encountered, you must render absolute obedience; there must be neither shuffling nor flight; but alike in war and in court and (in a word) everywhere the mandates of your State or fatherland must be executed; for in all our actions we ought to have regard not to our own advantage and interests, but to the well-being of our country.

Cic., against
Vatinius.

[10] Indeed, death for one's fatherland has ever been reckoned a most glorious thing; and so Cicero exclaims: "O death, happy above all others, when the debt of nature is paid for one's fatherland!" On the other hand it is a most shameful thing, when the occasion offers a valorous and honorable death on behalf of one's country, to prefer life at the cost of disgrace and cowardice.

Dig. 27, 1, 18.

Philipp. 14.

Cic., to Herenn.,
bk. 4.

c. 9, C. 23, qu. 8,
and c. 46, C. 23, qu.
5, and Span. Ordin.,
bk. 3, tit., 25, par. 2.

Those, in truth, who die on behalf of the Church obtain a heavenly kingdom, and that is the meaning of Cicero's utterance: "They, then, whom you have slain will expiate even in the world below the penalty of parricide, but you who have so gloriously yielded up your last breath have obtained the seats and habitation of the blest." And indeed the soldiers of the Cimbri of ancient times held death on behalf of their country so glorious that they did not deem themselves blessed unless they died fighting, on the ground that they had not otherwise been steadfast to the end of their life; they would, accordingly, leap for joy when in the battle-line, as if about to quit life in a glorious and blessed way, while they would mourn, when stricken with disease, at the approach of a disgraceful and miserable end.

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 6.

[11] It follows that those generals and soldiers who, in the struggle for victory, expose themselves to extremity of danger in battle and encounter, wherein death is more probable than escape, are not to be

forthwith convicted of mortal sin, for (in the words of St. Augustine) : Bk. 3 against Faust. Manich. And c. 4, C. 23, qu. 1.
 "No blame attaches when in battle those die who must die at some time or other: it would be the timid rather than the religious who would find anything to blame there, for although no man may effect his own death (so to do being mortal sin), yet it is allowable to expose oneself to death or to extremity of peril for a just cause, as on behalf of one's country or the Catholic Church." De offic., bk. 1, ch. 20. Ambrose, accordingly, defends the brave Eleazar from a charge of sin and covers him with praise, in that he slew an elephant which towered above the rest and wore royal trappings, because he thought the king was on it, and was himself crushed to death by the beast in its fall. c. non licet, [C. 23, qu. 2 (?)]. Aug., Kingdom of God, bk. 1, chs. 20 and 21.

[12] Nay, if (in the interests of his country's well-being) one were to kill his father or his son, he would not only be guiltless but even worthy of reward. And this holds good, I think, if the destruction of his country be really in question and the son can, neither by advice nor by threats, avail at all to divert his father from his design; for there is abundant authority among the philosophers for preferring the well-being of one's fatherland to the well-being of one's father, and the law too takes the same view, whatever Bodin may say to the contrary and in rash rebuke of the expounders of the law. Maccab., bk. 1, ch. 8. When Fulvius, the son of a senator, was setting out to join Catiline, his father had him called back and put to death. This was a noble act. He, indeed, who betrays his country is guilty of high treason. Dig. 11, 7, 35. Cic., Offic., bk. 3. Republic, bk. 1, ch. 4. Sallust, Catiline. Dig. 48, 4: 1 and 2.

[13] Further, as regards that second precept of Plato, great diligence must be employed lest when we are proposing to safeguard individual parts of the State we subject the body as a whole to danger. Accordingly the defense of allied cities and other places which are not easy of defense ought not to be lightly undertaken in war. It is better to leave them exposed to the enemy than by a futile defense of them to endanger the main concerns; or even to bring them into reputed danger, for often what is noised about over widely and made more serious than is actually the case, is of first-class importance to the whole issue of the war.

And so the saying goes that rumor takes part in war and that trifles drive the minds of men towards hope and towards fear. That is why Philip, King of Macedon, after sustaining defeat in war at the hands of the Romans, turned and laid waste the allied cities and other places which he had no means of defending, and summoned all the men who were capable of following him, giving permission to owners to take with them such of their goods as they could, the rest being the booty of the soldiery. To do this was a bitter thing for Philip, but he wanted to take away at any rate all movables from land which was soon to pass to the enemy. Livy, bk. 32. And in doing it he seems to have copied the example of the Suevi who, when war was made on them, used to hold a council and then send messengers in all directions ordering the inhabitants to quit the towns and

On Dig. 1, 1, 2 and Cod. 2, 7, 14. Bonaud in his suppl. to Terrarubea, tract. 3, art. 3. To the same effect what Clarus gives in § feudum, qu. 21, nu. 3.

take their children and wives and all their goods into the forests, and bidding all who were capable of bearing arms to assemble at some one spot.

Caes., *Gallie war*, bk. 4.

On the same principle, when Vercingetorix was planning a revolution and attempting to seduce the Gauls from their loyalty to the Romans, he induced the Bituriges to burn their towns which were not free from danger, having regard to their state of defense and the nature of their position, lest they should yield cover to such of their men as wished to shirk military service or should be open to the Romans for the purpose of forage and pillage.

Caes., *Gallie war*, bk. 7.

Absolute precautions must, however, be taken that none of these measures opens the way to cruelty or greed; for when Hannibal on the one hand could not hold with his garrisons all the peoples of Italy who had joined him—at any rate without splitting up his forces into a number of small detachments (a thing highly inexpedient at that juncture)—and on the other hand could not, by the withdrawal of his garrisons, leave the allies who had trusted him void of hope and a prey to fear, he plunged headlong into greed and cruelty and yielded to the sacking of the places which he could not protect. But (says Livy) the issue showed how foul that plan was, for not only did he thus alienate the minds of those who suffered these indignities, but the minds of other men too; indeed the example affected a wider circle than the calamity itself. Better advised were the Romans after they had sustained the defeat of Cannæ; they carefully scrutinized all the resources of their dominion and when their distant allies implored a garrison they did not send one, not having sufficient strength, but bade them shift for themselves and abstained from all cruel measures against them.

Livy, bk. 23.

Adroit, indeed, was the conduct of the consul Marcus Porcius Cato, when waging war in Spain, on the occasion when ambassadors came to him from Bilistages, the chieftain of the Iltergetes, to complain that their strongholds were besieged and that they were without hope of resistance except in the protection of Roman soldiery. The consul was harassed by a twofold anxiety: he did not want to desert his allies and he did not want to diminish his army, inasmuch as this would entail either his delaying battle or incurring greater risk in battle. He decided not to lessen his army for fear that the enemy should inflict some disgrace on him meanwhile, and determined that his allies must be fobbed off with a hope rather than with anything actual, for fictions posing as facts have often been of the greatest service in war and one who believes he has obtained assistance is in much the same position as one who has actually obtained it, for he finds safety in that very trust and in hoping and daring. Accordingly, Cato made answer to the envoys that, though he hesitated to lessen his own forces by lending them to others, yet he was mindful of them and of their crisis and danger more than of himself; so he had a

proclamation made to a third part of the men of every cohort, bidding them quickly cook the food which they were putting on shipboard, and ordered the ships to be got ready by the third day thereafter. The envoys did not leave before they had seen the soldiers embarked; and, noising it abroad as a matter now beyond all doubt, they filled not only their own men but the enemy also with the news of the approach of Roman help. But the consul, now that he had made enough show to satisfy appearances, had the soldiers recalled from the ships. By this means he put heart into his allies to sustain a siege by the hope of help and deterred the enemy from carrying on the siege, yet himself made for the enemy with unimpaired strength and gained a glorious victory.

Livy, bk. 34.

[14] Further, just as the defense of those parts which you can not protect ought not to be rashly undertaken, so also those parts ought not to be deserted which can sustain and shatter an attack of the enemy. In this respect Antiochus made a disgraceful blunder. He had been beaten by the Romans in a naval engagement; and, because he had been driven from the possession of the sea, he distrusted his capability to guard the outlying parts and so (by what later events showed to be a cowardly plan) he ordered the garrison to be withdrawn from Lysimachia lest he should be overwhelmed at that spot by the Romans. Now he might not only have easily protected Lysimachia from the first onslaught of the Romans, but also have sustained a siege during the whole of the winter and, by thus prolonging the time, have reduced the besiegers to the extremity of want.

Livy, bk. 37.
Appian, Syrian war.

[15] Lastly, among the other obligations connected with war, Cicero includes this: not to be excessively severe to the conquered, seeing that there is nothing more praiseworthy, nothing worthier of a great and eminent man, than readiness to be appeased and clemency and

Parcere devictis et debellare superbos.

(To spare the conquered and break the proud.)

The multitude, accordingly, should be spared, and those fugitives who throw themselves on the good faith of a general ought to be received (even, as Cicero says, when a battering-ram has knocked down the wall) and only the leaders of the crowd should be punished, for (as our author says, *ad Herennium*): "It is a brave man's part to reckon those as enemies (*hostes*) who are striving for victory and to judge as men those who are conquered, so that bravery may lessen the evils of war, and humaneness add to the blessings of peace."

Bk. 4.

Now in the matter of the destruction and plunder of cities, Cicero strongly urges that good heed be given not to do anything rashly or cruelly. In this respect Marcus Marcellus won for himself the highest praise. He issued a proclamation in a general assembly giving the wealthy city of Syracuse to the soldiers as booty, but, before doing so,

he wept and he provided in his proclamation that no one should injure a free person.

Acc. to St. Aug.,
Kingdom of God,
bk. 1, ch. 6.

Scipio, too, after the capture of Carthage, which was filled with statues and votive offerings in the Greek style, brought from Sicily, proclaimed that people might come from each of the quarters of the city to identify and carry away their own property, and he did not allow any of his own men, whether free or slave, to accept anything by way of booty or even to buy anything, while the others were busy with the work of destruction.

Plut. Apoph.

Caius Cæsar, too, used to say that nothing afforded him greater pleasure than to spare the multitude, and he wrote to Trebonius, his legate, who was besieging Marseilles, expressly charging him not to allow the city to be carried by assault, lest the soldiery should get over-excited and, by reason of their hatred of defection and their disregard of himself and their protracted toils, should put all the young people to death, as they were threatening to do.

Caesar, Civil
war, bk. 2.

Clemency, accordingly, is not only worthy of a great man, but it is in many cases found to be both serviceable and glorious. This is the meaning of the answer made by Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, to those who were urging him to order the adoption of stern measures against the Athenians. He said that their opinion was absurd, in that they would have a man who was displaying so many acts and

Plut. Apoph.

Paul Oros.,
bk. 2, ch. 17.
Bk. 31.

endurances, and with so much glory, overthrow the theater of his glory. So, too, after the Spartans had compelled the Athenians to surrender, there were some who urged that so hostile a city ought to be destroyed and its very name with it; but the Spartans said that they would not allow one of the two eyes of Greece to be plucked out. And Livy writes that the kings of Macedonia, who were wont to fight to the bitter end in battle, would spare towns, as far as they were able, with a view to possessing a more opulent dominion; for where is the wisdom of destroying the very things the possession of which is being fought for, so that nothing is left to oneself but the war? Accordingly, we read in Dionysius of

Rom. antiq., bk. 2.

Livy, bk. 1.

Halicarnassus that the third ordinance of Romulus was this: Not utterly to destroy towns that were taken in war; nay, Livy writes it down as a characteristic of war that the vanquished are enabled, by satisfactory terms of peace, to get the better of the victors and control them.

It does not seem out of place to append here the wise advice of Belisarius, whereby he dissuaded Totila from the overthrow of Rome. When Totila had entered Rome as victor he had determined to level it entirely with the ground. Belisarius wrote to him urging him to do nothing rashly: "For [said he] one of two things will inevitably happen, either you will be beaten in this war and give in, or you will win by the aid of propitious fortune; now if you come out victor and have destroyed Rome you will have ruined, not some one else's property but

your own; whereas, if you shall have preserved it, you will beyond doubt have preserved the finest and richest royal residence in the world. Should you, however, be beaten by us, you will have the right to expect undying gratitude from your conqueror for preserving the city unharmed; whereas if it be destroyed he will proceed against you without any leniency." Under the influence of this letter Totila abstained from the destruction of the city.

By a similar dilemma certain eminent men of this Academy of Louvain softened the enraged heart of the Prince of Orange, for when in that wicked expedition against his fatherland A. D. 1572 he was besieging the city of Louvain, which had no garrison, and the wisest citizens saw that they could not withstand the force of the enemy, they elected—despite the baseness of coming to terms with a wicked and unjust foe and in order to avoid the sight of the violation of all things human and divine, the profanation of temples, and the destruction of by far the most renowned Academy by utterly abandoned enemies—to yield to necessity and to buy off all these evils by the payment of a fixed sum of money rather than risk the cruelty of the enemy. And when the Prince was not satisfied with the amount of the ransom he went so far in his shamelessness as even to require from the citizens of Louvain an oath which they could not take without committing treason, and these same men, who would rather have died than bind themselves by so great a crime, checked the shamelessness of their enemy in the following way: they said,

"Either you will gain this battle which awaits you with the royal army (under the Duke of Alva) or you will be beaten. If you win, there can of course be no dealings between you and us, for we, willy-nilly, shall be in your power; but if you are beaten (the fortune of war being so doubtful) there is no reason why you should wish to incur our wrath and the King's and the Duke of Alva's."

And in this way, without treason to the king's majesty and by means of a necessary but not disgraceful agreement, they secured the interests of their commonwealth with consummate wisdom.

This commendation of humaneness and clemency is, however, subject to the limitation that severity must be employed on behalf of the State, especially when this is entirely necessary for the State. That is why the Romans utterly wiped out Numantia and Carthage, although the Pontifex Maximus, Scipio Nasica, was opposed to the destruction of Carthage, the rival of the Roman empire, and, when Cato clamored for its destruction, he maintained the contrary, through apprehension that security was the enemy of weak souls and because he saw how needful it was that fear should act as a fitting guardian to the (so to say) infant citizens. And his opinion was not at fault, for the Roman State began from that time to waste through ease and luxury.

Acc. to Pet. Crinit.,
de honesta discipl.,
bk. 6. following
Procopius.

Kingdom of God,
bk. 1, ch. 9.
Appian, Punic war.

1 Sam., ch. 12.
Judith, chs. 2, 3
and 4.

Plut. Apoph.

On this point St. Augustine has some fine remarks. And Samuel, too, made it abundantly manifest to the people that God had stirred up enemies against the Israelites in order to keep them in the path of duty. For men have a way, when they have more strength than is wanted for external wars, of using it up in conflicts with one another, and this kind of war is far the most deadly. The Spartans, therefore, did well in refusing their permission, when one of their kings promised to destroy a city which had given them a deal of trouble: "Do not (said they) destroy the whetstone of valor."

Cod. 8, 10, 9; and
8, 11, 14.

Further, it is provided by law that in time of war, when the interests of the State demand it, houses (whether belonging to enemies or to citizens) which are built up to the walls, and from which there is a risk of fire or of ambush, may be overthrown and destroyed, even without the payment of compensation.

CHAPTER II.

Of the commander or general of an army.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Nothing more uncommon than a perfect general. 2. To whom the name '<i>imperator</i>' is applied. 3. Better to have a good general than good soldiers. 4. The best age for a general. 5. <i>Leges annales</i> of the Romans (laws as to the age-qualification for public office). 6. Four requisites of a general. 7. The virtues of a general. 8. A general does not rashly engage with the enemy. 9. Better to excel in intellect than in sword play. 10. A cautious commander to be preferred to a bold one. 11. The enemy to be prevented from victualing. 12. Not easy to arrest undertakings once begun. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 13. The firmness and confidence of a general in war. 14. Before an engagement the spirits of the soldiery to be maintained in divers ways. 15. The misfortunes of the army to be concealed. 16. The best general he who knows most about the enemy's affairs. 17. Credence not to be rashly given to deserters. 18. The general should constitute himself leader in all difficult exploits. 19. The general ought to proceed cautiously in difficulties. 20. The advice of Antigonus. 21. Not only valor in war but other virtues, too, required in a general. 22. A general must be allowed a free hand. 23. The Carthaginians severe upon their generals in war. |
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[1, 2] If a war has to be waged the thing of first importance is to decide whom we shall appoint to command the army, for it is a true old saying that an army is worth just as much as its general is, and there is nothing harder to be found than the perfect general. Now this designation "*imperator*" used to be of common application to those who were appointed to command an army for a given period, but subsequently Cæsar adopted it as a standing title after he had acquired the supreme headship of the State and herein he was followed by others.

[3] For the reason given above, Philip of Macedon used to say that he wondered at the Athenians' appointing new generals every year, seeing that in the whole course of his life he had found no more than one good general, Parmenio. He used also to say that an army of deer commanded by a lion would excel an army of lions under the leadership of a deer. And so Caius Cæsar, when going into Spain to campaign against Petreius, declared that he held him cheap because he was going to an army without a general. And when Caius Fabricius heard that the Romans had been beaten by Pyrrhus he said, "It is not the Epirotes who have beaten the Romans, but Pyrrhus." And indeed the case of Marcus Coriolanus clearly shows (according to Livy) that the Roman superiority lay in their generals rather than in their army; for when Coriolanus took command of the Volscians, they were victors though they had always before been vanquished by the Romans.

Appian, Pref. to
Rom. Hist.
Tacitus, Annals, bk. 3.

Plut., Apoph.
Livy, bk. 2.

Hence Epicrates, when discoursing on the military art, says that an army is comparable to an animal much like a man, the general being its head, the drawn-up battle array being the breast and trunk, the infantry being the hands, and the cavalry the feet. And just as, in the case of the body, when the head is disturbed and upset, the other members can not discharge their functions; so when the general is discomposed his army can not but waver and fall into peril and ruin.

And after Alexander's death Leosthenes compared his army (which was wandering about and knocking up against itself) to the Cyclops, who after the loss of his eye kept poking out his hands as far as he could, but not in any definite direction, and similarly after the loss of its general an army with its great bulk is convulsed by unregulated movements. And just as, after the departure of the soul, the corpse does not remain holding together, but is scattered abroad in dissolution, so was Alexander's army, after his death, a prey to tremors and was jostled about and tossed to and fro.

Plut., On fortune
and valor
of Alex., orat. 2.

And indeed the greater the difficulties which a war presents, the more care should be bestowed in preparing for it (as said above); but if less, we must try to get a general the equal of the opposing general, for (as Quintus Fabius used to say) any sailor or passenger can manage the helm in a calm sea, but when a gale springs up and the vessel is swept by the wind over a stormy sea, then a man and a helmsman is required.

Livy, ch. 24.

[4] On these grounds Plato laid it down that no one ought to be put in charge of a military expedition before his thirtieth year, not even if of well-approved valor and covered with military glory. And this was the age which the Athenians adopted as the statutory age for military office, although they at times allowed exceptions to the rule, notably in the case of Alcibiades, who was such a favorite of the populace in his early manhood that he drew on him the eyes of all whenever he appeared in public, and no one at Athens was reckoned his equal. He was given command in the Syracusan war before attaining the statutory age. Two much older men, however, were given him as colleagues, Nicias and Lysimachus, in order the better to guard the interests of the State.

[5] The Romans, too, had their *leges annales* whereby a greater age still was required for the consulship (out of mistrust of the rashness of youth) and for other magistracies. The men of olden time, however, had not these *leges annales*, really old as they were (so Cicero says), but they were introduced many years later, by the rivalry for office, in order that the struggle for the several steps of office might take place between men of the same age, the result being (as Cicero also tells us) that in many instances great capacities for virtue were extinguished before they could be of service to the State. But the men of earlier days, who held that they ought not to expect an outstanding and surpassing virtue to increase with years, promoted persons to honor according as they excelled in virtue without taking into account either age or family or any

other attribute, but simply reckoning each man at his proper value: this appears from Dionysius.

Rom. antiq., bk. 6.

"Indeed," says Cicero, "in olden times the Rulli, Decii, Corvini, and many others, and in more recent days the elder Africanus and Titus Flaminus, having been elected consuls quite as youths, achieved such exploits that they have increased the power and adorned the name of the Roman people. Nay, did not Alexander of Macedon meet his death when he was thirty-two, having begun to perform the greatest exploits from the very outset of his life? And this is ten years earlier than our laws permit men to be consuls."

Philipp. 5.

Whence (as the same Cicero tells us) it can be perceived that the development of valor is quicker than that of age. Further, Valerius Corvinus, who was made consul in his twenty-third year, used to say that the consulship was the reward of merit and not of blood: and Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, a very poor man, owning only four acres of land and cultivating them with his own hand, was summoned from the plough to Rome to assume the dictatorship, being the only hope of the Roman people. And this, says Livy, it is worth while for those to hear who despise all things human except riches, and imagine that there is no great scope for honor and virtue save where there is abundance of wealth. Those again who were sent by the Senate to Attilius to summon him to assume the sovereignty of the Roman people, saw him sowing seed, yet those hands worn with rustic toil established the public safety and hurled to the ground the huge forces of the enemy.

Val. Max., bk. 4,
ch. 4.
Pro lege Manil.

[6, 7] Again, Cicero holds that a general ought to possess the following four qualities: knowledge of the military art, valor, authority and good fortune; and that the foremost merits of a general are the following: industry in affairs, bravery in dangers, assiduity in action, promptitude in execution, prudence in planning. Yet nothing worthy of high praise will be accomplished without practice and exercise, for in the art of a general as in other arts three things are requisite, natural aptitude, education, and experience—natural aptitude being disclosed in the man's intelligence, education in his knowledge, and experience by its products.

[8] Now since events correspond to one another nowhere less than in war (and so, as Hannibal said to Scipio, the least possible reliance is to be placed on even the best stroke of good fortune), a general must give great heed not rashly to engage with the enemy, staking all on the doubtful cast of battle; but rather to pursue safety on principle than success at haphazard. Let principle guide him, not chance, for the latter is deceptive and by small causes produces vast mutations of fortune. We read accordingly how Cæsar became more and more reluctant to engage in battle towards the end of his life, deeming that the more victories he had won the less reliance was to be placed on the happenings of chance and that he would not gain by victory as much as disaster would cost him.

Suetonius, Life
of C. Cæsar.

[9] And, indeed, just as successful achievements secure the goodwill of an army (as Cæsar said), so ill-success secures ill-favor: and so a general will be acting more shrewdly, more safely, and more gloriously (according to the opinion of Pericles), to overcome his enemy whenever he can by intellect and reason rather than by the sword, for since the works of the mind rank above those of the body (as Cicero says) so we derive more satisfaction from the conquests of our intellect than from those of our strength. And this is taken to have been the meaning of the custom of the Lacedæmonians, whereby a general who had won a victory with much bloodshed and great slaughter of the enemy sacrificed a cock in lieu of a trophy, whereas one who by obtaining a surrender and by a treaty and by his assiduity had won a not over-bloody victory and had avoided the worst evils of war, sacrificed a bull.

Dion, too, says in his *De regno*, that far greater things are accomplished by the shrewdness of a few than by numbers and strength, a fact which Homer is adverting to when he introduces Agamemnon as asserting that he could much more easily settle Troy's business if he had ten Nestors or Ulysses for counsel than as many Ajaxes and Achilles for stout fighting. That is the drift of the speech of Ulysses to Ajax found

Metamorph. 13. in Ovid:

Quippe manu fortes, nec sunt mihi Marte secundi:
 Consiliis cessere meis: tibi dextera bello
 Utilis: ingenium est quod eget moderamine nostro.
 Tu vires sine mente geris: mihi cura futuri est:
 Tu pugnare potes; pugnandi tempora mecum
 Eligit Atrides: tu tantum corpore prodes;
 Nos animo: quantoque ratem qui temperat, anteit
 Remigiis officium: quanto est dux milite major:
 Tantum ego te supero: nec non in corpore nostro
 Pectora sunt potiora manu: vigor omnis in illis.

* [All these had been my rivals in the shield,
 And yet all these to my pretensions yield.
 Thy boisterous hands are then of use, when I
 With this directing head those hands apply.
 Brawn without brain is thine; my prudent care
 Foresees, provides, administers the war:
 Thy province is to fight; but when shall be
 The time to fight, the king consults with me.
 No dram of judgment with thy force is joined;
 Thy body is of profit, and my mind.
 By how much more the ship her safety owes
 To him who steers, than him that only rows;
 By how much more the captain merits praise
 Than he who fights, and, fighting, but obeys;
 By so much greater is my worth than thine,
 Who canst but execute what I design.
 What gain'st thou, brutal man, if I confess
 Thy strength superior, when thy wit is less?
 Mind is the man: I claim my whole desert
 From the mind's vigor, and the immortal part.]

* Translation by John Dryden.

And so on, in Ovid's poem, where he tells how the armor of Achilles, for which Ulysses strove with Ajax and which was offered to the worthier, was awarded to Ulysses.

Therefore glory resides not alone in bodily strength and in mighty muscles, but rather in moral virtues (as Ambrosius says). Wherefore De offic., bk. 1. also the giants whom we read of in Holy Writ, much as they excelled in strength and bulk, yet because they had not wisdom perished because of their foolishness; while on the other hand it is written of the wise man, Baruch, ch. 3. "There arose a knowing son and through him was overthrown all the power of the enemy." Eccles., ch. 47.

[10] A discreet and wise general, then, according to the teaching of Euripides, is to be preferred to a daring and rash one, since (as the same writer said) a great force of soldiers can be overcome by wise counsel. And so Xerxes, who led so many thousand men against the Greeks, was beaten by the efforts of one man, Themistocles. Aristides, accordingly, used to say that arms were not the only resource against an enemy, but that counsel was the first resource; for, when we can escape from superior strength by planning and diligence what boots it to encounter dangers?

[11] Hence military experts discern exceptional merit in a general who carries on war on such a principle that he and his army are provided, in the most convenient way, with food and water and wood and fodder, while the enemy on the other hand is deprived of all these and driven to surrender, if possible, by famine: and who, though he may think that he could join battle with great safety, yet deems it safer, by holding roads and cutting off supplies, to gain a woundless victory.

This was the principle which especially commended itself to that consummate general, Julius Cæsar, who determined not to join battle with Afranius and Petreius (of Pompey's faction) unless absolutely compelled, for he had set before himself the hope of being able to finish off that business without a fight and without one of his soldiers receiving a wound, by cutting off the food-supplies of his adversaries, asking himself why he need lose any of his men, even in a successful engagement, and why he should allow troops who had deserved so well of him to be wounded, and why, in a word, he should run the risks of fortune, especially as it was no whit less a general's business to overcome by strategy than by the sword. And in the end he compelled his adversaries to surrender by stress of utter want. And on the same principle Pompey Caes., Civil war, bk. 1. might easily have crushed Cæsar at Pharsalus through his lack of everything, as he had planned to do, had not he suffered himself to be diverted from his plan by his soldiers in their elation after the victory of Dyrrhachium. But it was Fabius Maximus who won the greatest renown in this class of warfare, even according to the testimony of his enemy Hannibal, who said that Fabius, when not fighting, inspired him with greater fear than Marcellus did when fighting; and his opinion was not at fault, Appian, Civil war, bk. 2.

for Fabius by his devices and by sitting quiet had already reduced Hannibal to such a condition that he not only had no provisions left of what he had seized day by day, but nowhere to seize any for the future, as all the corn had been gathered from all sides into the fortified cities when the open country had become insecure, so that provisions for hardly ten days were left (as subsequently was discovered), and it had been arranged, in the event of a decision to await the seasonable ripening of the crops, that the Spaniards should return home because of the dearth of supplies. All this the consul Terentius Varro upset by his rashness; and although on his arrival Hannibal, who was surrounded by these difficulties, saw that the enemy's forces were augmented by a half, he was exceedingly glad, for he hoped (as really happened) that fortune would give play to the preposterous disposition and rashness of the consul; and by the blunder of this man that terrible disaster of Cannæ befell the Romans.

Livy, bk. 22.

Caius Sulpicius, dictator against the Gauls, also adopted the same system, and was in no way inclined to trust himself to fortune, there being no stress of circumstance, against an enemy whom lapse of time and the strangeness of the locality were weakening day by day, and who was lingering without any organized commissariat or solid means of defense. Moreover, those minds and bodies which derive all their

Livy, bk. 7.

strength from attack find their strength lessened and enfeebled by delay. Indeed, when Alexander was besieging Leucadia, he let every one from the neighborhood take refuge there in order that their store of provisions might be consumed all the quicker, and after this was consumed he gained an easy victory. Antigonus, also, after ravaging the territory of Athens, departed at the sowing-season, and when their remaining corn had been used for sowing purposes he returned and again destroyed their actually grown corn, and reduced the Athenians into his power when they were exhausted by hunger.

We ought, therefore, to bear in mind the advice which Cambyses gave to his son Cyrus, never to be overtaken by lack of supply, but in times of plenty to bear scarcity carefully in mind; for it is more common to see an army worn out by want than by battle, hunger being (in the words of Vegetius) keener than the sword.

Accordingly, as we have said, it is by such devices before all that an enemy is to be overcome; and rash joinder of battle should be avoided save where the circumstances imperatively demand it, after the example set by Scipio who, when he was sent against the Numantines and saw the boldness, bordering on madness, of the enemy, said that he would in time visit the enemy's boldness on him and that it was the part of wisdom to exploit the folly of others, for a good general, like a good doctor, ought to use steel for curing ills only in the last resort. None the less, he

Plut., Apoph. rose up in his own good time and overthrew the Numantines.

Side by side with this may be placed the advice of Sertorius, who, at the time of Sulla's proscription, was compelled to become commander of the Lusitani and, being unable to divert them by speech from joining battle with the whole Roman force, brought out before them two horses, the one very strong and the other very weak; and then he had the tail of the former plucked hair after hair by a decrepit old man and the whole tail of the latter tugged at by a young man of exceptional strength, thus suggesting that the Roman army was like a horse's tail, portions of which any one who tried could destroy, while he who attempted to destroy it as a whole would more speedily yield up the victory than gain it. By this illustration Sertorius brought round to his way of thinking those barbarians whom he could not bend by argument.

[12] Further, just as one ought not rashly to tempt fortune and undertake difficult tasks, so when one has once begun them they ought not to be lightly given up. Of this Marcellus gave an example on the occasion when the Roman soldiery, rashly approaching the walls during the siege of Casilinum, sustained many wounds without any corresponding degree of success. Fabius was then of opinion that this minor operation, which was just as difficult as a major one, should be forborne and stopped, as graver matters were pressing, but Marcellus urged that, though there were many exploits which great generals would not attempt, yet, when once they were begun, they ought not to be given up, because the influence of rumor would be great one way or the other, and he insisted that the undertaking should not be abandoned.

Livy, bk. 24.

The conduct of Cæsar's troops, then, at the siege of Avaricum was worthy of all praise. They were beset by all manner of difficulties and Cæsar told them that he was purposing to raise the siege for want of supplies, but they one and all begged him not to leave the matter unfinished, saying that it would be a standing ignominy to themselves if they abandoned a siege which they had begun and that the great influence of rumor on war was rightly admitted by the best generals, and that he who retires was deemed to have been put to flight.

Caes., Gallic war, bk. 7.

[13] Accordingly, as in other affairs so especially in war, perseverance and confidence are most excellent qualities in a general and often produce the most important results on the whole issue of a war. Of this the Romans furnish us with striking illustrations; and notably so after their defeat at Cannæ, when, though the resources of their State were exhausted, they dared to send reinforcements into Spain and, while Hannibal was actually knocking with his army at the Porta Capena, they prevented the site of the enemy's camp from being sold for less than if the Carthaginians were not in occupation of it. Such conduct as this (says Valerius Maximus), what else is it than to overcome adverse fortune by one's self-respect and turn its ragings into benefits? And that is the meaning of Cæsar's saying that if all things are not going well, ill-fortune can be mitigated by effort.

Bk. 3, ch. 7.

In the same spirit of confidence Scipio Africanus neither punished the spies of Hannibal who had been captured in his camp nor interrogated them about the plans and resources of the Carthaginians, but had them handed over to the military tribunes and bidden to observe everything without any fear and be taken whithersoever in the camp they wanted to go; and then, having asked them whether they had explored everything with complete convenience, he provided them with an escort and sent them back to Hannibal. And by this display of absolute confidence (as Valerius Maximus says) Scipio inflicted a blow on the spirits of his enemy instead of on the enemy's arms, for Hannibal was so exceedingly struck by the confidence of his enemy that he forthwith sent a messenger to Scipio begging for an opportunity of an interview, with the idea that he would be able to obtain more equal terms of peace if he sought peace with strength unimpaired instead of after a defeat.

Bk. 3, ch. 7.

Livy, bk. 30.

[14] Further, generals of great renown, with their clear perception of the great advantages of perseverance and confidence, are in the habit of so acting before an engagement as to inspire their army with the utmost degree of confidence in themselves and in that way to fortify the spirits of their troops. This they used to do in divers ways. The dictator Valerius Corvinus, when making war with the Samnites, before giving the signal of battle would spend some days in skirmishes for the purpose of sampling the enemy, so as that the novelty of battle and of the enemy should not frighten his men. The consul Quintus Fabius, on the eve of engagement with the Etruscans, in order to revive the spirits of his troops, whom the enemy's numbers had alarmed, sang the praises of the Samnite wars which they had brought to a very successful issue and disparaged the Etruscans, saying that the one enemy could not be compared with the other, nor the one array with the other, and furthermore that they would know in course of time about another secret mis-
 Livy, bk. 7. sile concerning which he must meanwhile keep silence; and in this enigmatical manner he feigned that the enemy was duped and marvellously fortified his troops. And undoubtedly the ingenuity of Fabius in this course deserves praise and imitation by generals, for it is a common weakness of human nature (as Cæsar said) to place too great reliance on the unseen, hidden, and unknown, and also to be overmuch terrified thereby; and (says Livy) the false, posing as true, has frequently been of the greatest service in war.

Livy, bk. 9.

Civil war, bk. 2.

Men of old, too, deemed it peculiarly the business of religion to fortify the spirits of their troops. And that is the explanation of all the auspices and oracles: if perchance these seemed to portend some mischance, generals would sometimes, by an adroit interpretation, twist it into a good augury in order to rid their troops of fear. Innumerable instances of this are extant.

[15] Now, just as there must be much done in the way of fortifying the spirits of the soldiery, so also a great point should be made of keeping back everything that might cause them alarm or in any way upset their minds; for (as Cæsar said) one conceals a wound of the body, and in the same way any evil plight of the army should be concealed, lest by its disclosure the troops should be alarmed and the enemy emboldened. In this respect the conduct of Terentius Varro, after the defeat of Cannæ, is rightly held blameworthy; for when the Campanians sent envoys to him to Venusia, whither he had come with a scanty half-armed band, he so added to their disdain of his circumstances and person by over-disclosure and revelation of the defeat, that the legates, who had already delivered their message, which was, that they were distressed that any misfortune should have befallen the Romans, and who had promised all assistance in prosecuting the war, returned home and reported (such was their disdain of the consul and of his speech in which he despaired of everything) that the very name of the Romans seemed as it were blotted out; and this made all the Campanians inclined to a revolt, assured that they would be able to gain the overlordship of Italy, and they, accordingly, made a treaty with Hannibal.

Livy, bk. 22.

In the same way Philip, King of Macedon, conceived the unwise idea that he would advance somewhat in the affections of his men and that they would be rendered more keen to incur danger on his behalf if he had some horse-soldiers buried who had fallen in a slight skirmish with the Romans; so he ordered the bodies to be fetched into the camp, so that every one might notice the funeral honor. Yet, what he thought would make his men readier to risk all combats, simply produced alarm and backwardness; for those who had seen the wounds made by spears and arrows and occasionally by lances in the wars which they had been accustomed to carry on with Greeks and Illyrians, when they beheld bodies shorn by the Spanish sword, arms cut off, the whole skull split open, heads severed from the body, protruding entrails, and other horrible kinds of wounds, were on all sides thunderstruck to perceive the sort of weapon and of men they had to fight against.

Livy, bk. 31.

Similarly, when the Romans saw that the populace was upset and frightened by the sight of the corpse of the consul Publius Rutilius Lupus, who fell in the Social war, and of the corpses of not a few other nobles, which had been brought back into the city, the Senate by decree ordained that thenceforth the bodies of those killed in war should be buried where they had fallen, so that the sight of them should not make the survivors more backward in their military service. This ordinance was soon noised abroad and even the enemy copied it.

Appian, Civil war, bk. 1.

[16] Now Chabrias, the Athenian general, used to say that the best general was he who got to know most of the affairs of the enemy; Plut., Apoph. and we do indeed read how ignorance of these has led to the rout of

many armies and how it has not seldom brought down into a critical condition those who were at the height of their prosperity. Thus, when Cassius was beaten on his wing by Cæsar's troops and driven from his camp, he committed suicide in despair because he thought that Brutus too was overcome, although the wing of Brutus was really successful. During a great battle between the Romans and the Volscians, night separated the combatants before an issue was arrived at, and (by an error similar to the foregoing) so great fear seized on both camps, owing to their ignorance of the result, that both armies left their wounded and a large part of their baggage and betook themselves to the neighboring hills as if they had been beaten. And Curio, Cæsar's legate in the civil war, putting undue trust in fugitives who reported that King Juba (who had joined Pompey with large reinforcements) had been summoned to a neighboring war, and that his prefect Suburra had been despatched with only a moderate force, rashly joined battle and, being surrounded with his army by the royal forces, was cut to pieces.

Livy, bk. 4.

Caes., Civil war, bk. 2.

[17] Accordingly, since (as Cicero says) it is a fault of human nature to believe greedily what we wish for and to expect others to think the same as we do, we ought to be very slow to trust fugitives and spies. And in this respect Cæsar, aforementioned, finds fault with the habits of the Gauls. They often, says he, engage in resolutions concerning the most important matters, induced by nothing more than reports and stories, of which they must forthwith repent, since they yield to mere unsifted reports and since they receive from most people answers framed agreeably to their wishes. It is therefore fitting that those who hold command should go out in person to examine, when any unusual difficulties arise, as Marcellus did, saying to his colleague, "Nay, we will go ourselves to examine, with a few horsemen, since things which are brought before our eyes will furnish a more certain basis for counsel."

[18] Again, it will be in the highest degree profitable for a general to lead in person in all enterprises of hardship and difficulty, for when you wish to enjoin anything on a subordinate, if you first impose the obligation on yourself and your own people, you will more easily render every one obedient. Accordingly a good general should imitate that brave and strenuous leader Gideon, whom God raised up and gave to the Jewish people. He addressed his men as follows: "What you shall see me do, do ye also." For (as Seneca says) good health flows from the head into the rest of the members. And in this connection there are the noble words of Valerius Corvinus, who said:

"As they ought to go into the field, every man trusting in his own manhood and glorious warfare, so should they have an eye under whose leading and regimen they were to enter into battle: whether he were a man that in the hearing of his soldiers could only make goodly and magnificent orations, fierce but in words, void of military works, or he who

himself knew how to handle his weapon, to advance before the standards, yea, and to be employed even in the middle medley of all the battle. I would have you, my soldiers, to follow my deeds and not my words, and of me to learn not only discipline but also good example, who by this right hand of mine attained unto three consulships and to the highest honor."

Livy, bk. 7.

In this fashion, also, Caius Cæsar often restored order to a disordered line of battle, opposing himself to the fugitives, and holding them back individually, and turning them on the enemy with a wrench of the throat. And so in that doubtful battle which he fought with the younger Pompey in Spain, when his soldiers were fighting in a half-hearted way because of their fear, and matters were in a critical condition and his exhortations produced no effect—he snatched up a man's shield and rebuking his soldiers he rushed on the enemy saying, "Now is the end of my life and of your soldiering." By this act, their fear giving place to shame, he restored order to the line of battle, after having received two hundred darts in his shield.

Suetonius on Caesar.

Appian, Civil war, bk. 2.

[19] Here, however, it is above all essential that the object of this activity on the general's part is to make his men readier to undergo some danger by his own readiness; but he must not rashly expose himself to danger, especially if he holds the supreme command, save where absolute necessity requires and where the issue of the whole war is involved. For we read that numerous cities have been ruined, and even more armies routed and put to flight, by the general's rash death. Thus the death of Publius Scipio in Spain, due to his exposing himself overmuch to the enemy's missiles, led beyond doubt to the victory of the enemy and the defeat of the Romans. And the wound of Cnæus Scipio at Munda, when the Romans were markedly getting the upper hand, struck terror into his men, anxious as they were about their commander's health, and proved an obstacle to an indubitable and glorious victory. So also when Hannibal fell wounded at the siege of Saguntum, having too carelessly approached the wall, there was such a flight and flutter round about him that the works and pent-houses were almost deserted. So when Epaminondas fell, who did the duty not only of general but of the bravest soldier, there fell with him all the energies of Thebes, for (as Justinus says) just as by smashing the edge of a dart you take from the rest of the missile its power to hurt, so when that great Theban general was removed, who was (as it were) the point of their dart, the energies of the State were blunted, so that it did not seem that they had merely lost him, but that with him all the energies of the Thebans had died out.

Livy, bk. 24.

Livy, bk. 21.

Bk. 6.

Let not leaders, therefore, put overmuch confidence in fickle fortune, not even in the shield of Jupiter, under which (according to Homer) they dwell; but in incurring dangers let them (says Cicero) copy the custom of doctors, who employ mild remedies for mild dis-

Offic., bk. 1.

orders, though they have to use more risky methods in more serious diseases. This is what the saying of Æmilius Paulus points to, uttered at the banquet with which, after the defeat of Perseus, he was celebrating his victory: i. e., that it is the same kind of skill that keeps an army really terrible to enemies as keeps a banquet really pleasant to friends. And Scipio Africanus, when taxed with being too little of a fighter, replied, "My mother bore me to be a general, not a fighter," meaning to show that the secret of success in arms lies rather in one man's knowledge and genius than in the arms and strength of many; for the arts of generalship and of soldiering are not identical.

[20] Further, a general, and more especially a sovereign prince, should bear in mind the counsel of Antigonus. He was tossed about by a violent storm, having all his family with him in the same ship, and he is reported to have enjoined on his children, for their own remembrance and for them to pass on to their issue, Not to dare to subject the whole of their race to a common danger at the same time. And mindful of this precept, Philip, when about to make war on the Romans, hesitated to trust his two sons at the same time to the hazard of whatever might by chance befall, and so he took the elder with him and sent the younger into Macedonia to assume the guardianship of his kingdom, thus copying the example of prudent heads of families who will not lay up the whole of their fortune in one place lest, if it should happen to be destroyed by earthquake or fire or war, their whole substance should be gone. And this is the meaning of that saying which is current among husbandmen and which Celsus reminds us of in a passage which Corasius expounds finely, Money without a fund laid by is a frail matter (*Pecunia sine peculio fragilis*).

[21] Further, not only is valor in war (as Cicero says) to be looked for in a consummate and perfect general, but there are also many qualities which are excellent handmaids and companions of this valor. Now it is especially looked for in one who wants to govern others that he can govern himself and his desires, and that he exercises over himself, in the hardest and sternest manner possible, that mastery which he proposes to exercise over others; for he who can not restrain himself is also unable, as general, to restrain an army, nor can he be severe in judgment who will not let others be severe judges of himself. Let him therefore refrain his passions, despise pleasures, control his temper, check his greed, and chase away the other flaws of character. And to one of this character (as Cicero says) fortune herself surrenders, she who is said to wield the greatest power, especially in war, and who (as the wise poet has said) renders to every one according to his character. Just as it is narrated of Marcus Porcius Cato, a man endued with all the virtues, that he had such force of character and intellect that, wheresoever he had been born, he would seem able to mould his own fortune, alike in

Livy, bk. 39. military and in civil life.

Dig. 32, 79, 1.

Miscell. jur. civ.
bk. 1, ch. 13.

Pro lege Manilia.

Paradox.

And it was with reason believed that Alexander the Great would have been more successful had he conquered his pride and wrath, those unconquered evils, and the other faults of his character; he, however, whom the arms of the Persians could not overthrow, was vanquished by his vices. Agesilaus, too, that consummate general, used to say that he would rather conquer evil desires than take the greatest city of the enemy, because it was a finer thing for a man to preserve his own liberty than to take away that of other persons. And Scipio, deservedly, did not get greater glory by capturing Carthage than by restoring, inviolate and untouched, to her bridegroom Allucius, a captive girl of such surpassing beauty that wheresoever she went she drew the eyes of all upon her, the amount of her ransom being given to Allucius by way of dowry. And the same Scipio produced more effect in Spain by the reputation which he had won for himself for clemency and self-restraint than by the unconquered arms of the Romans. Poetic fictions, therefore, about monsters tamed by Hercules and slain tyrants, mean that the good general, put before us in the guise of Hercules, ought to restrain the corrupt affections of the soul.

[22] Further, when supreme command is given to any one, it will be a well-advised thing to allow him full discretion in the decision of matters of highest import, as did the Senate and people of Rome, who allowed the general full discretion in all things pertaining to war, and left it to his judgment whether it were best to conduct the campaign by sitting still or by fighting, and whether to besiege this or that town; nor did they reserve to themselves anything save the authority to declare a new war and to solemnize a treaty with the enemy, matters which, as we have shown elsewhere, pertain to sovereign power. Accordingly when the consul Quintus Fabius was sent against the Etruscans in order to relieve the Sutrii (allies of Rome), whom the Etruscans were besieging, after he had defeated the Etruscans in battle and put them to flight, he pursued the enemy, without the Senate's knowledge, through the Ciminian forest and carried the war into Etruria. And after the defeat of Antiochus, the consul Cnæus Manlius, without the authorization of the Senate or the command of the people, made war on the Gallogræci, for bearing aid to Antiochus; and as the legates who had been with him brought no charge against him he was carried in triumph into the City.

In the same way, after Cæsar, to whose lot the province of Gaul had fallen, had driven the Germans from Gaul he crossed the Rhine in order to make war on the Sicambri for that they had refused to surrender those who, after fighting against him and Gaul, had taken refuge in the territory of the Sicambri; and he, further, took an army over into Britain because he understood that in nearly all his battles in Gaul help had been furnished from that quarter to the enemies of the Romans. And all these things he did merely on his own authority.

Quint. Curt., bk. 6.

Plut., Apoph.

Livy, bk. 26.

See above, bk. 1,
ch. 6.

Livy, bk. 9.

Livy, bk. 38.

Caes., Gallic war,
bk. 4.

Plut. on Pompey.
Cic., pro lege Manil.
Appian on Mithrid.

The conduct of the war against the pirates, again, was intrusted to Cnæus Pompey by the *Lex Gabinia* for three years in such wise that in the whole sea within the pillars of Hercules and in the maritime provinces up to the four hundredth furlong (*stadium*) from the sea, he had power to order kings and governors and states to furnish him with everything necessary for the conduct of that war. And the dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus received permission to do everything he thought beneficial to the republic. And the consul Titus Quintius was allowed full discretion to make peace or war with Philip.

Livy, bk. 32.

Now in these respects you may deservedly bestow praise on the wisdom of the Roman Senate and people, for one who is dependent on the fears and intentions of another can not accomplish anything noteworthy. Moreover, it would have been difficult for the Senate to administer according to its own judgment matters which had not been brought before its eyes, and determine the sites for pitching camps and fix the places to be occupied by garrisons and the times for engaging the enemy and the times for lying quiet, and (as the saying goes) govern for the whole earth—especially as (in Livy's words) if the opportunity afforded by a moment's space flies past and you make ever so little delay, you will soon be seeking in vain to repair its loss.

Further, in order that generals might apply themselves to their lofty tasks with better spirit, in freedom from all anxieties and without being worried by the fear of punishment for their conduct of affairs, the Roman Senate and people, if an operation chanced to be mismanaged, laid the blame on the fortune of war alone and never took any over-cruel measures against them and never exacted (even from those who by rashness and ignorance had lost their armies) more than a pecuniary fine; and a capital charge was hardly ever brought against a general for mismanagement of a war, for they thought that the failure itself and the loss of praise was punishment enough.

An example of this was furnished by the case of Marcus Sergius and Publius Virginius, tribunes of the plebs with consular powers, in the war against Veii. For the enemy chanced to attack a camp in the district commanded by Marcus Sergius and the Romans were unable to protect themselves against the enemy and their only hope was in assistance from the larger camps within the command of Virginius. Now Sergius was in private life a bitter foe of Virginius, and Virginius refused to send help to his colleague unless he begged for it, and Sergius, rather than be seen to have begged help from his foe, preferred to be conquered by the enemy to conquering by the aid of a fellow-citizen. The one, accordingly, was as obstinate as the other was proud. And so it came about that between the two camps the slaughter of soldiers went on for some time, and at last the defenses were abandoned and some few reached the larger camps and the greater part, including Sergius himself, pushed on

to Rome. And there each party's case was discussed in the Senate and before the people on an appointed day and the guilty parties were only fined ten thousand heavy asses each.

Livy, bk. 5.

In the same way Marcus Postumius, tribune of the plebs with military power, was also fined ten thousand heavy asses for causing the loss of a battle at Veii. And the consul Caius Sempronius was fined fifteen thousand asses for his failure in the Volscian war. And the only case that I can find in which a capital charge was brought is that of the prætor, Cnæus Fulvius, for his loss of an army in Apulia—in which case he was loaded with all opprobrium and many declared on oath that the panic and flight began with the prætor himself and that the soldiers turned their backs only when deserted by him, for they could not think their general's fear to be ill-grounded. However, before the day of the assembly of the people arrived he went into exile to Tarquinii.

Livy, bk. 36.

But many years before that, Spurius Servilius, on giving up his consulship, was capitally accused, on an appointed day, by the tribune of the plebs, who alleged that when the Etruscans were fleeing to their camp he had followed them up more keenly than was wise and so had lost a picked body of men. The patricians, however, treated this as a most unworthy proceeding, insisting that it was intolerable that those who had indefatigably offered themselves to the enemy on behalf of the State should be accused of cowardice, when fortune frowned, by persons who had never taken their place in the battle line, and they so prevailed with the people that the votes of all were cast for an acquittal, thus proving that it was not for the good of the State that generals should be condemned for want of success.

Dion. Halic., Rom. antiq., bk. 9.

Nay, even in the case of the consul Caius Terentius Varro, whose rashness and neglect of the advice of his colleague Lucius Æmilius Paulus brought to the Romans the terrible defeat of Cannæ, and who had forthwith fled, leaving behind him his army and his colleague who had bravely died, no reproach was addressed to him for his mismanagement, but a crowd went out to meet him on his return even from so great a defeat and tendered him thanks for not despairing of the commonwealth—whereas if he had been a Carthaginian general no punishment would have been thought too great for him.

Livy, bk. 22.

[23] For the Carthaginians were so stern in the business of war that they crucified generals who had pursued unwise plans, even though they had been successful, imputing their successes to the help of the immortal gods and their errors to their own fault. And so that renowned Carthaginian general Mago, who was the first to found the empire of the Carthaginians upon an ordered military discipline, and who consolidated the strength of his State not less by his skill in war than by his valor, slew himself through fear of punishment for a failure against the

Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7.
Livy, bk. 38.

Justin, bk. 19.

Syracusans; and the Carthaginians, not satisfied with this, crucified the corpse of the dead man.

Plutarch, Life of
Timoleon.

Further, it should be stated that this wide and large power of dealing at discretion with the loftiest concerns which is granted to a general should be very much restricted in the case of a master of the horse or tribune or other subordinate commander (as we shall say in the proper place). And, indeed, however freely a general is allowed to administer everything at his own discretion, yet he will be liable if he acts fraudulently, for (as Scævola says) he is taken to have received plenary power, but only within the limits of *bona fide* conduct; and whenever a man receives a discretionary trust the test to which its exercise is referred is in all cases the standard of the ordinarily prudent man.

Below, On the office
of legate and tribune.

Dig. 17, 1, 60, 4.

Dig. 50, 17, 22, 1;
and 18, 1, 7; and 19,
2, 24; and 17, 2, 6.

CHAPTER III.

Here follow some propositions relating to war and cautions for commanders, affirmed by the examples of men of old.

There should be one head of an army, and not more; with full power; and permanently appointed; and not a man who has previously been reprimanded or disgraced.

1. A divided command in war is useless.
2. On what occasions the Romans used to appoint a dictator.
3. The power of a dictator.

4. A successor should not be sent to a general until the war is over.
5. Monarchy the best form of government.
6. Dangerous to intrust supreme command to one whom you have criticized.

[1] The four tribunes with military power who were appointed at Rome, three of whom set out for Veii after the levy was made, furnish proof (says Livy) that it is useless to split up the command in war among a number of persons; for each followed his own plans, one taking one line and another another line, and so they furnished the enemy with advantageous openings; and while their battle-line was in confusion and some were ordering the trumpets to sound the advance and others the retreat, the Veians attacked at the favorable moment and drove them to flight. And it was the same when Lucius Æmilius Paulus and Terentius Varro were opposed to Hannibal. And so also, not long ago, when the princes of Germany contended with Charles V, to their great loss. You can not properly split up the command among a number. Bk. 4.

[2] And so when some serious war or civil strife threw their State into disorder, the Greeks and Romans used to take refuge in the commandership of some one man—dictator or archon or harmost—as on some holy anchor. Hence when the Romans were overcome by the Veians, “the sorrowing State (says Livy), unaccustomed to defeat, resorted to the appointment of a dictator.” And elsewhere Livy says: “When the people at home raised a tumult and matters pointed to a very serious sedition, the fear-stricken Senate employed their two last resources, viz., sovereign power and the most distinguished citizen; and it was decided to appoint a dictator and Marcus Furius Camillus was nominated.” And so when Flaminius, with the greater part of his army, was killed at Thrasymenus and there was much alarm at Rome, the State (says Livy) fled to a remedy which had long been called for but not yet Bk. 22.

applied, namely the appointment of a dictator. And the same writer
 Bk. 16. tells us how the men of Præneste relied on a civil discord at Rome to lay waste the Roman territory with a hastily gathered force and to bring their standard right up to the Colline Gate; but the Romans turned from civil discord to war and made Titus Quintius Cincinnatus dictator. And when this was noised abroad, the enemy (such was their fear of this magistrate) withdrew at once from the walls and the younger Romans assembled on his command without demur.

Bk. 5. It is, accordingly, not rash to accept Livy's view, that the Gauls would not have captured the city of Rome if she, when driven to her last resources by her numerous troubles, had done as she would have done against her enemies of Fidenæ and Veii and other neighboring peoples and had appointed a dictator against this new and unheard-of foe, who was bringing up war from the ocean and the furthest shores of the earth.

[3] Now when a dictator had been duly appointed by law, he was vested with sovereign authority in matters of war and peace and punishment and reward without appeal, so that he might the better discharge the duties of sovereignty, in freedom from all hindrances. And so when
 Pomponius in Dig. 1, 2, 2, 18. the consuls Titus Quintius and Agrippa Furius were on an expedition against the Æquians and Volscians, as there were two consuls with equal power in the Roman army the supreme command was resigned by Agrippa into the hands of his colleague (a thing which, according to
 Bk. 3. Livy, is of very great service in the administration of great affairs). In the same way the distinguished Aristides, who was one of the Athenian generals at the battle of Marathon, as several generals had been appointed with equal power according to the Athenian custom, made over the sole command to his colleague Miltiades and induced his other colleagues to do the same. And it is clear that that proposal, removing, as it did, all rivalries, procured for the Athenians their most glorious victory over the Medes.

Plutarch, Aristides.

[4] Now we showed in the preceding chapter how important it is to allow a general free power of providing for the highest interests. Further, since it is undesirable to make a breach of continuity in matters which are best despatched under a uniform administration, a successor to a general should not be appointed save at the completion of a war; for what with the transfer of the generalship and the newness of the successor, who has to give himself up to the things that require learning before the things that require doing, opportunities of successful operations often fall through. That is why Fabius Maximus urged the people to use great care to appoint consuls who could show themselves Hannibal's equals. "For" (said he) "when we have chosen the best warrior and captain in the whole city, then presently, without any longer delay, being elect for one year, he shall be sent to match with an old captain that hath ever continued in the field, one that is not inclosed within com-

pass of time or the strait bounds of law or prevented from managing and ordering everything according as the occasions of war require; whereas by that time that we can make all ready to begin our affairs, the year is come about and clean gone."

Livy, bk. 24.

Accordingly when Livy is comparing the Roman generals with Alexander he makes them out to be more remarkable than Alexander or any other king because the dictatorship was held for periods of ten or twenty days only and no one held a consulship more than a year; the levies were delayed by the tribune of the people; they started for the war late and were recalled early because of the assembly (*comitia*); their year of office expired at the very crisis of the campaign; at one time a colleague's rashness and at another time his perversity hindered or hurt; after a miscarriage they succeeded to another's leavings; they were provided with a raw or an undisciplined army. While, by Hercules, says he, kings, in complete freedom from every kind of impediment, and masters also of circumstances and seasons, control all things in subserviency to their designs, and wait on no one. And over and above all these inconveniences, it was unreasonable, after one man had planted a tree, that another should gather the fruit of it, to borrow the words used by Quintus Fabius Maximus, when he was putting forward his claims to have Etruria assigned to him as an extraordinary province, on the strength of his having opened the Ciminian forest and made a way for the Roman arms, through passes until then impracticable.

Livy, bk. 10.

[5] Now by these proofs and illustrations much force is added to the opinion of those who have maintained that monarchy and royal power are the form of State most in harmony with universal nature, and the best. And so the Sibyl is said to have prophesied in her weirds that the well-being of the Roman State was in a monarchy and that its citizens could not otherwise find safety than by having a king. For (as Tiberius used to say) it can not be that a well-constituted State, which is but one body, should have several heads.

[6] Further, it will also be a most hazardous thing to put into the highest command a man whom you have had to criticize or visit with disgrace. Marcus Livius can be taken as an example of this. After his consulship he was condemned by the popular tribunal and, taking this disgrace to heart, he retired into the country, and then in the eighth year after his condemnation he was brought back into the city and made consul a second time. Now the story is preserved how Marcus Livius, being still embittered against the citizens, was cautioned by Quintus Fabius, when starting for the war against Hannibal, not rashly to join battle with any until he had found out of what kind they were, and he replied that he would fight with the first band of the enemy that he set eyes on; and when he was asked the reason for this hurry he said, "I

will either win distinction and glory from the enemy or from the conquered citizens, a pleasure which they owe me, however dishonorable.”
Livy, bk. 27.

In like manner, when Astyages, King of the Medes, hating Harpagus for preserving his grandson Cyrus, slew the son of Harpagus by way of revenge and sent him to the father to be eaten, Harpagus dissimulated for a time his grief and postponed his hate of the king until an opportunity for retribution came; and afterwards, when Cyrus was making war on Astyages, the latter intrusted the supreme command to Harpagus, who surrendered his army to Cyrus as soon as he had received it and took vengeance for the King's cruelty by a perfidious defection.
Justin, bk. 1.

CHAPTER IV.

Whether gentleness and kindness or sternness and cruelty are the more advantageous in a general.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No animal the management of which requires greater skill than man. 2. Scipio by humane conduct and Hannibal by cruelty obtained equal renown in military matters. 3. Manlius by severity and Valerius by kindness kept their soldiers in their duty. 4. Heed must be given that overmuch gentleness does not produce contempt or overmuch harshness hatred. 5. Kindness is required in a prince. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Love can not mingle with fear. 7. A general will find courtesy to his soldiers more profitable than roughness of manner. 8. Men desire to be treated with kindness and consideration. 9. The habit of obedience allows a milder method of command. 10. Kindness even to an enemy is of much avail. |
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[1] We have said elsewhere that not merely valor in fighting is looked for in a consummate and perfect general, but that there are also other excellent qualities, hand-maidens and attendants of this virtue. And inasmuch as there is no animal (as Seneca perceived) the management of which requires greater skill than man, the question is frequently raised whether harshness and severity are more requisite in a commander than humaneness and kindness.

[2] In this controversy countless illustrations can be given on either side. First of all, Hannibal and Scipio present themselves, consummate generals who, with very unlike geniuses and even more unlike methods and principles, won equal glory in military matters. For when the latter was sent into Spain he not only conquered the affections of his soldiers by his inborn humaneness and kindliness, but he also, by the reputation for clemency which he had acquired, reduced the whole of Spain under the Roman sway. The former, on the other hand, laid waste Italy with great violence and cruelty and plundering, and all the peoples of Italy and almost all the towns defected to him, so that while Spain was reduced by the humaneness of Scipio, Italy was reduced by the fear which Hannibal inspired.

[3] We have a similar example in Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, who lived at Rome with equal virtues and glory, yet with dissimilar dispositions and methods; for Manlius was naturally fierce and exceedingly severe in military discipline, but Valerius won the soldiers by all manner of humaneness and kindliness. This contrast was so marked that the former, with a view to keeping his soldiers in their duty, had his son flogged and beheaded when bringing precious spoils as victor

because he had engaged with the enemy without orders, while the latter found fault with no one: yet with all this difference in their modes of procedure they reaped no dissimilar results and glory. For no disaffection ever broke out among the soldiers of either general, nor did any shirk battle or disobey a command, and each of them accomplished great things. Thus Manlius with his sternness and peremptory edicts established military discipline in a wonderful manner; but Valerius, while paying just as much attention to military discipline, molded the minds of his men into obedient habits by his inborn humaneness and gentleness, and if he chanced to punish any contemners of law and discipline they put this down to the provisions of law and not to the general's severity; for he would not proceed against them in virtue of his sovereign authority (*imperium*) in cases where he could invoke legal process. These examples leave the question before us still an open one.

[4] Further, whichever course we adopt, great judgment and caution must be applied, on the one hand to prevent excessive leniency from producing contempt, as happened to Scipio, among whose soldiers a very serious disaffection broke out in Spain—and on the other hand to prevent excessive severity from producing hate, as happened to Hannibal, who by his cruelty and greed in laying waste the regions which he could not defend, so as to leave them bare for his enemy, alienated the minds of all, not only of those who suffered these indignities but of others also. Nay (as Livy says) the example affected a larger number than the misfortune.

[5] Now writers on the theory of kingship put Valerius and Scipio forward as better examples to copy, and demand in a king humaneness and kindliness and such like virtues—as in Xenophon's book about Cyrus.

[6] Fear (as Cicero says) is a bad guardian as regards duration, while, on the other hand, kindliness is a faithful one forever. And Prætextatus says, in Macrobius, "He who is revered is also loved: love can not be joined with fear. What do you think to be the origin of that most arrogant proverb which boasts, We have the same number of enemies as of slaves? We 'have' not the latter as enemies, but we make them so when we behave to them in a haughty, contemptuous, and cruel manner." Accordingly Ennius' lines are excellent:

Quem metuunt, oderunt;
Quem quisque odit, perisse expetit.

Whom they fear they hate; whom a man hates, he seeks to destroy.

[7] And, that no resources can withstand the hate of a number of people, Cicero shows by the death of Caius Cæsar. And this opinion concerning the death of the "Imperator" (Commander) is confirmed by the example of the consuls Appius Claudius and Titus Quintius. For when Appius was sent against the Volscians, he so harassed the army by

his harsh methods of command, and his roughness so caused the soldiers to become slack and slow and negligent and contumacious, and the minds of all were so embittered with hatred of the consul, that neither shame nor fear would move them, and it got to such a pitch that when the Roman army was drawn out in battle-array, it not only did not desire to win, but desired to be beaten, and made for the camp in disgraceful flight. But when Quintius, who was of a milder disposition, was sent against the Volscians, he won the affections of the soldiers by his courtesy and kindness and gave them all the booty with commendations thrown in (which are not less gratifying to soldiers' minds than rewards are), and after notable achievements he returned to the city.

Livy, bk 2.
Dion. Halic., bk. 9.

So when the consul Cæso Fabius was sent against the men of Veii, besides manifesting many other virtues of a good commander in the preparation and conduct of the war, he so marshalled his line of battle that, by despatching his cavalry merely, he defeated the enemy's army; but the infantry, because they so hated the consul for his roughness of manner, would not follow up the defeated enemy and retreated with their standards without orders. Yet (says Livy) "the general wist not what way to remedy this so pestilent an example: so much have men, of excellent wits, been more wanting in skill to govern their fellow-citizens than to vanquish an enemy."

Bk. 2.

In the same way the dictator Lucius Papyrius was neither popular with his soldiers nor terrible to his enemies—Agesilaus, however, thinks this the greatest praise that can be given to a general—because of the savagery with which he persisted in demanding the punishment of Marcus Fabius, his master of the horse, who had engaged with the enemy without his orders, albeit with success. And so, when the enemy approached the camp of Papyrius, such (says Livy) was the importance of that single man Papyrius that, if the zeal of the soldiery had seconded the plans of the general, it is reported as a thing beyond doubt that he could have completely crushed the Samnites on that day—he had drawn up his line of battle with such regard to ground and supports and had so strengthened it by every military device. But the soldiery made no exertions, and this of set purpose in order to injure the reputation of the general, and victory was prevented. The experienced general, however, perceived wherein lay the obstacle to his victory, i. e., that his temper must be curbed and austerity blended with courtesy; and so, with the utmost dexterity, by taking especial care of the wounded, he met with such success that through his attention to the healing of the soldiers' bodies he even earlier regained their affections; and, having re-created his army, he attacked the enemy, with complete assurance, both on his part and on that of his men, and defeated the Samnites and put them to flight.

Bk. 8.

[8] Gravity must, therefore, be seasoned with affability. For, as Xenophon wisely writes, while other animals are brought into condition

by three methods conspicuously—by food when they are too low-spirited, by a lowering diet when they are over-lusty, and by the whip when they are obstinate—man, the most high-spirited animal of all, refuses to be coerced either by threats or by punishment, but he loves to be treated with kindness and good-will; for, while the brute creation allows itself to be dragged by violence, man will not be led except by reason.

[9] Nevertheless it must be remarked that the clemency of kings and of generals (as Alexander the Great used to say) is founded not only upon their own character, but upon the character of those who obey, for the habit of obedience allows a milder method of command. But where character has no reverence and we make no distinction between the highest and the lowest, there must needs be force in order to repel

Quint. Curt., bk. 8. force.

[10] And, further, kindness and humaneness are not only of advantage in dealing with soldiers and citizens, but also they have more than once been of greater avail in dealing with enemies than the unconquered Roman arms, as we have already shown by the case of Scipio. The case of Camillus, when he was besieging the Falisci, also illustrates the same truth; for it seemed that this was going to be an unending toil, had he not lured them to make surrender by his considerate act in handing to them the betrayer of their king's sons. The generosity of Fabricius, too, in informing Pyrrhus of the doctor's plot against his life, broke down and conquered the King's heart. And so humaneness (as Valerius Maximus says) conquers anger, lays hatred low, and mingles the enemy's tears with his blood.

Livy, bk. 5.

Val. Max., bk. 5,
cb. 4.

CHAPTER V.

Times and seasons to be taken into account, above all in war.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The proper conduct in war is one thing, in peace another. 2. In peace custom must be followed, in war expediency. 3. The opinion of Fabius Maximus about the deserter Altinius. 4. Marcellus preferred to conciliate Lucius Brantius by kindness rather than check him by punishment. 5. Scipio Nasica overthrew Gracchus by summoning the good citizens on his own initiative. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Octavius Cæsar waged war on Antony of his own motion. 7. Civil laws are silent in time of war. 8. Necessity makes the unlawful lawful. 9. That is not reckoned a breach of law which is done under pressure of necessity. 10. On fit occasions the principle of a war must be altered. 11. Fabius a slow-mover (<i>cunctator</i>) by nature, not by design. |
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[1] Writers on obligations have laid down that in all actions very great heed is to be paid to times and seasons, especially in cases where chance is the dominating factor. And so, as Quintus Fabius Maximus used to tell his son, the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus, judgment and conduct are to be framed one way in the full heat of war and another way in the tranquillity of peace; for in peace those steps may, without hindrance, be taken which equity and justice indicate and we may take our stand upon the law; but in times of war and tumult remedies of this ordinary kind are frequently found to be irritants, and stimulants of war and strife, rather than sedatives. Hence it is often the case that, with the exception of what has been enacted to hold good in perpetuity as being permanently expedient, war abrogates the legislation of peace and vice versa, just as in navigation (as Livy says) one set of measures is employed in good weather and another in bad weather. Cod. 6, 51, pr.

[2] And so (says Cicero) our forefathers always submitted to the guidance of custom in peace and of expediency in war and always, as new emergencies arose, adapted new plans and principles to them; and in another passage he says, "In such a clash of disturbed affairs we can not but do what the times require rather than what is customary." Pro lege Manil. Philipp. 11.

[3] And this was the principle on which Quintus Fabius Maximus, the father, acted in the case of Classius Altinius of Arpi, who had come to the Roman camp secretly by night and promised that for a reward he would betray Arpi. Quintus Fabius Maximus would not allow him to be flogged and executed, as others thought he should be, for that after the defeat at Cannæ, instead of keeping faith through all changes of fortune, he had defected to Hannibal and carried Arpi with him in his defection and then when, contrary to his hope and wish, the fortunes of Rome (so

to say) rose again, he plans a new betrayal. Fabius, instead, determined that he ought to be set for an example to any such as himself who might be coming to their senses and bethinking themselves of their former friends, for if it were allowable to quit the Roman side, but not allowable to return to it, who could doubt that in a short space Rome would be found deserted by her allies and the whole of Italy bound by treaties with the Carthaginians? Still he did not think it right that any trust should be placed in Altinius, but, adopting a middle plan, that he should be treated as neither enemy nor friend.

Livy, bk. 24.

[4] It was so also at the time when Nola was in an exceedingly critical condition, Marcellus holding it not so much by means of his garrison as by the good-will of its nobles, and the commonalty verging on a revolt, which was a cause of much apprehension. The ringleader was Lucius Brantius, a young man of energy, whom the general agreement about the expected revolt and fear of the Roman prætor was prompting at one time to a betrayal of his country and at another to desertion. Marcellus perceived that he must either be restrained by punishment or won over by kindness and he thought it better to attach to himself than to drive over to the enemy so brave and active an ally. Accordingly he had him brought, and so worked on the mind of the wild young man by his courtesy and by rewards into the bargain that thenceforward none of the allies served the Roman State with greater bravery and fidelity. But as regards the other inhabitants of Nola who were accused of treason Marcellus, after defeating Hannibal, shut the gates and had a criminal

Livy, bk. 23. inquiry held over them.

[5] And the story told of Scipio Nasica tends in the same direction. It was at the time when Tiberius Gracchus, in his tribuneship, was behaving himself very oppressively towards the State by aid of profuse bribery, whereby he had ingratiated himself with the populace and was openly repeating that the Senate ought to be suppressed and the whole conduct of affairs left to the people. And, though there was a general agreement that the consul ought to use force to preserve the State, yet Mucius Scævola declared that he could effect nothing by force. Then said Scipio Nasica, "Since the consul in his regard for strict legality is letting the Roman State with all its laws be ruined, I, private citizen tho' I be, place myself at your disposal as your leader"; and raising his right hand he called out, "Let those who desire the safety of the State follow me." And at this word the better citizens shook off all diffidence and forced Gracchus and his accursed faction to suffer the punishment they deserved.

Val. Max., bk. 3.
ch. 2. Appian,
Civil war, bk. 1.

[6] Hence, too, Cicero praises Octavius Cæsar for taking the field against Antony of his own motion, without waiting for a decree of the Senate; for, as he said, the season for issuing decrees was not yet, and he saw that if he let the occasion slip by without warlike measures the State would be destroyed and the issue of decrees entirely prevented.

Philipp. 8.

[7] Sometimes, then, civil laws are silent in times of war and themselves disallow that regard should be paid to them, since he who would look to them may have to suffer injustice before claiming justice. And the story told of Caius Marius tends in the same direction. He had given Roman citizenship, in breach of treaty, to two cohorts of Camerians, for their admirable valor in keeping their line intact against the forces of the Cimbri, and he excused his conduct by saying that in the din of arms the words of the civil law can not make themselves heard; for the crisis was one when measures of defense were more proper than hearkening to the law.

Cicero, pro Milone.

Val. Max., bk. 5, ch. 2.

[8] And beyond doubt necessity often makes that lawful which otherwise would have been unlawful. And so when the strength of Rome had been shattered by the defeat at Cannæ, the condition of things was so critical that, at the bidding of the dictator Marcus Junius, the spoils of enemies which were fastened to the temples and consecrated to the divine will were plucked away in order to serve as instruments of war; and mere lads (*prætextati*) put on armor; and several thousands of assigned debtors (*addicti*) and men condemned on a capital charge and slaves were enrolled, for in those days they scorned to have the lowest class of citizens (*capite censi*) for soldiers. Now (as Valerius Maximus says) this, regarded in itself, is somewhat shameful, but if the stress of necessity is taken into account in estimating it, it will be seen to be a remedy suitable to the harshness of the occasion. For, as the same writer says, one must yield to fortune in cases where, if counsels which make for the greater safety are not chosen, utter ruin awaits the man who follows appearances.

c. 26, Dist. 5, de consecr., and c. 3, X, 5, 18.

Livy, bk. 23.

Bk. 7, ch. 6.

So, also, when the consuls Caius Marius and Cnæus Carbo were at variance in the civil war with Sylla—a time when it was not so much victory being sought for the State as the State being the reward of victory—by virtue of a decree of the Senate the gold and silver ornaments of the temples which Numa Pompilius had dedicated to the solemn rites of the gods were melted down in order to prevent a failure of the soldiers' pay—so great was the regard paid to public honor even in this time of supreme distress. But it was not, as Valerius Maximus says, the free-will of the Senate, but thy fell hand, O most loathsome Necessity, that put the pen to that decree.

Bk. 7, ch. 6.

[9] Nor, again, is that reckoned a breach of law which is done under the stress of necessity and at the instance of public expediency. For by a law paramount, sanctioned by Jupiter, as Cicero says, every thing that makes for the well-being of the State is just and lawful. And so, when there was urgent need that the cash in the treasury should be taken out for State use and the quæstors dared not open the treasury because they thought the law forbade, Scipio Africanus straightway demanded the keys and opened the treasury, making the law give way to

Philipp. 8.

Val. Max., bk. 3, expediency. And the Lacedæmonians, when driven to postpone the law
 Appian, Punic war. ch. 7. to necessity, are reported to have said, "To-day let the laws go to sleep."

Hence, according to some, if a sudden and unforeseen war is apprehended or some other extreme need arises, the Church is bound to make contribution.

Abb. Panormit. on c.
 29 (?), X, 2, 24.

[10] Again, in what concerns the administration of a war, a general or commander of an army must, more than most, accommodate himself to times and seasons; and, if the occasion arises, the plan of a war must be altered. And at one time proper conduct calls for a certain impetuosity and ardor of soul and fierce seizure of the advantages of an opportunity, and at another time for slow-going and cautious sitting still. And as this is a difficult matter and contrary to nature, in that (as Livy says) the gods have not given everything to any one man, we must put great care and diligence into the effort to adapt our disposition to the shape of the times; and we ought not always to protract a war, after the fashion of Fabius, nor join battle lightly in our passion for fighting, after the fashion of Marcellus and Scipio and others.

[11] For Fabius, being a slow-mover by nature and not by design, earned his great renown in military matters by favour of the special occasion; for, it being impossible to defeat Hannibal in battle, inasmuch as he was of warlike disposition and rendered fierce by several victories, and as the Roman strength was worn down, Fabius broke the impetuosity of his enemy by sitting still. Yet the same man, following nature and not adapting himself to the occasion, persisted in the same attitude even after the Romans had renewed their strength, and he resisted Scipio's request to have Africa decreed to him as a province, although this was the only way to draw Hannibal out of Italy, as the event showed.

If, however, Scipio had been sent against Hannibal at the time when Fabius was sent, in all probability he would have brought the Roman fortunes even lower by his excessive lust of battle, after the fashion of Flaminius and the other predecessors of Fabius. So difficult it is to alter character and nature. And on this ground a free republic is ordinarily preferred to a monarchy in that you may find there the greatest variety of character to suit varying times.

Above, ch. 3. In another place of our journey we have shown how useless a divided command is in war.

CHAPTER VI.

Factions and prolonged deliberations on matters of war are very harmful, especially when what is wanted is action rather than counsel.

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| 1. Very advantageous in deliberations that all should be of one mind. | 3. In adverse fortune the most daring plans are the safest. |
| 2. Slow and prolonged deliberations hurtful. | 4. The noble deed of Scipio. |
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[1] As in all deliberations and consultations, so especially in those relating to war, it is very advantageous that all should be of one way of thinking and not spoil good counsels by factiousness and obstinacy (which not infrequently create an extremely critical state of affairs).

And this was made clear to the citizens of Syracuse by one of the chieftains, Apollonides, after the death of Hieronymos, the Syracusan tyrant, when a very serious difference had arisen among the Syracusans, some of whom were for seeking the friendship of the Carthaginians and others of them that of the Romans, and there was a disturbance so great as to be not far short of sedition. Apollonides addressed the men of Syracuse in a speech of much ability and, having regard to the circumstances, of considerable polish, as follows:

"Never was there a city nearer either to hope of assured safety or to fear of utter destruction than this of ours at this present; for, if all would go one way together, and with one accord either incline to the Romans or to the Carthaginians, there were not a city under the cope of heaven whose state were more happy and fortunate than ours. But in case we be distracted and the common weal go divers ways, there would not be more bitter war between the Carthaginians and the Romans than between the Syracusans themselves, when within the same walls there should be banding one against another and each side have their forces, their armor, and captains of their own. And therefore we ought to endeavor our utmost that all may be of one mind. As for the question, which alliance be the more expedient, that is a matter of far too little importance to be consulted long upon."

Livy, bk. 24.

[2] Further, just as these contentious deliberations are very hurtful, so, as a rule, are slow and prolonged ones, especially in war, where we read more than once that counsel, which otherwise and in itself is a safe and beneficial thing, has proved rash and disastrous by reason of the delay. And the men of Lavinium furnished a proof of the truth of

this. After wasting a deal of time in deliberation, they only began to send help after the Latins had been defeated, and, just as their foremost ensigns and van were issuing from the gates, up comes a messenger with the news of the defeat of the Latins. Thereupon they faced about and went back into their city: and it is said that their prætor, Milonius, remarked: "There will be a big fare to pay to the Romans for a very short journey." Now the Lavinians might either, by keeping quiet, have retained the friendship of the Romans or, by sending help to the Latins betimes, have rendered their joint forces superior to the Romans.

Livy, bk. 8.

And a further illustration is afforded by what the Latin prætor Annius said, at a time when the Latins were considering about a defection from the Romans and the Romans had in consequence summoned ten of their leading men to Rome and a discussion was taking place about the proper answer to be given in the matters which they believed would be put before them at Rome. "Although I myself," said he, "have moved you to resolve upon an answer, yet I think it concerneth us more in our main estate to determine what to do than what to say. And when we have resolved what course to take, an easy matter will it be to frame words fit for the purpose."

Livy, bk. 8.

[3] There is, therefore, no room for delay (as Tacitus says) in a plan which can only be justified by success; and (as Livy says) in difficult and critical situations the boldest counsels are the safest, seeing that the least hesitation in seizing on the opportune moment, as it flies by, means that you will seek for it in vain thereafter. Caius Cæsar, accordingly, used to say that daring and doughty exploits were meant to be performed and not to be deliberated on.

[4] And in this connection we have the notable deed of Publius Cornelius Scipio. It was after the defeat of Cannæ, and those who had fled to Canusium had offered the supreme command to the military tribunes Appius Claudius Pulcher and Publius Cornelius Scipio. And as they sat with some few others in counsel together about the management of their main affairs, Publius Philus, whose father had been a consul, gave them to understand that all their consultations were in vain, that they did but cherish a foolish hope, and that the condition of the State was desperate; also that certain young noblemen, of whom Lucius Cæcilius Metellus was the principal, minded nothing else but to take to the sea and forsake Italy and fly for succor to some king or other. This evil tidings put them all in a state of consternation and they that were there present laid their heads together and thought good to call others to counsel on the point; and then Scipio, a young man predestined to be the fatal captain of this war, said, "It is no time now to sit consulting, but to proceed to action and to do some exploit. As many therefore as are ready to save the commonweal, take arms and go with me forthwith, for nowhere are our enemies, to say the truth, encamped against us more

than where such designs are being deliberated on." Forth he went with a few following after him to the lodging of Metellus; and, finding there the young men aforesaid, close together in counsel thereabout, he drew his sword and brandished it naked above their heads as they sat in consultation. "I swear before you all," quoth he, "and from my very heart, that I will neither forsake the commonweal nor suffer any citizen else of Rome to abandon her. And if I fail in my word, witting and willing, then confound me, O Jupiter most good, most great, and bring a shameful end upon my house, my family, and all that I have. Swear thou, Lucius Cæcilius, after me as I have done, I advise thee, and ye all that are here present take the same oath; for whosoever shall refuse, know he assuredly that upon him I have drawn this sword." Hereat, they being no less terrified than if they had seen the conqueror himself, Hannibal, took the oath every one and yielded themselves unto Scipio to be kept in ward to serve against Hannibal. Beyond doubt, this deed brought Scipio greater glory than all the triumphs which he subsequently won. Livy, bk. 22.

And thus slow-moving (as Tacitus says) is not wanted when it is more harmful to lie quiet than to be daring, and this is preëminently the case in civil discords and rebellions, where nothing conduces to safety more than swift action, and there is more need of acts than of counsels, seeing that (as Cicero said when urging the prompt adoption of warlike measures against Antony) every evil can easily be checked in its inception, while it generally gets stronger as it gets older. Philipp. 5.

Accordingly, when the Gauls were planning active hostility once more, Cæsar, by dint of forced marches, made sudden onslaughts on the conspirators in all quarters, and allowed no city any leisure to think more about the safety of any other city than about its own, and by this rapidity he kept in their allegiance those who were faithful and frightened those who were hesitating whether to accept his terms of peace, and put down the attempts of the Gauls with complete ease.

And so, as the proverb goes, we ought to get to know the times, so as to avoid what usually happens in ill-starred schemes, namely, that the best course proves to be one which it is now too late to take and the fit time for action is allowed to go by in futile delays. Caesar, Gallic war, bk. 8.

CHAPTER VII.

So long as their strength remains unbroken, the king and State should not admit the slightest derogation from their sovereignty; and those err who think that the pride of an enemy can be tamed by moderation and patience.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If once the sovereignty of kings begins to totter, it is easily overthrown. 2. Concessions ought not to be lightly made to an enemy. 3. It is better to surrender a kingdom after defeat in war than without a struggle. 4. Patience and moderation only make an enemy fiercer. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Evils should be faced in due time. 6. The fable of the dog. 7. There should be no giving in to the evil designs of an enemy through fear of war. 8. The fable of the wolf, the shepherds and the dogs. |
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[1] There is nothing more entirely true than what Scipio Africanus said to Antiochus when warning him not to reject the terms of peace which he was offering, i. e., that royal majesty is with greater difficulty drawn down from the summits to a middle position than it is
 Livy, bk. 37. hurled from a middle position to the depths.

[2] And so, as long as their strength is still unbroken, kings and States should be very chary of allowing any encroachment on their sovereignty, for their main affairs would at the same time be thereby endangered, those to whom the concession has been made being emboldened to ask for more, their own men being rendered less ready to defend them, and they themselves falling into general contempt.

[3] It is, accordingly, more conducive to their good fortune and more consistent with the dignity which is a brave man's due to endure all the chances of war, so long as there is any hope left in arms, rather than by concessions here and concessions there to lose everything without a struggle. It is better to suffer defeat in the main object of the war, after resort, though in vain, to every kind of effort, than to make a concession through fear of war.

[4] For, as Livy says, the aim of war and peace is to produce a general agreement. And there is no baser act than to surrender a kingdom without fighting, nor more glorious act than to hazard everything in defense of dignity and sovereignty—and all the more so because it is a provision of nature that we generally only make people fiercer against us when we think to overcome their arrogance with patience and lowliness.

This is well shown by the following case of the Latins. They and the Campanians were making war on the Samnites; and envoys, sent by the Samnites to Rome, complained in the Senate that they, though now confederate with Rome, were subject to the same hardships as they had suffered when enemies; and they solicited, with the humblest entreaties, that they would by their sovereign authority keep the Latins and Campanians out of the Samnite territory, if these people really were under Roman dominion, but, if otherwise, that they might employ force to restrain them. To this an equivocal answer was given, because it was mortifying for the Romans to acknowledge that the Latins were not now in their power and they were afraid that, by finding fault, they might alienate them from their side. The case of the Campanians, they said, was different, they having come under Roman protection by surrender and not by treaty; so the Campanians, whether they wished it or not, should remain quiet. But there was nothing in the treaty with the Latins to restrain them from going to war with whomsoever they pleased.

This answer (says Livy) sent the Samnites away uncertain as to ^{Bk. 8.} the conduct which they were to think the Romans would pursue and it also further estranged the Campanians through fear, while it rendered the Latins more presumptuous, they thinking that there was nothing which the Romans would now refuse them. Accordingly, their leading men summoned frequent meetings under the pretext of preparing for war against the Samnites, but in all their deliberations among themselves they fomented a plan for war with Rome. And hereupon their prætor Annius inflamed them with the following harangue:

“ If ye ever wished to see the day wherein ye might participate in government and recover your liberties again, lo that time is now come, presented unto you by your own valor and the gracious goodness of the immortal gods. Tried their patience ye have in denying soldiers! Who doubteth but that they were in a great choler when we brake a custom of more than two hundred years’ prescription? Yet, nevertheless, this grief have they put by. We warred upon the Pelignians in our own name and quarrel, and they who aforetime allowed not us the liberty so much as to defend our own marches of ourselves, nothing gainsaid. That the Sidicines were taken to our mercy and protection, that the Campanians revolted from them and sided with us, that we levied an army against the Samnites their confederates, they heard and knew well enough; and yet they stirred not forth once from their city. How come they to be so calm and quiet, but upon a knowledge of our puissance and their own weakness? ”

And in this way the Romans entered on a war of uncertain result with the Latins, a war all the more grievous to them because due to the excessive patience which they had used in the hope of avoiding it;

whereas, if they had withstood the earliest attempts of the Latins, they would have had little trouble in keeping them in their duty. The Roman forbearance did not avoid the war but only put it off, to the great advantage of the Latins, to a time when the enemy's preparations for war were more complete.

[5] Plans for the future should, then, be thought out beforehand and the best line of conduct be determined on in advance, for any contingency that may arise of either kind; and this ought to be faced before it happens, instead of waiting until you are overwhelmed and the ill grows day by day and gets past cure. This is also a maxim of doctors in the treatment of disease. And so Regulus, when in Gaul, addressing Commanus, King of the Segoregii, insisted that Marseilles (which Senanus, the predecessor of Commanus, had allowed the Greeks to found) would soon or late cause the ruin of the neighboring peoples, and he urged that it ought, then, to be checked in its beginning, lest when it had increased in strength it should overthrow him himself.

[6] And he added this fable: "A pregnant bitch once begged a temporary lodging from a shepherd in which to bring forth her young; and then, after having obtained this, made a second request for permission to bring up her puppies there; and in the end, being installed as guardian of the house, she claimed the ownership of the place." Just in that way, said he, the men of Marseilles, now wearing the guise of tenants, will in time become proprietors of those parts.

Justin, bk. 43.

If, then, war is apprehended, it is better to attack the enemy before he is ready than, merely in order to avoid a war at the present time, to lay up for oneself a much bitterer war for some future date.

[7] For there should never be any giving in to the evil designs of an enemy through fear of war; so to do is not so much a method of avoiding war as of putting it off to a much more inconvenient season, and you may be sure that often by a posture of war you will be more likely to have peace than by putting your arms on one side and making concessions to the arrogant demands of the enemy, an attitude which rather stimulates and feeds the ferocity of the enemy than appeases it.

Philipp. 7.

And this was what prompted Cicero's speech, in which he urged the Senate not to make peace with Antony: "By the immortal gods, O conscript fathers, do not, in your hope for a present peace, lose a permanent one." The Romans, accordingly, acted wisely, when Philip and Antiochus were concocting a war, in being the first to take warlike action, and they preferred to shift the war into Greece rather than wait for it in Italy. This is what Vegetius meant when he said, "Let him who wants peace prepare war," and what Manlius Capitolinus used to say, "Just show war and you will get peace: let them see you prepared for blows and they will admit your claim."

For (as Cicero said) salutary severity outdoes a futile show of clemency. If, however, we persist in being clement we shall never lack civil wars. And, as the same writer says in another place, when dealing with civil war: Peace ought not to be granted to an enemy save when he sues for it with arms laid down, but if he sues for it while still fighting he must get his peace by a victory and not by a bargain. This, too, is the drift of Mimus' remark: "It is humane to pardon when the man pardoned is ashamed, but in other cases, by putting up with an old wrong you invite a new one." Epist., bk. 10.

And here we have, I think, the explanation of the fable which was propounded by Demosthenes. It was at a time when Alexander the Great, under the cloak of liberty, had invaded a great part of Greece and was besieging Athens, making out that his conduct was not meant to deprive them of liberty or reduce the city to slavery, but was due to the incessant revilings with which he was assailed by ten insensate citizens of theirs; and declaring that directly these few were surrendered to him he would quit the siege and release the people from war and hunger; but before all he demanded the surrender of Demosthenes and nine other highly distinguished citizens. And the Senate was hesitating and many were calling out that the interests of the many should be considered before those of the few, and those few who were demanded for punishment were in considerable fear and hardly dared to speak because all the others were hoping to gain peace and liberty through their destruction.

[8] And their surrender would have been decided on, had not Demosthenes disclosed the King's crafty snares in the following fable: "Once on a time," said he, "a wolf persuaded some shepherds whose diligence he wanted to elude, to form a friendship with him on terms that his enemies the dogs, who were the cause of their hostility to one another, should be handed over as hostages. The shepherds hearken to him, and the dogs, in conformity with the terms of peace, are handed over, though they had been the most diligent guardians of the sheep. And then the wolf, putting fear aside, tears and devours the whole flock till his lust is satiate and mangles the shepherds, too. This," said Demosthenes, "O men of Athens, is what Alexander is now doing, demanding, as he does, the surrender of all those whose speeches are aimed against his schemes and who lay open his snares, so that when the city is deprived of its guardians he may the more easily attack and plunder it." Plutarch, Life of Demosth.

CHAPTER VIII.

Whether it is better to await war at home or to carry it into the enemy's territory.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Scipio's opinion. 2. The opinion of Quintus Fabius Maximus. 3. The Athenians more successful in war at home than abroad. 4. The fable about Antæus. 5. A courageous aspect a great advantage to the fatherland. 6. Although Agathocles could not withstand a siege at home, he nevertheless carried the war into Africa. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. The plan of Hannibal. 8. The opinion of Agis. 9. The advice given to the Romans by Hiero, King of Syracuse. 10. War abroad to be conducted in one way, war at home in another. 11. The soldiery better at a distance from their homes. 12. The useful example of Fabius. |
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This question has been very variously discussed by generals of the highest renown, and many arguments and examples have been cited on either side, so that it is not easy to say which opinion ought to be followed.

[1] And there was once a keen contention on this matter between Quintus Fabius Maximus and Publius Scipio; the latter sought the allotment of Africa to himself as a province, asserting that the war with Hannibal would not be brought to an end save by carrying an army over into Africa and thereby diverting the war from Italy; and he pointed out the effect of striking fear, of one's own initiative, into the enemy and of putting another into peril and removing danger from oneself; and he used for this the example of Hannibal himself. He pointed out, too, the great difference between seeing the territory of another ravaged and of seeing your own overrun by fire and sword, and how much more courage a man has who is causing danger than one who is warding it off. And (he continued) it would be consistent with the dignity of the Roman people, and the high reputation they enjoy with foreign kings and peoples, to appear to have had spirit not only to defend Italy, but also to carry hostilities into Africa. Let the Roman camp (said he) dominate the gates of Carthage rather than that we Romans should again behold the rampart of the enemy from our walls; let Africa be the seat of the rest of the war; let terror and flight and the laying-waste of lands and the defection of allies and the other disasters of war be diverted thither.

[2] Fabius, however, maintained the contrary, holding that Hannibal ought first to be driven out of Italy in a straightforward way rather than be drawn into Africa by roundabout methods. This, said he, is

naturally the first object, to defend your own possessions, and after that you can proceed to attack those of others. Let the object be peace in Italy, not war in Africa; let us be free from fear ourselves before we bring it upon others, and that, too, in a quarter where there are no harbors open to the Roman fleets, no allied city, no friendly king, no room anywhere either to take up a position or to advance, but whichever way one turns one's eyes, all is hostility and danger. The Carthaginians will defend the walls of their capital, the temples of their gods, their altars and their hearths in other sort than they defended Spain. Where Hannibal is, there is the head and bulwark of the war, and if he be drawn over into Africa, he will only be rendered more powerful in arms and men by the nearness of Carthage and the friendliness of all Africa.

Livy, bk. 23.

[3] Now on Fabius' side there is, too, the example of the Athenians; for so long as they carried on war at home they always came off conquerors, but when they despatched a great fleet into Sicily they plunged their flourishing State into lasting ruin, as the result of one naval battle.

[4] And what is told of Antæus, King of Lybia, also makes for Fabius' view, for he was invincible to the Egyptian Hercules so long as he waged war in his own dominions, but when Hercules had craftily lured him outside he was struck down and lost both life and kingdom. And this gave rise to the story that Antæus, being the son of the Earth by Neptune and second to none in strength and bravery, as often as his limbs were weary received fresh strength at the touch of his mother Earth, and so Hercules, when fighting with him, grasped him by the middle and lifted him up from the earth, not being able in any other way to master him, and forced him to yield up his life thus clasped to his bosom.

Lucan, Civil war, bk. 4.

Thomyris, too, queen of the Scythians, no whit frightened by the approach of Cyrus, preferred to conceal his approach rather than go to meet him, thinking that the issue of the fight would be more favorable to herself if it took place within the boundaries of her realm; and there, after luring Cyrus into a narrow defile, she ambushed and slew him with two hundred thousand Persians.

Justin, bk. 1.

So, too, when the Lacedæmonians once were waging other wars against some neighboring peoples, the Thebans, under the leadership of Epaminondas, conceived the hope of seizing their city and silently set off for Lacedæmon; but no more than a hundred Spartans, worn out with age, who had remained at home, offered battle to the fifteen thousand Theban soldiers.

[5] Such courage and strength does the sight of one's fatherland and household gods afford, and so much more do things that are present (says Justin) draw out the finer qualities of men than things that are a mere remembrance; for the Spartans had before their very eyes the

Bk. 6.

interests and persons that were at stake and this gave them resolution either to conquer or to die.

This, too, was the meaning of the advice which Titus Quinctius Flaminius gave the Greeks when they were compassing a war on Zacynthos: "Not like a tortoise (which is safe against all blows so long as it stays in its shell, but if it protrudes any part is open to attack and defenseless in the exposed member) to expose themselves to danger by sticking their heads out of the Peloponnese."

Livy, bk. 36.
Plut., Apoph.

On Scipio's side in the argument, however, is the result of that very war, in which he overcame Hannibal (who had carried on the war in Italy for thirteen years scatheless); for he first lured him into Africa, and then gained a glorious victory over him.

[6] In the same way, when the Carthaginians had drawn the line of siege round Syracuse and the tyrant Agathocles saw that he was not of sufficient strength or well enough equipped to sustain a siege, he straightway, with admirable boldness (it being as if one who could not defend his own things were to attack another's), carried the war into Africa and pitched his camp at the fifth stone from Carthage; and, after overcoming Hanno, the Carthaginian general, and ravaging Africa, he seduced numerous splendid towns, which weighed the obligations of friendship by reference not to good faith but to success, to defect from the Carthaginians to himself.

Justin, bk. 22.

[7] Another thing on Scipio's side is the plan which Hannibal proposed to Antiochus after he himself had spent thirteen years in Italy carrying on war with the greatest glory. Antiochus was turning over the question of a war with Rome, and Hannibal suggested that he should make Italy his field of operations, seeing that Italy would supply both soldiers and provisions to an outside enemy and that in Italy the Romans could be beaten by their own resources and strength and arms, while if no action took place in Italy the Roman people would be able to carry on war outside Italy with all the strength and supplies of Italy and no king

Livy, bk. 34. or people would be the equal of the Romans.

[8] This, too, was the view taken by Agis, King of the Lacedæmonians, who urged that the war against the Ætolians should be carried into their own territory and that they should not be permitted to enter the barriers of the Peloponnese.

Plutarch,
Life of Agis.

[9] And after the slaughter of Caius Flaminius and the Roman army at Thrasymenus, the same advice was given to the Roman people by Hiero, King of the Syracusans, who was friendly to the Romans, i. e., that the consul to whom Sicily had been assigned as a province should send his fleet into Africa, so that the enemy might have war in their own land and have no respite for the despatch of reinforcements to Hannibal.

Livy, bk. 22.

On this plan, too, the people and senate of Rome declared the Macedonian war on the proposal of the consul Servius Sulpitius, to

whom Macedonia had been assigned as a province. He persuaded the people to ordain the declaration of the Macedonian war by the following reason: that it was no question whether the Romans should have war or peace (for Philip, who was projecting a vast war by sea and land, would not allow them that choice), but whether they should send their legions into Macedonia or await the enemy in Italy. How great the difference between these two courses was, they had found out (said he) in the last Punic War; for who doubts that if, when the besieged Saguntines implored aid from the Romans in reliance on their good faith, the Romans had sent it without demur—as their ancestors had done to the Mamertini—they would have succeeded in diverting the whole of the war into Spain? By their dilatory measures, however, the Romans laid up for themselves a great defeat in Italy. And it is unquestionable that if, at the time when Philip had bound himself to Hannibal, by envoys and letters, to make an expedition into Italy, Levinus had been sent with his fleet to carry on war with Philip up in Macedonia, Philip would have been held in check and Italy would have continued in greater prosperity and its strength less impaired. And many commanders and armies would have been spared to it, which the Punic War subsequently destroyed, when Pyrrhus attacked and shook it and advanced victorious almost to Rome itself, and not the Tarentines only, and that tract of Italy which is called *Magna Græcia*, revolted from the Romans, but the Lucanians also and the Bruttians and the Samnites, who were all induced by Philip's project of coming over into Italy to remain just about as quiet and faithful as they did during the Punic War! Why, if the Romans had then demurred to crossing over into Africa they would even now (continued Sulpitius) have Hannibal in Italy and be at war with Carthage. Let Macedonia rather than Italy be the seat of war. Let the cities and lands of the enemy be wasted with fire and sword. We have already found by experience that our arms are more potent and successful abroad than at home.

Livy, bk. 31.

[10, 11] This discourse lends support to the saying of Agathocles, that war is to be conducted one way abroad and another way at home. At home the only aid is that furnished by the resources of one's own country, while abroad the enemy must be conquered by means of his own resources. Add to this, that a soldier is better at a distance from his home, for he has no available shelter and can not evade the necessity of fighting. It was on that principle that Hannibal, when campaigning in Spain, garrisoned Africa with Spaniards and sent for reserves from Africa to enable him to do this. And a soldier will fight all the more boldly and bravely on hostile soil, in proportion as there is more hope and courage in taking the offensive than in taking the defensive. Moreover, if you have overcome your enemy outside his own territory, he can easily repair his losses and protect his own soil, while if you beat him in

Livy, bk. 10.

his home, so that he has no opportunity to recruit his strength, you will easily overcome him and dictate an end of the war. And Hannibal would not have found this difficult after his victory at Cannæ, had he made proper use of his victory and of fortune's smiles, for it is quite clear that it was only his dilatoriness that saved the city and empire of Rome.

Livy, bk. 22

Now after putting forward these arguments and illustrations we leave every one a free choice in forming his opinion thereon. Yet, whenever there is a question about the relative advantages of making or awaiting war, repeated scrutiny must be addressed to the points whether the enemy's territory is easy of approach, whether it is fortified, whether it is level or mountainous (so that ambushes may be suspected), and whether you have to do with an enemy who is armed and warlike or with one who is unarmed and unwarlike and whose strength is in his purse. For the latter kind of enemy can easily be crushed in his home by means of his own resources, as in the case of the Carthaginians, but it is quite a different thing when you have to do with an armed, bellicose enemy, well-equipped at home for war, such as the Romans were.

[12] If, however, you have to meet on your own soil a warlike enemy who is accustomed to victory, it will be well to follow the example of Fabius: for he saw that it was no easy matter to beat Hannibal in battle, he being flushed with several victories, and so he adopted the policy of sitting still, whereby he broke Hannibal, and he gave Hannibal no chance of a victory, in order that he might be conquered by others, deeming that he had gone quite quick enough in the direction of victory if he had prevented Hannibal from winning one. By adopting that policy he retrieved the fortunes of Rome when brought low by many disasters.

A very notable description of this policy is contained in the words which that same Fabius addressed to Lucius Æmilius Paulus when moving out against Hannibal. They are as follows:

"The only way to war against Hannibal is that which I took and always used. Neither is it the issue and event alone (for that is teacher of fools) which shows this unto us, but even reason itself, which hath been and will still be the same and immutable, as long as things in the world hold on as they do. We war (you see) in Italy, at home, in our own ground and place of residence—all quarters round about us full of our own citizens or friendly allies, who daily help us and will be ready still to furnish us with armor, men, horse, and victuals. Sufficient proof of their faithfulness have they given us already in our hard distress. Space and process of time make us better and wiser every day than another, and more resolute. Contrariwise, Hannibal is in a strange and foreign land, in his enemy's country, in the midst of all things that are cross and adverse to him, far from his house and home, far from his native soil,

having peace nowhere, neither by land nor sea. No cities receive him, no walls he hath, nothing sees he, wheresoever he goes, that he can say is his own. He lives from day to day upon rapine. Scarce a third part has he of those forces which he transported over the river Ebro. Hunger has wasted more of them than the edge of the sword. And for this small remainder that is left he is scant provided of food. Do you make any doubt, then, that we shall vanquish him by sitting still, who day by day waxes old and feeble, who neither has store of victuals, nor reserves of men nor money? "

Livy, bk. 22.

And it is, in truth, admitted that Hannibal was at that time brought to such a pass that he could have been defeated without any trouble, had not the rashness of Terentius Varro given the enemy the opportunity of success. On the same principle the dictator Cnæus Sulpitius dragged out the war in Italy against the Gauls. He was reluctant to run any risks against an enemy whom time and place were weakening every day, and who was lingering on without provision of supplies and without adequate defenses. Moreover, he knew that a little delay enfeebles those souls and bodies who derive all their strength from attack.

Livy, bk. 7.

CHAPTER IX.

Whether it is better at the beginning of a battle to make for the enemy with much din and a vehement charge or on the other hand to hold one's ground and await the enemy's attack.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Trifles sometimes very important in war. 2. The Samnites and Gauls fierce in on-slaught. 3. Fabius sustained the attack of the enemy and carried the day. 4. Decius attacked the enemy and was defeated. 5. Titus Veturius followed the example of Fabius. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. The dictator Aulus Cornelius Cossus was successful with his waiting tactics. 7. Cæsar decried Pompey's tactics in ordering his men to await Cæsar's attack. 8. The custom of the Gauls and Germans at the beginning of a battle. 9. The Syrians drew an augury as to future victory or defeat from the din made. 10. The tactics of Cyrus. |
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[1, 2] Nothing is so trifling that it may not sometimes produce great results in war. What happened to the consuls Quintus Fabius and Publius Decius in the war against the Samnites shows us this. They had so marshalled their line that Fabius was opposed to the Samnites on the right wing, and Decius to the Gauls on the left wing. The course of the
 Bk. 10. fight was by no means similar on the right and the left wing, says Livy. The Romans under Fabius rather repelled than offered assault and the contest was prolonged until very late in the day, for their general knew very well that both Samnites and Gauls were furious in the first onset, so that to withstand them would be enough, and that, in a protracted contest, the spirits of the Samnites gradually flagged and even the bodies of the Gauls, remarkably ill-able to bear labor and heat, became quite relaxed and, although in their first efforts they were stronger than men's, yet in their late efforts they were weaker than women's. Fabius therefore reserved the strength of his men as unimpaired as possible, until the time when the enemy were the more likely to be worsted.

[3, 4] Decius, more impetuous, as being in the prime of life and full flow of spirits, exerted whatever force he had to the utmost in the first encounter, making an attack on the enemy which did not succeed, for his troops were put to flight early in the conflict and scattered. Then, as he could not rally them, he determined to win the glory which he could not get through victory by imitating the example of his father Publius Decius and devoting himself and the legions of the enemy to the infernal gods on behalf of the army of the Roman people, the Quirites; and, wherever he saw the line of the Gauls thickest, he spurred forward

his horse and, rushing upon the enemy's weapons, met his death. And the Romans, on the loss of their general—an event which on other occasions inspires terror—stopped their flight and set about beginning the combat afresh; and, when supports reached them which, on the orders of Fabius, had been sent from the rear to support his colleague, they won the victory.

[5] And the consul Titus Veturius, when despatched against the Volscians, copied the example of Fabius. He stirred up the enemy to an engagement, they having a considerable advantage in numbers. But he did not advance his forces or allow them to return the enemy's shouts, but bade them stand still with their spears fixed in the ground and, when the enemy came to close quarters, the cohorts were then to fall to it with their swords and with their full strength. That is a very fierce kind of fighting. The Volscians, weary with running and shouting, set on the Romans as if these were quite benumbed by fear, but after they found what a vigorous resistance was being made and saw the swords glittering before their eyes, they turned their backs in great disorder, just as if they had been ambushed. Nor had they strength sufficient even for flight, because they had advanced to the battle at full speed. The Romans, on the other hand, because they had not stirred from their ground in the beginning of the action, being fresh and vigorous, easily overtook the wearied fugitives, carried their camp by assault, and after driving them thence pursued them to Velitræ, into which the conquered and the conquerors entered in a body.

Livy, bk. 2.

[6] In like manner the dictator Aulus Cornelius Cossus, just before engaging with the Volscians, who had a large army, addressed his troops as follows:

"The day, my men, is ours, if either the gods or their prophets can foretell future events. Therefore, as resolute men of assured hope and such as shall encounter with far meaner than ourselves, pitch we our javelins down at our feet and draw our swords only. Neither would I have you to charge out of the main battle, but to keep your ground, to stand steadfast, and abide the first shock of the enemy. And when they have spent their volley of shot in vain, and shall in full torrent come upon you as you stand, then let your swords glitter in their eyes, and think every man of the gods that they will help the Romans, the gods, I say, who in auspicious hour have sent us forth into the field of battle."

The troops fought as he had charged them; the general had not duped his legions, and fortune did not dupe the general. Pompey, too, *Livy, bk. 6.* adopted this plan and, just before engaging with Cæsar at Pharsalus, bade his men await Cæsar's attack and not budge or allow their line to be broken. And this he is said to have done by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the charge of Cæsar's soldiers might be checked and their line broken; and he thought that the javelins would

fall with less force if the soldiers were kept in their ground than if they met them while themselves in movement; at the same time he trusted that Cæsar's soldiers, after running over double the usual ground, would be out of breath and exhausted by fatigue.

[7] Cæsar was of opinion, however, that herein Pompey acted without sufficient reason, for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit or an alacrity implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by the desire to meet the foe in fight. This a general (Cæsar says) should endeavor not to repress but to increase, it not being a vain institution of men of old that the trumpets should sound on all sides and a general shout be raised, for they thought that this struck the enemy with terror and inspired their own army with courage.

Caes., *Gallie war*, bk. 3.

[8] Thus the Gauls and Germans, who were men of reckless wrath and passion, had the custom, when they were preparing to attack the enemy, of raising a wild, discordant song called *harritus*, and of shrieking and jumping about and brandishing their shields, and they used to forecast the result of the coming fight hereby.

[9] The Syrians did the same at the commencement of an attack: after an act of worship of the sun, they had their signal trumpet sounded for the joinder of battle, and then they raised a most excited shout in order to inflame their ardor as they rushed to the onslaught and delivered their attack. If, however, the noise they gave out were harmonious and not irregular and conflicting and discordant, it would not sufficiently stimulate their courage for the battle or betoken a coming victory, for each man's determination and courage was gauged by the pitch of excitement and insistence to which he was raised by the presence of the enemy, and this afforded an unquestioned indication of the way the fortune of battle would go.

Bk. 4. And Livy mentions the same kind of thing in connection with the battle which the consul Caius Sempronius so rashly and ill-advisedly fought with the Volscians:

"The first token which way victory would incline," says he, "was the manner of shout at the first charge: which by the enemy was more loud, more shrill and continual, but by the Romans dissonant, unequal, dead and cold, often begun and often renewed: and by their uncertain and variable noise they bewrayed the inward fear of their hearts."

[10] Now Cyrus' plan was the following. If the enemy attacked in a tumultuous fashion his soldiers were to receive their onslaught in silence; but if the enemy attacked in silence, his line of battle was to advance with shouts and din. It certainly makes a vast difference, however, whether you have to deal with raw soldiers, who are susceptible to the slightest unusual noise and impression or with seasoned veterans who are not usually frightened by trifles.

Alex. ab Alex.,
Genial. dies,
bk. 4, ch. 7.

CHAPTER X.

It is not prudent to attack a state which is torn by civil dissension merely in reliance on that fact.

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| <p>1. Civil discord renders a State mortal which otherwise would be immortal.</p> <p>2. Dissensions of enemies to be fomented.</p> | <p>3. Enemies not to be attacked because of their dissensions.</p> |
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[1] Men of old held the well-founded opinion that a great state is immortal if its citizens abstain from the madness of civil strife, for experience shows that to be the one poison and weakness which brings to ruin the greatness of flourishing states. An example of this is furnished by the Roman State, which was so long the ruler of the whole world, until its strength was worn out in civil and intestine wars and it sank to nothing.

[2] Prudent generals, accordingly, make a practice of fomenting the dissensions of their enemies whenever they have the chance, so that in this way they can overmaster the strength of their enemy by a bloodless victory. It was in pursuit of this policy that Marcius Coriolanus, in his approach to the city, when laying waste the territory of Rome, ordered the lands of the patricians to be spared so as to render them objects of suspicion to the plebeians and thus intensify the civil dissension which had already begun. And when Hannibal saw that Quintus Fabius, making war by reason and not by chance, was robbing him of victory by his astute policy of delay (which, however, brought him into contempt at Rome, where he was called timid)—in order to increase the unpopularity of Fabius, he ordered that no hostile measures were to be taken against his estate, although the property all round it was leveled with the ground, so that this might seem to be a price agreed on in some secret arrangement. And Fabius, in order to avoid this unpopularity, is said to have sold that estate and to have devoted the proceeds to the ransom of prisoners. Herein he imitated Pericles, for the Spartans ordered his estate to be exempted from the general devastation, in the hope that he would either fall into danger by unpopularity or into infamy by the suspicion of treachery; but Pericles had anticipated their intentions and foretold them to the people, and in order to turn aside the attacks of malice he had presented these very properties to the State. Thus the danger in which he had been placed was turned into the greatest glory.

Livy, bk. 1.
Dion. Halic., bk. 8.

Livy, bk. 22.

Justin, bk. 3.

[3] Further, it would not be a well-advised policy to attack an enemy in reliance merely upon his internal dissensions, for (in Livy's words) pressure from without is the best cement of concord within. And so it befell when the Prænestines imagined that the dissensions of the Romans were providing them with an excellent opportunity. They made a hasty march, laying waste the country as they went along, and advanced their standards as far as the Colline gate. The panic in the city was great: the alarm was given to take up arms: people ran together to the walls and gates. But in the end they turned from their dissensions with one another to war and appointed Titus Quinctius Cincinnatus dictator. And when this got abroad (so great was the terror of that office) the enemy retired from the walls and the younger Romans assembled to the edict without demur. For terror from without represses civil discords.

Livy, bk. 6.

And so when Cæsar was campaigning against Britain, the Britons unanimously conceded full powers and the conduct of the war to Cassivellaunus, although previously perpetual wars had taken place between him and the other States; but Cæsar's arrival so alarmed them that they intrusted him with the whole war and command.

Caes., Gallic war,
bk. 5.

In the same way during the war with Veii, in the consulship of Cnæus Manlius and Marcus Fabius, the minds of the soldiery were so embittered by domestic dissensions that the consuls abode in their camp and did not venture to hazard a battle, for they could not trust their men with arms; and the enemy, in reliance on this, tried in every possible way to worry the Romans into a fight by indignities and insults. The Romans at last could not endure the shame any longer and the competition between external and internal hatred ended in favor of the former, so disdainful and insolent was the mockery of the foe. And so the soldiers formed in battle line, enraged against the enemy and reconciled to each other, and Livy says that the Romans never joined battle in any previous war with bitterer hostility; while, had the enemy restrained themselves, they could quite easily have conquered the Romans with their own strength and soldiery.

Bk. 2.

The Æquians and Volscians furnish another example. They had made a joint incursion into Roman territory, and then a dispute arose whether the Æquians or the Volscians should supply a leader of that force, and out of that dispute a fierce dissension sprang and a fight took place in which the enemy wrought havoc on each other in a deadly and obstinate manner, so that they allowed the Romans to carry off the victory.

Livy, bk. 2.
Dion. Halic., bk. 8.

And so when Scotio, the Dacian commander, learned that the Roman people were torn by civil strife, he did not think this an opportunity which ought to be seized on for harassing them, for he perceived that an external war is often the means of extinguishing an intestine war;

and he repressed and restrained his men's ardor for a fight in a neat manner, by instituting a comparison with two dogs which he brought before their eyes and then, when these dogs had been fighting with each other for a little while, he introduced a wolf and at once the dogs dropped their anger against each other and keenly attacked and put an end to their common foe.

Cæsl. Rhodig., dig.
lect. antiq., bk. 9,
ch. 50.

CHAPTER XI.

Troops to be so placed, by all possible endeavors, that fighting is an absolute necessity for them; but the enemy should be afforded an escape from that necessity.

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| 1. The force of necessity.
2. The soldiery to be compelled of necessity to fight.
3. The opportunity of flight to be taken away from the soldiery, so far as possible. | 4. The enemy to be afforded opportunities to avoid the necessity of fighting.
5. The enemy to be provided with an avenue of escape by flight. |
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[1] How great the force of necessity is has been sufficiently discussed by the philosophers, for they hold that all things are ordained by Necessity. And so when Thales was asked what was the strongest thing, he replied, "Necessity, for it alone can not be overcome."

[2] And the most noted generals, by reason of their perception of its force and inherent virtue and in view of its great effectiveness in all departments, and especially in war, and of the access of courage which it produces, make a practice of carefully insuring that their soldiery may be driven by necessity to fight: for, as Quintus Curtius said, necessity comes before reason, especially in war.

So, too, the dictator, Quintus Fabius, after keeping his men within the rampart for several days after a drawn battle with the Samnites, like one besieged rather than a besieger, suddenly displayed the signal for battle. He judged it the more efficacious method of inflaming the courage of brave men to let none have any room for hope but in himself, and so he kept secret from the troops the arrival of the master of the horse and a new army; and, as if there were no safety but in fighting their way out, he made a speech pointing out to the troops the confined nature of the situation and the dearth of supplies, and said that there was no way out for them except what a victory would open. He then ordered the camp to be burned lest they should retreat thither, as on the former day, without completing their victory, saying that fortifications ought to be secured by arms, not arms by fortifications. Then the soldiers advanced against the enemy with spirits roused by the dictator's address, which seemed to indicate the extremity of need; and the very sight of the camp in flames behind them was no small incitement to victory.

Livy, bk. 9.

And so also when Marcus Porcius Cato was campaigning in Spain, he marched his army round to a place at some distance from his ships and camp, where their only hope would be in their own valor, and he

joined battle in the very center of the enemy, addressing his soldiery as follows. "Men," quoth he, "there is no other hope now left but in clean strength and valor, and I of very purpose have wrought it so. Between us and our camp the enemies are encamped all; behind at our back we have our enemy's land. The bravest courses are ever safest, namely to build and ground our hope surely in valor."

Livy, bk 34.

And after Hannibal's passage of the Alps, when he was on the eve of a battle with Scipio, he showed his men the absolute necessity of fighting, in the following speech:

"On both hands, right and left, inclosed we are by two seas, and we have not so much as one ship to escape away in. Before you, near at hand, is the Po, a greater river and more violent than the Rhone; behind you, to hem you in, are the Alps, which you hardly passed over when in heart and lusty. Here, men, you must either get victory or lose your lives, even where you first encountered the enemy; and the same fortune which has laid upon you the necessity of fight proffers unto you (if you go away with victory) such rewards as men use not to wish for greater and more honorable at the hands of the immortal gods. The Romans have sent over this year already two consuls, one into Africa and the other into Spain; nothing have they left for us but that which we can win and hold at the sword's point. Well may they be timid and idle, having a place of refuge to retire into, who in their own country and ground may be received when they take to their heels through safe and peaceful paths to save themselves. But as for you, it stands you upon to play the men and to make account of no middle designs between victory and death, but, upon certain despair of all shifts besides, either to obtain victory or, if fortune shall fail us, choose rather to die fighting than to be killed flying. If this be settled and deeply resolved in your hearts, I will say once again, The day is yours."

No sharper spur to conquest, says Livy, has been given to men by the immortal gods. And so when the Volscian general, Vectius Messius, saw that his troops were hemmed in by the Romans on all sides, he shouted out to them with a penetrating voice:

"What, will ye here, without making your defense, without revenge, offer yourselves to be devoured of the enemy's sword? What do you, then, with weapons? Why began ye war first? Are you troublesome and unruly in peace and cowards in war? What hope have ye in standing still? Do you look for some god to protect and deliver you? You must make way by dint of sword. Come, then, and that way where ye shall see me go afore follow ye after and stick to it like men, as many of you as mind to see again your home, your parents, your wives and children. It is neither wall nor trench, but armed men that must withstand armed men. In valor ye are their matches, but in necessity (which is the last and strongest engine of all other) ye are the better."

Livy, bk. 4.

[3] Further, just as the most noted generals would so place their troops that fighting was an absolute necessity, so they would employ various methods to take away from them the chance of flight. Thus Cæsar, before engaging in battle with the Helvetii, first removed his horses from his own sight and then from the sight of everybody, and harangued his troops, pointing out that all were now in equal danger and urging them to put away all hope of flight; and this was a common custom with the Helvetii. When the tyrant Agathocles crossed into Africa, he had all his ships burned with the assent of his troops, so that all might know that they had nothing to hope for from flight and must therefore either conquer or die. When Astyages, King of the Medes, was fighting with Cyrus and the Persians, he posted part of his troops in the rear and bade them put fugitives to the sword, just like enemies, and had a proclamation made to his men that, if they did not conquer, they would find just as strong men behind their backs as in front of them, and so his troops derived from this necessity a large accession of courage. And the Romans not infrequently had their fugitives put to death just as if they were enemies.

Caes., *Gallie war*, bk. 1.

Justin, bk. 22.

Justin, bk. 1.

And very often great advantage accrued from the wholesome device which we read of as much resorted to by the Romans in times of great alarm, and of severe stress and despair: namely, to post squads of cavalry in front of the fortifications with orders to treat as enemies those who were sufficiently ill-advised to flee from the battle back to the camp, and to attack them with swords drawn, so that they should see a hostile array behind them as well as in front. This final counsel of despair at times so inflames the courage of soldiers as to restore lines that have yielded and been scattered in disgraceful flight, so that the troops, under the coercion of a twofold fear, have not seldom snatched victory out of the hands of the enemy.

[4] That same principle, however, which suggests the expediency of throwing on troops the absolute necessity of fighting, demonstrates the expediency of removing this necessity from the enemy; for it often happens that despair turns into valor, as in Virgil's line,

Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem.

(The sole safety of the conquered is to abandon all hope of safety.)

And so in the war with Veii, the enemy at one time set off to storm the Roman camp with troops withdrawn from the fighting line: and thereupon the consul Cnæus Manlius rode back to the camp and posted troops at every gate in order to bar the retreat of the enemy; but the despair thus created rendered the enemy rather mad than bold, so that the consul was killed and their onset could not be any longer withstood, and matters would have reached the worst extreme if the legates had not opened a way for the enemy to escape by one gate. And so the

Livy, bk. 2.
Dion Halic., bk. 9.

opinion of Scipio has been deservedly praised, i. e., that a way for the enemy to escape by should always be provided.

[5] For (as Tacitus says) the more hope the mind cherishes the less inclined will it be to offer resistance, seeing that necessity gives an edge even to cowardice, and despair is often the parent of hope or, at any rate, is a great incitement to an honorable death. And so when the Greeks were eager to prevent the crossing of Xerxes after his defeat in battle and to cut off the King with his army, Themistocles, fearing that his enemy, if thus cut off, would turn their despair into a virtue and would hew with the sword a way which would not be open to them otherwise, acted with much wisdom, when he found himself unable to bring the others to his view, in sending a slave to Xerxes with the warning to effect a crossing by a timely flight.

Justin, bk. 2.

And the conduct of the dictator Marcus Furius Camillus, at the siege of Veii, was also shrewd. A mine had been driven through the citadel of Veii through which he had sent picked soldiers and had filled the city with his soldiers, and there was general fighting; then a great slaughter took place whereby he facilitated the capture of the town, and, when the ardor of the fight had abated, the dictator ordered the heralds to proclaim that the unarmed should be spared. In this way an end was put to bloodshed and, laying down their arms, the enemy began to surrender.

Livy, bk. 5.

The same thing happened when the colony of Fregellæ was occupied by the Samnites after a sudden surprise in the night. The Fregellans contrived to maintain the battle for a considerable time without loss of ground, both because they fought for their religion and liberty and because the multitude unfit to bear arms assisted them from the tops of the houses. At length, says Livy, a stratagem gave the advantage to the assailants, for they suffered the voice of a herald to be heard proclaiming that whoever laid down his arms might retire in safety. This relaxed their eagerness for the fight and they began almost everywhere to throw away their arms.

Bk. 9.

Caius Fabius Ambustus resorted to the same stratagem at the storming of Auxur, when the battle was continued, despite the capture of the city, by a large number of the defenders because they had no hope of quarter; so he suddenly gave orders for a proclamation to be made that none but the armed were to be injured. He thus induced all the remaining multitude voluntarily to lay down their arms, and in that fashion gained an easy victory.

Livy, bk. 9.

A similar thing happened at Sutrium, a city in alliance with the Roman people. On the same day on which it was stormed by the Etruscans it was unexpectedly recaptured by Camillus; he ordered the gates to be shut on the Etruscans, who were cut down in every quarter; all hope of flight was thus taken away; but (Livy tells us) the battle would

Bk. 6.

have been renewed and kindled by the despair of the enemy had not heralds, sent in every direction through the city, issued orders that their arms should be laid down, that the unarmed would be spared, and that none but those carrying arms would be injured. And then even those whose minds had been, in their last hope, obstinately bent on fighting, when hopes of life were offered threw down their arms in every direction and surrendered themselves, unarmed, to the enemy, which fortune had rendered the safer course.

Cæsar, too, at the battle of Pharsalus, when Pompey's battle-line had given way, adopted a very well-advised plan in order to prevent the soldiers from restoring their ranks, and with a view to obtain a more easy victory he sent heralds in all quarters to proclaim to his troops that they must spare their fellow-citizens and only wreak their wrath on the mercenaries. And whenever the victors came across the vanquished, they bade them, "Abide in safety," whence that expression "Abide in safety" (*sta securus*) got to be a kind of watchword. And Cæsar thus

Appian, Civil
war, bk. 2.

gained his victory.

The admonition given by Lycurgus to his own people also points in that direction, namely, if ever they routed and overthrew an enemy in battle, only to pursue the fugitives far enough to secure the victory and then immediately to withdraw—not only because it was un-Greek to slay surrendered enemies, but also because of the utility of that course, for if the enemy knows that quarter will be given on a surrender their distaste for being killed will make them discover the advantages of

Plutarch, Apoph. flight over fight.

CHAPTER XII.

In time of victory the first and chief thought should be about peace.

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| <p>1. We are better able to bear bad fortune than good fortune.</p> <p>2. Neither prosperity nor adversity to be borne in ill-restrained manner.</p> | <p>3. In time of victory peace to be insured.</p> <p>4. Nothing in war more miserable than a victory.</p> |
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[1] It is clearly a provision of nature that we can better bear bad fortune than good. For (as Tacitus says) prosperity probes the soul with sharper goads than adversity, since we tolerate wretchedness, but are corrupted by happiness. It was the recognition of this that led Abdolominus, who though of royal stock was very poor and needy and who had been made king by the Sidonians with the permission of Alexander, to make the following reply to Alexander's question how much patience he needed to bear poverty: "Would that I could endure a kingdom with the same amount." And Alexander the Great himself furnishes a good example of this same thing. For before Fortune emptied itself into his heart, he bore the beginnings thereof with moderation and wisdom, but he failed to bear its full development fitly. For it continually happens that the soul of a man gets so puffed up by prosperity that he can not then bear either any others or himself. No trust, then, should be reposed in even the greatest degree of prosperity, for it is uncertain what the evening will bring forth. Q. Curtius, bk. 4.

[2] It is accordingly just as much a mark of extreme weak-mindedness to bear prosperity immoderately as adversity; and their admonitions are clearly well founded who bid us, in proportion as we are lofty, to bear ourselves lowly. For (to quote Cicero), just as men send their horses to trainers when they get wild and mettlesome by reason of the frequency of combats, in order that they may manage them with greater ease, so men who have shown themselves unbridled and overweening in prosperity ought to be taken to the training-ground (so to speak) of reason and instruction, in order that they may learn the frailty of human affairs and the mutability of fortune; for the failure to impose a limit on happiness and to repress good fortune when it presents itself involves a ruin as disgraceful as the degree of elation was undue. Offic., bk. 1.

[3] And so in times of victory, which otherwise are times of insolence and pride, the first and chief thing to be thought of is peace; nor should this be delayed (as Demades used to say of the Athenians when

they were given up to an untimely lust of war) until we have to beg for it in mourning. For nowhere less than in war do events turn out as they are expected to. Accordingly when Mago, who had come to Carthage to announce Hannibal's victory at Cannæ, was granted audience by the Senate and was extolling in profuse style his brother's prosperity in Italy and was urging that the nearer the prospect of finishing the war was the more readily should aid be sent with all confidence to Hannibal, Hanno, who had always deprecated the undertaking of war against the Romans, remained quite unmoved thereby and wisely urged the Senate to consent in that time of prosperity to make the most of their fortune and to think on peace rather than on war. "For," said he, "if you let slip this advantage of the time when we may seem to give rather than to take conditions of peace, I fear that even this so goodly a show of growth as it maketh now will run up all to straw and bear no head to yield corn in the end."

Livy, bk. 23.

Now this attitude was scorned at the time, but afterwards, though too late, it was praised in vain by the Senate, at a time when they were reduced so low that the terms of peace, which they could have imposed, were begged for by themselves, and refused, and they were in that condition which Livy tells us of in relation to the Latins, i. e., that they could endure neither peace nor war, a condition which is of all things the most miserable. The same thing happened to Antiochus, who treated for peace when the Romans had already crossed over into Asia to campaign against him. The reply of Scipio was that this ought to have been done at an earlier date and not now when the King was bitted and mounted.

Plutarch, Apoph.
Appian, Syrian war.
Livy, bk. 37.

A wise man, then, will not put away a sure peace that is in the victor's hand in the fallacious hope of an uncertain victory that is in the hand of fortune. And so when Hasdrubal Hædus, the legate of the Carthaginians, was treating for peace in the Roman Senate, he said that men were seldom gifted with good fortune and good intelligence at the same time and that the Roman people were unconquered because they knew how to be wise and take good counsel in times of prosperity, and that if in times of good fortune the gods gave us good wit, we should reflect not only on what had happened, but also on what might happen.

Familiar Epistles,
bk. 4, Epist. 3.

[4] And Cicero, in a letter to Marcellus, says: "Though everything in war is miserable, yet there is nothing more miserable than victory itself, for even if this befalls the better-disposed, it yet renders them fiercer and more headstrong, so that, even if they have not these qualities by nature, they are of necessity made to have them.

And so Cæsar, mindful of this weakness of the human soul, said that the only time for discussing peace with Pompey was the time when each of them had confidence in himself and seemed the equal of the other, but that, if fortune gave ever so little an advantage to one of them, he who seemed to be getting the upper hand would have nothing to do with terms of peace and would not be content with equal shares, seeing that he would rely on getting the whole.

Caes., Civil
war, bk. 3.

CHAPTER XIII.

After the enemy has been crushed, what is the best method for keeping him quiet in a lasting peace.

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| 1. Not less valor needed in order to retain what has been won than to win it.
2. The advice of Herennius Pontius concerning the Romans, who were surrounded at the Caudine Forks.
3. The opinion of Camillus with reference to the conquered Latins. | 4. The pronouncement of the Senate concerning the men of Privernæ who had been compelled to surrender.
5. The opinion of Marcus Cato on rebels.
6. The Romans allowed their allies to make war only under Roman leadership.
7. The custom of founding colonies. |
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[1] Seeing that there is not less virtue in preserving what we have gained than in acquiring it, and in the right use of victory than in victory itself—for as Ovid rightly says:

Casus inest illic, hic erit artis opus

(Chance controls the one, but in the other there is need of skill)

—and seeing that the object of war is to live in peace, our whole thought, after the enemy has been crushed, should be by what best means to restrain him forever from making war again. For what good was it to Pyrrhus to be great in crushing an enemy if he could not guard what he had gained? So much more successfully did he set himself to acquire dominion than to keep it! On this account he was compared by Anti-Justin, bk. 25. gonus with an unskilled gamester who, though he makes many good throws at dice, yet does not know how to make the best of his game.

[2] And in this connection I think that by far the most useful advice was that given by Herennius Pontius, father of Caius Pontius, at the time when the Samnites, under the leadership of Caius Pontius, had enticed the Romans by fraud into the Caudine Forks between two defiles: for the Samnites had no plan prepared for these joyful circumstances and so they determined that the advice of Herennius Pontius should be sought. Herennius, accordingly, was consulted by a messenger from his son and he gave it as his opinion that all the Romans should be set free from there as soon as possible without receiving any hurt. On this counsel being rejected, and the same messenger returning a second time for his advice, he recommended that they should all without exception be put to death. The meaning of his first plan, which he esteemed the best, was that by an act of extraordinary kindness perpetual peace and friendship should be established with a most powerful nation; and by his second plan he meant that the renewal of the war should be

put off to the distance of many ages, during which the Roman State, after the loss of these two armies, would not easily recover its strength. A third plan, he said, there was not.

And when his son and the other chiefs went on to ask him if a plan of a middle kind might not be adopted, i. e., that they should be dismissed unhurt and at the same time that terms should, by right of war, be imposed on them as vanquished: "Marry," quoth he, "this is the way indeed that neither winneth you friends nor yet riddeth you of your foes—to save them whom ye have provoked with shame and disgrace. The Romans are of this nature, that they can not sit still and be quiet so long as they have the worse—that is what will ever be fresh in their hearts whatsoever shame the present extremity shall fix upon them, and never will it give them any rest before they have been by manifold ways revenged of you."

Neither opinion, however, was adopted, and the Romans were sent under the yoke and that notorious peace of Caudium was made. But it was subsequently repudiated by the Senate on the ground of informality and the authors of it were surrendered to the Samnites. This people then found that they had got a renewal of a most bitter war instead of an arrogant peace and all the results thereof were not only brought to their notice, but took place almost under their very eyes. Too late and vainly did they then praise both plans of old Herennius, by blundering between which they found that they had trafficked the possession of victory for an uncertain peace and had let slip the opportunity alike for kindness and for severity, and had to fight with those whom they had had it in their power either to destroy as enemies or to convert into

Livy, bk. 9. friends.

[3] The conduct of the Romans was wiser, for when Camillus, after the defeat and subjugation of the Latins, was taking the instructions of the Senate with regard to their treatment, he is said to have held the following discourse:

"It now remains to be considered, since they annoy us by their repeated rebellions, how we may keep them in quiet and in perpetual peace. The immortal gods have put the determination of this matter so completely in your power that they have placed it in your hands whether Latium shall continue to exist or not. Ye can therefore insure to yourselves perpetual peace as far as regards the Latins, by adopting either severe or lenient measures. Do ye choose to adopt cruel conduct toward people who have surrendered and been conquered? Ye may destroy all Latium and make a vast desert of a place whence in many and serious wars ye have often obtained the use of an excellent army of allies. Do you wish, according to the example of your forefathers, to augment the Roman State by admitting the vanquished among your citizens? Materials for extending your power with the highest glory are at hand.

That government is certainly by far the most secure which the subjects find a pleasure in obeying. But whatever your decision is, it must be speedy. So many States have ye with their minds in a suspense between hope and fear, and it is necessary that ye be quit as soon as possible of your solicitude about them and that their minds, while they are still in a stupor through expectancy, be impressed either by clemency or by punishment."

Thus Camillus.

The Senate praised his exposition of these affairs of high policy, but said that, as the States were differently circumstanced, their plan should be so adjusted that a determination might be arrived at according to the deserts of each, the question being put regarding each State separately. This was, accordingly, carried out under a decree of the Senate, and to some the right of citizenship was granted, with a restoration of the exercise of their religious rites; to others the right of citizenship which they already possessed was continued, their offense not being imputed to public wrong-doing, but to the few ringleaders; others had their walls razed and were ordered to find a dwelling elsewhere.

Livy, bk. 9.

[4] The memorable pronouncement of the Senate in the matter of the Privernians is also relevant here. They had been driven to make surrender and their walls had been razed under a decree of the Senate, and their leader Vitruvius had been put to death together with some sharers of his guilt; and the consul Plautius had referred to the Senate the question, what to do with the rest of the multitude. Then one of the Privernian envoys, more mindful of the prospects to which he had been born than of present exigencies, when asked by one of the Senators, what punishment the Privernians had, in his opinion, deserved, answered, "Such as those deserve who deem themselves worthy of liberty." And when the consul saw that this stubborn answer the more exasperated those who were adverse to the cause of the Privernians, he asked him, with intent to draw from him a more conciliatory reply by means of a favorable question, "But if we remit to you the punishment, in what manner may we expect that ye will observe the peace which shall be established between us?" He replied, "If the peace which ye grant us be a good peace, it will be observed as both inviolable and eternal; if bad, as one of no long continuance." These words roused the anger of some, but the better part of the Senate interpreted his answer more favorably and said that what they had just heard were the words of a man, and a free man. And they asked whether it was credible that any people, or even an individual, would remain longer than necessity constrained in a situation which irked him so acutely. Peace, said they, was observed only when those at peace were voluntarily so, but fidelity was not to be expected where it was wished to impose slavery. And so by the authoriza-

tion of the Senate a proposal was laid before the people to grant rights of citizenship to the Privernians.

[5] Marcus Cato, however, held that rebels could best be kept in their duty by making it impossible for them to rebel. And so he disarmed all the Spaniards this side the Ebro and razed all their walls on one and the same day. But this they took so much to heart that many committed suicide, a proud people not reckoning life worth living without arms. And in this Cato seems to have followed the example of Cyrus, who, when the Lydians again broke out into war, took away their arms and horses, and ordered them to ply the trades of the tavern-keeper, the public player, and the pimp. And in this way they became effeminate by soft living and lost their former manhood, and those whom war, before the time of Cyrus, had made invincible, ease and sloth conquered when they had fallen into habits of luxury.

Now, after the capture of Saguntum, Hannibal ordered the slaughter, on a given signal, of all over the age of puberty. And this certainly was (as Livy says) a ruthless decree; yet the event showed that it was almost a necessity; for how could quarter be given to persons who either shut themselves up with their wives and children and burned their homes over their own heads or who, in the fighting line, did naught before the close of the engagement save what people would do who desired death? And this is clearly the meaning of the saying of Agesilaus, that it is hard to be at the same time both merciful and wise.

[6] Again, the Romans, in furtherance of the policy of removing from their allies all opportunity of rebellion, thought it inadvisable to allow them to make war with their own army and strength and plans, or except under Roman leadership. And so when the Æquians invaded Latin territory and the spokesmen of the Latins requested the Senate either to supply help or allow them to take up arms and protect themselves, it seemed more expedient to defend the Latins, keeping them unarmed, than to allow them to take up arms again.

It was also an ancient custom of the Romans, in connection with those with whom friendly relations had not been established by treaty or on equal terms, not to exercise sovereignty over them on a peace footing before they had made a surrender of all things, human and divine, and hostages had been received, and their arms had been taken from them, and garrisons had been stationed in the towns.

[7] It was another custom of the Romans in the course of their subjugation of this or that people of Italy, to sequester part of their soil and settle a colony in it, or in the case of already founded towns to enrol new colonists of a special variety; and these colonies were stationed, like garrisons, in the provinces which had been acquired in war. And so Sylla, in prudent albeit tyrannical fashion, after he had made himself supreme in the State by force of arms, despatched those who had worked

Dion. Halic.,
bks. 3, 4 and 5.
Appian, Civil
war, bk. 1.

on his side in that war, as colonists into the lands and towns of those who had striven against him; and these persons, quartered in convenient places, kept Italy subject to his power and the landed estates were shifted from their former owners to them. This boon rendered them submissive to him for their whole lives and established his dominion in a marvellous manner, for, inasmuch as they could not assert their own claims except by ratifying the acts of Sylla, they became champions of his dignity even after his death; and those whose citadels and walls and goods and immunities they had taken away were prevented, by lack of resources, from hurting them.

Appian, *Civil war*,
bk. 1.

Again, after the defeat of Perseus and the decree for Macedonian freedom, the Romans ordered that the King's friends and high officials, generals, naval and garrison commanders and all other subordinate officials whose habit it was to serve the King with humility and lord it over others, should quit Macedonia and migrate into Italy, so as to prevent them from compassing fresh schemes in Macedonia. And this seems to have been the purpose of Lycurgus in those laws of his called *Retræ*, in which he forbade the frequent repetition of war against the same people, lest they should learn the Spartan tactics. And so when Agesilaus had been carrying on a continuous war with the Thebans and fell wounded in a certain battle, it is reported that Antalcidas said to him, "You are getting a fine payment from the Thebans for teaching those who did not know how to fight": and in truth history says that the Thebans were never more bellicose than at that time, owing to the oft-repeated expeditions of the Lacedæmonians against them; for the fortune of war (as Quintus Curtius said) imparts skill even to the conquered.

Livy, bk. 45.

Plutarch, *Apoph.*

BOOK THE THIRD

Of the Law and Duties relating to War and of
Military Discipline.

CHAPTER I.

Of military discipline.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Military discipline of great importance. 2. The raw and unwarlike rendered warlike by military discipline. 3. The luxury of Capua undid the previously unconquered army of Hannibal. 4. An example showing the difference between the neglect and the maintenance of military discipline. 5. Women camp-followers a disgrace. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Incumbent to reduce the amount of baggage. 7. The "mules of Marius." 8. The derivation of "exercitus" (i. e., army). 9. Military laws. 10. Three things that soldiers have in charge. 11. Military discipline. |
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[1] History tells us how great the importance of military discipline is: so does daily experience; and it is abundantly clear that the conquest of the world by the Roman people was accomplished by nothing else than the training in arms, the discipline of the camp, and the practice of campaigning. Quintilian puts this very well when he says:

Vegetius, de re milit., bk. 1. Livy, Preface to his History.

"Rightly considered, the empire of the Roman people has been based until now on military discipline; for we are not more numerous than the Cimbri, or possessed of greater resources than very wealthy kingdoms, nor is contempt of death easier to us than to most barbarians, though they may have no great inducement to live. It was the sternness of our institutions, our system of military service, our love of toil, our daily exercisings, and our assiduous consideration of questions of war."

On the soldier Marian.

And so Valerius Maximus said that there was no bond so lasting as that of military discipline, that preëminent adornment and buttress of the Roman power, in whose bosom repose the serene and tranquil blessings of peace.

[2] And indeed we read how numerous armies of slaves and unwarlike recruits have been made invincible and warlike merely by discipline and command and, on the other hand, how numerous armies of seasoned troops, hitherto unconquered, have been corrupted and sapped merely by license and by all their vices and by the neglect of discipline, and have been undone before ever they set eyes on the enemy. And a proof of this is furnished by Tullus Hostilius, King of the Romans, who roused the Romans to war after they had lived forty years of peaceful ease, and merely by means of military discipline rendered them excellent soldiers, though previously they had had no experience of it. And Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, who had an army of slaves given him, in a short time, by dint of military training and system, brought it to pass that, when they were in battle-array, no one ever thought about their

Livy, bk. 1.

race and origin, and that they were a protection to the allies and a terror to the enemy. So, also, after Thebes had been freed from its subjection to the Spartans, Pelopidas and Epaminondas, by means of military institutions, had no difficulty in turning the Thebans from unwarlike men into excellent soldiers, so that they were not only the equals but the superiors of the Spartans.

Now Scipio Æmilianus, that excellent commander and consummate master of the art of generalship, in order to break the high courage of the city of Numantia, which had been but fostered by the faults of his predecessors in the command, is said to have had two thousand harlots and everything else which merely ministered to pleasure removed from his camp directly he entered it, and in that way to have repaired the failure of military discipline. By this method he succeeded in burning and throwing down in ruins level with the ground that courageous and haughty Numantia; and so (as Valerius Maximus says) for having neglected military discipline Mancinus saw himself compelled to make a deplorable surrender and Scipio, for having preserved it, obtained as recompense the most brilliant triumph.

And Metellus followed Scipio's example by restoring military discipline into the army which he took over from Spurius Albinus, when in Africa during the Jugurthine War, and which the latter had spoiled by excessive indulgence. It is said that he began by issuing a proclamation banishing everything that conduced to cowardice; and he won a glorious victory over the enemy.

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.

And when Scipio Africanus the younger was despatched as consul into Africa and saw the corrupt state of discipline and the slothful plundering and greedy habits which the troops had developed under Piso, he realized that he would never conquer the enemy until he had got his own men in hand; so he severely rebuked them in a great speech and drove away all non-soldiers and re-established military discipline, and thus succeeded in overthrowing the powerful Carthage, the rival of Rome's empire.

Appian, Punic war.

[3] The army of Hannibal, on the other hand, which had so often and so long endured every human ill and had never known or been accustomed to comforts and had not been sapped by the virulence of any evil, was ruined by the excessive comforts and pleasures of the immodest Capua. For sleep and wine and feastings and harlots and baths and ease (which by wont grows daily more agreeable) so enervated their bodies and souls (says Livy) that it was their victorious past that kept them safe and not their present strength.

And in this the general is considered by those who are skilled in the art of war to have committed a greater error than in not marching his troops to Rome forthwith from the field of Cannæ. For his delay on that occasion might be considered as only to have postponed his victory,

but this mistake to have deprived him of the power of conquering. Accordingly, by Hercules, it was as though he marched out of Capua with another army, for it retained in no respect any of its former discipline. For most of the troops returned in the embrace of harlots and as soon as they began to live under tents, and the fatigue of marching and other military labors tried them, they broke down, like recruits, both in bodily strength and spirit. From that time, during the whole period of the summer campaign, great numbers of them slunk away from the standards without furlough, although there was no other lurking-place for the deserters than Capua. Marcus Marcellus, accordingly, who had drawn up his troops near Nola, upbraided the enemy, with a view to raise the courage of his own troops, by saying that Capua was Hannibal's Cannæ, for that there he had lost his warlike valor, there his military discipline, there the renown of his past and of his future, too. Marcellus then engaged the enemy in battle and routed him.

And just as Capua was fatal to the army of Hannibal, so Babylon was to the soldiers of Alexander, and quite corrupted their military discipline, so much so that if Alexander had only had an enemy, his loss of strength for future conflicts would beyond doubt have been disclosed (so wrote Quintus Curtius).

Bk. 5.

[4] And, to be brief, we can not have a better instance of what the neglect or maintenance of military discipline means, than that of the Romans; for they who aforetime were superior to all people in their instinct for justice and their military glory, later on, when discipline decayed, were conquered by every one. And so Cato (in Sallust) says:

"Do not suppose that our ancestors, from so small a commencement, raised the republic to greatness merely by force of arms. If such had been the case, we should enjoy it in a most excellent condition; for of allies and citizens, as well as arms and horses, we have a much greater abundance than they had. No, there were other things which made them great, which among us have no existence—such as industry at home, equitable government abroad, and minds impartial in council, unswayed by any improper or corrupt motive. Instead of such virtues we have luxury and avarice; public distress and private superfluity; we extol wealth and yield to indolence; no distinction is made between good men and bad; and ambition usurps the honors due to virtue."

And when Fabricius was sent as envoy to Pyrrhus, and heard at his court one Cyneas of Thessaly telling how some Athenian, of repute for wisdom, maintained that pleasure was the sole motive of human action, he shrewdly took the speech as an augury and prayed that this wisdom might straightway descend on his enemy Pyrrhus and on the Samnites. It was politic, too, of the Spartan State to withdraw for so long the eyes of its citizens from looking to Asia, for it recognized that thence flowed all seductions and certain most baneful poisons, both of body and of mind, and that more was lost by such victories than was gained in war.

Val. Max., bk. 4,
ch. 2.Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 6.

[5] Hence, too, our forebears reckoned women camp-followers a great disgrace and matter of severest reproach and a soldier was not allowed to have his wife or family with him save by permission of the prince, and a soldier might not even marry a wife when in a province. And a proconsul was liable for the delicts of the wife whom he had taken with him into his province; and, indeed, Ulpian says that it is better for a proconsul to go to his province without his wife. This was the opinion, too, of Severus Cæcina (in Tacitus), for he said it was a characteristic of the companionship of women to hinder peace with luxury and war with fear and to turn the marching column of the Romans into the likeness of a barbarian raid. Formerly, too, a constitution of Constantine forbade unions between low women and certain soldiers, but the emperor Justinian amended this and allowed soldiers to marry what wives they pleased so long as they were free-born women.

Cod. 12, 35, 10.

Cod. 5, 4, 6, and Dig. 23, 2, 65.

Dig. 1, 16, 4, 2.

Dig. 1, 16, 4, 2.

Annals, bk. 3.

Nov. 117, c. 6.
Cod. 5, 4, 21.

[6] The task of keeping down the amount of baggage is also a matter intimately connected with military discipline, for this often is a very serious hindrance on a march. And so when Philip of Macedon first enrolled an army he forbade the employment of vehicles and would not allow his cavalry more than one servant each and his infantry only one servant among ten to carry mills and ropes. Scipio forbade the keeping of pillows and was himself the first to use a hay pillow and he would not let his men ride on asses or mules when on the march, saying that very little was to be expected in war from him who could not go on his own feet.

Appian, Span. war.

[7] Caius Marius, in order to reduce the amount of baggage, had the dishes and eating vessels of his men fitted into bundles and placed on prongs, under which the burden of them was more manageable and easy—hence the popular saying, “mules of Marius.” And the same thing was also provided by the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain.

Reg., bk. 1, tit. 22,
par. 2.
Tuscul., quest., bk. 2.

[8] And this is what Cicero had in mind when he said: “You may see whence the very name of our army, i. e., *exercitus*, is derived: Great is the labor of an army on the march. Then consider that they carry more than a fortnight’s provision and whatever else they may want, including the burden of the stakes; for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no more incumbrance than their own limbs, for they say arms are the limbs of a soldier, which they carry (says he) so commodiously that when there is occasion they throw down their burdens and use their arms to fight with as readily as if they were limbs.”

Alexander, indeed, when his force was so burdened with booty and the apparatus of luxury that it could scarcely move, had the stuff collected, all except absolute necessities, and put a torch under his own to begin with and then ordered the rest to be burned, so that the mischance should fall on the stuff rather than on discipline.

Quint. Curt., bk. 6.

[9] Further, as to military discipline, it was provided by a military law that camp-followers should not wander about indiscriminately among the cavalry, and that no soldier should sell the corn supplied to him at the public expense or exchange his booty of cattle or slaves for wine, and that no private soldier should have a slave or beast of burden in the battle-array or camp, and that no one should afterwards be captain where he had been military tribune, nor one who had been captain afterwards become private. And so Livy tells how one Volero, a ple-beian, who in earlier expeditions had been a captain, was enrolled among the privates and refused his military duties, alleging that he ought not to be made a private where he had been a captain, as he had not incurred any ignominy during his service. A soldier, too, who failed to demand his rations within proper limits of time had them withdrawn. Bk. 2.
Dion. Halic., bk. 9.
Cod. 12, 37, 6.

Cato, too, urged that soldiers should be instructed to be fierce towards enemies, but humane towards fellow-citizens and allies, slow to inflict an injury, but prompt to avenge one, and desirous of nothing more than winning praise and glory. And in olden time it used to be sedulously inculcated that soldiers should deem their first bond to be the obligation of their oath; and the second the love of each other in, as it were, an inexplicable union; and the third the iniquity of desertion.

[10] Lucius Æmilius Paulus used to say that there should be one commander in an army to consider and devise what measures should be adopted, at times by himself and at times with those whom he has summoned to his councils, not discussing his plans either openly or secretly with those who have not been summoned, and that the private soldier has in charge three things, to keep his body as strong and active as possible, his weapons in condition, his food ready for sudden orders; and for the rest to know that the care of himself belongs to the immortal gods and his general; and that an army was not in a healthy condition if its consul and commander were affected by rumors of the mob. For (as Tacitus says) soldiers ought to be ignorant of some matters and to know about other matters. The rigor of discipline varies with the authority of commanders, so that there are many orders which it is expedient should only be given through centurions and tribunes. Livy, bk. 44.

It is rather by the obedient attitude than by the putting forth of officers' orders that a military situation is kept in healthy condition; and that army will be bravest in time of crisis which is the quietest before the crisis. And so Cæsar rebuked the rash eagerness of his troops before Avaricum, for they determined for themselves where to go and what to do, and did not halt at the signal for withdrawal, and could not be kept in hand by the military tribunes and legates; and, much as he admired their high spirit, which neither fortified camps nor high mountains nor walled towns could check, yet, said Cæsar, he must equally blame their license and arrogance in thinking that the planning of victory and of

Caes., *Gallie*
war, bk. 7.

developments was their business rather than the business of their generals, and that he wished for modesty and self-restraint in his troops not less than for valor and high spirit.

[11] Again, there is preserved in Flavius Vopiscus a letter from Aurelianus Cæsar to some tribune, in which military discipline is briefly touched on, as follows:

"If you want to be tribune, nay, if you want to live, control the hands of your men. Let none steal another man's chicken or seize his sheep or carry off his grapes or requisition oil or salt or wood, but let him be content with his rations; let him make for the booty of the enemy and not the tears of the provincials; let his armor be clean, his tools in repair, his sandals stout, his clothing new; let him put off his old clothing; let him spend his pay on a sword-belt, and not in a cook-shop; let him wear armlet and ring; let him groom his horse and clean his own stall, and not sell the animal; let him readily attend to the company's mule; one soldier should humor another as if he were his slave; a soldier is entitled to free medical aid; soldiers should give nothing to soothsayers; should live chastely in their quarters; and the one who goes to law should get a flogging." So he.

Furthermore, for the better keeping of soldiers in their duty, governors of provinces through which troops pass have instructions to have all supplies ready for them, without giving cause of complaint to the provincials, and whatever expenses are incurred in so doing are reckoned part of any tribute-money that may be owing to the emperor. Soldiers, too, are bidden to be content with such food as is found in the different localities, and they can not claim any different food. This is also laid down in the constitutions of Gaul.

Nov. 130, col. 10.

CHAPTER II.

Of the duties of legate and tribune and other officers.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The principal military officials among the Romans.2. Who legates are.3. The functions of a legate different from those of a general.4. The limits of one's commission ought not to be exceeded in war.5. Whether the terms of a commission can be departed from when a favorable change of circumstances arises. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">6. The good governance of an army.7. Furlough to be sparingly granted to soldiers.8. Soldiers to be promoted for merit.9. The military tribunes had authority over the men and a vine-staff used to be carried before them.10. The functions of tribunes.11. The punishment for a false return of the number of the troops. |
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[1] Who were in olden times the principal military officials among the Romans is clearly shown by the following words of the dictator Papyrius, as reported by Livy:

Livy, bk. 8.

“So that the soldier would not obey the commands of the centurion, nor the centurion the tribune's, nor the tribune the legate's, nor the legate the consul's, nor the master of the horse the dictator's: and the orders of generals-in-chief would be disregarded.” Now we have already spoken of the office and power of a general or commander of an army.

[2] Legates were persons accompanying an expedition and helping in its affairs, who were appointed to consuls and generals in order to act as their deputies and carry their plans into execution. They were also in a position to give the most trustworthy testimony of any cases of good counsel or of any acts of bravery or of deserving valor or of cowardice, and also of the degree of care and good-faith and diligence and military discipline with which the commanders governed the army and camp; and whether their reports contained anything false or ill-founded, or not the whole truth. And the authority of legates was such, alike as regards the administration of a province and the management of an army and the drawing up of a battle-line, that if the consuls or the general were absent or prevented, they exercised sovereign power.

Alex. ab Alex.,
Genial. dies, bk. 6,
ch. 3.

Civil war, bk. 3.

[3] Furthermore, it is clear that (as Cæsar says) the functions of a legate are different from those of a general. The former has in everything to carry out orders, while the latter has free discretion in the measures he takes for the good of the State. And so Cæsar said that the policy of Sylla, whom on his departure he had put into command of the camp, did not seem to have been a faulty one, namely, to recall his men when they pursued Pompey's troops too far, although it was a common belief that, if a keener attack had been assented to, the war could have

been ended on that day. For when Sylla was left by Cæsar in charge of the camp merely, he set his men free and was contented therewith and declined to take part in the engagement. For the same reason Quintus Titurius Sabinus, Cæsar's legate in the Gallic war, kept within the camp, although the enemy were already up to the trenches of the camp, for he thought that a legate ought not to fight with so numerous an enemy, especially in the absence of the supreme commander, unless on equal ground or because some favorable opportunity had arisen.

Caes., Gallic war, bk. 3.

Further, just as the Romans were extremely lenient with their generals (to whom they granted full discretion to provide for the State's highest interests) when they had sustained a reverse, as has been said elsewhere, so did they prove harsh in the punishment of legates, tribunes, and other subordinate officers in a case of contempt or disregard of the supreme authority.

[4] For in military matters it has always been reckoned a very grave fault, worthy of a capital accusation, for one to exceed the limits of his commission, even though he meet with success. It was especially on this ground and because of its accordance with old usage that the contention of the dictator Papyrius prevailed, when he demanded that his master of the horse, Quintus Fabius, should be given up to punishment for having led out the army contrary to his commands, although he had returned to camp victor over the Samnites. The Roman people, however, and the tribunes of the plebs interposed on behalf of Fabius, and after a time, overmastered by a speech of Papyrius, they turned to prayers and entreaties that the dictator should remit to them the punishment of the master of the horse; so he yielded; but he called them to witness that Quintus Fabius was not acquitted thereby of the guilt of fighting contrary to the orders of his commander, but that, after having been condemned as guilty, he was granted as a boon to the Roman people, and to the college of the tribunes which supported him with its prayers and not with the regular powers of its office. As to himself (said he) it was enough to have vindicated military discipline and sovereign authority, which had been placed in jeopardy.

Livy, bk. 8.

[5] There are, however, some who think that the terms of a commission may be departed from if, owing to change of circumstances, an opportunity arises of successful action—as, for instance, some chance occurrence promises a successful result and an almost certain victory—for fear of losing an opportunity of success which has been offered by the gods. This is, however, a thorny question, especially when reckoning has to be made with some hard and inexorable Papyrius or Manlius or Postumius, who holds that the whole office of a general is destroyed and dissolved if any one receives a command without due respect, or even with circumspect advice. For the limits of a commission must be jealously observed and nothing be done inconsistent with it, even if the

By inference in Dig. 17, 1, 30. Felinus, generally, on c. 1. X, 1, 2 (col. 14), and c. 9, X, 1, 33 (col. 3). Cremen. Sing. 150, and Rochus Curt. on c. 13, X, 1, 2 (col. 2).

probable result thereof would be the greater advantage and profit of the author of the commission. And this is a question which has been variously treated, even by philosophers. Beyond doubt the severity of Papyrius deterred others from successful action, although they had the opportunity; and the example of Quintus Fabius (says Livy) was so much before the eyes of the legate, Marcus Valerius, who commanded the camp in the absence of Papyrius, that he did not fear the forces of the enemy more than the grim anger of the dictator. And so when the commissariat was ambushed in difficult ground with heavy loss, the common belief is that the legate could have relieved it if he had not been in such dread of the stern edicts.

[6, 7] Further, the governance of an army does not consist alone in keeping discipline (as Marcian said), but also in observing it; and he who commands soldiers ought to grant them furlough as sparingly as possible, so much so that a soldier ought not to be sent to fish or hunt, and this was so laid down in the discipline of Augustus. In fact, for the greatest security, the tribune can not allow furlough to more than thirty men; if he allows it to more, their pay is to be passed on to the treasury, and the tribune who has allowed it must make the pay good to the men, in addition to the penalty of losing his girdle. But in a time of active service, or when an attack of the enemy is threatened, no one at all should be away from the standards and it will be a capital offense to allow furlough; and absence from the standards is so much disfavored that a soldier while on furlough is not taken as being absent on State business.

[8] Further, the commander of the army can not, at his mere pleasure, move a man from one rank to another, except the emperor give consent on grounds of utility to the State; for, as the emperor says, none should attain increase of honor by canvassing, but only by labor, and none should be promoted to dignity by voting, but by labor and according to due gradation of ranks; and that man ought to be in front of others who is put there by longer service or by labor. And so the consul Quintus Metellus, although prevented by no law from having his son as perpetual pupil-attendant (*contubernalis*), preferred, nevertheless, that he should earn the position in due course. And Theogenes the Athenian is reported to have employed an ingenious stratagem, while leading his army to Megara. Some soldiers besought promotion, and he replied that he would grant it to them then and there; and then he moved his cavalry to the front and bade them face about and, feigning to be the enemy, make an attack on their comrades; and when this was done he allowed the ranks of those whom he had in readiness as if for an attack of the enemy to be so arranged that each man held the position in which he wished to be and, as all the slackest had stepped back and all the keenest had jumped forward, he promoted each man in military rank just according to the place in which he found him standing.

It was, also, ordained of old that no one could be admitted to the tribuneship who had not previously commanded a wing, nor command a wing unless he had been in charge of a cohort; and it was ancient usage that when in camp a private should go and salute his centurion every morning and await orders, and similarly a centurion the tribune. But Hadrianus Cæsar promoted to the tribuneship men of ripe years and great sagacity, who had been taught by age and experience. And he issued an edict forbidding the appointment of a beardless young man to that office; and Alexander of Macedon put such a value on his tribunes and centurions that he would allow no one under sixty years to command the ranks. It is clear, however, that at times, in days gone by, these dignities were conferred on the unworthy and even on boys under puberty.

Dig. 27, 1, 8, and
Cod. 6, 21, 18.

It was also enacted by a military law that none should subsequently be made a captain where he had been tribune, for the centurion, decurion, and commander of the ranks were inferior to the tribune; but this rule, so Livy says, was not made in favor of tribunes, but it was enacted by a military *lex sacrata* (i. e., law devoting to the infernal gods one who violated it) on the demand of some confederate soldiers adversely to Publius Salonus, who was military tribune and chief centurion in almost alternate years. But military tribunes may have centurions and decurions under them, subject, however, to the authority of the legate.

[9] Further, it is usual for military tribunes, when in command of camps and legions, to exercise authority over the troops, and the lictors carried vine-staves before them to deter the insolent, and not rods as in the case of a consul or prætor. For the Romans used to beat contumacious soldiers, not with rods, but with vine-staves; but if they were foreigners, with cudgels, and this punishment was not infaming in character, as was that inflicted by a lictor. It must, however, be observed that tribunes could not punish a Roman citizen capitally, nor any other soldier, as we shall remark elsewhere. It was, too, an early usage for the head of the State, when raising any one to the tribuneship, to give a sword into his hand, signifying thereby that he was to have authority over the soldiers according to military law.

Plin., bk. 14,
ch. 1.

Below, chap. on
military courts.

[10] Now it was the especial function of a tribune to supervise the camp and army and see that it was properly entrenched and patrolled; to order ever-watchful sentinels, so that the enemy could not effect anything by stealth; to have the troops who were in camp listening for a word and intent for a command; to lead them to exercises, to appoint their stations, to collect the keys of the gates, to visit the watch, to attend to the provisioning of the troops, to sample the provisions, to repress the frauds of the corn-measurers, to listen to the complaints of the men, to chastise their offenses within the limits of his authority, to inspect the invalided, to take charge of the wounded, and above all to administer to the soldiers the solemn oath.

Dig. 49, 16, 12, 2.

Further, it was from the tribunes that the troops received the watchword—whether they were proceeding to march against the enemy or to lay out a camp or to take their position in the front line of battle or in the reserve line, or to go on outpost duty or on watch. And the tribunes received instructions from the general about the appropriate signal. It was also the peculiar function of the tribunes, in the heat of battle, to cheer and admonish the men, individually and collectively, and to take note of their conduct in attack. And it was theirs to grant a discharge to soldiers who had performed the military service that was required of them, on good cause shown and upon the authority and subject to the orders of the consuls—it not being competent for the tribunes to do this on their own authority. And so the censor Quintus Fulvius Flaccus removed his brother Fulvius from the Senate for having discharged a cohort belonging to the legion of which he was tribune, without the orders of the consul.

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.
Livy, bk. 31.

And, lastly, it was in olden days an especial duty of generals and tribunes and centurions, when in summer-camp, to make the recruits who had recently joined march up and down and over and over again in squads, and shout and take up positions and submit to authority and obey the word of command and form in close order, or make a wedge or a phalanx, and follow the standard and accustom themselves to endure weariness and heat and vigils. And all this in order that they might not encounter the enemy without plan or governance, or be beaten and retreat, and that every one might know his place in the ranks, in such sort that by daily use their instincts would tell them what was to be done and what left undone, without any outside impulse or command. And this special drilling is attributed to Iphicrates, who by that means taught the troops so to take up their position in battle-line, without the general's intervention, as to display the most scientific disposition.

[11] Further, if a tribune or centurion or any other person makes a false return of the numbers of the troops and intercepts the extra pay he is condemned in fourfold and degraded; but by the constitutions of Gaul he is punished capitally. He also who takes money in connection with the draft or discharge of a soldier is liable under the *Lex Julia repetundarum* (i. e., on extortion) and is, accordingly, usually punished by exile or worse, and anything given to obtain exemption from levy as a recruit can be reclaimed as if given on immoral consideration.

Cod. 1, 27, 2, 8.

Dig. 48, 11, 6, 2.

Dig. 48, 11, 7, 3.

Cod. 4, 7, 3.

Further, any one who, during a passage of troops, receives anything from towns or estates, by bringing improper pressure to bear, is liable in double; but one who has plundered a province is usually recalled for so doing and ordered to make fourfold restitution.

Nov. 130, col. 10.

Dig. 48, 11, 1.

CHAPTER III.

Of quartermasters (metatores, mensores).

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| 1. Quartermasters, who they are.
2. How quarters are assigned to troops.
3. Who are exempt from the inconveniences of supplying quarters. | 4. Nothing over and above quarters can be claimed by the troops.
5. Punishment of quartermasters who take bribes from those who supply quarters. |
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On Roman
Camps, and
Vegetius,
bk. 2, ch. 7.

[1] The name *metatores, mensores*, i. e., quartermasters, is given not only to those who select the place for pitching a camp or pavilions or tents (a topic well dealt with by Polybius), but also to those who go in advance of troops who have to be quartered in towns and indicate the houses, fixing marks on them and giving the names of those for whom quarters have to be found in each house; and any one who dares to destroy these marks is liable to condemnation for falsification.

[2] Further, in accordance with a rescript of the emperors Arcadius and Honorius, a house was divided into three parts and a third part was allotted to the troops—in such sort that the owner had the right of first choice, the guest the second, and the third part was left again for the owner. Any compartments used for sale of merchandise are ordinarily exempt from this division, unless there does not happen to be enough room for the troops in their third of the house. Men of illustrious rank, however, ordinarily have half a house, not a third, assigned to them—on the terms that the one chooses and the other makes the division. Antigonus, however, decreed that none under fifty years of age should be quartered on a *materfamilias* (matron); and when he heard that his son had gone off into the house of one who had three very good-looking daughters, he said, “I hear, my son, that you have very crowded quarters in a house where there are several owners; take more roomy quarters.” And he bade him make the change. Further, a soldier whose home is in that town can not demand that other quarters shall also be assigned him.

[3] Certain persons are free from the annoyance of having to provide quarters: the physicians of the sacred palace, to wit, professors of the liberal arts in the City of Rome, and painters of free birth; men of consular or patrician rank, consuls, the heirs of these persons, and others of preëminent dignity. This important immunity was granted them by a constitution of the Emperor Arcadius: and the Emperor Claudius, by a decree of the Senate, forbade privates to enter the houses of senators, even for the purpose of paying their respects.

Suetonius, Life
of Claudius.

[4] Men of low estate, too, ought not to be compelled to supply quarters to soldiers; and in towns quarters only can be demanded for the troops, so that they can not claim from their host anything necessary for themselves or the keep of their animals, nor indeed can they receive such things even from willing hosts.

Dig. 1, 18, 6, 5.
Cod. 12, 40, 5; and
12, 41; and 12, 37, 3.

[5] Quartermasters who have extorted money by improper means from those supplying quarters must restore it twofold and are punished by exile and, according to the constitutions of Gaul, capitally.

Nov. 130, col. 10.

CHAPTER IV.

Of soldiers and who can serve as such.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Soldiering is not sinful. 2. A soldier may lawfully kill an enemy. 3. Who are called soldiers. 4. Clerics not to be enrolled as soldiers. 5. Nor agriculturists. 6. Nor slaves. 7. Nor those capitally accused. 8. Nor heretics. 9. Nor those branded with <i>infamia</i>. 10. Nor crippled persons. 11. Soldiers forbidden to engage in agriculture. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. No one can have two military positions of differing kinds. 13. A soldier may not be a <i>procurator</i> (agent). 14. Of the age for soldiering. 15. Veterans may be levied. 16. Natives rather than foreigners to be employed as soldiers. 17. The Romans for a long time served at their own costs. 18. The amount of a Roman soldier's pay. |
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[1] To take part in a just war is no wrong, as we have elsewhere shown; but to do so for the sake of booty is a sin. And so, when John, a man most acceptable to God, was asked by the soldiers, who were anxious about salvation, what they should do, he did not forbid them to serve as soldiers, but said, "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely, and be content with your wages."

Luke, ch. 3. And
c. 2, C. 23, qu. 1,
last para.

[2] Accordingly, both the canon and the civil laws allow a soldier to kill an enemy in war; nay, if he abstains from doing so, he is guilty of desertion and contempt of sovereign authority.

c. 13, and c. 41,
C. 23, qu. 5.
And Dig. 48, 8, 3;
and 49, 16, 7.

c. 13, C. 23, qu. 5.

[3] Now those only are called soldiers (*milites*) who have had the oath put to them and have taken it and have been incorporated in the ranks. Sailors and oarsmen in the navy are "soldiers."

Dig. 37, 13, 1.

[4] Further, not every one is admissible as a soldier and some persons are not compelled to become soldiers; for clerics, first of all, are exempt from military service, a concession made in olden days, as part of a general immunity, by the Gauls to their Druids, who had charge of religious matters. The priests also, on Romulus' foundation, were free from all warlike duties; to this law an addition was made, after the capture of the city by the Gauls, that priests should have this immunity

Caes., Gallic war,
ch. 6.
Dion. Halic., Rom.
antiq., bk. 2.

Appian, Civil war,
bk. 2.
Plutarch, Life of
Marcellus.

except in the event of a Gallic war. Cicero, however, tells us that in the Gallic war the usual exemptions prevailed, but not at the time of the Gallic and Italian revolt—from which he infers that revolt is a graver thing than war. But clerics are forbidden to serve as soldiers: and of them and of himself Ambrose said: "Let not the soldiers of Christ look to iron missiles and armour; but grief, weeping, tears, and entreaties were my weapons against the enemy." For no man that warreth

Philipp. 5 and 8.

c. 3, C. 23, qu. 8.
And c. 3, Dist. 36.
And c. 1, and c. 27,
and c. 28, C. 23,
qu. 8.

for God entangleth himself in the affairs of this life (as the Apostle To Timothy. says) ; and if a cleric should take service as a soldier he will be unfrocked. c. 5 [and c. statim?] C. 23, qu. 8.
But one in lesser orders who fights in a just war—unless he kills or wounds—is not irregular. c. 24, X, 5, 12, and gloss on c. 47, C. 7, qu. 1.

[5] Agriculturists, also, are not admissible as soldiers, even when they willingly offer themselves, nor can they be compelled to serve if unwilling; for it is not less important to the State to have men to till its soil than to have men to fight its battles. Hence it has been decreed that agriculturists who have enlisted as soldiers can be reclaimed into their former condition; for the dirt of the fields does not go well with the honor of soldiering. Cod. 12, 33, 3; and 11, 48, 18. Cod. 11, 48, 7. Cod. 11, 63, 4. Cod. 12, 5, 2.

[6] Wherefore also Marcianus ruled that slaves ought to be kept off all military service: otherwise they may be punished capitally. But a distinction must be drawn, in accordance with a rescript of Trajan, according as they have offered themselves voluntarily or have been levied or have even been given as substitutes; for if they have been levied, it is the official (*inquisitor*) who is in fault; if they have been given as substitutes, it is the fault of those who have given them; if they came of their own accord with full knowledge of their status, the fault must be visited on them. Indeed if it be with the cognizance of their owner that slaves have succeeded in enrolling themselves as soldiers, he will be deprived both of his ownership and of the rights of patronage (*jura patronatus*). Plin., Epist., bk. 10. Cod. 12, 33, 7.

Furthermore, after the defeat at Cannæ the dictator Marcus Junius and Tiberius Sempronius, his master of the horse, made a novel levy and, under the pressure of necessity, bought at public cost eight thousand strong youths out of slavery and armed them—having first questioned them one by one whether they were willing to serve as soldiers (whence they were called *volones*, volunteers)—and subsequently, by dint of discipline and authority, they turned them out first-rate soldiers. And when the same Tiberius Sempronius was appointed consul, he issued instructions to the legates and tribunes that no reproaches based on the former status of any soldier should sow discord in the ranks; that the veteran should allow himself and the recruit to be treated on the same footing, and the same as between the freeman and the “*volo*”; and that all should esteem those to be sufficiently honorable and well-born to whom the Roman people had intrusted its arms and ensigns; for the same stress of fortune which makes it necessary to adopt any given measures, makes it necessary to support them when adopted. Livy, bk. 22.

Again, not only slaves, but those also about whose status there is a dispute, are prohibited during that time to assume the title of soldier, even though they may be in reality free. So also free-born persons who are in good faith detained in slavery (*qui bona fide serviunt*), and ransomed prisoners before paying off their ransom-price, may not be

Livy, bk. 22.

Dig. 49, 16, 8. received as soldiers. We read, further, how in days gone by the Roman people took great heed that there should be no need for generals to administer the oath of service to the lowest class of citizen (*capite censos*), whose excessive poverty laid them open to suspicion, and so public arms were not intrusted to this class; and Caius Marius was the first to break this usage, confirmed as it was by long continuance, and to admit one of this class as a soldier.

Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 3. [7] Further, those liable to a capital charge who voluntarily enlist Dig. 49, 16, 4, 5. are capitally punished; similarly with those who have been given to beasts or deported to an island, and who enlist or conceal the facts when Dig. 49, 16, 4: 1 levied. But if one enlists who has been deported for a time only, and and 2. that time has now elapsed, the nature of his condemnation must be inquired into (so Arrius Menander ruled), so that if it involves perpetual infamy he may be discharged from his military oath; otherwise he is Dig. 49, 16, 4, 4. not prohibited from enlisting and seeking the honors of military service. He again who has compounded the adultery of his wife is ordered to be Dig. 48, 5, 12. discharged from his oath and deported. Yet, nevertheless, after the defeat of Cannæ, the dictator Marcus Junius, inasmuch as there was a dearth of soldiers of the proper class of citizen, decreed that if any of those who had ventured on capital crime or who were in chains as judgment-debtors would serve under him as soldiers he would order Livy, bk. 23. their release from their liability or their debt.

Cod. 1, 5, 8. [8, 9] Furthermore, heretics are forbidden to enlist and all who Dig. 3, 2, 2, 3. are suffering under *infamia*. Therefore those affected with ignominy Dig. 49, 16, 6. are not to be admitted as soldiers. Also, no one can assume the quality Cod. 12, 33, 2. of armed soldier in order to evade the obligation to hold civil office; and he who has sought a soldier's position in order to escape a lawsuit Cod. 12, 33, 1. should be discharged from his oath on the application of his opponent. Dig. 49, 16, 4, 8. So also one who has enlisted through fear of a criminal charge, with Dig. 49, 16, 16. which he is threatened, must promptly be discharged from his oath. No Cod. 12, 43, 1. vagrant and no veteran soldier ought to be admitted as a recruit. He, too, must be judged unworthy of a soldier's position who has brought Dig. 37, 15, 3. a criminal charge against his parents who reared him.

[10] Further, those so crippled as to be unfit for military service Dig. 49, 16, 4, 12. are not to be received as soldiers—not to be included in this list is the man born with only one testicle or who has lost one, for he may lawfully enlist, according to the rescript of Trajan. The generals Sylla and Dig. 49, 16, 4, pr. Cotta are remembered to have been naturally of that build: and we read also that the eunuch Narses was appointed by Justinian to the command of his army, and it was he who put an end to the war with the Ostrogoths in Italy; and a man with only one testicle is not either diseased or Dig. 21, 1, 6, 2. blemished, seeing that he can procreate. And Cyrus had eunuchs as his bodyguards, thinking that they would show more devotion to duty and be a more reliable protection as being beyond the temptations of lust.

[11] Again, soldiers are forbidden to carry on agriculture or trading or any other business lest their proficiency in arms should suffer by their attention to other occupations. For, as Plato laid down in the *Republic*, it is fitting for different individuals to practice different arts. Cod. 12, 37.
Dig. 49, 16, 12, 1.
Cod. 12, 35, 13;
and 31, end. Wherefore, too, a soldier may not purchase land in a province lest his attention to agriculture should lead to neglect of his military duties. Cod. 12, 35, 31.

[12, 13] Hence, too, no one may have two military positions of different kinds at the same time, or a civil office and a military position. Cod. 12, 33, 5. And for the same reason a soldier may not be an agent, not even for his father or mother or wife, but only in his own interests (*procurator in rem suam*). And a soldier can not sue in respect of property which he asserts to have been given to him, when the gift has been made with intent to alter the parties to a suit (*judicii mutandi causa*); but it is the former owner who must bring the action, lest it seem that a lawsuit rather than a bit of property has been made over to the soldier. Cod. 2, 13, 2. Lastly, a soldier is forbidden to act as accuser, except in cases of treason and of outrage on himself or his family. And Justinian enacted that those who involved soldiers in private business and withdrew them from the State's business were to be punished by having their property sold up. Dig. 48, 2, 8.
Dig. 48, 4, 7.
Cod. 9, 1, 8.
Nov. 116.

[14] It now remains to say something about the age for soldiering. It is known that the Romans would hardly ever have any one enlisted as a recruit who was less than seventeen or more than forty-six years old, and this dates from the ancient census-arrangements of Servius Tullius and was subsequently secured by a *lex sacrata* under Caius Gracchus. At the time, however, when the Romans were sore pressed in their war against Veii, a levy was made, and not only were younger persons enlisted (Livy tells us), but older persons also were compelled to give in their names to do service as city-guards. This was by the orders of Camillus. Plutarch, Life of Gracchus.
Bks. 5 and 6.

On another occasion, after the defeat at Cannæ, the dictator Decius* Junius enrolled persons of less than seventeen years, nay mere boys, and those over sixteen who did not take part in that war were officially censured. But Phocion, with intent to lessen the ardor for war of the over-bellicose Athenians, by means of a rigid levy, not only summoned the young men but compelled even octogenarians who had served their term to give in their names. There is extant, however, a constitution of the Emperor Frederick dealing with the judicial combat, which says that one over sixty or under twenty-five is not bound to fight in person. Sacred history also tells us that the Lord ordered Moses to enroll all Israelites over twenty years of age, and this was the age which Plato thought the fittest for military service. With this in view, the precept is wise that if you have no veterans you must seek young recruits. Livy, bk. 22.
Feud. Law: ii, 47.
Numb. 1.

* Thus in original, but should be Marcus. See page 186.

[15] Now a small band of trained veterans is far more valuable than untaught and inexperienced numbers who, when confronted by slaughter, are terrified by every trifle and think more about escape than about glory. And so Alexander, after the death of Philip, his father, overcame divers and countless hostile forces by means of the forty thousand veterans, well-trained and thoroughly experienced in the business of war, whom his father had left to him, and he reduced very many provinces of the world; and when the same man was about to lead his seasoned veterans against Darius, he exercised great care in his choice of recruits and thereby overthrew and put to flight a vast horde of Persians with his small band.

Veget., de re milit.,
bk. 1, ch. 1.

It was the ancient practice, too, to judge by a man's habit of body whether he was fit for military service, with deep chest and erect carriage, whether he was brave and undaunted and what his appearance and vigor and bodily strength would be, so that the service of the State might employ such as were brave and faithful. And so Cato held that a fat soldier was of no use to the State, for everything between his gullet and his groin would be in the service of his belly.

[16] And sovereigns should be urged to employ as soldiers in war natives rather than foreigners, for the latter serve for pay rather than glory. This was the example set by Tullus Hostilius; for he had determined on war at a time when the Romans had had forty years of peace and leisure and exemption from war, and he scorned foreign auxiliaries, and summoned his own men only to war, and in a short time he turned them out first-rate soldiers by dint of discipline. For native guards are far the safest, and one's own arms are far more suitable than another's. Sacred history is taken to have shown this to us, for when David offered himself in single combat with Goliath the Philistine, and Saul, to increase his courage, would have put his own armor on him, David would not have it, on the ground that it would hamper him, but attacked with his own weapons only, namely, a sling and a staff, and laid his enemy low. Indeed, if a general desires, or is driven by necessity, to employ foreign auxiliaries at all, he must give especial heed not to place such confidence in them as that he has in his camp a smaller amount of native force and strength, lest there deservedly befall him what befell Cnæus Scipio in his war in Spain against Hasdrubal. For Hasdrubal noticed what a small force of Romans was in Cnæus Scipio's camp and how he was placing all his hope in the Celtiberi, and so he had secret interviews with the chieftains of the Celtiberi and bargained with them that, for a great reward, they would call off their forces and withdraw from the war, for there was no fear that the Romans would detain them, seeing that the Romans were so few in number. And Livy urges Roman generals to keep this example before them as a warning. Now, because the Emperor

1 Sam., ch. 15.

Bk. 25.

at Constantinople had no forces of his own, he summoned Turkish auxiliaries to protect him from his neighbors; but he could not get rid of them at the end of the war; and that is how the whole of Greece fell under the rule of Turkey.

I, therefore, do not approve of the policy of Cyrus, who declared that soldiers should not be selected out of citizens, but be brought from afar like the best horses, nor of that ancient custom of the Alexandrians, who would not allow of any but foreign soldiers. Much sounder was the Roman policy; for, in order to have an ample supply of native soldiers, they stipulated in their treaty with Antiochus that he should not hire soldiers or receive volunteers out of Roman dominions. And in the war with Pyrrhus, although the Romans had suffered two defeats, they nevertheless returned the auxiliaries who had been sent by the Carthaginians.

Livy, bk. 38.
Appian, Syrian war.

Justin, bk. 18.

[17] Further, it is worthy of remark that the soldiers of Roman stock, right away from the foundation of their city for nearly three hundred and fifty years, served at their own cost and expense. For, during one part of the year they served in camp and during the other part they made provision for their children and wives and household gods and themselves and their household by agriculture and country tasks. But at the time when a declaration of war against Veii was under discussion, which war would involve a long and difficult siege and would have to be carried on throughout the winter, the Romans, taught by expediency and necessity, provided by a decree of the Senate for the payment of the soldiers out of funds publicly collected, although up to that time every one had performed his military duties at his own expense. Further, after the defeat at Cannæ there was such a determination to help the treasury-deficit that no knight and no centurion would take pay, and they employed the word "mercenaries" as a term of abuse for those who would take pay.

Livy, bk. 4.

Livy, bk. 24.

[18] Now Tacitus indicates that the pay of the Roman soldier was ten asses a day, when he says that during the Pannonian revolt the soldiers complained, among other things, that their bodies and souls were reckoned at ten asses a day each, and that for this sum they had to find dress, arms, and tents, and put up with the severity of the centurions and the absence of gifts; and so they claimed pay at the rate of a denarius each. It is clear from this that, although the denarius was originally reckoned at ten asses (and so bore the mint-stamp X), yet in course of time the value of the denarius was increased. And so, during the dictatorship of Quintus Fabius Maximus, when Hannibal was bearing hard on the State, Pliny writes that the exchange-value of the denarius was sixteen asses; yet he asserts that for the purposes of a soldier's pay a denarius was always given for ten asses. But the prætorian cohorts received two denarii each. If, however, we compare this denarius with the

Annals, from death of Aug., bk. 1.

Bk. 33, ch. 3.

Tac. Annals, bk. 1.

De veter. col. num., money of our day in weight and value, Covarruvias clearly proves that
 ch. 2. Hornan. in it was almost equal to the Spanish real, after Endæus and others; so
 Nomencl. rei num. that the pay of our soldiers is not at all or very little different from that
 Alc. on Tac. of the Roman soldier.

But what the amount of the pay of Roman cavalry was, is not quite clear, except for the fact that public horses were assigned to them and that in the division of booty they sometimes had three times, and sometimes twice, as much as the infantry. And so, out of the booty taken by Lucius Æmilius Paulus, after the defeat of Perseus, each foot-soldier
 Bk. 55. (Livy tells us) got a hundred, each centurion twice as much, each horse-soldier three times—on which some found a conjecture as to the pay of a
 Bk. 55. horse-soldier. But in another place the same writer tells us that there was so much booty from the Epirote cities, which had defected to Perseus, that four hundred denarii apiece were divided among the horse-soldiers and two hundred apiece among the foot-soldiers. And so I dare not make any definite statement on this matter. But it is quite clear that the cavalry were held in highest honor among the Romans.

CHAPTER V.

Of the military oath.

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| 1. One who was not enrolled with the military oath could not be a soldier.
2. How it was usual to take the oath.
3. Various formulas of the oath. | 4. Nature of oath among Lacedæmonians.
5. The ceremonials of the Samnite oath.
6. The oath taken by Athenians on reaching puberty. |
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[1] Among the Romans no one was allowed to be a soldier or attack the enemy with a sword who had not been enrolled with the accompaniment of the military oath; and it was just as much a military offense for one who had not been enrolled with an oath to kill an enemy as for one to commit an outrage upon a fellow-citizen or an ally. And so, when Pompilius—or, as others read, Paulus Æmilius—discharged one legion, and with it a son of Cato also who was serving in it, and Cato's son remained in the army because of his martial ardor, Cato wrote to Pompilius that if his son obtained leave to remain in the army, he must a second time be bound by the military oath, because, as the first oath had ceased to operate, he could not rightly fight with the enemy. And to his son, Cato wrote that he must be careful to keep out of the way of fighting, it not being right for one who was not a soldier to fight with the enemy.

Cic., Offic., bk. 1.

[2] In earlier days the cavalry squadrons and the infantry by centuries voluntarily pledged their oaths with each other. Then later, in the consulship of Æmilius and Terentius Varro, for the first time and never previously, the soldiers were compelled by the military tribunes to take a statutory oath instead of a voluntary one. The commander was bound to take this oath first, then according to rank there followed the legates, then the tribunes, then the centurions, after them the decurions and then the camp-prefects, and last of all the private soldiers. This oath was taken afresh each year on the first of January.

[3] It was a solemn oath in which the takers swore by the gods that they would assemble at the consul's command and not disband without it; that they would not depart for flight or for fear, nor leave the ranks except to bring or seek weapons or to assault the enemy or to succor a comrade.

But in later times, as Vegetius says, the soldiers swore by God and Christ and the Holy Ghost and by the majesty of the Emperor (to whom, says he, fidelity and devotion are due as if to God in the body) that they would diligently perform all the Emperor's commands, would

De re milit., ch. 5.

never desert the colors, nor refuse death for the Roman State. But sometimes when a great battle was expected, and at times of grave crisis, the troops would swear (so we read) that they would never return to camp except after the defeat, rout, and overthrow of the enemy. This was done in the consulship of Marcus Fabius and Cnæus Manlius, in the war against the Veii and Etruscans, for the consuls abode in the camp and would not trust the troops with arms (because in the year before, through disaffection to the consul Cæso Fabius, the infantry refused to follow up the enemy after his rout by their cavalry and returned to the camp without the command of the consul). Then Marcus Flavoleius, in his ardor for battle, took the initiative and said, "As victor, Marcus Fabius, I will return from the battle-line"; should he play false, he invokes Jupiter the father, Mars Gradivus and the other gods. After that the whole army, one by one, made the same invocation.

Livy, bk. 2.

In the same way, when Pompey halted near Dyrrhachium and ordered the camp to be pitched and the army was in great alarm, Labienus, in order to reassure it, set the example and swore that he would not desert Pompey but would share the same chance, whatever fortune might have in store for him; the other legates did the same; the military tribunes and the centurions followed, and the whole army took the same oath. And when Pompey decided to engage Cæsar in battle, the same Labienus was again the first to swear that he would not return to camp except as victor and he urged the others to do the same; so Pompey, approving this, took the same oath and there was none of the others who hesitated to take it. Petreius, too, Pompey's legate, exacted from all his men, when they were in communication with one another about a proposed defection to Cæsar, an oath that they would not desert the army and its leaders, nor betray it, nor make schemes for themselves apart from the others. And the commander-in-chief himself took an oath in those words and compelled Afranius to take the same; then followed the military tribunes and centurions: and the men, led out by centuries, took the same oath. Now Alexander's soldiers used to swear in his own words, he taking that oath first, that they would have the same enemies and the same friends as he had.

Caes., Civil war, bk. 3.

Caes., Civil war, bk. 3.

Caes., Civil war, bk. 1.

Quint. Curt., bk. 7.

[4] This too was the oath which the soldiers were wont to take among the Lacedæmonians, namely, that they would have the same enemies and the same friends as their general, so that there might be one firm agreement and federation between them for woe or for weal.

[5] But the Samnites, at times of great crisis, used to hold a levy with the accompaniment of the same ancient oath-ritual as on the initiation of recruits, and after a sacrifice had been offered in solemn fashion the general bade an official summon all the noblest in family or in exploit and, while the centurions stood around with drawn swords, the

soldier was approached to the altar rather as a victim than as a sharer in the sacred rite, and he was bound by an oath not to publish what was there seen and heard and then he was made, in a weird incantation, to devote to eternal destruction himself, his family and his stock should he refuse to go in battle whither his generals led him or should he himself flee from the battle-line or see another flee and not straightway slay him; and those who refused to take that oath were cut in pieces before the altar and, lying there among the carnage of the sacrifice, were a lesson to the rest not to refuse.

Livy, bk. 10.

[6] Now it appears in Æschines that the oath taken by the Athenians, on reaching puberty, was such as this: "My consecrated weapons I will in no manner handle with dishonor; whatever comrade may be mine in the battle-array, him I will not desert in danger; for our hearths and altars, alone or with others, I will strenuously fight; my fatherland, such and as great as I have found it, neither lesser nor worse, but greater and better, will I leave it."

It is a traditional story, too, that the Athenians, by reason of daily disagreements and breaches of the Law of Nations, developed bitter hatred and enmity towards the men of Megara, and that, whenever they bound their soldiers by the customary military oath, they made them also swear that every year during their term of military service, by whatever means they could, they would invade the lands and territory of Megara with a hostile army and would lay the country waste, not leaving anything intact, and would bring upon it all possible disaster of war.

It is, further, worthy of remark that when the whole Roman army took an oath to the consul, it sufficed if the centurion or tribune, on behalf of the army, swore in a set form of words with uplifted voice, and the whole array and each individual soldier with a common accord and assent took a silent vow in the same words, and this was just as binding as if each individual had said the set form of words aloud, and it was deemed sacred and inviolable.

It must also not be omitted that the tribunes were wont, on arriving where a camp was pitched, to exact from all in the camp, free as well as slaves, and individually, an oath that they would not steal anything from the camp—nay, further, that if they found anything whatever they would bring it to the tribunes.

Polybius on
Roman Camps.

CHAPTER VI.

Of discharge.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One once enrolled as a soldier can not be removed from the roll. 2. A soldier may not quit the colors. 3. Three kinds of discharge. 4. Honorable discharge. 5. Discharge invalidated. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Ignominious discharge. 7. Ignominy not the same as infamy. 8. Who can be discharged with ignominy. 9. A fourth kind of discharge. 10. The general alone can grant a discharge. |
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[1, 2] When once a man has been enrolled as a soldier he can not, against his will, be removed from the roll unless he has been cashiered for unworthy conduct; for by a military *lex sacrata*, introduced in the dictatorship of Marcus Valerius Corvinus, no one who had been enrolled as a soldier might be removed from the roll without his consent. Nor might a soldier absent himself from the colors, or abandon his service, until he was discharged from his oath.

Livy, bk. 7.

Dig. 4, 6, 45.

Dig. 49, 16, 5.

Dig. 49, 16, 13, 3;
and 3, 2, 2.

[3, 4] Now there were three kinds of discharge and methods of releasing a soldier from his oath—the honorable, the invalidated (*causaria*, for good cause), and the ignominious.

An honorable discharge was given when the full term had been served and all the profits attending a discharge had been earned. It carried with it exemption from office-holding. On this occasion it was usual to dedicate shield, sword, and armor to the Lares (i. e., tutelar deities), just as gladiators do to Hercules, because by the aid of the immortal gods the soldier had completed his service and received his staff of discharge. The period for this discharge was on attaining the fiftieth year: Augustus, however, allowed those over forty-five, who did not wish to continue in the cavalry, the privilege of returning their horse and of obtaining a dismissal, as if after a completed term. Others were of opinion that no one could claim discharge until after ten years' service. By the Roman custom, however, the military oath was released at the end of the eleventh year and, when that had elapsed, a discharge was granted to those who had served their term. Later, the end of military service was put at the sixteenth year of service, and the Emperor Tiberius extended it to the twentieth year, and enacted that no discharge could be obtained before then; and this agrees with our rule. And one so discharged is exempt from all civilian offices and enjoys very many privileges.

Dig. 27, 1, 8.

Cod. 10, 55, 3.

Dig. 27, 1, 8
and Cod. 10, 55, 2.

[5] Now a discharge is said to be "invalidated" when a soldier is reported unfit for service by reason of age or bad health or some bodily weakness. This kind of discharge is not easily obtained, and only after

a physician's report and after a careful examination of the defect by an expert. When it has once been granted, the rule is not to allow the discharged soldier to be re-enrolled on the allegation that his health has been restored; but, whatever the ground of his discharge may have been, Cod. 12, 35, 6. he can not be re-admitted to the army without an order of the prince. A Cod. 12, 59, 2. soldier discharged on these grounds will also obtain exemption from office-holding, but not a perpetual exemption, and he does not enjoy Dig. 27, 1, 8. those privileges which those enjoy who have been discharged after a completed term; he will, however, enjoy the other privileges of veterans and will receive the rewards granted to a veteran. Now this discharge Dig. 49, 16, 13, 2. invalidated casts not the smallest stain on the reputation, and it is also an Cod. 12, 35, 8. honorable variety of discharge. Those so discharged are called invalids Dig. 27, 1, 8. (*causarii*) by Livy in the passage, "Let a third army be raised by Titus Bk. 7. Quintius out of the invalids (*causarii*) and older men, to guard the city-walls."

[6] But an ignominious discharge, also called shameful (*pro-brosa*), occurs when a soldier is discharged from his oath on the ground of wrong-doing or crime; and a soldier so discharged is, according to the Dig. 3, 2, 1. prætor's edict, to be infamous, and is disqualified for any dignity, and he may not reside in the city nor anywhere else where the emperor is. Cod. 12, 35, 3 and 10, 55, 1. In fact one so discharged without mention of ignominy is nevertheless Dig. 49, 16, 13, 3; and 3, 2, 2, 2; and Cod. 12, 35, 2. taken to have been discharged with ignominy, according to Macer. Dig. 49, 16, 13, 3. Ulpian, however, holds that the ground of the ignominy ought to be stated in the discharge. But in the case of those temporarily discharged, Dig. 3, 2, 2, 2. the infamy does not continue after the lapse of the time named. Cod. 10, 61, 1.

[7] It should be pointed out, too, that there is a difference between ignominy and infamy, as is abundantly clear from Cicero, who says that a censor's mark of blame is not as grave a matter as a judgment of a court; for the censor's rebuke entails little more for the guilty party than a blush and a mark of ignominy, which is little more than nominal, and dignities are still open to the man who has such a mark, and access to the Senate, too. But it is quite different with those who have been found guilty by a court. They are perpetually barred all honor and dignity, and receive the mark of infamy, which can not be imposed save upon a judgment. Accordingly, those soldiers who had been discharged Dig. 48, 1, 7. with ignominy were at one time not infamous, until the prætor's edict declared that they should become infamous. And so, that may be styled Dig. 3, 2, 1. ignominy which our commentators call infamy in point of fact, while that is infamy proper which they call infamy in point of law.

[8] It should not be forgotten, too, that not only a common soldier, but a centurion too, and a tribune, nay, any one holding command in an army, even though enjoying the distinctions of a consul, may be discharged by a general with ignominy, and that one so discharged suffers the mark of infamy. And so Caius Cæsar dismissed Caius Anienus, Dig. 3, 2, 2, pr.

the tribune of the tenth legion, with infamy in the presence of the army, in the following words:

" Caius Anienus, because in Italy you stirred up the soldiers of the Roman people against the republic, and made plundering expeditions into the townships, and have been of no use to me or to the State, and have caused the State a shortage of troops in a time of necessity, for these reasons, I remove you from my army with ignominy and I order you to leave Africa and to betake yourself as much farther as you can."

Ant. Her.,
Span. war, bk. 5.

[9] Besides these three kinds of discharge which we have described, Ulpian adds a fourth: If a man has enlisted in order to escape civil office-holding he is ordered to be dismissed; but this discharge does not affect his reputation.

Dig. 3, 2, 2, 2;
Dig. 3, 2, 2, 2; and
49, 16, 4, 8.
Dig. 3, 2, 2, 2; and
49, 16, 4, 8, end.

[10] Further, the general or commander of the army can alone grant a discharge. And so the censor Quintus Fulvius removed from the Senate his brother Fulvius for daring to discharge home, without the consul's orders, a cohort of the legion in which he was military tribune.

Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7.

CHAPTER VII.

Of the privileges of soldiers.

1. A soldier may not be thrown into prison for debt.
2. Whether nobles have the same privilege.
3. The privilege of not being sued beyond the limits of competence, its nature.
4. The property of an absent soldier may not be assigned to creditors.
5. A soldier is excused from being tutor and from giving evidence.
6. A soldier's property not liable to confiscation for non-payment of taxes.
7. Things bought with a soldier's money belong to him.
8. When a soldier sues for the recovery of money paid by mistake, the burden of proof is on the defendant.
9. A soldier may plead ignorance of law.
10. But not in case of delict.
11. A soldier not liable to torture or to the punishments of plebeians.
12. Military service does not release a son from paternal power.
13. A soldier son-in-power is reckoned independent of his father as regards *peculium castrense*.
14. What *peculium castrense* consists of.
15. Of soldiers' wills.
16. One capitally condemned for a military offense can make a will.
17. The goods of a soldier who leaves no successor pass to his legion.
18. A soldier who ill-advisedly enters on an inheritance is not liable beyond the assets.
19. He can not make a gift to his concubine.
20. A soldier who dies in battle is deemed to be still living.
21. A soldier who has died in battle counts towards his father's *jus trium liberorum* (privilege of three children).
22. Soldiers' privileges are not extended to the hurt of others.
23. Rewards owed to soldiers who have died are given to their children.
24. Soldiers' privileges are only granted to such as are strenuous in their military service.
25. Certain soldiers' privileges are not confined to soldiers, but are granted to others also who are camp-followers.
26. Women camp-followers, what privileges they may have.
27. Whether soldiers of the present day enjoy soldiers' privileges.

Seeing that, as Cicero truly says, honor fosters the arts and we are all spurred on by the desire of glory, while those pursuits are neglected which are generally despised, the Romans (who attained such a pre-eminent pitch of glory in war) acted with wisdom, undoubtedly, in holding the military profession in high honor; and they, accordingly, granted numerous very ample privileges to soldiers, the heads of which—and, for brevity's sake, the heads only—we will here just touch on. Tusc. Quest., bk. 1.

[1] In the first place, a soldier can not be imprisoned for debt, nor be sued save within the limits of competence; this was a provision of Egyptian law also. Action can not be brought against him, I say, save within the limits of competence; that is (as Justinian says), within the limits of what he can afford to pay, heed being given that he is not reduced to need thereby. And so, according to the common opinion, he is not bound to make cession of goods as an insolvent. Many, however, hold that this is only so if the debt has been contracted in camp or in connection with his military profession: the matter is doubtful. Certainly the privilege in question can not be renounced for it inheres in the person and not in the contract. Dig. 42, 1, 6 and 18.
Diod. Sicul., bk. 2.
Instit. 4, 6, 36.
Dig. 50, 17, 173.
Dig. 42, 1, 6 and
Bald. thereon.
Cod. 7, 71, 1, at end.
Alex., col. 5, on
Dig. 28, 6, 15.
Dig. 21, 3, 141 and
Alex. thereon.
Dec. on Dig. 50,
17, 28, n. 8.

Gloss. and doctors
on Dig. 42, 1, 6 and
text in Cod.
6, 21, 18.
Cod. 4, 28, 7.

[2] Many hold that this privilege attaches also to those who have

received a grant of nobility: and even if there may be a doubt on this point in common law, it has been so settled by a royal ordinance of Spain for those who are styled *hidalgos*. But neither by the common nor by Spanish law have these nobles any privilege not to be sued beyond their competence, for that is nowhere laid down, but only the privilege not to be imprisoned for debt. But the armor, chargers, and residences of these nobles can not be seized or taken in execution of a judgment except for a crown debt. By common law, too, the arms of soldiers can not be seized in execution of a judgment and this is sound, for the ancients used to call arms the limbs of soldiers. Nor ought execution to be levied on the pay of soldiers if the creditor can obtain satisfaction elsewhere.

Span. Ordin., bk. 3, ch. 5, tit. 2 and bk. 4, ord. Span. Ordin., bk. 24, with additional titles and 21, part 2.

Cod. 7, 53, 4.

[3] It must be remarked that that privilege of not being sued beyond the limits of competence does not affect the obligation nor the right of action nor the decision, for the plaintiff can sue for the whole amount; but the judge will only condemn within the limits of the defendant's competence, and even if the judge in error condemns in the whole amount the plaintiff will not obtain execution for more than the defendant can afford to pay; and the time to be regarded in this connection is the time of enforcement of the judgment; and so, although the defendant was able to pay at the time of the judge's sentence, he will nevertheless be able to plead this privilege.

Further, in favor of military service, sometimes not only soldiers, but those also who are desirous of becoming soldiers, have been released from imprisonment; for the consul Publius Servilius issued an edict, at the time when the Volscians were making war, that no one should detain a Roman citizen in fetters or under restraint so as to prevent him enrolling his name in the consul's lists; and, at a later day the dictator Marcus Junius, after the defeat of Cannæ, declared by edict that he would order the release from liability or from debt even of those who had dared to commit a fraud involving capital liability, and of all imprisoned judgment debtors, if they would take service as soldiers under him.

[4] Very much like the foregoing first-mentioned rule is that whereby, if a soldier absent on State service has rendered his goods liable to seizure in execution by his creditors, through having failed to enter an appearance, yet the goods will not be so assigned to his creditors. And if the creditors of a soldier have sold up any of his property under the law of distress, the soldier is entitled to be restored to his former position (*restitutio in integrum*) on discharge of the debt or on proffering the price at which the property was sold, should that have been less than the value of the property; for a soldier who is in any way damaged while performing his duties to the State is entitled to *restitutio in integrum*. And so the consul Publius Servilius declared, during the Volscian war, that none should seize or sell up the property of a soldier who was on service.

Ealdus on Cod. 7, 71, 1.
Alex. on Dig. 28, 6, 15.
Jason on Dig. 42, 1, 6.
Reg., bks. 4 and 5, tit. 2, bk. 4 ord. and bk. 69 Tauri.

Cinna, and others, on Dig. 42, 1, 6, and Cod. 28, 6, 15.

Acc. and Alc. on Dig. 50, 16, 125. Bald. on Rubr. Cod. 7, 71. Cyn. and Salic. on Cod. 7, 71, 1 col. 13.

Dig. 24, 3, 12.

Dig. 42, 1, 41.

Dig. 24, 3, 15.

Dig. 17, 2, 63, 7.

Livy, bk. 2.

Livy, bk. 23.

Cod. 2, 50, 4.

Cod. 8, 33, 2.

Cod. 2, 50, 6.

Cod. 2, 50, in general.

Livy, bk. 1.

[5, 6] Again, a soldier is excused from tutorship and other public duties; and he can not be compelled to give evidence if he wishes not to, lest private advantage should entail his absence from the colors where he is the guardian of the whole State. And so, though a soldier is not exempt from taxation yet his property will not be confiscated for non-proffer or non-payment of taxes.

[7, 8] And although things do not necessarily become my property because they are bought with my money, yet if they are bought with a soldier's money he can bring action for them as owner. And although in an action to recover money paid by mistake the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, yet a soldier-plaintiff is freed from this burden and it is thrown on the defendant, who must show that he had a good title to receive the payment—this is so, however, only when the soldier claims that the whole amount paid was not owing and not if his claim relates to a part only.

[9, 10] Another privilege of a soldier is that he is not prejudicially affected by ignorance of law, for it is his business to understand arms rather than laws. And so a soldier who, e. g., through ignorance of law, does not utilize some peremptory plea which is open to him, is allowed to resort to it even after sentence given. This is a provision also of the laws of Spain. In case of delict, however, ignorance of law is no excuse, for we learn by nature the obligation to abstain from delict.

[11] A soldier is further favored in not being subjected to torture or to any punishment of plebeians, and this is so even after he has received his discharge after a full term of service; and so he can not be condemned to the beasts or the gallows. The constitutions of Spain contain a similar provision in the case of nobles. And it applies, also, to the sons of soldiers and of veterans, aye, and to the grandsons, too, of such as have attained the highest military rank. But this privilege does not extend to cases of high treason, treachery, sorcery, forgery, or private-prison-keeping.

[12, 13] Further, although military service does not release a son from paternal power, yet a soldier son-in-power is treated as independent (*sui juris*) so far as * *castrense peculium* is concerned; to this his father has no claim. So far does this go that an action may lie between a father and his soldier son-in-power in connection with the *castrense peculium*, though in other circumstances no suit can be maintained between them. On this principle a soldier son-in-power can not plead the *senatus consultum Macedonianum* no matter what the purpose was for which he borrowed the money. Hence, too, although there can not be a gift between father and son-in-power, yet a gift made by a father to his son-in-power, on some consideration of military service, is valid and what is given forms part of the *castrense peculium*, and for the same reason a gift between spouses on the same consideration, though it would otherwise be revocable, is valid.

* See Section 14, below, for meaning of this.

[14] Now, whatever a soldier has acquired in connection with his military service is reckoned *castrense peculium*. Even the succession to his wife, which she has bequeathed to him in appreciation of his military service, will, by a rescript of the Emperor Hadrian, be his, although he be under power of his father, as *castrense peculium*. This is not the case, however, with a dowry (*dos*) given or promised to the husband, for it is inseparably connected with the obligations arising from the marriage and passes to their joint children, who are in the grandfather's power. The inheritance of a brother on the father's side, or other comrade, which is offered to him as such comrade, is considered to be *peculium castrense*; this is only the case if they have been on military service in the same province or if the bequest be made in consideration of his military service, and not otherwise.

[15] Further, in reference to the wills of soldiers, such liberal treatment is allowed them in will-making that the solemnities of will-making are entirely dispensed with in their case. For the Emperor Trajan allowed soldiers to make wills in whatever form they chose, and declared that a bare declaration of intention sufficed. Papinian accordingly gave the opinion that a soldier's intention was his testament. But this is only true if the act of testation occurs while they are on an expedition; and, if two witnesses have been summoned thereto, the intention of the soldier may be proved in that way. This was introduced in favor of soldiers. But if the testamentary act occurs in the course of a battle, the will is valid, even without the summoning of witnesses, and it is enough for the soldier to have written the name of his heir on his shield or in the dust. And outside the exigencies of a campaign a soldier is bound by the common law when making his will: and this has been held to be also the law of Spain.

Now a will made on a campaign in accordance with this special law for soldiers will continue valid for a year after discharge. And the soldier is allowed such unfettered capacity to make his will as he likes, that he may die partly testate and partly intestate and can institute an heir up to a given date and thereafter take away the inheritance, giving it directly to another; and, if he has named no one, his statutory heirs will succeed. And the *jus accrescendi* (i. e., law whereby certain persons if not named as heirs may be added to those who are named as heirs) does not operate in the case of a soldier's will.

A soldier can also pass over his son in his will, and the mere passing him over will be taken as an implied disinheritance, provided he did it intentionally, and so also the agnation of a son after the making of a soldier's will does not avoid it, provided his intention be clear. And although in codicils an inheritance can not be directly bequeathed, yet it may in the case of a soldier's inheritance. A soldier, too, may make a will while uncertain about his status; and a will made in military fashion by a civilian is valid if he be a soldier at death.

Further, although the will of a civilian is not annulled by mere intent or by a mere attempt, not carried through, to make a subsequent will, yet the will of a soldier is annulled by mere intent without any difficulty. A soldier can even die leaving two valid wills. Further a soldier

Instit. 2, 17, 7 and
Dig. 28, 3, 2; and
28, 1, 21, 1.

can give away more than three-fourths of his estate in legacies and these legacies suffer no abatement under the *lex Falcidia*. A soldier can

Dig. 29, 1: 17, 4 and
18. Cod. 6, 21, 12 and
Dig. 35, 2, 1.

make a valid will, although dumb or deaf. And a soldier son-in-power

Dig. 29, 1, 11.

can dispose of his *castrense peculium* by will; and this applies even though he be in an unarmed branch of the service. And the wills of

Dig. 5, 2, 32.

soldiers are not liable to impeachment as undutious. And a soldier

Cod. 3, 28, 24.

son-in-power will not only be able to make a will for himself, but also a will for his son by way of pupillary substitution, so far as regards

Dig. 29, 1: 20 and
15, 4.

his *castrense peculium*. But this testamentary privilege so granted to soldier sons-in-power must not be extended to those who are below puberty and have (as sometimes happens) been allowed to enlist as a special favor. Such a person will not be able to make a will either by common or by military law, because of the unstable character of that age. Herein Justinian corrected the ancient law so far as it allowed this.

Cod. 6, 21, 18.

Further, a civilian can not make a direct substitution to a stranger or his own son, over the age of puberty, whom he has instituted heir, in such a way that if he enters on the inheritance and shortly thereafter dies the substitute may become heir; but the only way in which this can be effected is by the testator binding his heir by a trust (*fidei commissum*) to pass on the whole or a part of the inheritance to the latter. A soldier, however, is allowed to do this in the first-mentioned way.

Instit. 2, 16, 9.

[16] Further, those who have been capitally condemned for military offenses may make wills of their *castrense peculium*, provided there has been no breach of the military vow and that the presiding judge gives permission in his judgment. This is not so in the case of a civilian.

Dig. 28, 6, 15 and
Cod. 6, 21, 6 and
Dig. 29, 1, 5,
and 29, 1, 41.

[17] And if persons condemned for a military offense die intestate the next of kin will succeed, to the exclusion of the treasury. Indeed the property of a soldier who dies without leaving a successor is given to his legion and not to the fiscus.

Dig. 29, 1, 11,
and 28, 3, 6, 6,
Dig. 28, 1, 8, 1,
and 4.

[18] Lastly, a soldier who has unadvisedly entered on an inheritance is not liable beyond the assets of the inheritance.

Dig. 28, 3, 6, 7 and
Cod. 6, 62, 2.

[19] Again, the favor which is shown to soldiers does not always manifest itself in an extension of their testamentary capabilities, but sometimes also in a restriction of them. Accordingly, although it is allowable to bequeath or make a gift to a concubine or mistress, yet a soldier can not give or bequeath anything to a woman suspected of being of loose character. A disposition, also, which is disgraceful or immoral is no more valid when made by a soldier than when made by a civilian.

Cod. 6, 30, 22 (end).

Dig. 39, 5: 5 and 1.

[20, 21] Add now to what has gone before the unique and glorious military privilege that when a soldier dies in war for the sake of

Dig. 29, 1, 41, 1; and
34, 9, 14.
Cod. 5, 16, 1.

Dig. 29, 1: 15 (1 and 2).

Dig. 28, 3: 1 and 2.
And 29, 1, 19, pr.

Dig. 29, 1, 4 and
Instit. 2, 11, 2.

Dig. 32, 22, 1; and
24, 1, 32, 8.

Dig. 29, 1, 29, 2.

his State he is taken as continuing to live through the glory of his exploits—only he must die in battle in actual fighting, and not even in a siege or in any other way simply connected with war; and so a soldier son-in-power who falls fighting in battle for his country counts towards the *jus trium liberorum* (i. e., three-children privilege) which excuses his father from tutorships and furnishes an excuse in the case of some other civil duties. Accordingly, when the *Lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus*

Dig. 27, 1, 18.
Instit. 1, 25, pr.
(middle).

Dig. 50, 5, 14.

(i. e., about the marriage of the different ranks) provided that that one of the consuls should have priority and have the right of carrying the *fasces* (i. e., the special emblem of the highest magistrates) who had more children in his power than his colleague had, those children were to be counted in, who had been lost in war.

Gellius, bk. 2, ch. 15.

[22] This privilege admits of many other applications; and so if a statute should provide (as is the case in many jurisdictions) that, in the succession to a father, a second son who survives his father is preferred to a grandson by the eldest son who predeceases the father, I am of opinion that, if his eldest son had fallen while fighting for the State, in this case the grandson is to be preferred, and for this reason, i. e., that his father (who is entitled to the grandfather's succession by the law of primogeniture) is deemed to be ever living; and in a precisely similar set of facts I have heard that the matter was so adjudged, notwithstanding the rule that soldiers' privileges are not to be extended to another person's injury and the rule that exceptions of an advantageous kind (*beneficia*) are not usually either extended or granted to another person's injury. These latter rules do not operate here, because no injury is done to the second son, seeing that it is not a case of something being taken from him, but only of something not being acquired by him. For (as Ulpian put it) persons are not reckoned as losing a thing which was never theirs and, as a rule of Paulus says, a man can not be held to cease to own what he has never owned. And that is the principle of Ulpian's dictum that no fraud is committed on creditors when the debtor omits to acquire something, but only when he diminishes the property which he actually has.

Dig. 26, 7, 40.

Dig. 36, 1, 12.
Cod. 8, 48, 4;
and 1, 19, 7,
Dig. 8, 3, 17.

Dig. 50, 17, 83.

Dig. 50, 17, 208.

Dig. 50, 17, 134; and
42, 8, 6, pr.

Now Papinian's pronouncement that soldiers' privileges are not to be extended to the injury of another person has no application to the case before us, for he is speaking of a case to which a soldier's privilege is not extended and in which it is clear that a wrong was being done to another. Accordingly I hold that in the case which we are discussing the grandson must be preferred to his uncle notwithstanding the statute—especially as, by common law, a grandson represents his dead father even when he has died otherwise than in war; and therefore, as the statute derogates from this common law, it ought to be restrictively interpreted.

Instit. 3, 1, 6.

Panormit. on c. 10,
X, 3, 30. Text in c. 1
(end), X, 1, 17, bk.
6 (?).

[23] Add to the foregoing that a royal ordinance of Spain provides that any rewards which a man has earned for distinguished services

in the field are, on his death, to be due to his children and next of kin. It was the Roman rule, and enacted at Athens also by a law of Solon, that the children of those who had fallen in battle should be brought up and properly educated at the public expense. And Constantine added that the sons should be summoned to the military profession of their father.

Span. Ordin., bk. 5, tit. 27, par. 5.

Cod. 12, 47, 1 and 2.

[24] It is, further, to be remarked that these military privileges are only granted to soldiers if they are performing their service with bravery and zeal, and they are not extended to veterans, though they, too, have privileges of their own. But oarsmen and sailors of the fleet are "soldiers" and enjoy military privileges.

Dig. 49, 18; and 38, 12, 1 and 2.

Cod. 12, 46: 1, 2, 3, 4.

Instit. 2, 11, pr. (mid.). Dig. 27, 1, 8.

[25] And, besides, certain military privileges are granted not only to soldiers, but to others as camp-followers; and in the forefront is this, that those who are not of a rank which entitles them to military privileges in will-making will be allowed, if kept prisoners by the enemy, to make their wills in whatever way they like and can.

Dig. 29, 1, 44.

[26] So, also, women who are absent with their husbands on the military service of the State receive the same assistance as soldiers if they are deprived of some legal remedy by lapse of time. A rescript of Alexander is to that effect; and Diocletian and Maximinian issued a rescript that a woman absent with her husband on a campaign was not to be adversely affected by a prescription *longi temporis* (i. e., based on lapse of time).

Cod. 2, 51, 1.

Cod. 2, 51, 2.

On the same lines is Ulpian's opinion, that those who have been lost in war are to be counted for the purpose of providing excuse from tutorship, of whatever sex or age they may be, provided they died in battle—for it is quite clear in ancient histories that women used to serve in array of battle and have sometimes rendered highly distinguished services in war. Thus in the Sabine war, the Sabine women at Rome, on whose account the war broke out, had the hardihood to throw themselves by a sideways movement among the flying missiles, their hair streaming, their gowns rent, for their womanly fear (as Livy says) was overborne by their sufferings, and they thus succeeded in composing the anger and hostility of the opposed forces. And that, too, is a memorable thing that is told of the Cimbrian women whom, as well as their husbands, Marius had to fight in battle and whose death was even more glorious than their fighting, for when they failed to obtain their freedom by sending an embassy to Marius, they suffocated or strangled their children indiscriminately and either killed each the other or, making a rope of their hair, hanged themselves on trees or the shafts of wagons. And the German women are reported to have more than once restored their line of battle when it was breaking.

Bk. 1.

Florus, de gest., Rom., bk. 3, ch. 2.

Crinitt., de honest. disc., bk. 12, ch. 8.

[27] Now, although many doubt whether soldiers of the present day enjoy these privileges, it is nevertheless the better opinion that those who are on the service-lists and are doing their service with bravery and

zeal are granted these privileges—at any rate such privileges as have not been abolished in practice, and it is immaterial that in their case the solemnities wherewith in olden days soldiers were enlisted, with an oath of military service, have been dispensed with. For we notice in our days an analogous disappearance of ancient solemnities in our actions at law, which are, none the less, of equal efficacy. The ground and reason for granting soldiers such ample privileges was that, being thus freed from all anxieties, they might devote themselves, unhampered, to

arms for the safety and defense of the Roman dominion. This reason applies equally to our soldiers, and so the law ought to remain the same. This view has the approval of men of highest learning, too.

Dig. 1, 2, 2, 6.
Cod. 2, 57, 1 and 2.

Dig. 3, 5, 46; and
48, 1, 8.
Cod. 2, 11, 15.

Cod. 2, 7, 14; and 2,
12, 7 (end).

Dig. 29, 1, 1.

Cod. 4, 65, 31.

Jacob de Rauen.,
Cyn, Bald., Bart.,
Salicet and others on

Cod. 1, 18, 1.

Alb. on proc. Rom.
civil. 43, and consil.

506.

Alex. on Dig. 28, 6,
15, nu. 23. Decius on

Rubr. Cod. 6, 21,

mentioned by

Francisc. Zoannettus on

Roman Emp., nu. 80.

Dig. 9, 2, 32, pr.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of military courts.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A soldier can not be sued save before his own judge: 2. Except he be a deserter, 3. Or has agreed to waive this right, 4. Or has become a soldier after issue of the summons, 5. Or has given perjured evidence, | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Or is also engaged in trade. 7. The Roman consuls only had power when on active service to punish a Roman citizen capitally without consulting the people. 8. The tribunes had not power of life and death over the troops. |
|---|--|

[1, 2] Soldiers can not be summoned before any but their own judge, or be punished by any other if in fault; and so, if arrested by a civil official, they ought to be remitted to their own judge, except in the case where a soldier while deserting commits some very serious offense, in which case the president of the province can take cognizance of the offense and punish the soldier in the place where it occurred. But otherwise a general or commander of troops has no jurisdiction over provincials and a provincial president none over soldiers.

[3, 4] If, however, a soldier shall have declared in a written instrument that he will waive the *præscriptio fori* (i. e., plea to the jurisdiction) which his profession entitles him to set up, the agreement must be adhered to. So, also, if a man becomes a soldier only after receipt of a summons, he is, as it were, anticipated and can not challenge the forum; for a lawsuit ought to be brought to a conclusion in the same circumstances in which it was begun.

[5, 6] Further, a soldier who has given perjured evidence subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the judge concerned even though he be a civilian. A soldier, too, who is a trader, subjects himself thereby to the judge of that trade.

Further, every one ought to answer in a military court regarding public matters which he carried through in the course of performing his military service and with regard to military accounts, and without being able to set up the *præscriptio fori*, and this although he has retired from the service; and a volunteer who is liable to capital accusation (and who, according to a rescript of the Emperor Trajan, is not exempt from capital punishment) should not be remitted to the place where the accusation is brought, but should be punished in the place where he ought to have been tried if the charge had been a military matter.

[7] Further, it is to be remarked that, although consuls were prevented by the *Lex Valeria*, which Valerius Publicola introduced, and by

the *Lex Porcia*, from capitally punishing a Roman citizen without the command of the people, and although they were only left the power to order imprisonment and public chains, yet when on active service they had the right of inflicting punishment at their discretion; and this was also allowed to prætors and other commanders of troops. The jurist consult Venuleius, however, is of opinion that this was limited to the case of private soldiers, they being meaner and less regarded. Whence it may be inferred that such punishment could not be inflicted on others without reference to the emperor.

[8] The tribunes, too, and others below the rank of general had no power of life and death over the troops, but were only allowed to inflict light punishment, as is clearly indicated by Marcianus, when he says that it was the business of the tribune to punish offenses within the limits of his authority. And what Tacitus says about the notorious Pannonian revolt is consistent herewith. He writes that Municius, the camp-prefect who had the chief command at the time owing to the general's absence, quieted that revolt in its beginnings by the execution of two soldiers—which was rather by way of salutary example than under any legally conferred authority.

Further, the business of military courts can be conducted, according to a rescript of the Emperor Trajan, even on holidays.

Dig. 1, 2, 2, 16.
Dion. Halic., bk. 10.
Polyb., bk. 6, de re
milit. ac domest.
Rom.

Livy, bks. 2 and 4
Cicero, Philipp. 3.

Dig. 48, 3, 9. Nov. 74, § 4 (3).

Dig. 49, 16, 12 (end).
Annals, bk. 1.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the punishment of soldiers.

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| 1. Twofold reason for punishing offenses.
2. Military punishments.
3. Military offenses either individual or joint.
4. <i>Fustuarium</i> (cudgeling), what it is.
5. Decimation.
6. Romans harsh in military punishments. | 7. The capital penalty remitted where the offense is due to wine or passion.
8. The Romans in their judgments did not balance good deeds against bad ones.
9. The Persians did the opposite. |
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[1] Plato, in his *Gorgias* (so Gellius tells us), opines that there is a twofold reason for punishing offenses: the one being the chastisement and correction of the offender, so as to make him more heedful and more ready to behave properly; this in the case of lesser offenses is ordinarily by a fine or some light restraint with a fine added; the other is by way of example, in order to deter others from similar offenses by the fear of punishment. And in the case of the graver offenses it is important that this should be inflicted publicly. Noct. Attic., bk. 6, ch. 14.

[2] And so some military punishments are of the graver order and are capital; others of the lighter order are necessarily inflicted by generals on delinquent soldiers in order to preserve military discipline, and vary according to the greater or less gravity of the offense.

[3] Now the offenses of soldiers are either individual or joint. An individual military offense is one committed by a soldier as such, e. g., behaving otherwise than military discipline requires. Now military punishments, according to Modestinus, are as follows: Castigation, fine, imposition of tasks, change to an inferior kind of service, degradation, and ignominious discharge; but soldiers are not sent to the mines or tortured or condemned to the beasts or to the gallows, nor are they liable to any punishment of the plebeians. Dig. 49, 16, 2.
Dig. 49, 16, 6.
Dig. 49, 16, 3, 1.
Dig. 49, 16: 3 (1) and 4.
Dig. 48, 19, 9, 2.
Cod. 9, 47, 5, and ch. on Soldiers' privileges, above.

[4] But for a grave offense they may be capitally punished or cudgeled. The latter punishment was as follows, according to Polybius: the tribune took a cudgel and just touched the condemned man and thereupon all in the camp struck him with cudgels and stones, so that the victims were generally killed in the very camp, and if any one escaped it did not stand him in good stead, for he was not allowed to return to his country nor did any of his kinsmen dare to shelter him at home; and so those on whom this trouble fell were doomed to perish. This kind of punishment was called *fustuarium*, according to Cicero, who says, "The legions who abandoned the consul deserved *fustuarium*." A like kind of punishment is in vogue even at the present day on service. It is this Philipp. 3.

Dig. 49, 16, 3, 15.

On Roman camps.

that the jurisconsults are thinking of when they use the phrase "to be cudgeled, killed, punished"; but elsewhere, when they use the phrase "to be cudgeled, chastised, admonished," they are not thinking of the capital variety, but of the lighter punishment; for this latter punishment with the cudgel is much lighter than scourging, according to Marcellus, Callistratus, and Hermogenianus, and the annotations of Hieronymus Verrutius.

As in Dig. 9, 2, 7, 1,
and 29, 5, 1, 17, and
48, 19, 8, 1.

In Dig. 48, 19, 10.
In Dig. 48, 19, 28, 2.
Dig. 47, 10, 45.
De verb. signif.,
bk. 6.

As in Dig. 1, 12, 1,
10; and 47, 10, 45; and
48, 19, 7; and 1, 15:
3 (1) and 5; and 48, 19:
10 and 28, 1; and 49,
16, 3, 15. Cod.
10, 59, 1

[5] Further, if several soldiers join together to commit some crime, or if a whole legion deserts, they are ordinarily cashiered. Sometimes the punishment was the very common one of binding the leaders of disturbances to a stake, or beheading them with an axe, and then choosing by lot one man in every ten of the rest and sending him to punishment. This can be gathered from the words of Cicero (*Pro Cluentio*) where he says: "Our ancestors laid it down that if a crime against military order was committed by several jointly, some were selected for punishment by lot, so that in that way fear might strike many, while the actual punishment struck but few."

Dig. 40, 16, 3
(at end).

And among other military punishments were the following: to postpone the year's pay, and in such cases not to advance any pay so that those so punished were called "bankrupts" (*ære diruti*), or to reprimand in public in a general assembly or to dismiss without any advantages in the shape of pay; to forbid the place in which they rested to be reckoned in the camp, so that they lay on the ground and in the open; to leave them outside the camp-ditch without tents; to flog with vine twigs; to order them to give in their spears—and this punishment was called the punishment of the spear (*censio hastaria*), and generals did not usually inflict it by way of punishment for any small offense, but for some grave offense. Now soldiers were ordered to give in their spears whose spear was taken away from them by way of disgrace for some shameful conduct or riotous living; for just as brave soldiers who for the first time had come out of a battle victorious were presented with an unstained spear as a mark of glory, so the cowardly and contumacious were deprived of their spears. This was as much as to say that the hope of military service was taken from them.

Those were publicly reprimanded on parade who had their arms in rough condition and insufficiently polished or whose horses were over-lean and scraggy, or who, on the day appointed for a battle, submitted over-reluctantly to orders and sought opportunities for shirking.

Alex. ab Alex.,
Genial. dies, bk. 2,
ch. 13.

Noctes Atticæ, bk.
10, ch. 8.

There was also in olden times a military punishment which consisted in ordering a soldier's vein to be opened, by way of disgrace, and blood let: Aulus Gellius thinks that this was first employed in the case of soldiers of sluggish disposition, whose natural habit was altering for the worse (so that it did not seem to be so much a punishment as a medicine); but in later times it became, by use, a method constantly resorted

to in the case of numerous other offenses, as if to suggest that all delinquent soldiers were somewhat wanting in health.

[6] Now, although in other departments rather mild punishments commended themselves to the Romans, who had a rule in ancient times that a man was not to be fined an ox in preference to a sheep—the assessment of severer fines being one ox or more, but of lighter fines a sheep—yet as regards military punishments they were always on the severe side, inasmuch as military discipline calls for a harsh and severe kind of chastisement. Hence, although the consuls were forbidden to punish a Roman citizen capitally, yet on active service they could inflict punishment at discretion, as we have elsewhere said. Hence, also, it was very rare for the emperors to pardon a second offense. For, as Marcus Cato wrote in his treatise *De re militari*, mistakes made in other circumstances can be corrected afterwards, but offenses committed in war do not admit of being put right, seeing that the punishment itself follows on the heels of the mistake and there is an avenger of cowardice or clumsiness standing ready who never shows any indulgence to a delinquent enemy. And that consummate general Lysimachus used to say that a second mistake is not possible in war, for that is a place where blunders or heedlessness or ignorance can not be put right; for in war a little slip often produces the most serious results. Nevertheless, certain delicts when committed by a civilian call for no punishment, or perhaps, on the other hand, for a rather severe one, which, when committed by a soldier, call respectively for a rather severe or a rather light punishment (so Marcellus held). And it is well-known that certain military offenses are punished capitally, these all being acts such as can not be done except guiltily.

Above, on Military courts.

Dig. 48, 19, 14.

As in Dig. 49, 16: 6 (1) and 7, 8 and 14.

[7] The capital punishment is, however, remitted in the case of those who have erred through wine or in frolic. They are merely sentenced to a change to an inferior kind of service; for intention and deliberation are distinguishing marks of crime, but they are non-existent in a drunken man. Pyrrhus, accordingly, let some men go scot-free who, when drinking, had loaded him with abuse and curses, and who frankly admitted it, throwing all the blame on the liquor, and who even said they would have said things far worse if they had had more wine—aye, and would even have killed the king if the bottle had not given out. The Emperor Charles V, on the contrary, issued a decree that drunkenness was not to be any excuse for crime; this was due to the excessive frequency of drunkenness at that time. And Pittacus introduced a law providing that one who offended when drunk was to pay twice the fine which would be inflicted on a sober man.

Dig. 49, 16, 6, 7, at end.

Dig. 48, 8, 1.

Val. Max., bk. 5, ch. 1.

Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Wise Men.

[8] It is, further, highly remarkable that the Romans, who elsewhere attached the highest importance to every man's merits and virtue, refused, nevertheless, to display on the judgment-seat any indulgence to

crime, even where most important services had been rendered to the State, or to balance good deeds against bad. The most conspicuous illustration of this is the case of Publius Horatius: though he wore, as victor, the threefold spoils of the Curiatii, and though his unaided valor had won their empire for the Roman people, he was charged with treason (*perduellio*) for stabbing his sister when she wept at the death of Curiatius, her betrothed. And he was in a highly critical position, from which he was rescued more by the entreaties and pathetic appeal of his father than

Livy, bk. 1. by his recent achievement.

And when Marcus Manlius Capitolinus was accused of aiming at kingly power, although his defense of the Capitol had saved Rome and although he led out into view nearly four hundred men to whom he had lent money without interest, thus preventing their property being sold up and themselves carried off as assigned debtors (*addicti*), and although, besides all this, he displayed to view the spoils of slain enemies and numerous gifts of commanders and had recalled his exploits in war in a speech, the greatness of which matched the greatness of his deeds, yet his

Bk. 6. crime (says Livy) outweighed all, and Manlius was condemned by the judgment of the people and was hurled from the Tarpeian rock.

[9] The Persians, on the other hand, never condemned a man unless he was convicted of having done more harm than good to the

Diod. Sicul., bk. 1. State.

CHAPTER X.

Of the contumacious and those who disobey the orders of their officers and who do not defend them.

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| 1. He who disobeys a command is punished capitally.
2. A soldier who resists a tribune or centurion when proposing to chastise him.
3. A tribune may not overpass bounds in chastisement. | 4. Those who refuse to defend, or who desert, their superior officers.
5. He who does what his commander has forbidden.
6. Discipline of their camps more important to the Romans than love of children. |
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[1] In order to establish military discipline, it is before all necessary that those who command the army or soldiers have their men obedient to orders. Accordingly, capital punishment is decreed for him who disobeys orders, and Augustus dismissed the whole of the tenth legion with ignominy when it was contumacious and disobedient. Dig. 49, 16, 3, 15.

Further, when Lucius Æmilius Paulus was despatched into Macedonia, he made it his first care to provide that in the movements of his army everything should be done in ordered fashion and without noise, at the first beck and command of the general. For, when proclamations of what was to be done were made to all at the same time, not every one heard them distinctly, and, as the orders were not received in clear form, some, making additions for themselves, did more than was ordered, while others did less, and dissonant shouts were raised in every quarter, insomuch that the enemy knew sooner than the soldiers themselves what was intended. The general, therefore, directed that the military tribune should communicate the order, secretly, to the chief centurion of the legion, then he to the next, and so on, each telling the next to him in rank what had to be done, whether the instructions were to be conveyed from front to rear or from rear to front.

Livy, bk. 34.

[2] Now we have elsewhere told how the tribune and the centurion have power of chastisement over the troops. A soldier, accordingly, who resisted the tribune or centurion when proposing to chastise him, was branded with the mark (*nota*) of disgrace, and this meant that no one might supply him with fire or have any dealings with him. But if he had laid hold of the vine-staff, he was put to inferior service; while if he had broken it intentionally, he was capitally punished. (We have elsewhere shown how vine-staves were carried before the tribunes, and not *fasces*.) Dig. 49, 16, 13, 4.

Above, ch. on the
Office of Tribune.

Dig. 49, 1, 12, end;
and 19, 2, 13, 4.

[3] A tribune must, however, give heed not to overpass due limits in chastisement; and should he assault a soldier without justification and not with any intention of chastisement for some offense, I think the soldier may lawfully defend himself; but in other cases resistance is unlawful. All contumacy towards the general or commander is a capital

By inference from
Cod. 10, 1, 5.

c. 97, C. 11, qu. 3 offense.

Dig. 49, 16, 6, 2.

Dig. 49, 16, 6, 1.

Dig. 49, 16: 2 (end)
and 6 (end).
Span. Ordin., bk. 3,
tit. 19, par. 2.

[4] Again, capital punishment is decreed not only for those who have offered violence to their commander, but also for those who have neglected to defend him or who, though defending him, have allowed him to be killed; and a royal edict of Spain has decreed the same for those who desert their king. Now the Roman Senate treated it as a most serious matter that the soldiers had allowed the consul Petilius to be killed when he was bravely fighting against the Ligurians, and they refused to advance the year's pay or to make any other payments to the legion, because it had failed to offer itself to the enemy's weapons for the safety of their general. Indeed, the Celtiberi deemed it a sin to survive a battle in which the chieftain was killed, to whose safety they had dedicated their lives. And Cæsar tells how among the Gauls there were men bound by a similar obligation, whom they styled "soldurii."

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 6.
Gallic war, bk. 3.

[5] Again, so stringent is the rule requiring obedience to a commander's decrees and observance of his orders that capital punishment awaits him who does anything which his commander has forbidden or fails to carry out his commands, even though he meets with success therein. This discipline had very stern champions in Postumius and Tubertus and Manlius Torquatus. One of these men had his own victorious son beheaded for attacking the enemy with an escort, of his own motion and without any orders to do so, and this though he had routed the enemy. And another of them, whose *cognomen* (surname) thereafter was Imperiosus, had his son flogged in sight of the whole army and beheaded for accepting, against his father's orders, a challenge to combat given by Geminus Metius, the Tusculan general, and this although his descent into battle was crowned with a glorious victory and he had brought back magnificent spoils. And Manlius, the son, when the troops were on the point of rising in favor of him, insisted that he was not of sufficient value for discipline to be destroyed on his account and he induced them to allow his punishment to be carried out.

Livy, bks. 4 and 8.
Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.
Gell., bk. 9, ch. 13.

[6] And so Paulus says that the Romans gave the discipline of their camp priority over their love for their children. And the dictator Papyrius displayed no less severity towards his master of the horse, Quintus Fabius, for leading the troops out, contrary to orders, although he had returned to the camp after a signal defeat of the Samnites. The dictator was not moved by his valor nor by his success nor by his high birth, but had him stripped and flogged and persisted in demanding his execution from the Roman people, and from the tribunes of the plebs

Dig. 49, 15, 19, 7.

who were interposing their veto on his behalf. It was, then, just as much a military offense to fight irregularly and contrary to orders, even after being challenged, or to be slow in obeying the trumpeter's signal to retreat, as to do an injury to a fellow-citizen or an ally. And Cyrus, accordingly, is said to have commended the soldier who, being just about to kill an enemy when he heard the signal for retreat, yet drew back his sword and restrained the blow and let the enemy go.

Livy, bk. 8.
Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.

CHAPTER XI.

Of truants.

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|---|--|
| 1. A soldier may not be away from the colors without leave.
2. A soldier who quits the ranks is flogged.
3. A truant (<i>emansor</i>) and his punishment. | 4. One who crosses over the ramparts.
5. One who does not return on the day his furlough expires. |
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[1, 2] It was provided by the military law of Rome that no soldier, unless he had permission, was to absent himself from the colors or quit a battle-field or abandon a post or flee from camp or go too far afield, and that the precautions of reconnoitering and watchwords and supports should not only be taken when marching in battle-array, but also when out collecting wood or making a foray; and, in a word, that all precautions and arrangements should then be taken as if in face of the enemy. But he who wanders outside the fortifications, out of hearing of the trumpet, unless it be by the orders of the general or tribune, is liable to military correction, the danger being that soldiers who are straggling along in loose order and carelessly may stumble into some hostile ground and be exposed to slaughter and other risks. And another reason for this is that they may be restrained from plunder. Hence one who quitted the ranks when on march was flogged or was put

Dig. 49, 16, 3, 16. to inferior service.

Lysander of Lacedæmon was once chastising a man who had left the line of march and, when the fellow said that he had not done so for any purpose of plunder, made answer, "But I mean you not even to look as if you were going plundering." And when Alexander Severus found any one turning aside to loot something or other, he had him flogged and ordered a herald to make proclamation during the chastisement, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them," a saying he had picked up from the Christians. And when Pompey was sent as legate into Sicily he heard that the men were in the habit of wandering off during the march and committing assaults and looting; so he checked their random roamings with punishments and

Plut., Apoph. affixed his seal to the swords of those who were sent on his errands.

[3] Further, one who makes off for some time without leave and then returns to the camp is called an *emansor* (truant). His offense is less heinous than that of a deserter, just as a slave with a habit of wandering is not so bad as a fugitive slave. And inquiry is made into the circumstances of his truancy—why the man went away and whither and

Dig. 49, 16, 3, 2.

Dig. 50, 1, 225.

what he did there, and pardon may be given where the reason was his health or his affection for his relatives by blood or marriage or where he was in pursuit of a fugitive slave or there was some other such explanation. Moreover, a recruit who has not yet learned military discipline is a fit subject for pardon.

Dig. 49, 16, 4 (end).

[4] When, however, an attack by the enemy is imminent, a soldier who stays away reconnoitering over long, or leaves the fosse, is punished capitally. So is he who crosses over the ramparts or enters the camp by climbing the wall, for walls have ever been held sacrosanct.

Dig. 49, 16, 3, 10.

Dig. 49, 16, 3, 15.
Instit. 2, 1, 10.

[5] He, too, who has been allowed furlough and does not return on the appointed day is to be treated (so Modestinus ruled) just as if he had been a truant (*emansor*) or deserter during the time by which he exceeded his furlough; but he should first be allowed an opportunity of explaining whether he happened to be detained by some accident which could be held fit ground for a pardon. So wholly undesirable was absence from the colors considered that, according to an opinion given by

Dig. 49, 16: 3 (7)
and 14.

Ulpian, a soldier who was away on furlough was not held to be away on

Dig. 49, 16, 1.

State service, and Javolenus was of the same opinion with regard to one

Dig. 4, 6, 34.

who, e. g., was wandering or taking his ease at home. For, as Ulpian says, those only are held to be away on State business who are away com-

Dig. 4, 6, 36.

pulsorily and not for reasons of their own convenience. And we have elsewhere said that leave of absence should be given to soldiers as sparingly as possible.

Above, ch. on the
Office of Tribune.

CHAPTER XII.

Of deserters.

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|--|--|
| 1. Who a deserter is, and the manner of his punishment.
2. Those who screen a deserter. | 3. A deserter who is reinstated does not get paid for the time of his desertion.
4. He who has withdrawn his son from military service. |
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[1] A deserter, in legal intendment, is one who is recaptured after a long period of unauthorized absence. Now when once a man was enrolled as a soldier, he might not quit the service unless duly discharged; so to do was reckoned one of the gravest crimes. All deserters, however, are not to be punished alike, for the man's grade and pay and antecedents will be taken into account. It is material, too, whether he deserted alone or with a number, and whether for the first or some subsequent time, and whether he added some other crime to that of desertion; and account must be taken, too, of the time at which the desertion took place, for he who deserts in time of peace is degraded if a horse-soldier and put to inferior service if in the infantry, while desertion in time of war is a capital offense. Severer penalties, too, are provided in the case of one who after his desertion re-enters the service elsewhere or allows himself to be levied. Commanders allowed any one to maltreat a deserter, but this was confined by the Emperor Leo to the case where the man resisted after he was discovered. The property of those who have died while deserting is publicly sold.

[2] Now not only are the deserters themselves to be punished, but also those who screen them, e. g., a judge who, for favor or by carelessness, has neglected to deal with a deserter. He, on the contrary, who gives up a deserter is rewarded: and indulgence is commonly shown to a deserter who gives himself up, unless it be after five years' desertion, for such an one is to be deported.

[3] And although by indulgence a deserter has been reinstated, he can not claim pay for the time of his desertion.

[4] Penalties no less severe than those enacted against a deserter were enacted against one who withdrew his son from military service. If he did this in time of war he was punished by exile and loss of property; and if in time of peace, he was flogged and the young man who had been claimed was put to inferior duties. And, by a rescript of the Emperor Trajan, he who maimed his son at the time of a levy, so as to render him unfit for military service, was to be deported.

And Cæsar, when the circumstances required it, is said to have been, among other things, a very sharp inquisitor of the seditious and of deserters, and a very ruthless punisher, too. And it is on record that Aufidius Cassius set the novel example of cutting off the hands and feet of deserters, declaring that it would be better for discipline that the criminal should drag out a wretched existence than that he should be killed.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of deserters to the enemy and traitors.

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| 1. Deserters to the enemy very severely dealt with.
2. He who can return but does not is reckoned a deserter to the enemy.
3. How those who carry intelligence to the enemy are to be punished. | 4. Secrets of the council not to be disclosed.
5. The enemy's spies.
6. Whether it befits a gentleman to be a spy.
7. Very unsafe to trust to deserters from the enemy. |
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[1] Very severe measures were always taken against deserters to the enemy, as being guilty of no ordinary crime and as traitors to their fatherland and their fellow-citizens, and they were deemed unworthy of pardon. For, as Paulus says, "A deserter who with evil design and traitorous intent has abandoned his native country is to be reckoned an enemy and punished capitally; and wherever he is found he may be killed like an enemy and he is within the *Lex Julia majestatis* (on treason); he can be tortured or condemned to the beasts or gallows, although his fellow-soldiers are not liable to those punishments. He, too, who is arrested when planning to desert to the enemy, is capitally punished." And so the senator Fulvius ordered his son, who was caught on the way to join Catiline, to be killed.

Sallust, Catil.
conspir.

Publius Scipio Africanus, too, although in other respects of a most lenient disposition, was bitter against deserters and fugitives; and, after the overthrow of Carthage, he ordered, for the better establishment of military discipline, that any Romans who, in contempt of authority, had deserted to the enemy, should be crucified and any Latins be beheaded: and Africanus the younger sent such deserters to the beasts. Paulus Æmilius, at the capture of Elephantis, and Marcus Marcellus at the capture of Leontini, beheaded about two thousand deserters. And we read that Metius Suffetius, when found guilty of treason, was drawn in pieces by four horses. And three hundred and seventy deserters to Hannibal, when recaptured by Quintus Fabius, were sent to Rome and all scourged in public and thrown from the rock. On another occasion, however, the same Fabius Maximus acted more leniently, for he ordered the amputation of the right hands of those who had deserted to the enemy in breach of their vow, so that the display of their mutilated arms should strike terror into the others and serve as a warning to others not to venture on the same crime. Indeed, among the Athenians it was a sacrilege to bury a traitor; he and all his issue were declared infamous and their corpses were ordered to be thrown over the boundaries of the State. To that

Livy, bk. 30.
Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7.
Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7.

Livy, bk. 24.

Livy, bk. 2.

Livy, bk. 24.

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.
Plut., Lives of the
ten orators.

Plut., On God's slow-moving vengeance.

deserter, however, who has subsequently captured many of the enemy and has pointed out the deserters among them, clemency may be shown, according to a rescript of the Emperor Hadrian.

Dig. 49, 1, 5 (end).

[2] He, too, is reckoned as a deserter to the enemy who, having an opportunity to return from captivity, has not done so; and, indeed, soldiers whom the enemy has released are not reinstated unless it is clear that they were genuine captives, not deserters.

Dig. 49, 1, 5, 5.

Dig. 49, 1, 5, 6.

[3] Further, those who secretly carry intelligence to the enemy are reckoned traitors and visited with capital punishment, either burning alive or hanging. It happened once at Carthage that one of the most powerful men of his day was found guilty of treason, his hatred of the general Hanno having led him to write in Greek to the tyrant Dionysius telling him of the approach of the army and of the slackness of the general: their Senate, in consequence, enacted that thenceforth no Carthaginian should learn either Greek literature or speech, so that there could not be any interpreter either for conversation or for correspondence.

Dig. 49, 1, 6, 4.
Span. Ordin., bk. 2,
tit. 28, par. 2 and
bk. 24, tit. 21, par. 2.

Dig. 48, 19, 8, 2.
Justin, bk. 20.

[4] Again, not only do those who carry secret intelligence to the enemy merit punishment, but those also who spread it abroad among their own troops. Accordingly, the Egyptians had a provision in their military law whereby any one who published a general's plans was to lose his tongue. And the Persians of old, in their discipline, secured the safe-keeping of the king's secrets by the penalty of death. And it is on record that no Senator for many centuries divulged the secret counsels of the Roman Senate. Accordingly, when Quintus Fabius Maximus told Publius Crassus about the secret proceedings of the Senate, with regard to a declaration of war against Carthage, he was vehemently upbraided by the consuls, although it was an act of inadvertence; for Fabius was aware that Crassus had held the quæstorship for the preceding three years and was unaware that the censors had not yet placed him in the ranks of the Senate. For, as Valerius Maximus says, they would never allow the habit of silence to be impaired, it being one of the most valuable and surest safeguards of administration.

Diod. Sicul., bk. 2.
Quint. Curt., bk. 4.

Bk. 2, ch. 2.

And so when the Asiatic sovereign, Eumenes, who was a great partisan of the Romans, intimated to the Roman Senate that Perseus was preparing to make war on the Roman people, it was not until after the capture of Perseus was known that any information could be obtained with regard to what Eumenes had told the Senate or the nature of their reply. It was, accordingly, a wise reply that Cæcilius Metellus gave to the military tribune who was interrogating him about his plans: "If I thought," said he, "that my tunic knew them I would take it off and throw it into the fire"; indicating thereby that the schemes of generals should not be disclosed.

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 2.

Further, those must be added to the list of traitors who supply the enemy with weapons and arms. This is a capital offense and their prop-

Cod. 4, 41, 1. erty is sold up. And Paulus gave an opinion that material of war can
 Dig. 48, 4, 4. not be sold to the enemy without risk of capital punishment. They, in-
 Dig. 39, 4, 11. deed, who assisted the barbarians to plunder the Romans and divided
 Cod. 12, 35, 9. the spoil with the enemy were burned alive.

[5] Further, enemy spies who may fall into our hands do not merit such bitter aversion as those who desert to the enemy or carry secret intelligence to him. This is evident at first sight, for their conduct is not stained with perfidy. And so when a certain Carthaginian spy who had escaped capture for two years was at last caught at Rome, Livy, bk. 22. he only had his hands cut off and was then let go.

[6] It is often asked in this connection whether it befits a gentleman (*nobilis*) to be a spy and secretly find out what the enemy is planning and doing. And my opinion is that it would not be honorable for a gentleman to ply this business professedly and for hire, and that he could not do so without ignominy—as may be gathered from the full treatise of Tiraqueau on *nobilitas*—but if his motive in doing it was love of the State and the safety of the general public, I pronounce it not only not unworthy a gentleman, but eminently glorious. For the Lord commanded Moses, when he was journeying with the Israelites into the Land of Promise, to send men forward, one chosen from each of the tribes and every one a ruler, into the land of Canaan, to see the land, what it was and its size, and the people that dwelled therein, whether they were strong or weak, few or many, and what the land was, whether fat or lean, and the cities, whether they were strongholds or not, and generally to spy out all they could. And Joshua sent two spies into the Numb., ch. 13. city of Jericho before he besieged it. Josh., ch. 2.

And so, also, Sextus Tarquinius, feigning that his father was harsh and bitter towards him, fled to Gabii and was chosen by the men of that town to be their general, and, after winning a battle or two, was intrusted with the whole affairs of Gabii; whereupon he carried off the chief men of the State from its midst and delivered up the town, without Livy, bk. 2. a blow struck, into the hands of his father, who was besieging it.

And when Zopyrus, a man of high rank and a friend of Darius, King of the Persians, saw that that King was weary of the long siege of Babylon and that the storming of the city would be very difficult, he had his nose and ears shorn off and fled to the Babylonians with his body mutilated, feigning that it was Darius who had thus foully treated him. The enemy believed him and received him kindly and gave him command of a body of horse and, after one or two successes in battle, made him at length commander-in-chief of their army; whereupon he delivered both city and army up to Darius. Justin, bk. 2.

Araspa, also, a Mede of very high rank and one of Cyrus' intimates, went over, on Cyrus' orders, to the King of Assyria as a deserter and, after spying out the enemy's forces and plans, returned to Cyrus and was commended by him in the public assembly. Xenoph., Cyropaedia, bk. 6.

[7] These examples show us how very hazardous it is to trust to deserters; for even if they are fleeing to us without guile or fraud and are genuinely betraying their own side, not much reliance can be placed on them, for how can you hope that a man will be faithful to foreigners who has shown himself unfaithful to his native land? And so Antigonus used to say that he liked traitors during their treason, but that afterwards he found them utterly repulsive. That is the meaning of Augustus' saying, "I like treachery, but do not commend the traitor."

Plut., Apoph.

And when some one complained to Philip of Macedon that the troops nicknamed him traitor because he had betrayed his country to Philip, that king made the witty reply, although he always chuckled at deceiving an enemy, "Don't be surprised: the Macedonians are very dull-witted: and rustic enough to call a spade a spade." By this reply Philip showed that traitors deserved obloquy from every one. And it was of a truth implanted in the Romans of old that they ought to gain their successes by what they themselves called Roman arts, i. e., by valor, Above, ch. on Trick-eries and deceit in war. toil and arms, rather than by the crooked conduct of others, as we have shown elsewhere.

CHAPTER XIV.

Of the seditious.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Intestine seditions dangerous. 2. Severe measures to be taken against the seditious. 3. Sovereign authority not to be rashly asserted. 4. Luxury and license great breeders of sedition. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Wonderful skill in quieting sedition. 6. Standards of conduct different in peace and in war. 7. Sedition to be appeased before the ring-leaders are punished. 8. How sedition may be repressed. |
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[1] How dangerous intestine dissensions are was neatly shown by the orator Menenius Agrippa, in the fable about the revolted limbs of the human body, which he addressed to the people who had seceded to the Sacred Mount. And Scillurus showed the same thing with his bundle of spears which he displayed to his eighty descendants for them to try to break. For it is sufficiently evident that not fewer armies have been ruined by their own strength through discord and sedition than have been overthrown by the enemy.

[2] Accordingly, the very sternest measures are always taken against the seditious and the movers of sedition, as being guilty of treason. And so Modestinus ruled that a man who had stirred up a fierce sedition among the troops, should be capitally punished, but that if the disaffection did not go farther than bluster and mild complaints, the punishment should be degradation. And Paulus' view was that the seditious should be hanged or thrown to the beasts or deported to an island, according to their rank.

By the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain, too, regard is to be had, in fixing punishment, to the quality of the offense and the rank of the offenders; and if the intent of their sedition was to neutralize an opportunity of striking some successful blow, they are to have their eyes plucked out and be cast into prison until the opportunity in question has gone by; while, if they are of the higher ranks, they are to be deemed prisoners and thereafter banished.

And, although Cæsar would overlook other offenses, he always punished sedition with marked severity; and at a time of civil disturbance and great public excitement he discharged a whole legion for sedition, and had the movers of the sedition beheaded. Shortly afterwards, however, he yielded to the entreaties of those whom he had discharged to be freed from ignominy, and he reinstated them and they turned out most valuable soldiers.

And when the troops kept threatening Cnæus Pompey that they would seize the money which he was carrying in his triumphal return home, and Servilius and Glaucias begged him to divide it up, so as to prevent sedition, he declared that he would forego his triumph and would rather die than give way to the audacity of the troops; so he addressed a scathing speech to the men and had the belaulled *fascēs* pointed towards them, so that the plundering might begin with them, and by this haughty act he reduced the troops to decorum.

[3] Generals should, however, take heed not to venture on any rash assertion of their sovereign prerogative (the whole essential force of which resides in the consent of those who submit to it), where there is any chance that the soldiers will not obey orders. This was the prudent advice given by the legates to Appius Claudius when he proposed to take very severe measures against the soldiers for having, out of spite towards him, basely retreated to the camp after he had led them out to battle.

Livy, bk. 2.

Further, the consul Gemitius discharged four thousand men and beheaded them in the forum because, with utter abandonment of all discipline, they had seized Rhegium which they were garrisoning, and he forbade the burial of their bodies and that any one should mourn for their death.

Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.
Livy, bk. 28.

[4] Yet in the prevention and restraint of military sedition a commander must show great discretion. In the first place he ought to realize that ease and leisure breed luxury and license, and that these in their turn foster more than anything else the development of designs of this kind among the troops, as Livy has convincingly shown in his history, where he says: "Capua, even then by no means favorable to military discipline, banished the remembrance of their country from the minds of the soldiers, which were debauched by the supply of pleasures of all kinds, and schemes were being formed in winter-quarters for taking away Capua from the Campanians by the same kind of wickedness as that by which they had taken it from its original possessors."

Bk. 7.

[5] Again, the skill displayed by the consul Caius Martius Rutilius, in foiling the conspiracy at Capua, is much to be praised. He was a man of ripe age and experience, and thought it the wisest proceeding to frustrate the violence of the soldiers by prolonging their hope of executing their project at whatever time they might choose; and so he spread the rumor that the troops were to pass the winter of the next year in the same towns. For they had been cantoned throughout the cities of Campania. The edge being thus taken off the eagerness of their projects, the mutiny was set at rest for the time being. And the consul, having led out his army to the summer campaign, determined, with admirable adroitness, whilst he had the Samnites quiet, to purge the army by discharging the turbulent characters, some on one pretext, some on another.

Livy, bk. 7.

[6] Now, the time is not always a fitting one to make hazardous assertions of sovereign authority. For, as Tacitus says, what in times of peace is dealt with by disciplinary vengeance, is endured, for caution's sake, in times of sword and mob. And, as Fabius Maximus used to say, different counsels and different lines of conduct are followed in the full ardor of war and in the tranquillity of peace, as we have elsewhere

Above, bk. 2, ch. 5.

shown. Hence, also, I think that when any serious sedition has arisen, all possible measures should be employed to appease it and that until that is done the movers ought not to be dealt with, for fear that otherwise the raging of the soldiery be rather irritated and kindled than soothed and extinguished.

That was the example which was set by Scipio at the time when a sedition broke out among his troops in his camp at Sucro in Spain. He sent seven military tribunes to them in order to calm the minds of the soldiers by their mild and soothing discourse, and then he drew them to Carthage by issuing a proclamation that they should come there to claim their pay. There he had the whole army surrounded, and after castigating the troops, who were numb with fear, in a powerful harangue, he had the leaders of the mutiny dragged into the midst of the assembly and bound naked to the stake and scourged and beheaded. There had been a divergence of opinion whether only the leaders of the mutiny should be visited with punishment or whether atonement should be exacted as for a defection rather than for a mutiny (it being of so dreadful a character as a precedent) by the punishment of a greater number. The more lenient view prevailed, that the punishment should fall where the guilt had originated.

Livy, bk. 28.

Annals, bk. 1.

[8] To this must be added the remark of Tacitus that it is a very serviceable thing for the preservation of soldiers' fidelity, at a time when sedition is feared, to spread the army out with long intervening gaps, lest the soldiers increase both their strength and their faults by union. And, further, seeing that ease is the great breeder of military sedition, it is expedient to break in on it with a war, after the fashion of Alexander. And Cæsar adopted a shrewd method in the civil war of binding his army to himself. For, he borrowed money from the military tribunes and the centurions, and then distributed it among the troops; hereby he attained two objects, for he secured the loyalty of the centurions by the pledge that he had thus given and he bought the affection of the troops with a bribe.

Cæsar, Civil war, bk. 1.

That, again, is memorable which the histories tell us about Hannibal. For, although he conducted a war for thirteen years on hostile soil and far from home and with varying fortune, and although his army was not homogeneous and made up of his own fellow-citizens, but was a mongrel assortment of all nationalities, who had no community of law or custom or speech, and differed in bearing and dress and arms, in rites

and religion (*sacra*) and almost in gods, yet he so bound them together by one bond that no sedition ever broke out among them or against their general, even when, as was often the case, there was a shortage of money and pay and supplies in hostile territory. We read the same thing about Viriatus, who for eight whole years, during which he was warring with the Romans, kept an army, composed of all races of mankind, free from sedition and in a most tractable disposition—a thing which indeed was impossible without a certain admirable virtue in the general. Livy, bk. 27. Appian, Span. war.

But Scipio, although in other respects a consummate commander, provided his men by his lenience with a handle for sedition, and Quintus Fabius Maximus used this to show that Scipio was born for the corruption of military discipline and that it was almost true to say that more was lost in Spain by the fault of Scipio through military sedition than in battle. So rooted in the natural disposition of some men is it to refuse to be offended rather than to pluck up sufficient courage to avenge offenses!

CHAPTER XV.

Of those who yield ground in battle, or surrender when beaten.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The general ought be more feared than the enemy. 2. He who begins a flight from battle, is capitally punished. 3. Severity conduces to success. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Those who surrender to the enemy have no right of postliminy. 5. He who simulates illness through fear of the enemy. |
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[1] The Lacedæmonian general Clearchus used to tell his army that they ought to fear their general more than they feared the enemy: he meant that those who shrank from a doubtful death in battle would find a sure punishment awaiting them if they deserted, his aim being that it should become an instinct with his soldiers either to conquer or die. And this necessity, indeed, is not infrequently turned into a virtue, as we have

Above, bk. 2, ch. 11. said elsewhere.

[2] And so it is provided in military law that the first to begin a flight from battle is capitally punished. And there is a similar royal enactment in Spain with regard to a nobleman who flees. By the canon law such a person is infamous; but the divine law requires that timid persons shall be ordered to return home, lest they infect others with their timidity. Appian Claudius, in the case of those who had yielded ground in the Volscian war, had one man drawn by lot out of every ten and executed. Antony did the same thing in the Parthian war.

In the consulship of Publius Cornelius Nasica and Decimus Junius those who had quitted the ranks were ordered to be flogged and then were publicly sold. And when Attilius Regulus was marching out of Samnium into Luceria, and the advance of his army was barred by the enemy, he stationed a cohort with orders to slay any fugitives just as if they were deserters. And the first thing that Camillus did after his appointment as dictator, during the war with Veii, was to punish by martial law those who had fled from Veii, panic-stricken, during the last-preceding battle; in this way he took away from his men any especial dread of the enemy. Titus Scaurus forbade his son to come into his sight, because of his retreat before the enemy in the Tridentine pass; and the shame of this ignominy so weighed on the young man that he committed suicide.

But Marcellus adopted a milder method with certain soldiers who had originated a retreat and had quitted the colors in panic; in the next

engagement he put them in the first rank, close-packed, so that by danger in other battles they might wipe out the ignominy they had incurred. Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7. The Roman Senate, however, by a stern decree reduced to a condition worse than death and banished into Sicily those who had abandoned their still-fighting comrades at Cannæ; and when Marcellus subsequently wrote for permission to employ their assistance in the storming of Syracuse, the Senate replied that they were unworthy to be received into the army and to have the State's interests intrusted to them, but that he might do what he judged expedient for the State, provided that none of them should have any privileges or receive any military reward or return to Italy so long as the enemy was in it.

And the same measures were taken with regard to those soldiers Livy, bk. 25. Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7. who had saved themselves when the prætor Cnæus Fulvius was so disgracefully beaten and put to flight in Apulia: and, over and above this ignominy, they were forbidden to spend the winter in a town or to build winter-quarters nearer than ten miles to any town; and Cnæus Fulvius was accused capitally and went into exile. When Scipio, however, went Livy, bk. 26. over into Africa, he did not spurn the survivors of the defeat at Cannæ, for he knew that that defeat was not due to their cowardice, but to the fault of their general, and that there were not in the Roman army any troops equally ripe and experienced, not only in various modes of fighting but also in storming towns.

[3] Further, many examples show us how greatly this severe discipline conduces to success. One such example is that of Licinius Crassus, Livy, bk. 29. when dealing with the gladiator Spartacus: this man was making war on the Romans with a large band of fugitives and men of his own condition and was flushed with a certain number of successes: so Licinius decimated his legions because of their poor behavior in the field and thus made them fear him more than they feared the enemy. Then he led his men anew into line of battle; and, although his army was much reduced in size by this decimation, he inflicted great slaughter on the enemy and won a decisive victory over Spartacus. In the same way, Appian, Civil war, bk. 1 (at end). when the troops of Lucius Apronius had been routed by Tacfarinas: Apronius, being more grieved at the disgrace of his own men than at the success of the enemy, did (says Tacitus) a thing which at that time was Annals, bk. 3. rare and a matter of ancient memory merely; i. e., he chose by lot one man out of every ten in the disgraced cohort and clubbed them to death; and this severity was so effectual that a company of veterans, not more than five hundred in number, routed the very same forces of Tacfarinas.

[4] The Romans, furthermore, reckoned it base and worthy of punishment not only to yield ground and flee, but also to fall by surrender into the hands of the enemy. And so Ulpian ruled that those who Dig. 49, 15, 19. surrender to the enemy with arms in their hands can not set up postliminy. And it is recorded that Titus Vespasianus maintained a discipline

so severe that he would not allow a certain soldier who, after capture by the enemy, had broken his chains and fled back to the camp, to continue in the service, and would not intrust arms to him because he had submitted to be taken alive by the enemy.

And when a large number of enslaved were voluntarily released and returned by Pyrrhus, the Senate, although the forces of the State were exceedingly reduced, decreed that those of them who had served in the horse should be joined to the foot and those who had been foot-soldiers should be enrolled in the auxiliary slingers and that none of them should come within the camp, or surround with a wall or a ditch the place assigned to them outside the camp, or have a tent made of skins; and he would only allow those to be reinstated in their former military condition who had won double spoils from the enemy.

Val. Max.,
bk. 2, ch. 7.

And the Senate displayed equal severity when Hannibal offered it the chance of ransoming eight thousand Romans who had surrendered to him when left in the camp after the defeat at Cannæ; for it spurned his terms and, in lieu of the captives, enlisted eight thousand slaves bought with the public funds. It preferred to have the latter as soldiers, although there was an opportunity of ransoming the captives at a lower cost, being mindful that so large a number of armed young men could not have been so disgracefully captured if they had been willing to die honorably. Now it was implanted in the Romans that they must either conquer or die. And it is recorded that when Hannibal heard of this incident, he was dismayed to find the Roman Senate and people of so lofty a soul in adversity.

Livy, bk. 22
Val. Max., bk. 2,
ch. 7.
Cic., Offic., bk. 3
Dig. 49, 1, 6, 5.

[5] Lastly, those also who feign sickness through fear of the enemy are ordered to be punished capitally. And Sallust relates a notable thing about the old Romans, namely: that in time of war they were more often accused of fighting with the enemy contrary to orders, because the recall came too late to prevent them going into battle, than of daring to quit the colors or to yield ground under compulsion.

CHAPTER XVI.

Of those who part with their arms or lose them.

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| 1. To lose arms in war, or to part with them,
a grave offense. | 2. Arms are not reacquired by postliminy.
3. The loss of shield or sword in battle. |
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[1] The ancients regarded arms as the limbs of a soldier, and so it was reckoned a grave crime to lose or part with them during war, and it was capitally punished. That crime is, indeed, put on a par with desertion, whether it be the whole outfit that is parted with or only a portion thereof—there being, however, this difference: a man who loses or parts with his leggings or cape is thrashed, but if it be his cuirass or sword or shield he is like a deserter, save that some allowance is made for a recruit. Dig. 49, 16, 3, 13.

[2] Hence it is that, as Marcellus ruled, arms are not reacquired by postliminy, because the loss of them is a disgrace. It is, accordingly, singular that by an ordinance of the Kingdom of Spain arms lost in war may be replaced out of any booty that may happen to be taken. The same constitution, however, brands nobles with infamy for this and deprives them of the prerogatives of their rank. And indeed the loss of arms in war has ever been held most disgraceful, and so when Marcus Cato, the son of the censor, was thrown during an engagement by a fall of his horse, and noticed, as he was gathering himself together again, that his sword had fallen out of its sheath, he so shrank from the ignominy thereof that he plunged into the thickest of the foe and after receiving several wounds recovered his sword and returned to his own men; and the enemy were so struck by this sight that on the following day they came as suppliants to beg for peace. Dig. 49, 16, 14.

The consul Lucius Calpurnius Piso, again, ordered his prefect of the horse, Caius Titius, who had surrendered to the enemy his arms and men when surrounded by a large number of fugitive slaves, to attend the parades in the general assembly (*principia*) during the whole time of his service, with the mantle of his toga torn in the lappets, with the girdle of his tunic undone, and with naked feet. And when Appius Claudius' force had been routed by the Volscians, he inveighed against it as a traitor to military discipline and a deserter of the colors, and demanded of the men one by one where the standards were and where their arms were, and he flogged and beheaded those soldiers who were without their arms and those standard-bearers who had lost their standards. Span. Ordin., bks. 4 and 5, tit. 25, par. 2.
Span. Ordin., last bk., tit. 21, par. 2.
Val. Max., bk. 3, ch. 2.
Justin, bk. 33.
Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7.
Livy, bk. 2.
Dion. Halic., bk. 9.

And the Lacedæmonians drove the poet Archilochus out of their city for writing a poem in which he seemed to suggest that the loss of arms was preferable to the loss of life. And the Spartan women used to bid their sons, when going out on a military expedition, either to return into their sight alive with their arms or with their arms to be brought back dead.

[3] Further, the Greeks had a military law that the soldier who lost his shield in battle should be punished capitally, but if it were his sword, he was to receive lighter punishment—the reason being that the generals of greatest reputation held it a more important point of discipline for a man to protect himself from the enemy and keep himself unhurt than for him to kill an enemy with hurt to himself. And that was the view of Scipio Æmilianus also, who said that he would rather save a fellow-citizen than undo many enemies. And so when Epaminondas lay dying, pierced by a spear, he asked first whether his shield was safe and then whether the enemy was utterly routed; and after he had obtained satisfying answers to both these questions, he died with heart at ease saying, “Now is your Epaminondas born, in that this is the manner of his death.”

Val. Max., bk. 3,
ch. 2.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of those who desert, or neglect, their watch.

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| 1. The duties of the watch to be diligently performed.
2. One who deserts the palace-watch to be capitally punished. | 3. The punishment of those who sleep at their posts.
4. If prisoners intrusted to the ward of soldiers escape. |
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Not the least important part of military discipline is the proper posting of guards and close attention to the duties of the watch. We read how neglect in these particulars has led to the slaughter and overthrow of many armies, to the capture of many camps, and to the occupation of many cities. It was in this way, at a time when he was buried in slumber and wine, that the son of Queen Thomyris was attacked by Cyrus, and perished with his whole army. And after the loss of the Scipios in Spain, Lucius Marcius operated with the residue of the forces against two camps of the Carthaginians and, finding them in a complete state of disorder and neglect due to their victory, he captured them in one night with slaughter of the enemy.

Justin, bk. 1.

Livy, bk. 25.

[1, 2] Those, then, who fail in their duty on night-watch, when the rest of the force is sleeping in reliance on their diligence, deserve punishment. And so Paulus held that the punishment for desertion of the palace-watch, was capital; and Modestinus said that one who abandoned a post was worse than a truant (*emansor*) and that his punishment, according to the degree of guilt, was flogging or loss of rank, while one who quitted his watch over a commander (*præses*) or any other officer was liable to be treated as a deserter. When the Gauls had slipped through up to the summit of the capitol, owing to the neglect of the watch (though they were ultimately aroused by favor of the geese), Publius Sulpitius, the military tribune, proclaimed that he would proceed by martial law against the guard at that place, whom the enemy in their climb had eluded; but he was frightened by the unanimous clamor of the soldiers, who threw the blame upon one member of the watch, and he took no measures against the rest, but with universal approval hurled the undoubtedly guilty party from the rock.

Dig. 49, 16, 10.

Dig. 49, 16: 3, 5 and 6.

Livy, bk. 5.

[3] And when Epaminondas was going his round of the watches and posts, he made an example, in the interests of discipline, of a soldier whom he found asleep, for he plunged his sword through him, declaring that he had left him the same as he had found him. And Augustus punished with death the men and officers of a company who had deserted

Plut., Apoph.

Span. Ordin., bk. 9,
tit. 18, par. 2.
On Roman camps.

their post. Further, by the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain, those who sleep at their posts are, after three warnings, thrown from the rock or the walls of the fortification where their watch happens to be placed. And Polybius tells us the principle upon which camp-watches were appointed among the Romans, and about the duty of those who went rounds of inspection of the watches, and what the punishment was of those who were negligent.

Livy, bk. 44.

Now Paulus Æmilius adopted a novel method for securing that the watches should strive more intently against sleeping, and that was to forbid them to take their shields with them on watch-duty, for this duty was quite distinct from fighting and did not involve the use of arms, but only of vigilance; so that directly they perceived the approach of the enemy they should retreat and rouse the rest to arms. And once when the Thebans made holiday and were all given up to wine and feasting, Epaminondas went round the city on foot, alone, and meanly-clad and full of thought; and, upon one of his friends expressing surprise and asking the reason, he replied, "In order that you all may drink and take your ease." And in the same way, once when Cambyses, the father of Cyrus, was asked about the best means of guarding a city, he shrewdly replied, "By the guards never thinking that they have taken sufficient measures of precaution against the enemy."

Plut., Apoph.

Dig. 48, 3, 12, 1.

[4] Now it is usual to intrust the custody of prisoners to soldiers: and, if they escape, the soldier is, according to the degree of guilt, chastised or put to an inferior service; but careful inquiry must be made whether the escape was due to the culpable negligence of the soldier or to accident. The Emperor Hadrian gave a rescript to this effect.

Dig. 48, 3, 12.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of him who loses, or surrenders to the enemy, a fortress or town which he has been appointed to defend.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. He who has failed to hold a fortress, guilty of treason. 2. In defense of a fortress, death not to be shunned. 3. Should the commander of a fortress be punished when it has been taken without any fault imputable to him? 4. In what circumstances a commander is not bound to defend a fortress. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. The commander of an ill-equipped fortress. 6. A fortress can hardly be given up to the enemy without incurring ignominy. 7. Whether the erection of a fortress is more help or hindrance to a State. 8. Foreigners ought not to have easy entrance to a fortress. |
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If slaves have to answer with their head to their masters for the safe-keeping of the house, alike from foes within and foes without, how much more must they to whom the custody of a fortress or a town is intrusted, seeing that in the protection of the public safety none ought to shun any danger or torture, or death itself! The very highest standard of diligence must, therefore, be satisfied in the safe-keeping of a fortress. Dig. 29, 5, 1, pr.

[1] And so failure to hold a fortress, or the surrender of a camp to the enemy, is punishable under the *Lex Julia* about treason. The consul Lucius Rupilius, accordingly, in the campaign which he conducted against the deserters in Sicily, ordered his son-in-law, Quintus Fabius, to quit the province for losing the fortress of Tauromenium by his negligence. And Caius Cotta had his kinsman Publius Aurelius Pecuniola (whom he had put in charge of the siege of Lipara, when he himself was going to Messina in order to take the auspices) flogged and put to the military duties of a common foot-soldier for having by his fault allowed the battering-mound to be burnt and the camp to be all but taken. And when his battering-mound was burnt by the enemy, Marcus Antonius decimated two of the cohorts that had been engaged in that work, and punished the decurions individually, and dismissed the legate with ignominy, and had the rest of the legion given rations of barley. By inference from Dig. 1, 15, 3, 3.
Dig. 48, 4, 2.
Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7.
Val. Max., bk. 2, ch. 7.

Titus Turpilius Syllanus, the prefect of the town of Vacca, was called on by Metellus to explain why one of his soldiers had escaped when all the soldiers of the garrison were cut down by fraud, and because he could not clear himself he was condemned and flogged and punished capitally. The dictator Quintus Cincinnatus, after conquering the Æquians and sending them under the yoke, made Lucius Minutius, whom he had relieved when besieged by the enemy, resign the consul- Appian, Parthian war.
Sallust, Jugurthine war.

ship, distributing the booty of all kinds among his own troops only; for he held that man unworthy of exalted command who owed his safety not to his own valor, but to a ditch and a wall, and who had not been ashamed to allow the arms of Rome to be confined within closed doors

Livy, bk. 3. by timid apprehensiveness.

Further, Alexander of Macedon punished with a fine a certain commandant of a fort for deserting his post; and after the Mamertines had accepted a Roman garrison and the Carthaginian garrison had been driven out by fighting, the Carthaginians crucified the commander of their garrison for his timidity and cowardice in losing that fortress. And that was an exceedingly fine remark of Alexander's which he made on hearing that Aornus, a rock in India, was naturally impregnable, but was held by a timorous man: "He makes," said Alexander, "the place quite easy of capture." And a certain Lacedæmonian noble made a fine reply when Philip threatened to decree (*prohibiturum*) punishment on him if the city was not handed over to him: "And will you decree (*prohibere*), too, that I am not to die for my country?"

Polyb., Hist., bk. 1.

Plut., Apoph.

And the reply made by Lucius Pinarius, who commanded the garrison in the fortress at Ænna in Sicily, was brave and wise. The leading men of Ænna had arranged with Himilco for betrayal of the garrison, but no opportunity for the treachery presented itself, so they publicly put it about that the town and fortress ought to be under their control and urged that the keys of the gates should be handed to them, because (said they) it was as freemen going into partnership that they had been given to the Romans and not as slaves going into custody. Then Pinarius made the reply that he had been placed in the command of the garrison by his general, and had received from him the keys of the gates and the ward of the fortress, which depended not on his discretion nor on that of the citizens of Ænna, but on the discretion of him who created the trust; that it was a capital offense among the Romans to quit one's post and that parents had sanctioned that law by the death even of their own children; that the consul Marcellus was not far off, and so they could send ambassadors to him who possessed the right and liberty of deciding. But the men of Ænna said they certainly would not send to him and solemnly declared that, as they could not obtain their object by argument, they would seek some means of asserting their liberty. Pinarius, upon this, asked that they would at least grant him an assembly of the people, so that it might be known whether the denunciations came from a few or from the whole State. And by their consent an assembly of the people was proclaimed for the next day. There all with one accord required him to surrender the keys, and when he lingered and put the matter off they passed on to fierce threats; whereon, as he could avail nothing, the prefect gave the soldiery the agreed-on signal with his gown and they rushed on the people of Ænna and put them, pitifully,

to the sword. By this act Ænna was retained. Marcellus did not reprobate it, but granted the spoil of the town to the soldiers, concluding that the Sicilians, deterred by this example, would refrain from betraying their garrisons.

Livy, bk. 24.

[2] And what has just been narrated agrees with the royal enactments of the Kingdom of Spain, whereby it is provided that no form of death should be shunned in the defense of a fortress, the safety of which calls for firm action from every one, even against a father or a son or a former master, and that no one ought to put death or any form of danger, which are but transitory, on the same plane as infamy, which brands a man who has paltered with his honor, him and his posterity forever. And indeed if the needs of hunger prove so imperious, a man ought rather to eat his son than surrender a fortress to the enemy without his lord's orders. And it is no ground of excuse for the surrender of a fortress that the enemy threaten death to his wife or children or any other persons; for the safety of the State ought to be preferred to love of children. And so Alfonso Perez Guzman, after Tarifa had been besieged for a fortnight and the enemy, being foiled in all their attempts were threatening to kill his son who was in their hands, made answer that he had begotten his son for the service of his country, and no immortal one either, and that he would rather be bereaved of him, should fate so decree, than quit his post or break his faith, for the one thing might happen even with glory to him, while the other thing could not happen without disgrace and crime; and so he allowed his son to be nefariously slain by the enemy before his eyes. And indeed the Spaniards were such severe censors of this kind of discipline that by one of their constitutions a commander of a fortress was none the less guilty of treason if the surrender of the fortress to the enemy was made by a deputy whom he had for good reason put in his place.

Span. Ordin., bk. 12, tit. 18, par. 2.

Span. Ordin., bk. 7, tit. 17, par. 2 and Cod. 4, 43, 1 and 2.

Span. Ordin., bks. 6 and 12, tit. 18, par. 2, and bk. 2, tit. 2, par. 7.

Span. Ordin., bks. 1 and 6, tit. 28, par. 2.

Cod. 9, 47, 22 and c. 23, Reg. jur. in vi.

Dig. 48, 3, 12.

Livy, bk. 27.

[3] Further, seeing that it is inconsistent with justice to punish a man without fault and that a man who is free from fault ought to be free from punishment too, equity requires that if absolutely no fault or negligence can be imputed to the commander of a fortress which has chanced to be captured by, or surrendered to, the enemy, the commander ought to be exempt from punishment. And that this was considered reasonable by those of olden time is shown by the dispute relative to Marcus Livius, the commander of the fortress of Tarentum. Some blamed the commander, alleging that Tarentum had been surrendered to the enemy through his laxity; others commended him for having kept the fortress safe for five years and above all for having recaptured Tarentum by his own sole exploit; while a middle party declared that the decision rested with the censors and not with the Senate.

And when Lucius Attilius, commander of the garrison at Locris, suffered himself and the Roman soldiers with him to be conveyed to

Rhegium, in order to snatch them from the enemy's cruelty and preserve them for the State, because he saw that he could not prevent the citizens from surrendering their town to the Carthaginians, this was not imputed to him as a fault. Accordingly, if a man under compulsion of necessity (which, as Livy somewhere says, not even the gods can overcome) and in the utter absence of human aid, surrenders a fortress to the enemy, I hold that he does not deserve punishment; for to do one's best is to do all the law requires, and a vassal only owes fealty to his suzerain within the limits of what is possible, there being no legal obligation to perform the impossible.

Livy, bk. 24.

Feudal Laws, bk. 1, tit. 1, last ch., and thereon Alvar. and other glossators, and Baldus on beginning of said tit.

Hence Egnazio tells us that those who were driven by necessity to surrender the fortress of Scutari to the Turks who were besieging it, received no upbraidings on their return to Venice; for the Senate knew what the force of necessity is and that no valor can stand up against it.

De exempl. illustr. vir., bk. 7, ch. 6.

[4] Hence it is a common doctrine that an ungarrisoned city is quit of the charge of treason should it be surrendered to the enemy, especially if no relief is sent, and that a commander of a fortress is not bound to defend it if the King fails to supply the things that are necessary for its defense. It is on this ground that a vassal is not bound to do his services to his lord, or to recognize him, if he abandons the vassal in time of need, and Charles Dumoulin records that the ancient kings of Gaul allowed towns which they could not defend to surrender to the enemy.

Matth. de Afflic. on the royal constitution which begins, Dubitationem.

Heiron. Grat., cons. 5 and 51, bk 1.

Feudal Laws, bk. ii, tit. 26, c. 1, qual. dom. etiam propr. and thereon Alvar. and others on c. 1, § Domino committente, and thereon Baldus and others.

Joan. Imol., cons. 34. Decius, cons. 600, nu. 18. Panorm. cons. 3, nu. 5, bk. 1.

In addit., Dec. cons. 604.

I hold, accordingly, that if a fortress should be ill-equipped and its commander be without any human aid or hope of relief and can not withstand the force of the enemy, he may provide for the safety of himself and his men by bargain or in any other way and may abandon the fortress, especially when every expedient has been resorted to in vain and it is clear that the fortress would have fallen into the power of the enemy in any case; for there is no obligation to await that which would do no good if it did happen. That is why a man who is remiss (*in mora*) in performing his contract to deliver some specific thing is not liable on a destruction of the thing in question which would have happened just the same if the thing had been in the hands of the other party. A commander of a fortress, accordingly, is not bound to offer himself and his garrison to absolutely certain death, to the hurt rather than to the profit of the State.

[1. stipulatio, § divus. Dig. (?).]

Dig. 16, 3, 14; and 5, 3, 40; and 12, 1, 5 and the commentators thereon.

And so Callicratides, the Spartan general, incurred well-merited blame for preferring to risk his fleet rather than his own reputation; and so, too, did Cleombrotus, who, through fear of falling into disfavor, rashly engaged with Epaminondas and ruined the force of Sparta. For a great man, as Quintus Curtius says, ought rather to scorn death than hate life, and Cicero teaches that we ought to die for our country whenever our death will benefit it. We must accordingly do what is best for

Cic., Offic., bk. 1.

Offic., bk. 1.

our State and country in all possible ways, whether by surrender or by death, should the occasion arise; for a brave man must consider in all his acts the interests of his country and not his own, as we have shown elsewhere.

Above, bk. 2, ch. 1.

[5] Add to the foregoing that by the constitutions of the Kingdom of Spain, which in other respects are not wanting in severity, he who has been intrusted by the King with the command of a fortress which is so badly built and ill-equipped that it can not be defended, and who has represented this to the King, is not guilty of treason, should the enemy gain the fortress by force and without the commander's fault. And, on this principle, under a rule contained in the same constitutions, when a commander of a fortress is unwilling to undertake its defense himself, he is allowed to abandon it, after furnishing reasons why the defense is impossible, and this, too, without waiting for the enemy's attack, if the King should not have despatched a successor. But, for this to be so, no one ought to undertake the command of a fortress or town save with much deliberation; and he ought so to arrange that if any reverse occurs and he is absolutely driven to surrender, this may not seem to be due to the fear of death so much as to the wish to preserve himself and his men for the service of the State and at all events to snatch a portion of the State's defenses out of a fortress which was about to belong entirely to the enemy.

Span. Ordin., bks. 4 and 6, tit. 18, par. 2.

Span. Ordin., bk. 20, tit. 18, par. 2.

[6] Although, however, the commander may be but discharging the duty of an intrepid man, it is barely possible for him to surrender his fortress without ignominy. For if, as we have shown above, the ancients held it a disgrace for a single soldier to fall into the enemy's hands, what shall we say in the case of a commander who has been commissioned to defend the fortress and has bound himself by an oath so to do? Nevertheless, as we have said elsewhere, he must incur even this ignominy, if it serve the interests of the State, rather than desert and betray his country by a futile defense and the dedication of himself and his men to death. Now the functions of a commander are one thing, those of a soldier another. The latter has to fight with bravery and the former to safeguard the interests of the State.

Above, bk. 3, ch. 15.

Above, bk. 2, ch. 1.

[7] Further, there was once no small discussion among writers on politics, whether the erection of fortresses did more good or harm to the State; and, although it was a prevalent view that a fortress was a useless and hazardous thing in the ideal State, still Rome was recovered, after its capture by the Gauls, by the garrison of the capitol; and the town of Ænna, mentioned above, was saved by means of its fortress and garrison.

[8] I hold, then, that there are many cases in which the erection of a fortress is expedient or even necessary, alike for withstanding an enemy's attack and for the preservation of the citizens in time of peace. For the rest, I would have commanders of fortresses enjoined to be chary

in allowing foreigners, especially men of strength and leading, access into the fortress, and to be mindful of the advice given by Pyrrhus, King of Epirus. For, when visiting Athens, Pyrrhus was shown over the citadel of Pallas, which was highly fortified by nature and art, and he viewed it with great appreciation and then he urged the prominent citizens who were in attendance on him never in the future to allow any king facilities for entering that citadel, for fear that some one might seize the opportunity of introducing an escort and might attack it; and this advice commended itself to the Athenians.

CHAPTER XIX.

Of theft and certain other military offenses.

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|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Punishment of soldiers caught thieving. 2. The nature of the oath which tribunes usually exact. 3. It is against the regulations to go out of trumpet-range. 4. A capital offense to strike a comrade with a sword. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. A serious offense for a disqualified person to enlist. 6. The punishment of a non-soldier who poses as a soldier. 7. The punishment of a non-citizen who poses as a citizen. |
|---|---|

[1] The sole reason, according to Plato in his *Republic*, why man, in the fiction of the poets, was changed into a wolf is that those who have given themselves up to plunder and theft seem to have simply put off the man and the qualities of manhood and to be now men in name only and not in reality; they must, accordingly, be repressed by severe punishments. And, although the civil law does not impose corporal punishment on civilians for theft, yet commanders, for the better establishing of military discipline, generally impose somewhat severe penalties on soldiers taken in theft. And so Tiberius had a soldier of the prætorian guard executed for stealing a peacock out of his grounds. Aufidius Cassius crucified soldiers who offered violence or caused loss to provincials, and there are numerous examples recorded of ancient commanders doing the same thing. But the jurisconsult Paulus ruled that a soldier found thieving in the baths ought to be discharged with ignominy.

Suetonius on
Tiberius.

Dig. 47, 17, 3.

[2, 3] Now it is usual for tribunes, on pitching a camp, to exact from all in it, whether free or slave, an oath that they will not steal anything from the camp and that, if they find anything, they will bring it to the tribunes. The formula of this oath is given by Gellius. And, for preventing the troops from looting, they are not allowed to go out of trumpet-range, except by the orders of the general or tribune, or to go outside the fortifications or quit the ranks. We have dealt with this elsewhere.

Polyb. on Roman
Camps.
Bk. 19, ch. 4.

Above, bk. 3, ch. 11.

[4] Marcus Cato held that those found thieving from their comrades should lose their right hands. Modestinus ruled that one who surreptitiously took another soldier's arms should be degraded from the service. And in olden days great pains were taken to develop the idea of affectionate comradeship as the most effectual link between soldier and soldier, and as a kind of indissoluble bond. Hence it was a capital offense to strike a comrade with a sword, and one who even wounded another with a stone had to leave the service. Again, a soldier so careless

Dig. 49, 16, 3, 14.

Dig. 49, 16, 6, 6.

of his honor as to compound for a money-payment with the avowterer

Dig. 48, 5, 12. of his wife is discharged from his oath and deported.

[5, 6, 7] It is also reckoned a serious offense for a disqualified person to enlist, and it becomes more heinous, as in the case of other offenses;

Dig. 49, 16, 2. the higher the dignity, rank, and distinction in the service. The penalty

Dig. 48, 10, 27, 2. of fraud attaches, too, to a non-soldier who poses as a soldier; and similar in character is the law introduced by the consuls Crassus and Scævola

Cic., Offic. bk. 3. forbidding a non-citizen to pose as a citizen—such a person was said to

Sueton. on Claudius. be accused of peregrinity. Now the penalty for fraud is deportation

Dig. 48, 10, 1. and public sale of property.

CHAPTER XX.

Of soldiers' rewards.

- | | |
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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The bestowal of punishments and rewards the best means of governing a State. 2. Soldiers to be incited by the offer of rewards. 3. Many rewards open to the soldier. 4. <i>Spolia opima</i>, what they were. 5. When a triumph may be decreed. 6. How long the Romans kept up the custom of the triumph. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Roman generals took names from the provinces and towns which they had subdued. 8. Military gifts were of divers sorts. 9. Military crowns, what they were. 10. A reward having been offered to the first to scale a wall, several scale it at the same time. 11. The rewards owed to dead parents given to their children. |
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[1] There is no better method of governing a State than the bestowal of punishments and rewards: this is approved by numerous opinions of philosophers. Thus Solon, one of the seven wise men and the only legislator among them, said that the stability of a State depends on it. And Democritus held that there were just two gods, Punishment and Reward. And when Lysander was asked what form of State he most favored, he replied, "That in which the brave and the cowardly get their respective deserts." When Theophrastus was asked what was the best protection of human life, he said, "Rewards and punishments." And Cicero asserts that neither a household nor a State can stand without any rewards for good deeds and punishments for bad ones. And no one, the same writer says, incurs dangers on the State's behalf in a laudable and valorous way, but his motive is the hope of reward from posterity. And where, said Thucydides, the greatest rewards of good conduct are offered, there the best men govern; for when good conduct receives the richest rewards, all strive for them with the best intent towards the State.

Pliny wrote, addressing Trajan, "The rewards of goodness and badness make the good and the bad; and the pleasure always felt by the deserving at being rewarded, reacts on others like them as much as on themselves." And labor, says Livy, will be bestowed and danger run in a quarter whence emolument and honor may be hoped for, and there is nothing that men will not undertake if rewards be offered proportionate to the arduous nature of the task, and high honors breed high courage. And so Socrates said that that was the best State in which there were the greatest inducements to virtue. Hence Demosthenes spoke as follows:

"Men of Athens, you ought to devote great zeal and attention to secure that all your laws shall be of the most excellent character and that this shall especially be the case with those which can increase or impair

Plut., Apoph.

Nature of the gods,
bk. 3.

Speech for Rabirius.

Panegyrica.

Bk. 4.

Against Leptines.

[2] Accordingly, just as military discipline needs sharpness in its punishments, so also there should be rewards to incite soldiers to valor. And herein a mistake is commonly made, in that (as Tacitus said) it is easier to requite an injury than a kindness, for gratitude is reckoned a burden and revenge a gain and many States are ruined, as Euripides says in his *Hecuba*, by the good and strenuous man receiving no greater reward than the slothful. Now Cyrus held in the highest esteem those who excelled in the military virtues, bestowing many honors on them.

Livy, bk. 1.

Livy, bk. 4.

Val. Max.,
bk. 3, ch. 2.

[5] In addition, commanders-in-chief were accorded triumphs for success in war, and this was the greatest prize of victory. Not every victory entitled to a triumph, but only when the character of the war and the victory seemed to justify that distinction; for it was provided by law that no one should celebrate a triumph unless he had slain five thousand of the enemy in one battle and had routed great forces in a pitched battle, and punishment awaited that general who made a false return to the Senate of the number of the enemy killed in a battle or of the number of citizens lost in it; for a triumph was not allowed to a man who had won an over-sanguinary battle with great loss, that being a sad and meager gain, bringing to the State many funerals and little advantage. It was also enacted that a triumph should not be decreed except for an enlarge-

ment of dominion and not for regaining what had been previously lost in the war. And a further condition was that the general should have overthrown and conquered the enemy under his own leadership and management, and in his own and not another's province, and in such a way as to pacify it and leave no trace of war behind him.

Again, if the war was against privates or slaves or fugitives, or any other class of men unworthy of the Roman name, it was exactly as if the cause of the war was a shameful one; and, despite the victory that was won and the rout and overthrow of the enemy, no triumph could be celebrated. Further, even though the enemy had been defeated and put to flight, and exploits worthy of a triumph had been performed, it was considered impious to celebrate a triumph if neither consul nor prætor had commanded the army and the conquest and scattering of the enemy had not been achieved under the leadership and command of the proper magistrate. And if there had been two commanders, both magistrates, a triumph was granted only to the one of higher rank, lest the glory of the triumph should put the lower and the higher authority on an equal footing and the auspices which pertained to the higher magistracy should be brought into confused relations with the lower; a consul, accordingly, did not triumph side by side with a dictator or a prætor. But some of the cases where a Roman general was not allowed to celebrate a triumph were cases for a lesser triumph, or ovation.

Further, it was immaterial what glorious exploits and distinguished services had been performed or rendered to the State in a civil war, the commander derived no name therefrom, nor were any public thanksgivings decreed, nor any entrance into the city with ovation or triumph; because, however necessary victories of that kind might be, they were always deemed lamentable, as being won at the expense of home blood, not foreign. It is also clear that a Roman citizen when conquered in war could not be led in triumph, no matter how harmful and hostile he had been to the State.

[6] Now the custom of celebrating a triumph over conquered nations who had been beaten in war survived at Rome up to the time of the Emperor Probus, who is said to have been the last of the Cæsars to celebrate a triumph. Many details about the law of triumphs and about the apparatus and ceremony of a Roman triumph may be found in *Valerius Maximus* and *Alexander ab Alexandro*.

Bk. 2, ch. 8.

[7] Roman generals were also wont to derive a surname by way of honor, from the towns and provinces which they had subdued by force. Thus, of the three Metelli, one took the cognomen Numidicus, from his conquest of Numidia; another Macedonicus from Macedonia, and the third Creticus from Crete; and there was also a Metellus Bale-
aricus, so called because of his victory over the Baleares. And Martius Coriolanus was so called from the Volscian town of Corioli; and the two

Genial. dies, bk. 1,
ch. 2 and bk. 6,
chs. 6 and 17.

Scipios, the elder and the younger, both took the surname Africanus from Africa; and another Scipio took that of Asiaticus from Asia. In the same way with a large number of others, whose examples the Cæsars subsequently followed, bearing illustrious surnames derived from races and nations whom they had overthrown in war, to their immortal glory: and they often took surnames under a popular decree and occasionally by an acclamation of the Senate—whence the diverse titles of Arabicus, Adiabenicus, Parthicus, Armenicus, Germanicus, Sarmaticus, and Africus.

Alex. ab. Alex.,
Genial. dies, bk. 2,
ch. 11.

[8] Moreover, there were diverse kinds of military gifts which in earlier times were given by generals to soldiers for valor in the field: and among the other prizes of the military profession the following were held specially honorable. There was the gift of the land won by their blood and sweat made to time-expired soldiers after the toils they had undergone; this they received as a most welcome return for labors and dangers, a sort of first-rate booty. Again, for the greater incitement of their courage towards the glories of military service by bringing their valor into greater honor and publicity, there was invented the reward of military crowns and other very signal tokens of honor, such as golden chains and double rations; and sometimes generals granted furlough or double pay as a reward of valor.

As appears from
Dig. 6, 1, 15, 2
and 41, 1, 16.

And there were several cases where persons who had rendered distinguished services in war and who had found their private concerns in an embarrassed and ruinous condition received gifts and gratuities. Thus we read that Lucius Sicinius Dentatus, a man of distinguished parts and performance, was presented, for his military exploits, in addition to eight golden crowns and fourteen civic wreaths and three mural wreaths and one obsidional wreath, with one hundred and eighty-three neck-chains, one hundred and forty armlets, eighteen unstained spears, and twenty-five medals. Manlius Torquatus was not far short of this: for he brought back the arms of about thirty slain enemies and received about forty rewards from generals, including two noble mural wreaths and eight civic wreaths. No one, however, who had performed any exploit went away unrewarded with military gifts, in proportion to his merits and valor.

Val. Max.,
bk. 3, ch. 2.

Livy, bk. 6.

[9] There were, it may be added, many varieties of military wreath: the triumphal, the ovational, the obsidional, the civic, the mural, the naval, the castrensic—wherewith generals and others were presented for raising the siege of a town or camp or army, or for saving the life of a fellow-citizen, or for being the first to scale an enemy's walls.

Gell., Noct. Attic.,
bk. 5, ch. 6.

[10] Now, suppose a reward is offered to the first to scale an enemy's wall, and two or more scale it at the same moment, it is often discussed whether the reward be due to all or to none: and the prevalent opinion is that it is due to none, for each bars the way of the other and

Dig. 34, 5, 10.

Dig. 28, 5, 44. is a hindrance to him; and where all are equal there can not be a victory. Dig. 45, 2, 13.

Now, this is sound if the general has clearly meant to give the reward to one only, as if the offered reward was such and such a horse, for this kind of offer does not admit of multiplication; but otherwise I think the prize is due to all. For, as Africanus held, "first" does not only mean being in front of everybody, but not having anybody in front of you.

And Paulus says, "*proximus*" means one with no one in front of him. Dig. 28, 6, 34.

The same holds good where there is a doubt who was the first to scale the wall.

By inference from
Dig. 28, 5, 44.

Dig. 50, 16, 92.

By inference from
Dig. 34, 5, 9 pr. and
10 (1).

And Scipio followed that opinion after the capture of Nova Carthago, for at that time a great strife, almost amounting to sedition, occurred between Quintus Tiberilius, a centurion of the fourth legion, and Sextus Digitius, a naval auxiliary, each one insisting that he was the first to scale the wall and that the honor of the mural wreath belonged to him; so Scipio ordered a general assembly and declared himself satisfied that Quintus Tiberilius and Sextus Digitius were absolutely equal in scaling the wall and that he would give both a mural wreath for valor.

Livy, bk. 26.

But Augustus was readier to give medals, neck-chains, and other gold ornaments as rewards than mural, or camp, or civic wreaths.

[11] The constitutions of Spain, also, provide numerous rewards for bravery in the field and declare these rewards to be due to the children if the parents who won them be dead; and this was ruled long ago by Pisistratus. And at Athens a law of Solon enacted that, over and above these gifts granted to soldiers by generals, the children of those who perished in war should be nurtured and well educated at the public cost. And Constantine declared that the sons should be summoned to the military profession of their father.

Span. Ordin., bk. 5,
tit. 27, par. 2.

Cod. 12, 47: 1 and 2.

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
*The translator estimates that there are 704 direct citations of the *Digest*, 228 of the *Code* and 15 of the *Novels* and *Authenticæ*.

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